UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCES

Regional Master's Programme in Peace Studies

MASTER'S THESIS

Compatibility of Main Western Theoretical Approaches to Nations and
Nationalism

Academic supervisor: Student:
Professor Radmila Nakarada   Miloš Vukelić
                                                            Index Number: 24/2015

Belgrade, 2017

Content:

Introduction

When the European migrant crisis was at its peak in the autumn of 2015, some questions and claims that used to be considered outdated, irrelevant and retrograde struck the continent with the unprecedented strength in the 21st century. Throughout Europe, a voice could be heard that the idea of multiculturalism is dead. Muslim refugees and migrants started to be perceived as invaders by a part of European public, not because of the sheer number of people who entered the "Old World", but because of their different cultures, systems of beliefs and everyday life practices. In political environments, right-wing parties and governments advocated for the return of "culturalism" to reality, claiming that opposed ways of life cannot coexist within a political unit and that the established cultural patterns should be defended by all means.

In some countries, the governments were the ones that promoted "culturalism" (Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia, Poland), and elsewhere were marginal or larger, but still oppositional political parties who did the same (France, the Netherlands, UK, Sweden, Austria...). However, even such a difference was enough for many to revive the old dichotomies and stereotypes about Eastern backwardness, ethnicism and exclusiveness as opposed to Western progressiveness, civilness and inclusion. Whether the fury and accusations were directed towards the non-Europeans or Europeans, the political landscape in the continent was again permeated by cultural issues rather than the "sterile" and bureaucratic ones regarding the European Union's norms, regulations and decisions. At the end of the cultural line of political defence was the nation. Either it was 'Front National' defending the Frenchness, 'UKIP' defending the Britishness or 'Jobik' and 'Fidesz' defending Magyarness. There were numerous enemies of the nation, starting from other nations and religions, over globalisation, trans-national corporations, international financial institutions and so on.

As the new/old dichotomies are already permeating European societies, the need to understand what constitutes the nation occurred. What is really Magyarness or Frenchness? It is a question to which many provide essentialist answers as if those were perennial and unchanging phenomena. In doing so, higher theoretical authorities are often called upon. On the one hand, the right side of the political spectrum tends to derive their understanding either from perennialism as an approach to nationalism, which explains that the nation is nothing new, but exists for millenniums, or from the ethno-symbolist approach, which is more prone to emphasizing that the nation is largely a cultural phenomenon, besides that it is also a modern, political one. On the other hand, the left side of the political spectrum diminishes the importance of the cultural, psychological and historical aspects within a nation, emphasizing

the nation's 'artificiality' and novelty, thus, claiming nation is but a temporary obstacle towards a new, global reality. Theoretical authority in this case is often derived from the modernist school of thought in the theory of nationalism.

The initial idea for this master thesis was to explore the relations of Serbian and Croatian nationalisms in the new European context. However, the essentialist, binary theoretical views (at least at first glance) on what the nation and nationalism is, decided in which way should the actual research develop. Having in mind that I am a student of peace studies, the theoretical framework offered to me denied the possibility to perceive the knowledge and the world in dichotomies and in essentialist ways. Therefore, an inspiration was found in Johan Galtung's view on contradictions. In his opinion, there is much more useful and more ethical category through which one can explain the world. It is the yin/yang opposition. "The yin/yang opposition or contradiction is endowed with much more life. Yin and yang are each other's opposites, but in the sense of complementarity, of being each other, not in the sense of one winning over the other. One balancing the other, not one prevailing over the other."[1]

Such a view on complementarity propelled the idea to overcome the usages of only one approach to nations and nationalism, and to possibly offer a perspective which would argue that the two interrelated phenomena can be best understood only when the main theories are cumulatively applied. The motivation for some sort of a scientific comprehension and contribution was even greater due to the fact that the potential object of analysis can be of a crucial importance in the upcoming development of political reality. Hence, I decided to analyse the most relevant writings in the study of nations and nationalism. As an addition, some basic research methods such as synthesis, abstraction, generalization, induction and deduction were used.

What was initially discovered is that nations and nationalism have both been subjects of the utmost political importance throughout the 19th and 20th century. Yet, they had not appeared as topics of special scientific interest until the dawn of the World War II. During the last seventy years, an ever-increasing number of academics have given their contributions to the deconstruction of these concepts. Starting from the work of Hans Kohn in the 40s (*The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*), Ellie Kedourie's *Nationalism* and Frederik Barth's *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* in the 60's, the list of the subfield founding

---

[1] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, PRIO and SAGE Publications, London, 1996, p. 16

fathers was completed with the works of Ernest Gellner (*Nations and Natonalism),* Benedict Anderson (*Imagined Communities*) and Anthony D. Smyth (*The Ethnic Origins of Nations*) in the 80s, together with Eric Hobsbawm (*Nations and Nationalism since 1790*) in 1990. Each of these authors had a decisive impact on further scientific study of nationalism by illuminating new ways of thinking about what the nation was, what it is and what it might become.

Therefore, we can say that the differentiation has been made between: those who belong to the school of thought which claims that the nation is a perennial cultural and political phenomenon with its roots in antiquity and continuity over time (perennialists Hugh Seton-Watson, John Anderson..); those who are certain that the nation is exclusively modern phenomenon and product of capitalism (modernists Ellie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm…); those who combine the two and argue that the nation is modern but with its cultural predecessors in antiquity (ethno-symbolist Anthony D. Smith) and so on.

However, the fact that something tends to be usual but not universal, leads us to the first problem that one may face if sets upon a journey of studying the nation and nationalism. The authors in the subfield are prone to have different perspectives about what makes the essence of an author's theoretical work, thus, to which approach does an author belong. For example, Frederik Barth is perceived from an anthropological perspective as a perennialist by Abner Kohen, because the former believes that it is in the human nature to strive for the belonging to a cultural unit, and that it has always been like that. On the other hand, Barth is placed within the realm of modernists by others, because he believes that the nation is a modern phenomenon, which is truly the main argument made by the advocates of this approach. Finally, there are some authors (e.g. Jovo Bakić) who believe that Barth is the founding father of a completely new approach which should be called *interactionism*, for its essence, which stems from social anthropology, ressembles no other theory.

The lists of approaches often differ from one scholar to another, depending on the particular standpoints of the authors who assemble them. That is either because of the use of divergent criteria or because of the dispute what the criteria should entail.

A variety of approaches have also emerged due to the fact that Gellner, Smith, Barth, Anderson and others do not come from the same scientific discipline. Philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, psychologists and political scientists all have dissimilar starting research points at lay emphasis on different issues. A social anthropologist would often start from the quest of finding universality in the human group behaviour. A sociologist would seek

for the constant structures and functions that shape societal and individual behaviour. A historian often tends to recreate constants in cultures and identities. This disciplinary difference is crucial point for the understanding of the second scientific aim of this thesis, which strives to provide an answer to the question whether different approaches are mutually compatible in a sense that the findings of one do not deny the findings of another. We find that the outcomes of the question raised above, are at the core of this work and thus, may compete for the status of a specific scientific contribution to the subfield.

In order to provide a satisfying solution to the detected problems, we faced several difficulties and limitations. First of all, the literature on nations and nationalism has developed enormously in the last 25 years. Therefore, it was quite a challenge to separate the most relevant works. The criteria that we used in this case was 'influence', by separating the highly quoted authors from the rest. Secondly, the studied literature and their authors all stem from the Western school of taught. Therefore, contribution to the subfield that stem from other academic surroundings are not taken into account, mostly because there are no visible traces of such works in the mainstream literature or because the author is not aware of the similar cases. Additionally, it might be an impossible task to cover all the influential authors from the field, which is one more reason to restrict ourselves within the highly influential Western paradigms. Thirdly, as in every theory, it is hard to avoid ideal-types when analysing any phenomenon. Hence, the solutions offered here should be viewed only as referent points for the real world. Finally, the most obvious value of this work is limited to its purpose - and that is a master thesis. The author himself finds that it should be at least a proof that he is capable of thinking, analysing, evaluating and describing phenomena in a rational, coherent and scientific manner.

In accordance with the set aims of the work, we define the general hypothesis as next: The main approaches to the concept of the nation and nationalism are theoretically compatible, meaning that the essential theoretical findings in each are not mutually exclusive. We also propose a way in which the main Western approaches may be compatible, through specific hypotheses. The first one is that modernists have given us the most comprehensive sociological macro perspective on the logic of the nation and nationalism within the wider set of social structures and functions of the 19th and 20th century. The second is that interactionists provided us with a convincing anthropological insight that nations and nationalism are products of both human's universal tendency towards the creation of boundaries of "our" group and tendency of using group sentiments and symbols as political resources. Finally, ethno-symbolism explains cultural, historical, psychological and political strengths of nations and nationalisms,

but at the same time their philosophical weaknesses, showing that the latter and the former are not mutually exclusive.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The idea is that each of the first four presents a piece of the jigsaw which is assembled in the final, fifth chapter. In **the first chapter**, several classifications of theories on nation and nationalism are provided, with the author's conclusion regarding the question - which classification he finds the most appropriate for the development of his research. **The second chapter** discusses arguments provided by the authors of modernism, starting with Ernest Gellner and his conclusions about nationalism. Benedict Anderson's theory and its main conclusions are presented in the second subheading. Finally, the chapter will also include some critical assessments of the two authors and of modernism as a whole. **The third chapter** elaborates the work of "Interactionists". At the beginning, some main conclusions of the theory will be critically discussed. In addition, the later development of the approach and its updates will be provided. The third one will cast some light on the potential flaws of the interactionist approach and how those might be transcended. **In the fourth chapter**, the research effort focuses on depicting the main conclusions of ethno-symbolism as a distinct approach. This will encompass the description and elaboration of the theory' specific methodology, as well as highlighting its contributions to the subfield through the introduction of Brodel's term *longue duree*. In **the final chapter**, the author will try to assess whether his findings verify the main hypothesis, and to demonstrate the possibility of theoretical complementarity.

1. Theories of the nation and nationalism – many approaches

1.1.The three main approaches

If one is eager to seek for the definition of nationalism, one will also stumble upon an immediate problem - there are too many of them. In fact, the very concept of nationalism can endure the seven basic criteria which W.B. Gallie set as a filter that could be used to decide which concepts can be described as essentially contested or as concepts that "inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users".[2] Even though these criteria have been later disputed as being too narrow or strict, notion of nationalism can fulfil the original Gallie's basic scale that includes: "(I) their appraisive character, (II) internal complexity, (III) diverse describability, (IV) openness, (V) reciprocal recognition of their contested character among contending parties, (VI) an original exemplar that anchors conceptual meaning, and (VII) progressive competition, through which greater coherence of conceptual usage can be achieved." [3]

As for nationalism and the nation, it would be sufficient to start from theory and several definitions provided by the most cited authors in the field to prove its contested character. As Benedict Anderson claims: "Nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse."[4] Ernest Gellner finds that "nationalism is primarily a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent", where "nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment."[5] On the other hand, Anthony Smith defines nationalism as "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the *autonomy, unity* and *identity* of a nation,"[6] whereas nation is "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members".[7] Benedict Anderson finds that "in an anthropological spirit" nation is "an imagined political community and imagined as both

---

[2] W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56, 1955, pp. 167–198, p. 169. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4544562 (Accessed on July 1, 2017)
[3] For further definitions of these criteria see: David Collier, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo and Andra Olivia Maciuceanu, "Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11(3), October 2006, pp. 211–246, p. 212 and pp. 236-238
[4] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition, Verso, London-New York, 2006, p. 3.
[5] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 2nd edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-New York, 2008, p. 1.
[6] Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, Penguin Politics and Current Affairs, London, 1991, p. 74.
[7] Ibidem, p. 14.

inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow – members, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."[8]

We find two conclusions to be adequate after analyzing the claims of aforementioned authors and their determinants of the two phenomena. First of all, the definitions are not mutually incompatible, say, the implications of one do not negate or exclude the implications of another. Secondly, there is an obvious difference between the nation and nationalism. For example, Walker Connor argues that "nationalism connotes identification with and loyalty to one's nation", while "nation connotes a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related", thus, preferable usage of what most people take as "nationalism" would be ethno-nationalism.[9] Although there are also differences throughout the literature whether states and nations produce nationalisms or vice versa, one thing is certain - both nationalism and nations are two parts of a symbiotic organism, where the nation is a static and nationalism a dynamic part. This will be taken as a working definition of the relation between the two and we will not embark on a further discussion about this issue due to the academic limitations and to the fact that the thesis has its own primary aims described in the introduction.

The first assessment from the previous paragraph also needs a short elaboration. Primarily, it is necessary to understand the background of the three definitions and of the authors themselves. Gellner's definition, and later on, his entire book *Nations and Nationalism* epitomizes a perspective of the modernization theory based on Weberian rationalism and structural functionalism. Gellner observes units of analysis (political and cultural ones) and what keeps them glued to each other. This definition is an introduction to understanding in which manner Gellner assembles his thoughts in the entire book. He adheres to the logic of modernization: There is an emerging dominant system in the world (in the 19th century) – capitalism; such system had a transition from a different one – the agrarian system; capitalism requires units – states; states require homogenous societies – nations; in order to create states, a homogenization process was required, and it occurred as nationalism. It was all spurred by industrialization, and so on. Hence, his definition of nationalism is a true summary of his own distinctive approach which lays emphasis on sociological aspects of the phenomena.

---

[8] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* op. cit., p. 6.
[9] Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism – The Quest for understanding*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. xi

Smith disagrees on some points with Gellner, but what matters for this part of the work is that his definition implies that the main concern regarding the topic is a cultural one. Smith, as a historian, was interested in understanding the nation as a cultural unit by determining its main elements (name, territory, myths, memories…). His books "The Ethnic Origins of Nations", "National Identity", "Myths and Memories of the Nation" etc., all swarm with historical examples of how and why is important to comprehend the nature of a nation's culture.

Anderson explicitly states his definition in an anthropological sense. Thus, it is without a question what perspective he uses to analyze nations. His book, *Imagined Communities*, consistently maintains an anthropological point of view where nations are the products of a ubiquitous and subjective sense of one's belonging to an "imagined" group of people.

Gellner's sociological view of the nation and nationalism is equally valid as Smith's historical perspective and Anderson's anthropological approach. We must bear in mind that the views of the aforementioned authors are not scientific dogma within their respective fields. Quite the contrary, all three of them face significant intellectual opposition form their peers, as will be shown in this work. The interdisciplinary potential of nationalism due to its "complexity" and, again in a sense offered by W.B. Gallie, its potential for "diverse describability" is a precondition for understanding that there might be more than one theoretical approach to this issue. In fact, that is exactly what occurred in the twentieth century – the establishment of multiple approaches to nationalism.

Some authors, like John Breuilly, claim that nationalism was not a subject of specific scientific interest until the 1918-1945 period, mentioning that, yes, Marx was an anti-nationalist and, yes, Weber was a great German nationalist and Durkheim on the other hand French republican patriot, but they also "equated nation with society and state and concerned themselves with the internal workings of society."[10] In such spirit, when discussing about predecessors of Gellner, Breuilly starts from the post 1918 period and the works of Carlton J. Hayes, E.H Carr and Hans Kohn.[11] Breuilly's explanation is rather confusing, having in mind that he recognizes Weberian theoretical spirit in Gellner's work, but omits to acknowledge Weber as his predecessor. However, this gap in argumentation can be filled in by introducing the explanation of another author specialized in nationalism. Umut Özkirimli understands that "contemporary theorists of nationalism have been profoundly influenced by the broader writings of these thinkers (18th

---

[10] John Breuilly, "Introduction", in Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 2nd edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-New York, 2008, p. xvi
[11] Ibidem, p. xvii

and 19th century ones, M.V.), on issues that are only indirectly related to nationalism. In short, the contemporary theoretical debate on nationalism did not arise *ex nihilo*."[12] In fact, the 'grand thinkers' such as Kant, Marx and Webber provided systems on which the field of nationalism was later grafted onto, and when thinking about nationalism and probably about plenty of other social phenomena, it is necessary to underline and be aware of their importance. For, as one of the field's most quoted author Benedict Anderson states, "unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes or Webers".[13]

The reserves regarding the pre 20th century nationalism thinkers, stems from a concern that they did not perceive it as something that should be objectively examined with its components explained, but rather as an inspiriration for contemplation and reflexion, natural as the Earth itself. Modernists particularly avoided pre-1918 classifications, as their view of nationalism as an artificial object strictly opposes those of Herder, for example, who claimed that "a nation is as natural plant as a family".[14] Or as Ernest Renan explained in his famous 1882 lecture at the Sorbonne, "a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle".[15]

Having in mind the previous argumentation, we find that an appropriate periodical classification is the one provided also by Özkirimli. He claims there are "4 stages in reflection on and the study of nationalism: The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the idea of nationalism was born', with contributors like Kant, Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, Mill, Lord Acton, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, Bauer, Stalin, historians like Michelet, von Treitschke, Renan, and early social theorists like Durkheim and Weber; 1918–1945, when nationalism became a subject of academic inquiry with the works of Carleton Hayes, Hans Kohn and Louis Snyder; 1945–1989, when the theoretical debate on nationalism became more intense and diversified, with the contributions of various disciplines; From 1989 to the present, when attempts to transcend the classical debate (characteristic of the third stage) have been made."[16]

We consider this periodical classification to be the most comprehensive one, for it covers and recognizes the necessity to take into account the 18th and 19th century efforts to, what turned

---

[12] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism – a Critical Introduction,* 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 31.
[13] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* op. cit., p. 5.
[14] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism,* op. cit., p.13.
[15] Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?", text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?,* Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992. (translated by Ethan Rundell), http://ucparis.fr/files/9313/6549/9943/What_is_a_Nation.pdf (Accessed on July 12, 2017)
[16] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism,* op. cit., p.13.

out to be the case, clear the ground for the early 20th century foundations of the discipline. Moreover, it also detects that 1945-1989 period was crucial for the discipline's maturation - the time when some classical, and still predominant and most influential approaches were established. However, we find it needful to answer the question - who has decided that only certain approaches should be detected and why? Again, the answer was offered by Özkirimli, claiming that "the tripartite division that we use today" was "popularized, if not invented" by Anthony Smith in his book *Theories of nationalism*.[17]

Smith's division (or at least what he popularised) truly makes the outline of nearly every classification provided by other authors in the field. It may be too cynical to say that this has occurred because of the tendency of Western scholars to constantly requote and thus, reinforce the impacts of an already most cited authors. However, one cannot contradict the fact that it is hard or nearly impossible to go beyond the Smith's lowest common denominators in order to ascertain the approaches to nationalism. Therefore, the reserve about the academic Eurocentrism does not automatically discredit the depth of European author's arguments.

The main Western categorization of approaches includes: **modernism**, **primordialism** and **perennialism** as one category and finally, **ethno-symbolism**.[18] There are additional inner sections in every approach where (e.g.) economic, political and cultural modernism is detected, or Primordialism I and II or Perennialism I and II. These subdivisions are where theorists diverge the most, either because of their own personal preferences or because they find that different issues should be considered as key features that form a subdivision. In addition, authors also tend to create a class of approaches where they assemble either those after the 80's peak or the ones which are hard to embed into existing patterns naming them as "Other" approaches or "New" approaches.[19] One can also notice that there is a repeating formula that always involves certain authors within this group, such as Rogers Brubaker or Michael Billig.

What makes the essence of Smith's classical distinction and is also frequently repeated, is the difference between those who view the nation and nationalism as a strictly modern phenomenon − emerging out of the transition from agrarian societies into industrial ones (modernists) − and those who believe nation is either an inalienable, universal human group trait which is also natural, constant and unchangeable (primordialists) or it has accompanied human groups for a much longer time than just two previous centuries (perennialists). Finally,

[17] Ibidem, p. x
[18] Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003
[19] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism,* op. cit., p. 169.

Smith's own approach is mostly considered to be a synthesis of the first two, where he argues nation and nationalism are truly two parts of a modern phenomenon, yet, certain features and inner cultural and social logic of the nation is something very close to earlier centuries' *ethnies* with their distinct ethnicisms. Thus, he claims nation has not emerged out of nothing.[20]

1.2. The key questions and dilemmas

Modernism, Ethno-Symbolism, Perennialism and Primordialism are formed as such because they provide different answers to the questions repeatedly posed in theory, regardless of an author's scientific background. Anthony Smith summarized these questions and dilemmas in his book *Nationalism and Modernism* where he also claims that certain issues prevailed as the dominant ones within the theory of nationalism.[21] The first one, *ethical and philosophical*, "concerns the role of the nation in human affairs" and it regards the dilemma "Should we regard the nation as an end in itself, an absolute value which is incommensurable with all other values? Or should we understand the nation and national identity as a means to other ends and values, a proximate value, and therefore bound to time, place and context, and especially to the conditions of a modern epoch."[22]

The second issue, *anthropological and political*, "concerns the social definition of the nation" and includes the following questions: "What kind of community is the nation and what is the relationship of the individual to that community? Is the nation fundamentally ethno-cultural in character, a community of (real or fictive) descent whose members are bound together from birth by kinship ties, common history and shared language? Or is it largely a social and political community based on common territory and residence, on citizenship rights and common laws, in relation to which individuals are free to choose whether they wish to belong?"[23]

Finally, *historical and sociological* issue deals with the most argued question during the "classical debate period": "Should we regard the nation as an immemorial and evolving community, rooted in a long history of shared ties and culture? Or are nations to be treated as recent social constructs or cultural artefacts, at once bounded and malleable, typical products of a certain stage of history and the special conditions of a modern epoch, and hence destined to pass away when that stage has been surpassed and its conditions no longer apply?"[24]

---

[20] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford UK - Cambridge USA, 2002
[21] Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, op. cit., p.8.
[22] Ibidem.
[23] Ibidem.
[24] Ibidem.

In their efforts to answer the three dilemmas and the related questions, the most influential authors either established one of the three dominant approaches or sided by one of them. The most argued, third dilemma is resolved by modernists in a way that they treat nations and nationalism as phenomena with both a production and expiry date, meaning that "nations (…) are typical products of a certain stage of history (…) destined to pass away". In most cases, modernists believe that the production date of the nation is inevitably the beginning of the French Revolution and the essence of its spirit, embodied in the slogan *Liberté égalité fraternité*, is considered to be the spark which ignited the flames of national revolutions around the World, ending in an international order that we have witnessed the past two hundred years. Perennialists and primordialists are on the other hand those who consider nations to be either eternal or at least thousands of years old constructs which are logical and natural manifestations of human group interests, identities and relations, regardless of the dominant system of socio-economic reproduction (e.g. agrarian or industrial societies). Finally, ethno-symbolists find modernist views of the nation's time and systemic boundaries to be understatements while perennialist perspective of the nation's durability through epochs and social orders disavow as pretentious. They offered a model which admits the industrial age possesses some features not seen before and requires new type of community, claiming cultural homogeneity and social equality - epitomized in bureaucracy, education and judicial order of the national state - are of no precedent. Nevertheless, they recognized that homogeneity and systemic equality could not rise *ex nihilo* but are based on the logic of communities of previous ages. Cultural integrity of the modern nation-states, according to ethno-symbolists, are emulated from the earlier ages' ethnies or "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with specific territory and a sense of solidarity."[25]

The modernist answer to the *philosophical and ethical dilemma* can easily be indicated by using their claims described in the previous paragraph. Within this paradigm, the nation was never an end in itself but a tool, means for the efficient functioning of the industrial system. The view of primordialists is again opposed to that of modernists, while ethno-symbolists lean more towards primordialism in this regard, having in mind that both approaches deeply appreciate the subjective feeling within an individual. As Smyth argues, myths, symbols, values and memories "are not 'simply' instruments of leaders and elites of the day, not even of whole communities. They are potent signs and explanations, they have capacities for generating emotion in successive generation, they possess explosive power that goes far

---

[25] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* op. cit., p. 32.

beyond 'the rational' uses which elites and social scientists deem appropriate."[26] This subjectivity of nationalism and it psychological power and impact on an individual through everyday practices, rituals and signs is also emphasized by some of the "new approaches" like in Michael Billig's *Banal Nationalism*.[27] However, even though Billig's perspective is often considered to be outside the "classical division", we find that his argumentation can serve to enforce the one of ethno-symbolists, which is argued in the Chapter 4.

The second question (anthropological and political dilemma) remains to be discussed last, for a reason. It offers more nuanced and complicated answers. The ethno-cultural definitions of a nation are characteristic for primordialism/perennialism and ethno-symbolism which would all agree that the nation is essentially "a community of (real or fictive) descent whose members are bound together from birth by kinship ties, common history and shared language".[28] The difference is that besides the predominant cultural feature, the latter also includes additions such as "common economy", "legal rights and duties" as shown in Smyth's definition. Modernists, though, define the ideal-type nation within the framework of institutions and system, solely. However, they also recognize the existence of different manifestations of nations in history and practice and often accept something that is known in literature as 'Kohn dichotomy', named after Hans Kohn who is credited for the dichotomy's proliferation.[29] What Kohn promoted is also known from the times of Ernest Renan when he recognized the distinction between French rational, political, inclusive and civic nationalism and German irrational, ethnic, exclusive and cultural nationalism.[30] Instead of French and German, Kohn introduced Western and Eastern nationalism to be the perfect exchange for the initial dualism. Although the two are seldom found in reality in pure forms and that Kohn's dichotomy has later been criticised from variety of perspectives, the mere existence of at least two different ideal-types of nationalism hints that the second important issue proposed by Smith, generates disagreements among the authors of nationalism but also propels them to recognize and include various forms of nationalism in their works when creating classifications. For example, according to ideological criterium (liberal, conservative, socialist, far right nationalism), criterium of different phases of nationalism (integrative, secessionist, unificatory) etc.[31] The

---

[26] Ibidem, p. 201.

[27] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, SAGE Publications, London-Thousand Oaks-New Delhi, 1995

[28] Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, op. cit., p.8.

[29] Milan Subotic, "Crno beli svet: prilog istoriji dualnih tipologija nacionalizma", *Filozofija i društvo, 1/XXIV,* Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd, 2013, pp 9-64, pp. 20-21.

[30] Ibidem. p. 20.

[31] Jovo Bakić, *Teorijsko-istraživački pristupi etničkoj vezanosti (ethnicity), nacionalizmu i naciji*, Sociologija, Vol. XLVIII, no. 3, april-jun 2006, pp 231-264.

key disagreements between the theorists of perennialism and modernism are summarized by Anthony Smith as follows:

Perennialism	**Modernism**
	The nation as
Cultural community	Political community
Immemorial	Modern
Rooted	Created
Organic	Mechanical
Seamless	Divided
Quality	Resource
Popular	Elite-construct
Ancestrally-based	Communication-based

Table 1: Attributes of the nation according to perennialists and modernists[32]

Nevertheless, the three main approaches are not monolithic, meaning that each of them can be further subdivided in new sub-approaches. Modernism, for example, has such a variety of subdivisions throughout the literature that it is hard to believe that those have much in common apart from their fundamental argument about the time-social structure coordinate system of the nation's existence.

1.3. Modernism

Özkirimli finds that there are at least three "modernisms", which all perceive the nation to be a young phenomenon in the history of the world but from varying standpoints and emphasizing different key factors such as: economic; political and socio-cultural transformations.[33] He probably found his inspiration in Smith's idea of three schools of modernism: those which "depart from the economic bases of modern society to explain the ubiquity of modern nations"; instrumentalists and finally, the approach coming from the books of Gellner and Anderson, as how Smith defines it.[34] Özkirimli also highlights that if authors belong to the school focusing on economic set of factors, that does not mean they automatically nullify the influence of other factors on nationalism, "they [just] attach a greater weight to one set of factors".[35] We find this 'openness' and 'diverse describability' (expressed in terms of W.B. Gallie) to be crucial for the

---

[32] The chart is borrowed from: Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 23.
[33] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism,* op. cit., p.72.
[34] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* pp. 9-10.
[35] Ibidem.

understanding of this thesis' main aim to at least imply there is a wide gap within the field when it comes to the hierarchisation and compatibility of closely related approaches, and that it is also possible to fill in such a gap.

Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter are, according to Özkirimli's opinion, the finest examples of authors focusing primarily on economic factors when it comes to nationalism. Nairn, who is often perceived as a neo-Marxist, due to his attention on the process of decolonisation that occurred in the 50s and 60s of the 20th century when arguing about the nation, uses key claims of dependency theory. Its key findings explain that there are core, peripheral and semi-peripheral states in the 'world-system' (Wallerstein), and the fact that core sates tend to exploit those on the edges, generates nationalism throughout the planet. Moreover, the resistance in the periphery stimulates nationalism in the core as well.[36] Hechter's vision is similar to Nairn's, just that he acknowledges numerous examples of the core-periphery (where 'periphery' have been non-dominant populations) system functioning within the states, consequently creating 'cultural division of labour' and eagerness of some 'cultural units' to seek their independence.[37]

Eric Hobsbawm, John Breuilly and Paul R. Brass are perceived by Özkirimli as authors who lay emphasis on the influence political transformations have had on the process of the nation creation and nationalism. Breuilly claims the vacuum left behind the weakening of the clerical power in the secularization processes of modernity was filled in with a newly formed power that serves as a way of ruling – nationalism, and as he states "nationalism is all about politics and politics is all about power.[38] Hobsbawm similarly claims that nationalism is the ending result of a form of 'social engineering', therefore 'invented' for the purpose of containing the dangers of mass democracy for the social elites.[39] Finally, Brass is regarded as 'instrumentalist' because he claims there are no nations and nationalism as such but only political elites that use cultural identities as mere resources in pursue for their political aims, similarly to the manipulation of material means.[40]

Socio-cultural transformations as key set of factors in a nation's creation are related to two most quoted authors in the field besides Smith and Hobsbawm. Their claims about the systemic

---

[36] Tom Nairn, *The break-up of Britain*, NLB and Verso, London, 1981, pp. 337-363.
[37] Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966,* University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, 1975, pp. 39-40.
[38] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism,* op. cit., p. 86.
[39] Eric, Hobsbawm, Terence O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 263-307, p. 265.
[40] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism,* op. cit., pp. 88-89.

roots of nationalism which are highly related to the processes of industrialisation (Gellner) and the development of 'print capitalism' (novels, newspapers etc.) provide, according to our opinion (which will be elaborated in Chapter 2), the deepest insight within modernism about the nation's roots and logic of its modern existence.

Jovo Bakić views the potential of modernism to be subdivided from another angle, where there are: theories of modernisation (without explicitly naming the representatives, but according to the description, Gellner should be the embodiment of the approach); instrumentalists (again, subdivided in the theory of ethnic competition and in the theory of ethnic segregation (Hetcher)) and neo-Marxism.[41] His classification is inspired by French anthropologists Philippe Poutignat and Jocelyne Streiff-Fenart whose perspective deviates from the mainstream one. Neo-Marxism in this case is understood differently. It perceives the world's division in classes to be blurred and distorted by nationalism which again serves as a mean of hiding the true nature of socio-economic relations, which of course, is a class struggle between the exploited and exploiters.[42] Even though authors who deliver such claims (Leslie Sklair, lately William I. Robinson) are not often regarded as those who are specialised in nationalism, and consequently, highly neglected by its prominent theorists, their contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon can be of a great importance. Arguably, we can say that such point of view can be closer to some sort of neo-Marxism or even conservative or traditional Marxism than Nairn's, which is derived from developmentalist perspective. Yet, whether we name them neo-Marxist or not, their macro perspectives on how and why nationalisms evolved are those of modernism. Even more, of modernism offered by Ernest Gellner on more abstract level, which we will see in the second chapter.

We prefer the standpoint of Smith and Özkirimli for two reasons. First of all, it covers wider range of theories, which generates more content for creating the deeper insight into the nation and nationalism. Secondly, the departure from the comprehension that certain theories revolve around particular predominant structural factors can offer a suitable framework when analysing nationalism in its totality (economic, political and socio-cultural reality) and can equip us with the tools needed to apprehend the way in which theories are compatible.

However, the reason why we introduced Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart is that their overall classification includes additional paradigms, beside the mainstream ones, interactionism and

---

[41] Jovo Bakić, *Teorijsko-istraživački pristupi etničkoj vezanosti (ethnicity), nacionalizmu i naciji,* p. 242.
[42] Ibidem.

postmodernism. For the latter, we will accept the opinion of Jovo Bakić who argues that postmodernism fails in theory in general and in the theory of our main topic at least for two reasons. First of all, the negation of the posibillity to seek for an objective, scientific knowledge, what seems to be the main epistemologicall argument of postmodernism, disqualifies its authors from the scientific community, if there is anything left of consistency in their argumentation. This is mainly because the relativisation as the key philosophical tool would mean that the same theory should relativise its findings and iself in the end. Secondly, Bakić claims that the main belief of the postmodern authors (Chantall Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau) is that when the concept is textually deconstructed, than the actual, material reality that nationalism created can be deconstructed, too.[43] In postmodernistic spirit, we do not believe, nor have we ever witnessed or found an example that could show how a great system or its main units ceased to exist in reality due to a collective philosophical or even psychoanalytical efforts of deconstruction. Nevertheless, we do not renounce the possibility to deconstruct national discources or myths or present them as constructed without relativising those at the same time. The idea that nations are 'imagined' or 'invented' are already popularized by the authors of modernism, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson. "Their respective formulations have provided the seedbed for more radical 'postmodernist' developments in which the idea of national identity is treated as inherently problematic and broken down into its component narratives."[44] Having in mind that Hobsbawm is considered to be a Marxist historian, his work is highly critical of the nation, but never too critical that he required some sort of reality deconstruction. Anderson, on the other hand never expresses ethical arguments on the nation as a concept in his works , of course, other than on the cases of the nation's most malign manifestations in the 20th century. Therefore postmodernism will not be taken into account in this work as a constructive part of the compatibility framework that we aim to build, but its roots or 'seedbed' will not be neglected, but on the contrary, it will be further investigated.

Interactionism, however, is meant to play a different role in our construction. It is defined throughout the literature as a part of modernism, mainly within instrumentalism, for the founder of this approach, Frederik Barth, is closest to the theory of ethnic competition, but also because their argumentation does not negate the nation's chronologically modern character.[45] Nonetheless, findings of this theory go beyond the usual instrumentalism and besides rational choices, they stipulate the usage of symbolic, often irrational resources by groups or individuals

---

[43] Ibidem. pp. 247-248.
[44] Anthony Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, op. cit., p. 6.
[45] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, op. cit., p. 10.

to be the norm in political behaviour. Thus, we will use interactionism as a more abstract and more developed instrumentalist line of reasoning.

Moreover, interactionism has another feature which propelled us to commit an entire chapter to its conclusions. Authors of this approach are devoted to the studies of ethnicity with special emphasis, incomparable to any other theory. They claim that even though most authors use ethnicity and nationality almost interchangeable, or at least with the respect that nationalisms are always backed up by an ethnic interests and motifs, ethnicity deserves a particular attention from an anthropological perspective.[46] According to the one of the most prominent authors of this approach: "Ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between persons who consider themselves as essentially distinctive from members of other groups of whom they are aware and with whom they enter into relationships."[47] Exactly the fact they consider ethnicity "an aspect of social relationship" that is maintained through the process of 'dichotomisation' (the concepts will be explained in Chapter 3) of the groups, when they are involved in different types of group contacts (wars, cooperation, change of international systems and circumstances etc.), makes this approach distinctive. Furthermore, they are even considered to be primordialists, but only within the realm of social anthropology, as their founder, Frederik Barth "implicitly seems to say that despite the contact across boundaries and the change in cultural content of the groups, the ethnic categories as such are constants which may be called upon when the need arises, as in a competitive situation."[48] It is not the primordialism as an approach to nationalism, but rather a primordialism within anthropology. It aims to explain the ever-present potential of a human group to create and maintain distinctive ethnic features as opposed to another human group, and to explain that the establishment of an ethnic group is also ever present feature of human kind, not just of one epoch.

Primordialism and perennialism on the other hand, will not be topics of particular interest in the rest of the work mainly for two reasons. First of all, they have been justifiably criticised by other authors for their negation of the dissimilarities between the nation and communities of previous ages, thus, for being blind for "peculiarities of different historical epochs".[49] Secondly, we believe that Chapter 3 with its main topic of ethno-symbolism overcomes the

---

[46] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives*, Third edition, Pluto Press, New York, 2010
[47] Ibidem, pp. 16-17.
[48] Ibidem. p. 63.
[49] Jovo Bakić, *Teorijsko-istraživački pristupi etničkoj vezanosti (ethnicity), nacionalizmu i naciji,* p. 235.

deficiencies of primordialism/perrenialism and uses their most constructive contributions to the theory.

To conclude this chapter, we will reiterate some of the key points substantial for the rest of our thesis. First of all, we detected that there are at least five distinctive and significant approaches to nationalism and those are: modernism; primordialism/perennialism; ethno-symbolism; interactionism and postmodernism. Moreover, "New approaches" or "Other" approaches will be discussed as much as their scientific influence or recognisability allows us, and their arguments will be organized around key of different theoretical perspectives in order to answer whether any of the arguments belong to already established views. Finally, as Tom Nairn argues, we believe that "it is necessary to locate the phenomenon (nationalism, M.V.) in a larger explanatory framework, one that will make sense of the contradictions", and according to the research we have conducted so far and the arguments provided, modernism, interactionism and ethno-symbolism are compatible in a way that a compounded usage of the three can offer the best explanatory potential when it comes to the theory of nationalism.[50]

---

[50] Tom Nairn, *The break-up of Britain*, op. cit., p. 332.

2. Nation as a modern phenomenon

2.1. *Nation as a Product of Industrialisation*

The most recognizable feature of modernity is an increase in volumes of production of goods with a simultaneous decrease in the time needed for the production of said goods. All of this was possible due to technical innovations and advancements which were unprecedented in history, and the whole process is known as industrialisation. Modernity has also produced volumes of theoretical material about the character and structure of the society that was transitioning from a more primitive milieu to the modern era, at least in a technological sense. The 19th century thinkers were, of course, aware of this process. Even more, it was the time when social science was established with its efforts to objectively describe the key factors that generate, preserve, shape, change and destroy common human existence. However, none of the authors, not even its most prominent opponents, viewed nationalism as an artificial phenomenon, created by humans in order to benefit from the changing socio-economic environment. As explained earlier, most of them perceived it as a natural and nearly inalienable part of every person.

However, it was not until the second part of the 20th century that nationalism was "objectivised" and detached from human nature. The most compelling insight about the usage of the phenomenon as a functional and necessary part of the industrial society was provided by Ernest Gellner. If the theory of nationalism did not provide "grand thinkers" as mentioned above, then we can say that Gellner was an author who was the closest to acquire such a status, or in the words of fellow scholar, John Breuilly, "Gellner's work represents the single most important attempt to provide a theory of nationalism as a whole."[51]

Gellner's ontological point of departure is just similar to that of Marxism. What one can conclude from his work and what we believe is implied is that material factors are crucial for the moulding of social reality. Nevertheless, it seems that he disagrees with Marxists on other ideas. For example, he claims that "contrary to what Marxism has led people to expect, it is pre-industrial society which is addicted to horizontal differentiation within societies, whereas industrial society strengthens the boundaries between nations rather than those between classes."[52] This rejection of the idea that conflicts in industrial societies might revolve around

---

[51] John Breuilly, "Introduction", in Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 2nd edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-New York, 2008, p. 53.
[52] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, op. cit., p. 11.

class and acceptance that people would rather identify with the nation, makes his theory compatible with the arguments of dependency approach and Tom Nairn's "neo-Marxism". This rejection was understandable since the bulk of Gellner's ideas stemmed from the time of the peak of the process of decolonisation. His 1964 book, *Thought and Change* was an early attempt to provide authentic theoretical framework which culminated in 1983 with the *Nations and Nationalism.* People's identification with nations rather than classes propelled Nairn to proclaim that "The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure."[53]

In the analysis of Gellner's work we find several concepts and phenomena to be crucial: Modernity; functionalism; structure: rationalism; stages of society; growth; division of labour; culture, and finally, nationalism. We will now analyse those separately or cumulatively, depending on their place in Gellner's explanatory hierarchy.

Modernity, functionalism and structure are all features than can be used as criteria to classify Gellner's work. As Breuilly explains, "He came to the subject (…) with a background in philosophy and anthropology. (…) He rejected any evolutionary approach which understood current society as shaped by earlier practices which survived into the present."[54] Nonetheless, what he accepted and what highly influenced his ideas and work was structural functionalism as an anthropological tradition with Bronislaw Malinowski as its supreme authority.[55] First of all, his perspective of modernity is that it represents a special manifestation of culture and social organisation. As such, modernity has a distinctive structure and different elements that can be used to enforce it. In that light, culture is but a necessary function or a functional element of modernity which provides the substantial homogeneous base for the smooth operating of the system, and nationalism is the latest form of a culture-political congruence – "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent."[56] We can often read in Gellner's book that nationalism as a base did not produce the system, but *vice versa*. For example, one of his assessments is that "It is not the case, as Ellie Kedourie claims, that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism."[57]

[53] Tom Nairn, *The break-up of Britain*, op. cit., p. 329.
[54] John Breuilly, "Introduction", op. cit., p. 20.
[55] Ibidem, p. 14.
[56] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, op. cit., p. 1.
[57] Ibidem, p. 38.

In order to understand the main elements of societal structure, where state plays the key role as an agency of society that "possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence" (in Weberian sense), Gellner introduced his ideas through explaining how three historical stages in history emerged as fundamental: the pre-agrarian, the agrarian and the industrial.[58]

The first one was incomplex enough with its simple division of labour, which did not require the state control and enforcement. The second, agrarian, did require state control, in lot of cases and in various forms, and the organisation that could manage the division of labour that went far beyond hunter-gatherer practices. Finally, the industrial age produced societies so large and internally complicated, where the absence of the state was not an option.[59] One could possibly be encouraged by previous explanations to think that the nation might be a logical ingredient for both agrarian and industrial age, however, Gellner provides the reasoning where, "the state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation", and the key ingredient for such an understanding is the differentiation between the culture in agrarian society and the one in industrial age. [60]

If both ages required centralization of power, it is not the case with culture. Gellner describes this case as follows. Culture was also centralised in agrarian societies. Nevertheless, it was a specific form of centralisation where only the privileged ones were part of state-owned cultural practices. Other than the rulers, nobles, clerics and military, literally no one was allowed to penetrate the stratification walls. Even the language of the "high culture" was different in most cases from what an "ordinary folk" spoke, thus, constantly reinforcing the barriers within societies. The inequalities of the agrarian age were impressively huge where only few were acting homogeneously, and those were on the top of the pyramid, while the rest was a heterogeneous mass with non-coherent cultural practices (it was more important to which profession does one belong than to which feud). The potential question arises: how can such inequalities exist for so long? The answer would be – stability. The agrarian age was not mobile, nor egalitarian, but it was stable or as Gellner explains: "Men can tolerate terrible inequalities if they are stable and hallowed by custom."[61]

---

[58] Ibidem, pp. 4-5.
[59] Ibidem, p. 5.
[60] Ibidem, p. 6.
[61] Ibidem, p. 24.

Mobility, or lack of it is what makes the crucial argument, at least in Gellner's opinion, for the dilemma - why did nationalism emerge. The roots of change were: the idea of a perpetual growth and the new division of labour.

Gellner argues that: "Industrial society is the only society ever to live by and rely on sustained and perpetual growth, on an expected and continuous improvement. Not surprisingly, it was the first society to invent the concept and ideal of progress, of continuous improvement."[62]

Driven by the idea of a constant advancement and change (on the level of collective unconsciousness), and the unprecedented technological progress throughout the last few centuries, the society that emerged also gave birth to a division of labour so complex that an additional ingredient for the functioning of the totality was needed. It was found in a specific form of cultural-political congruence – nationalism. As argued before, its artificiality is constantly emphasized by Gellner. "Contrary to popular and even scholarly belief, nationalism does not have any very deep roots in the human psyche. (…) The roots of nationalism in the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society are very deep indeed."[63]

These strong statements will need further elaboration in order to understand the connection between nationalism and division of labour. High productivity generates constant growth. The idea of perpetual growth requires constant changes. Gellner argues that constant changes do not allow people to be under one occupational niche for their entire lives, thus, provoking them to constantly change their jobs. This constant change would not be possible had there not been for the infrastructure that allows people to move across the labour market without any serious disruptions or problems. The infrastructure that can support such system is too large to be owned by someone else than the state and such pattern that enables people to be equipped for the new division of labour is what we call the system of education. The cultural material for the entire system in the West is borrowed from earlier epoch's "High Cultures", or elite cultures, while vernacular ones are mostly neglected or forgotten. Being a privilege for the few in agrarian society, the high culture pours down the pyramid vertically, creating a horizontal, equally spread, and at least provisionally, egalitarian society. Finally, "the immediate consequence of this new kind of mobility is a certain kind of egalitarianism. Modern society is not mobile because it is egalitarian; it is egalitarian because it is mobile."[64] Additionally,

---

[62] Ibidem, p. 22.
[63] Ibidem, p. 34.
[64] Ibidem, p. 24. The whole system from division of labour to the system of education is described in details in Gellner's book from p. 23 to p. 37,

Gellner assesses that "nationalism is essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society", however, "nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture."[65]

Therefore, Gellner's main idea is that the new homogeneous units are created because of the system requirements, not because of cultural specifics of a nation. Nationalism, in his view, is definitely just a necessary requirement of the industrial society, a product of the system, not its creator. Criticism and the place of Gellner's theory in our framework and efforts to prove that it might be a substantial part of the compatibility that we try to prove will be offered at the end of this chapter.

2.2. Nation as a Product of Printing Capitalism

Gellner offers scarce, or little to none historical evidence of how industrialisation, and consequently nationalism, occurred. One may think that his position must be the one which would argue that the entire process emerged due to actions of an intelligent, ubiquitous and divine mind of historical progress. Nonetheless, the furthest Gellner goes in the *Nations and Nationalism,* regarding the forces that might have created the modern system, is to acknowledge that: "Industrial society did not arrive on the scene by divine fiat. It was itself the fruit of developments within one particular agrarian society, and these developments were not devoid of their own turbulence".[66] He also gives an indication that "the particular agrarian society" is a Protestant one and does not immerse deeper into this specific topic.[67] It seems that on his level of abstraction, one does not meddle in historical realities. It seems he leaves the job to some other authors both to seek for the actual processes that ended up as constitutive forces of nationalism, and also to elaborate the yearn of industrialisation for culturally homogeneous societies in order to function properly.

Indeed, numerous empirical and, attached to it, theoretical examples were provided in literature. There is one example repeatedly acknowledged as a perfect description of industrialism-nationalism complex emergence. It stems from the idea and historical facticity that technological progress was first tested and implemented in military. "Advances in engineering and logistics promoted a new class of military professional with a high degree of training and expertise in science and technology; these in turn required the services of trained bureaucratic personnel, which monarchs were increasingly forced to recruit to ensure adequate

---

[65] Ibidem, p. 56.
[66] Ibidem, p. 39.
[67] Ibidem, p. 40.

resources and supplies for their armies and navies. (…) It also encouraged the development of institutes of higher education, scientific societies and technical academies, and the expansion of upper echelon posts in technical administration and finance."[68]

Authors of modernism and ethno-symbolism mostly agree about the idea elaborated in the previous paragraph. However, what they do not agree about is whether the entire process was controlled by a human or was it only history happening in a Hegelian, linear manner on which Marx' dialectical materialism was grafted onto. A Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawm also agrees with aforementioned idea which describes how industrialisation occurred, but does not accept that nationalism too, has developed in an equally natural and subtle manner. He claims it was all "invented" by the ruling elites in order to maintain control over masses, while simultaneously national myths and traditions were invented and practiced through the primary education development, public ceremonies and production of memories and monuments and minimal electoral democracy, in order to keep them safe from accusations of illegitimacy and tyranny.[69] Interesting and compelling is Hobsbawm's description of political engineering in 1870-1914 France where "(…) inflammable Parisians could be permanently outvoted by the over-represented villages and small towns, and that the Republican rural voters' genuine passion for the French Revolution and hatred of the moneyed interest could usually be assuaged by roads suitably distributed around the arrondissements, by the defence of high farm-prices and, almost certainly, by keeping taxes low."[70]

The Eurocentrism, of which the main authors of nationalism are frequently accused, indeed makes both potential perspectives on the nationalism development (artificial and natural) realistic, for historical examples do not contradict this ambiguity. Even Hobsbawm's example and probably more detailed one offered by Eugene Weber in his book *Peasants into Frenchmen,* proves that 1870-1914 France copies "the naturalness" of 1789.[71] However, none of these European examples have provided a deeper insight in what made a human mind prepared to accept the horizontal spread of a culture regardless of whether nationalism is used as a symbolic resource by the elites or not. There are several questions inherent to the theory of nationalism which would require answers if one is to grasp the meaning of horizontal individual identification and how do individuals know where are the boundaries of such

---

[68] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* op. cit., p. 132.
[69] Eric Hobsbawm, Terence O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, op. cit., pp. 263-307
[70] Ibidem, p. 269.
[71] Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen – The Modernisation of Rural France 1870-1914*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1976

identification. First of all, why are people prepared to die and to live for their countries, and also, why are they willing to kill or hate in the name of those? Secondly, how come that a person can identify so strongly with someone whom he or she has never seen before, nor has a great chance of doing so in the future? These are the questions that Benedict Anderson posed to himself in an effort to demystify nationalism, not only in the West, but in general or even universal way, by elaborating examples from Latin America and Asia. This does not make him a non-Western author. On the contrary, he is one of the most cited authors within the field, but in our opinion, the one who attempts to go beyond the already paved roads.

For the purpose of clarifying Anderson's ideas, it will be necessary to repeat his definition of the nation. "It is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[72] The substance of his comprehension is space, understood as a complex relationship between one's mind and the material, physical space. "Inherently limited" stands for the idea that even though physical geography does not recognise cultural boundaries as real ones, one has the knowledge about the borders of a community to which he or she belongs, beyond which other such communities lie. "Sovereign" means that the reign of the national political unit as a people's ultimate manifestation of principles is above those of earlier ages which included strict, pyramidal stratification of the society. Finally, "community" denies vertical system of ruling "high cultures" as a principle and opposes it with the idea of "comradeship", or of equality based on a belief that all share the same values.[73]

Something had to spur the revolutionary change in human's mind which generated nationalism. In Anderson's opinion, it was the moderation in human consciousness about the perception of time. An individual in an epoch before modernism was permeated by a significantly different understanding of simultaneity. The difference between the past and the future did not exist nor was cause and effect system of thinking used on a macro level, as a tool for the apprehension of history in a logical, rational manner. On the contrary, "the shepherds who have followed the star to the manger where Christ was born bear the features of Burgundian peasants. The Virgin Mary is figured as a Tuscan merchant's daughter. (…) Figuring the Virgin Mary with 'Semitic' features or 'first-century' costumes in the restoring spirit of modern museum was unimaginable because the mediaeval Christian mind had no conception of history as an endless chain of cause and effect or of radical separations between past and present."[74]

---

[72] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, op. cit., p. 6.
[73] Ibidem, pp. 6-7.
[74] Ibidem, p. 22-23.

Simultaneity of our time is something profoundly different. Anderson claims that it is this particular, modern version of it that made nationalism possible. It made an individual aware that besides him or her, there are numerous individuals alike, who share the same cultural code at exactly the same time. "An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than handful of his 240 000 000-odd fellow Americans (when the book was written, M.V.). He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity."[75] It might be hard to grasp how exactly this steadiness, anonymity and simultaneity are responsible for the creation of the nation, which is probably Anderson's deepest and fundamental claim from which all others are derived. In order to elaborate his, what might have seemed to be controversial when the book first came out, the author of *Immagined Communities* provided non-European examples, where that of Latin America from 16th to 18th century stands out as the most compelling one.

The main question for the Latin American example is: why was there not a development of a single state in that part of the world, when one language under one imperial rule was spoken in the area that ultimately produced sixteen states? Anderson claims that "the beginnings of an answer lie in the striking fact that each of the New South American republics had been an administrative unit from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century."[76] If that was the case, then the nation has nothing to do with the culture, nor with the inner qualities of a society (with the Spanish language for example). Such an answer can pose numerous problems to other theories. However, Anderson would strictly oppose any similar assessment. For him, nation is essentially a strong cultural and psychological phenomenon, which is far away from the idea that it is only a product of political and administrative constructions. In fact, he makes a clear distinction between nationalism and other "isms" such as liberalism or Marxism by depicting that nationalism has a specificity that no other ideology shares. He argues that: "No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers. (…) The cultural significance of such monuments becomes even clearer if one tries to imagine, say, a Tomb of the Unknown Marxist or a cenotaph for fallen Liberals."[77] Anderson also claims that socialist revolutions with their recognizable after-war iconography of anonymous warriors-workers do not represent an exception, for every such a revolution

---

[75] Ibidem, p. 26.
[76] Ibidem, p. 52.
[77] Ibidem, pp. 9- 10.

ended in defining itself within the territorial boundaries of the previous ages, gradually accepting the sentiments and logic of the nation.[78]

Nonetheless, it still remains unclear from the aforementioned examples how did administrative division create nations as cultural-political units in its substance. Anderson finds that it was simultaneity. Revolutionary and never seen before, which was first generated by the products and the embodiments of capitalism – the novel and the newspaper.[79]

A reader of a novel is able to play the role of a ubiquitous being, all-knowing mind, with the feeling of pride aroused by the fact he or she has things under control. When one reads a classical novel written in a third person, he sees the life of a protagonist, and of other characters from a wholly another perspective. "Only they (the readers, M.V.), like God, watch A telephoning C, B shopping, and D playing pool all *at once.* That all these acts are performed at the same calendrical time, but by actors who may be largely unaware of one another, shows the novelty of this imagined world conjured up by the author in his readers' minds."[80] The idea which a reader has about A, B and C being a part of one particular society and that there is something that connects them even though they might not know each other, is of crucial importance in order to understand how Anderson's simultaneity works. According to him, the novel made it possible to imagine that people are connected with something that is more than here and now, and that such a connection was spread horizontally with an unprecedented force, due to the fact that the old "liturgical languages", like Latin, died away and were replaced by vernaculars that are available to much larger groups of people besides aristocrats, clergy and military.[81]

However, what actually allowed this change in consciousness was not an extraordinary artistic power of writers. There must have been a reason why nationalism became popular. It was capitalism. The invention of printing machine in the 15th century meant that the exclusivity of the written word was about to cease and the availability of it to rule. Anderson shows data about the proliferation of the written texts from the moment when the printing machine was invented. Arguably, up to 20, 000,000 books were out of the machines by 1500 and up to

---

[78] Ibidem, p. 2.
[79] Ibidem, p. 25.
[80] Ibidem, p. 26.
[81] Ibidem, p. 41.

200,000,000 already by 1600.[82] The rules of the market prevailed and by the 18th century another invention related to print reinforced the new simultaneity – the newspaper.

Newspaper presents us how a murder happened in the south of the country; what is a governor's thought on the new policy; how good a shipping company does the business; what is the new price of wheat etc. However, the main power of the novel and the newspaper lies in the fact that it is not only one person that reads those information, but thousands or millions of them that receive exactly the same information in exactly the same way and order at approximately the same time. Anderson quotes Hegel how "newspapers serve modern man as a substitute for morning prayers" and paradoxical is that "it is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull (…) yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions)."[83]

A small digression from the Latin American example was needed in order to comprehend Anderson's claims.

Each of the 16 administrative units that Spain created in Latin America in order to rule more efficiently had their own newspapers throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th century. Therefore, when there was news about a murder, it was "our" murder. When there was a shipwreck, it was "our" shipwreck. When a bishop made a statement or an advice, it was "our" bishop. As Anderson describes it "(…) what brought together, on the same page, *this* marriage with *that* ship, *this* price with *that* bishop, was the very structure of the colonial administration and market-system itself. In this way, the newspaper of Caracas quite naturally, and even apolitically, created an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow-readers, to whom *these* ships, *these* brides, bishops and prices belonged."[84] The possibility to imagine was later reinforced by other inventions, out of which Anderson finds the map, census and museum to be the most important ones.[85]

Anderson's key argument about the development of nationalism can be summarised in his next sentence. "What, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fruitious, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations

---

[82] Ibidem, p. 37.
[83] Ibidem, p. 35.
[84] Ibidem, p. 62.
[85] Ibidem, pp. 163-186.

(capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity."[86]

Having in mind that the two theories summarized above (Gellner's and Anderson's) have certain similarities, but that they also lay emphasis on different issues, we will further try to present the criticism of the two, after which we will see what is left "usable" from these theories.

2.3. What is Missing?

Brendan O'Leary records that the usage of Gellner's writings "needs little justification since all worthwhile subsequent writing and research on nationalism will benefit from Gellner's work, whether they build on his presumptions or dissent from them".[87] Indeed, one should not go far into reading of the most relevant works in the field to realize that Gellner's assumptions are some sort of a reference point for almost every new argument on nationalism. For example, Eric Hobsbawm derives his theory from the understanding that industrialization and nationalism are intertwined in a way that the author of *Nations and Nationalism* proposes. Yet, he adds an important critique, which will be described later. Anthony D. Smith was Gellner's student who based his theory on his professor's findings in order to either "build on his presumptions" or more to "dissent from them". The same applies to John Breuilly, Rogers Brubaker etc.

We find at least three potential problems with Gellner's claims. The first is a theoretical one, which addresses the problem of structural-functionalism in general. The second deals with a still ongoing dispute between modernists and ethno-symbolists about the origin of the nation, while the third one outlines some empirical omissions of his work.

Firstly, the main theoretical claim proposed by Gellner is that nationalism did not exist before industrialization, but that it is rather its product. As far as he is concerned, nationalism proved to be a good structure in fulfilling its functions for the forces of historical development which are embodied in modernization. However, besides that he locates the emergence of nationalism in "one European Protestant society", he never embarks on a journey to understand from what sort of material did it come out. Within the tradition of Bronislaw Malinowski, it perfectly fits

---

[86] Ibidem, p. 43.
[87] Brendan O'Leary, "Ernest Gellner's diagnoses of nationalism: a critical overview, or, what is living and what is dead in Ernest Gellner's philosophy of nationalism?", in: John A. Hall (ed.), *The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 40–88, p. 40.

to say that nationalism has its function in a wider architecture propelled by industrialization. Nevertheless, Gellner never proves that something will function in reality if it makes perfect sense in theory. He never demonstrates that once established nation-states do not actually have to mess with ethnic politics anymore. Of course, he must have seen there was more than one state, even in Europe, that did not resolve the issue of interethnic violence. However, his theory convinced him that persisting heterogeneity in ethnic sense still exists due to the development in which industrialisation came later in different parts of "The Old Continent" (for his speculative examples stretch only to Europe). In fact, he forms his own typology of nationalism in a space-time continuum, where first true nationalisms were created in Western Europe with France and England as the exemplary ones. Those were nationalisms that were established in a perfect order (at least for Gellner), which means that high cultures first homogenised their populations after which nationalism was practiced smoothly, in comparison to that Eastern ones, where wars, hard politics and diplomacy had been practiced in Italy and Germany before homogenisation occurred, through the implementation of already existing high cultures. Finally, Eastern Europe, suffering from "backwardness", had to go through the process of "cultural engineering", which meant – the creation of high cultures from the folk ones. Thus, the process was largely impeded by this "unfortunate fact". For all of the above, Gellner does not offer empirical evidence, but mostly earlier analyses such as that of John Plamenatz, a Montenegrin who consistently insisted on Kohn's dichotomy.[88]

The example of Gellner's line of reasoning from the previous paragraph was necessary to understand the following criticism of his work. There are authors who overtly dismiss that once established state architecture is a fertile ground for further homogenisation. The argumentation based on the tradition of structural-functionalism, if something is useful for the smooth running of the whole, then it must function in reality, is a large omission of that paradigm in general, and Gellner follows it properly.[89] Even if such a claim has proved to be mainly true for certain Western states (with notable exceptions of Catalan, Basque, Scottish, Corsican etc. nationalisms), it did not turn out to be the best prescription for the rest of the world. Structural-functionalism affected the creation of politics of state-building which, for numerous reasons, happened to be insufficient for the establishment of a fully functional, autonomous societies. Rogers Brubaker coined the term to describe the beforementioned omission. In his opinion, there is something that should be called "the architectonic illusion", which is actually "the

---

[88] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, op. cit., pp. 94-98.
[89] Milan Subotić, *Na drugi pogled – prilog studijama nacionalizma*, Institut za društvenu teoriju i filozofiju, Filip Višnjić Beograd, 2007, p. 61.

belief that the right 'grand architecture', the right territorial and institutional framework, can satisfy nationalist demands, quench nationalist passions and thereby resolve nationalist conflicts".[90] Numerous examples of failed state-building and peace-building projects which produced vast literature for itself, proves Brubaker's addition of 'illusion' to be right.[91]

Secondly, viewing nationalism as something that "had" to be created by some objective forces, Ernest Gellner simply denied the power of ethnic culture. This "negligence" is at the heart of Smith's critique, that was first pointed out by Connor Walker, who did not intend to criticize Gellner, as he published his article (in which "classical modernism" and the idea of state-building is attacked), previous to Gellner's main work. Walker summarized his earlier writings in a 1994 book, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding.* He claims that "Scholars associated with theories of nationalism have tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor impediments to effective state-integration."[92] Walker also notices that authors of modernism missed to acknowledge that nationalism is not as objective force as one might fathom, but that it is closely related to ethnic groups where psychology, kinship, irrationalism and other subjective phenomena play a very important role. In fact, in his opinion, "the essence of nationalism is not tangible. It is psychological, a matter of attitude, rather than a fact".[93] Smith additionally encourages such a way of thinking. Actually, he criticizes Gellner for not dedicating enough attention to where does nationalism come from, in a sense that Smith believes that it truly had cultural predecessors from which the essence of nationalism was "borrowed". He denounces Gellner's understanding which depicts earlier *ethnies* as navels. Even though Gellner was not a physiologist, he claimed navels are a sign of birth and had no particular function. Therefore, they do not mean anything and the best proof for that is that some nations had *ethnies* and some did not. The consequences are the same. It simply does not matter.[94] Smith highly disagrees with such an assessment and in his response to Gellner's argumentation connected to "navels", he argues that it is actually very important to accept that nations had their cultural predecessors, in a sense that languages, myths, memories, and names of the modern nations are largely borrowed from earlier epochs. Even when they are imagined,

[90] Rogers Brubaker „Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism", John Hall (Ed.), *The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism,* Cambridge, 1998, pp. 272-306, p. 273.
[91] Oliver P. Richmond, *Failed Statebuilding – Intervention, the State, and the Dynamics of Peace Formation*, Yale University Press, 2014.
[92] Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, op. cit., p. 28.
[93] Ibidem, p. 42.
[94] Ernest Gellner, "Ernest Gellner's reply – Do nations have navels?", in *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 2, No.3, ASEN, 1996, pp. 366-370.

the essence of this newly created entity is the same as of the "old" one, and it has the same dimensions as *ethnies*.[95] Thus, a nation needs myths and memories as much as *ethnies* needed them. And if one wants to look at the "special qualities and durability of *ethnie*", he "has to look at the nature of their myths and symbols, their historical memories and central values".[96] The same applies if one wants to understand a character of a nation. Culture is a key ingredient of nationalism needed to properly understand the essence of that phenomenon. This still does not mean nation is not a modern concept, just that it has other important dimensions besides its political, economic and systemic ones.

That the Gellner's negligence of culture might be truly real and important, proves criticism coming from his own theoretical niche. Eric Hobsbawm relies heavily on Gellner's assumptions, but also criticizes some features of his work. "They are (nations and its associated phenomena, M.V.) (…) constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist. If I have a major criticism of Gellner's work it is that his preferred perspective of modernization from above, makes it difficult to pay adequate attention to the view from below." [97] Indeed, Hobsbawm points out that there are certain "proto-national" feelings of belonging, such as ethnic culture, religion, language and the "consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity", but these are simply not enough to form a nation, without the elite's political mobilisation.[98] Which brings us back to the point that "ancient" traits of the nation are important, but its modern characteristics are the ones that encircle the phenomena.

Finally, there is one more problem with Gellner's theory, which many authors, again, point to. John Breuilly argues there are justified critiques of Gellner from the empirical point of view.[99] Subotić argues that some Balkan countries had nationalism even before industrialization and that Gellner's response how "shadows of industrialization" had already covered that part of the world seems as an insufficient *ad hoc* explanation which does not respond to the question – how did the homogenization occur without a state. In addition, Subotić emphasizes that one of

---

[95] Anthony Smith, "Memory and modernity: reflections on Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism", in *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 2, No.3, ASEN, 1996, pp. 371-388

[96] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* op. cit., p. 15.

[97] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* – second edition, Cambridge University Press, 2016, pp. 10-11.

[98] Ibidem, pp. 46-79.

[99] John Breuilly, "Introduction", in Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 2nd edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-New York, 2008, p. xxxvii

the main defficiencies of Gellner's work is that it is too wide and general, so it very often has to reach for *ad hoc* solutions and answers. Yet, at the same time, its hights are what makes his theory a very good explanation of nationalism in general.[100] Hobsbawm recognizes the same peculiarities in the Balkans, but in some other places as well. Nevertheless, he still rejects to call these movements full-fledged nationalisms (in his modernistic habit), without the sufficient explanation why not to consider them as such. He claims that, for example, Serbs, Croats, English and Russians had undeniably proto-national feelings even before the 19th century.[101] Regardless of whether we perceive those feeling as proto-national or national, a mere fact that even some modernists view the world of nations in a more nuanced manner, is enough to offer a criticism of Gellner's lack of concern for history.

Even if we accept that those were "only" proto-national feelings of these groups of people, it would be more than sufficient to offer a critique and maybe a better understanding of Benedict Anderson's theory, which leads us to the question of potential problems of our second most relevant author and his ideas elaborated in *Imagined communities*. It differs from *Nations and Nationalism* in a way that actually serves to explain how nationalism emerged in reality and what are its origins. They were not divine, or of some unnamed European Protestant group (according to Gellner), but was produced by the printing machine, which, at least according to Anderson, inevitably prepared the human psyche to imagine an unimaginable in the previous centuries. What connects the two authors is their determination that there was a clear cut between the previous eras, which could not have formed the nation, and industrialization and capitalism that made nation possible through the embodiment of an unprecedented material advancement. Therefore, both believe that objective-material forces made it inevitable that human socio - political organisation will end up in the nation-state.

However, Anderson's work also suffers from the underestimation of the earlier ages. It could be surely stated previous epochs also had communities with an idea of sovereignty, embodied, for example in the freedom from the conqueror. That was also imagined and limited and stretched beyond local kinships and blood ties, all the way to the people whom one may had never met. Therefore, that horizontal comradeship in a way proposed by Anderson, had to exist before the invention of printing machine. Eric Hobsbawm provides us with an example borrowed from Ivo Banac, regarding the Serbian nationhood. "There is no reason to deny proto-national feelings to pre-nineteenth-century Serbs, not because they were Orthodox as against

---

[100] Milan Subotić, *Na drugi pogled – prilog studijama nacionalizma,* op. cit., p. 62.
[101] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

neighbouring Catholics and Muslims – this would not have distinguished them from Bulgars – but because the memory of the old kingdom defeated by the Turks was preserved in song and heroic story, and, perhaps more to the point, in the daily liturgy of the Serbian church which had canonized most of its kings."[102] Oral history, narrated by the local music player of the ethnic instrument of *gusle* (fixation instead of print), which preserved the memory of the "Serbian lands" (limited), served as a reminder that the people conquered by Turks shall be free (sovereign) one day. And all that happened in remote mountain villages of Montenegro, Herzegovina and Dalmatia where villagers from Montenegro, certainly did not know personally those from Dalmatia. What Hobsbawm does not entail in his book (and Anderson for sure), was that the seeds for this "imagined community" were planted in early thirteenth century, when the first Serbian, archbishop, Saint Sava translated liturgical text from Greek (the official Byzantine language) script into the vernacular, and established churches which had liturgies in a language understandable to the locals, next to the Romeic (Byzantine) ones. Eventually, the local language churches swarmed with people, while the Greek ones remained empty, resulting in the formation of the strong sense of community, even between the feudal elites and the ordinary serfs.[103]

Anthony Smith only reinforces such argumentation, by providing an interesting line of thinking. In his opinion, *ethnicisms* are predecessors to nationalisms in the same way that *ethnies* are predecessors of nations. "*Ethnicism* is more a collective movement whose activities and efforts are aimed at resisting perceived threats from outside and corrosion within, at renewing a community's forms and traditions, and at reintegrating a community's members and strata, which have become dangerously divided by conflicting pressures".[104] These "restorations" were either territorial ones (Smith finds this example in the restoration of Pozharsky and Minin or "Next Year in Jerusalem" saying among Jews), genealogical (finding dynastic lines of descent with some even more ancient dynasties) and cultural ones. They all served to homogenize people from the "foreign threat" like it happened in the Hundred Years' War when, as Smith claims, French and English identities were forged and firmly established against one another, or in Ancient Greece, when the Greek city states were well aware of their identity based on the same language, religion, culture and practices, like Olympic games, which united them against the Persian Empire.[105] Therefore, he believes that "imagined communities"

---

[102] Ibidem, pp. 75-76.
[103] Domentijan, *Žitije Svetog Save*, Srpska književna zadruga, Beograd, 2001.
[104] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* op. cit., p. 50.
[105] Ibidem, pp. 51-67.

always existed and that we cannot assume that, "because of the generally poor state of communications in pre-modern eras, there was a low level of communal sentiments everywhere; this may be true of 'outlying areas' (though even here 'tribal sentiments' are known to have been significant), but it can hardly obtain for well-connected centres of civilization in the Middle East, North Africa, Southern and Western Europe, or India and China".[106]

We can conclude that Anderson's work might face the same problems as Gellner's because they firmly attach their theories to the idea that something radically new happened in all spheres of life in 18th and 19th century. If the system of social-economic reproduction has changed, that does not automatically mean that the entire humanity before the industrialisation served only to create nation-states and entirely new human beings. Maybe capitalism, perpetual growth, the new division of labour, did influence individual and collective perception of culture, politics and economics, but there must have been something universal, perennial or even primordial left. Not in a sense that a Serb today is the same as a Serb who lived seven centuries ago, which would be more than a ridiculous statement, but that a tribal Serb or a tribal Croat sought for a higher, spiritual meaning, above the material world, the same way that today's Serbs and Croats do – through culture, and that different ways of "finding the meaning" forged distinctive identities that could have been politicised. Also, that "us" and "them" is still a predominant group behavioural trait, inherent to the human nature. As a matter of fact, some authors claim that the need for belonging and identity is one of the basic human needs, besides the survival needs, well-being needs and freedom needs.[107] If political or economic elites perceive culture only as a mere symbolic resource that can be used in their opportunistic aims, it does not negate the strength that it has both on the individual and holistic level. It also does not mean that we cannot explore the qualities and potentials of cultures, and that there is something within them, not within politicians, that can generate either higher productivity, entrepreneurial spirit or on the other hand, low productivity and passive spirit.

The criticism of modernist authors does not prove this approach might be obsolete. On the contrary, it would be hard to argue that industrialization did not bring systematic changes, or that nationalism has not been useful for the nation-state system of the international relations. It would likewise be difficult to challenge the notion that the novel, the newspaper, the map and

---

[106] Ibidem, p. 70.
[107] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, op. cit., p. 197.

the census did not create some sort of a change in human perspective of wider communities. What is left very useful from modernism, after all the problems we enlisted, will be argued in the final chapter. Before that, a much shorter of theories that could provide us with potential "universalities" in the human collective behaviour, will be presented – starting with interactionism.

3. "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" – Interactionsim

3.1. Otherness and Dichotomisation – Ethnic Boundaries

While Gellner seeks to understand nationalism from a top-down perspective, numerous authors strive to comprehend whether there are some autonomous developments on a micro level which could influence the larger picture. Anthony Smith, for example, believes there is a certain methodology we should apply in order to understand the essence of every nationalism, which could lead us to the answers about different nature and inner qualities of each nationalism separately. For, some of them may be similar, but there are no two exactly the same (Chapter 4). In fact, Smith argues that "no (…) general theory is possible", and although he prefers "a certain kind of approach, which may be termed - ethno-symbolist", he feels "that the differences between nationalisms across periods and continents are too great to be embraced by a single Euclidian theory".[108] He overtly favours history over every other science and strongly believes than a nation can be fully understood only when a bottom-up perspective is applied.

Nevertheless, study of the historic nature and qualities of cultures does not provide arguments about why a certain ethnic group emerges separately from another. A classical 1969 study by Frederik Barth et al, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* attempts to answer this particular question because "the differences between cultures, and their historic boundaries and connections, have been given much attention; the constitution of ethnic groups, and the nature of the boundaries between them, have not been correspondingly investigated".[109] Thus, we will dedicate more attention to the theoretical findings of interactionists whose most prominent figure and founder was Frederic Barth. It is an approach that also emphasizes the importance of a bottom-up perspective, but slightly different from Smith's. Peculiarity of this approach is that its proponents all come from the same scientific background – social anthropology, and therefore, they search for the universality in a behaviour of each human group. This is important, because it offers some sort of a stable ground for the theory of nationalism, in a sense that the nation might not be a mere cultural construct, but some sort of a human primordial need for

---

[108] Anthony Smith, "Memory and modernity: reflections on Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism", op. cit., p. 386.
[109] Frederic Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1969, p. 9.

organizational bonding in critical situations for one's existence, or what one believes is critical. The nation is just the latest embodiment of this need, but certainly not the only.

One of the key concepts this perspective uses extensively is "ethnicity", and it is inevitably related to the concepts of the ethnic group, the ethnic identity and nationalism. This relation needs to be elaborated more in order to understand the nuanced differences which exist between them.

The core of Barth's theory, and of interactionism as well, are the following questions: What constitutes the identity of an ethnic group? Is it an objective, static quality around which people gather, or is it possibly something else? Interactionists answer that ethnicity is what constitutes ethnic groups and their identities, and it is not a quality, but relation. Ethnicity is not about the colour of the skin, or of the eyes. It is also not about the language or religion. One ethnic group can differ from another in a sense of religion or even language, but it does not mean that these two play the crucial role for other such groups which can be poly-lingual or poly-religious. Therefore, interactionists believe that objective physical and cultural criteria play a role in the identity construction, but "we cannot predict (…) which features will be emphasized and made organizationally relevant by the actors".[110] For example, if we take language as the main criteria, how would we explain the fact that Austrians are not the same group as Germans, or Croats are not the same as Serbs, Bosniaks and Montenegrians? On the other hand, how would one be able to explain multi-religious Albanians, if religion is the key ingredient of an ethnic group? Thus, interactionists offer an answer that ethnic identity and ethnic groups are not consequences of "objectivity", but of extreme subjectivity, and that those are "categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves".[111] Ethnic groups are not created because of cultures, but certain cultural characteristics are made relevant by the people due to various reasons. However, those reasons always meant some sort of interaction and relation with other groups. The whole idea is summarized by Thomas Hylland Eriksen, who is, arguably, one of Barth's chief successors within interactionism: "Notably, the use of the term 'ethnic group' suggests contact and interrelationship and, ultimately, that we all live in one, 'continuous' world. To speak of an ethnic group in total isolation is as absurd as to speak of the sound from one hand clapping. (…) By definition, ethnic groups remain more or less discrete, but they are aware of – and in contact with – members of other ethnic groups. Moreover, these groups or categories are in a sense *created* through that very contact. Group identities must always be

---

[110] Ibidem, p. 14.
[111] Ibidem, pp. 10- 14.

defined in relation to what they are not – in other words, in relation to non-members of the group."[112]

There is still a need to explain what we mean by "various reasons". Eriksen names a few: "Population growth, the establishment of new communication technologies facilitating trade, inclusion of new groups in a capitalist system of production and exchange, political change incorporating new groups in a single political system, and/or migration."[113] The European migration crisis from 2015 brought about interactions which produced religion as something that turned out to be socially relevant in explanations of the groups' differences or even "incompatibilities". More and more voices were heard echoing the sentiment that *The Clash of Civilizations* was not just a book or a dangerous idea that could eventually lead to "self-fulfilling prophecy", but an inevitable and natural reality itself which occurs when Islam and Christianity meet face to face within one social system. What may seem strange is an extremely swift transition from ethnic groups to the entire civilizations. European migration crisis is not our topic, but it may be used to depict how extraordinary wide is the explanatory potential of interactionism. In fact, the logic of Frederic Barth and interactionists can indeed be extended from ethnic groups, all the way to civilizations. We are not arguing that ethnic group, nation and civilization are the same thing, but that those three share some common, possibly primordial features. Eriksen finds, for example, that "like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders (…) The distinguishing mark of nationalism is, by definition, its relationship to the state (…) Although nationalisms tend to be ethnic in character, it is debatable whether there is a necessary ethnic foundation for national identity".[114]

Eriksen clearly distinguishes ethnic groups from nations, accepting modernist paradigm about the novelty of the latter. Nevertheless, this does not mean he claims there is absolutely no link between the modern era nation-state constructions, and the earlier ones. They are all permeated with *otherness*. An ethnic group, a nation, and a civilization are inherently defined by the "outsiders", and in lot of cases, this can inevitably lead to political requirements and actions. If examples of ethnic groups not demanding for political autonomy within the states are sufficient to explain that "otherness" is not a common denominator for ethnic group and nations, then examples of those groups which require autonomy can prove the opposite. The

---

[112] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives,* op. cit., p. 14.
[113] Ibidem, p. 26.
[114] Ibidem, p. 10.

point is that even if there is a seed or a potential for *self - otherness* relation, some interaction, crisis, war, migration, or a change of the entire international system (like in 1789) can trigger the creation of ethnicity, which could lead to further *dichotomization* of groups, possibly ending up in the creation of nations.

Interactionists also extensively use the abovementioned concept of *dichotomization*. Eriksen defines it as a "mutual demarcation process" through which "group membership and loyalties are confirmed and strengthened" by "stereotyping and the articulation of conflict or competition" between two groups.[115] If one locates the place where these dichotomizations occur, that means he also discovers ethnic *boundaries*, or the lines which serve to demarcate one group from another. That boundary can sometimes be filled in with the cultural content of religion, sometimes with a language, sometimes a race, etc. It is crucial to understand that what is used to "dichotomize" two societies, is not what objectively defines the existence of these separate groups of people. For example, Serbs and Croats can go through the process of building up mutual hatred by explaining their two religions are incompatible, because the other one is bad, hypocritical, violent etc. After that, some "obvious" cultural differences may be emphasized, like Serbian vicious "Easternness" or Croatian "Cold bloodedness", and so on. The ethnic boundaries are lines over which dichotomizations occur, while socially relevant cultural traits are signals that we can use to recognize where the boundaries are. In Barth's own words: "The cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed, indeed, even the organizational form of the group may change – yet the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of continuity, and investigate the changing cultural form and content."[116] Therefore, what matters for Barth is that organization precedes culture, and the latter can vary within the same groups of people. For example, Serbs were Serbs two centuries ago, but their cultural practices were far from those of today's members of the same group.

It can surely be argued that Barth's theoretical findings are hard to comprehend at first sight, for he introduces all these new concepts like *boundaries* (which he also calls diacritics) or *dichotomization*. However, his work was and still is extraordinary influential and it attracted much more attention after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when constructivism and identities became popular in the scientific community. The entire army of researches who sought for the

---

[115] Ibidem, p. 33.
[116] Frederic Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries,* op cit., p. 14

boundaries between identities has emerged. "Self-other" research perspective has become mainstream which has offered some additions and expansions of Barth's original ideas.

3.2. Ethnicity and Its Functions – Interactionism Updated

What Barth's theory does not cope with, is the question - how can we distinguish ethnicity from other phenomena? If we believe that only boundaries matter, because they create distinct organisation - in a sense that everything later grafted onto them is secondary - then a lot of things may be considered as ethnicity. How can we distinguish social class or gender from ethnic groups? Both gender and class have their own boundaries with specific cultures. There is an interesting example provided by Abner Cohen, who writes about *Urban Ethnicities*. He believes that the elite in London's City or Hausa traders in Nigerian city with Yoruba majority are ethnicities for themselves. "City men are recruited from exclusive status groups. They are mostly products of the public-school system. The schools in this system achieve two major tasks: they socialize, or rather train, their pupils in specific patterns of symbolic behaviour, including accent, manner of speech, etiquette, style of joking, play; second, they create a web of enduring friendship and comradeship among the pupils, and these relationships are often continued through periodic old-boy reunions, affiliation with the same clubs, and further interaction in other social situations."[117]

Cohen's view is considered by Eriksen to be too extreme, for there is a distinction between class and the ethnic group, which significantly narrows the possibility of ethnicity to be relativized to such a degree. He finds that the metaphors of "bed, blood and cult" provided by Manning Nash in 1988 as "the lowest common denominators for all ethnic groups", even though they are too strict and too objective in nature, are on the right path to recognize the distinct character of ethnic groups.[118] Being careful about not using objective criteria excessively himself, Eriksen adds that "ethnic groups or categories generally have notions of common ancestry justifying their unity".[119]

There is one more potential flaw in Cohen's argumentation. Neither class nor feminism legitimize state or any similar political construct existing in the world. Even though the intention of most authors in interactionism was to limit their research within much smaller communities than the state, the implications of their conclusions can go much further. Iver B.

---

[117] Abner Cohen, "Introduction: The Lesson of Ethnicity", Abner Cohen (ed.) *Urban Ethnicities*, pp. ix-xxiv, p. xix

[118] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives,* op. cit., pp. 41-42.

[119] Ibidem, p. 42.

Neumann, an author who bases some of his arguments on ethnographic approach to nationalism, recognizes the potential implications and even criticizes interactionists for limiting their research only to small ethnic groups, subcultures, villages and small communities, adding that the choice of units of analysis can be raised to a much higher level (which later he did in the book, by analysing European "Otherness").[120] Therefore, we find that if one recognizes obvious differences between ethnic groups, states and civilizations, this does not mean that each further discussion about their similarities is obsolete.

Eriksen further develops Barth's findings by introducing different degrees of ethnic cohesion, offered by Don Handelman in 1977, when he recognized the distinctions "between the ethnic category, the ethnic network, the ethnic association and the ethnic community", where the first one is a very loose unit, while, the last one is the most compact and tight. Category means the person who is within it is well aware of "others" and that one should behave differently towards them than towards "us". An individual in the ethnic category also has an idea of a distinct group origin. The ethnic network goes further and it can influence allocation of common goods among its members. For example, if high, well paid, state job positions in Serbian capital, Belgrade, are occupied by Montenegrins, that means they already function as a network. The ethnic association includes active involvement of its members in common institutions, and activism, even within political parties with a clear ethnic mark. Finally, ethnic community is a "kind of collectivity (that) has, in addition to ethnic networks and shared political organisation, a territory with more or less permanent physical boundaries."[121]

Ethnic communities are in control of many nation-states in the world. They did not appear out of nothing, but in most cases, they required time for evolution to happen in order to grow from the ethnic category to the community. Even modernist authors recognize evolutionary paths of present day nationalisms. For example, Eric Hobsbawm claims that he only deals with the third phase of the national evolution when "nationalist programmes acquire mass support that nationalist always claim they represent".[122] It resembles the ethnic community, while the previous phases, like "phase B" - when nationalists formed "a body of pioneers" - and phase A - when "cultural, literal, folkloric" traits were important, while political action was non-existent - remind more of categories, networks and associations.[123] Even though both

---

[120] Iver B. Nojman, *Upotrebe drugog - Istok u formiranju evropskog identiteta*, Službeni glasnik, Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, 2011, p. 25.
[121] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives,* op. cit., pp. 49-51
[122] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, op. cit., p. 12.
[123] Ibidem.

Handelman's and Hobsbawm's concepts are strictly ideal types and probably have never existed in reality in such a perfect form, they can serve to understand that every group with at least basic self - other awareness has a potential to become political (whatever "political" means in one epoch). Therefore, examples of ethnic categories, networks etc. which have not evolved into units of political control over, as proofs that nationalism is not cultural in its essence, but solely political, remain impotent when introducing the ideas of evolution. This will be further elaborated in Chapter 4.

According to Eriksen, there is one more crucial deficiency in Barth's theory, and that is the idea that ethnic identity of an individual is strictly defined in a subjective sense.[124] This means that one is an Englishman if he decides to be so, and not by the definition of others. Eriksen recognises at least two ways how this may not be entirely true. First of all, if a person decides to change his "belonging" to a certain group, and makes a move to another, that person is likely to be deprived of privilege he/she had in the previous group. In the realm of nations, even if a person has dual citizenship, one is still of limited choice, because there is a whole objective structure (state/set of rules, privilege etc) determining an individual. Secondly, ethnicity is sometimes firmly connected to some sort of an objective feature, like colour of the skin, and some societies are exclusive enough they would simply not accept a person of a different race as one of their own. Eriksen also notices that theorists tend to either emphasize subjective or objective feature, when it comes to identity. The truth is that both have influence to a certain degree. Moreover, he uses famous Giddens theory of structuration, which explains that, yes, an individual can be an agent sometimes, but his action is also limited by objective forces of social structures. Finally, he criticizes Barth's "individual preference" of identity, through the work of Sandra Wallman, who depicted where the former might be mistaken: "The ultimate constraint must lie in the fact that no one can take up an option which is not there", meaning that one can decide to be a Jedi in a state census, but one will still be defined by objective forces.[125] Einstein, Freud and Ernest Gellner could have defined themselves as the citizens of the world, by they still had to escape the Nazi regime, for they were objectively unwanted, because of "who they were" in the eyes of others.

Additionally, one specific contribution of interactionism as a part of modernism should be mentioned. If authors of ethnic competition, like Brass or Hechter, thought of it solely in a sense that nationalism is a consequence of a rational choice that occur either due to competition

---

[124] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives,* op. cit., p. 65.
[125] Ibidem.

for the scarce resources or as a way out of the oppression, interactionists have widened this idea. Eriksen proposes to think about ethnicity and nationalism in a broader way. That ethnic symbols and identities can be deployed by a group as political resource not only when they expect some sort of practical gains, but even for completely irrational goals.[126] For example, how can one explain the defiance of small nations against large empires, like it was the case with Yugoslavia against NATO in 1999. This argument, and the universality of the idea that cultures are used as political resources is accepted as unquestionable by ethno-symbolists as well.

Finally, it is more than worth mentioning that the entire subfield within international relations has emerged based on the focus of boundaries between societies, not between political constructs such as states. Physical borders can be crossed, but mental ones are harder to comprehend. The constructivist theory in international relations, which gained its wide recognition after the 1989, approached and maybe even overused the self - other perspective. Thus, ethnic groups, nations, regions, civilizations, all have been units of analysis in scientific efforts to recognize the mental borders of Europe, Russia, Northern Europeans, or of the Middle East, their maintenance and dichotomization. From the ethnic category, to the civilization, all eventual actors with potentially distinct identities in international relations, according to proponents of this approach, should be examined. For example, Iver Neumann urges scientists not to restrict themselves solely to nations, but to focus on all possible communities and only then to decide where do boundaries of one unit reside.[127]

3.3. Culture and its Persistence – What is missing?

There are at least two critiques directed at interactionism which we can find justified. The first one is conceptual, while the second is related to the inherent problem of social sciences in general, with interactionism carrying the seeds of it in particular.

The first critique addresses the fact that Barth, Eriksen and others view culture as something too relative and easily replaceable. On the other hand, this does not mean they claim entire ethnic groups and nations to be replaceable, just their cultural parts. Their view, that groups should be examined through time in order to comprehend which boundaries are durable and maintained, is considered to be the adoption of Fernand Braudel's view of history, who argues

---

[126] Ibidem, p. 89.
[127] Iver B. Nojman, *Upotrebe drugog - Istok u formiranju evropskog identiteta*, op. cit., p. 55

that only slow evolving and more permanent structures are worth examining.[128] However, interactionists emphasize that only organizations are durable, not cultures themselves. We find interesting that Eriksen tried to interpret and explain Barth's idea of cultural relativity through the example of Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia. For him, as a theoretician who watched the presentation of ethnic hatred at its worse in the 1990's, this "ethnic hatred" was something that was reinvented after almost fifty years of peace. This period without a conflict was sufficient evidence to prove cultural relativity, as he argued: "Presumed cultural differences which had been irrelevant for two generations were suddenly 'remembered' and invoked as proof that it was impossible for the two groups to live side by side."[129]

There are two problems with such a statement. One is empirical, while the other is again conceptual. First, peace between the nations in Yugoslavia was everything but absolute. If nothing, the ethnic hatred was preserved among both Croatian and Serbian diaspora, with Croats being more active, even trying to smuggle weapons in 1972 in order to begin "the uprising" against the "oppressive communist regime", after a failed national revolution in 1971. Besides overt signs that hatred was not "suddenly remembered" and "irrelevant", the entire communist system was built upon a structure that enforced "a national key" system, which meant every single political, state, military etc., position was allocated in a proportional ethnic manner. Thus, even though the idea of Yugoslav identity existed, the ethnic or national boundaries were, ironically, emphasized by the system itself.

Second, the recurrence of hatred in Yugoslavia appeared when interaction was augmented due to the collapse of the bi-polar international system. At first glance, this fact may seem as something that only reinforces Eriksen's findings. Nonetheless, the counter argumentation may come from his own insights and improvements of Barth's theory. If an objective structure influences individual behaviour, there is also a possibility of an agent's action. Ethnic groups as separate agents, acted more or less in a homogeneous way during the crisis, and their actions were legitimized by the old patterns of behaviour, old dichotomies, stretching at least two centuries in the past.[130] Therefore, old culture, customs and old hatred were being latently

---

[128] Jovo Bakić, *Teorijsko-istraživački pristupi etničkoj vezanosti (ethnicity), nacionalizmu i naciji*, op. cit., p. 246

[129] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives,* op. cit., p. 46.

[130] The examples of first noted modern dichotomizations stretch at least to the 18th century, when Serbian Orthodox religious leaders taught their ethnic flock how to greet among themselves in order to differ from the opposing religious Catholic flock. Of course, the reaction on the other side was swift, so the matching greeting was introduced among Catholics themselves. "Pomozbog", versus „Hvaljen Isus" on the Catholic side, which later became a distinctive, national greeting among Croatians. See: Milorad Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije – Tom I*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1989 Beograd, p. 31.

cultivated, but never forgotten or dismissed. The qualities of the two ethnic contents decided in which manner will the groups act. If the same or very similar dichotomies were used by both Serbs and Croats in the nineteenth century, in 1914, 1941 and 1991, then some sort of a persistency exists in the culture itself, not just in the organisation. Maybe those were indeed invented at some point, but how come that those recur in each great European crisis in the last two hundred years. The organisational existence (of any kind) of Serbs and Croats is definitely more durable than the culture, but the culture also seems to be more permanent than what interactionists would expect. Even though each new conflict produces new memories, myths or even values, the old ones should be also in the focus of every study of a particular nationalism. Even Barth accepted this critique that came from the field of ethno-symbolism as justified, in a sense that theory should be concerned, at least slightly more than interactionists propose, about the question – what is a boundary truly made of?[131] Something similar to the Yugoslav case can be seen in the old *ethnies*. Anthony Smith claims that: "It is quite possible for ethnic solidarity to be overlaid by other types of allegiance for certain periods, be they dynastic, congregational, class or regional; but, where an *ethnie* is concerned, we should expect the periodic re-emergence of ethnic solidarity and institutional co-operation in sufficient force and depth to override these other kinds of loyalty, especially in the face of external enemies and dangers".[132] One may argue interactionism and ethno-symbolism make a perfect match, after realizing that the former recognizes the explanatory potential of *longue durée*, and the latter acknowledge that interactions spark the ethnic identity to either emerge, or to recur and "reinvent" itself. The *longue durée* in Yugoslavian case is seen in the cultural content. However, Smith views it also in another, broader sense, which we will discuss later.

The second problem of interactionism stems from the academia's insatiable urge to find regularities and patterns even where they do not exist, or where it might be dangerous to remind of them. "If one goes out to look for ethnicity, one will 'find' it and thereby contribute to constructing it", as Eriksen notices.[133] It is a problematic issue in social sciences in general, which Robert Merton articulated in an article from 1948: "(…) a false definition of the situation evoking a new behaviour which makes the originally false conception come true."[134] This might be particularly dangerous if one uses interactionism as a theoretical background in a

---

[131] Jovo Bakić, *Teorijsko-istraživački pristupi etničkoj vezanosti (ethnicity), nacionalizmu i naciji*, op. cit., p. 246.
[132] Anthony Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations,* op. cit., p. 15.
[133] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives,* op. cit., p. 218
[134] Robert Merton, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy", *The Antioch Review, Vol. 8, No. 2*, Antioch Review, Inc, 1948, pp. 193-210, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4609267, p. 195.

study, because political consequences of inventing "self-otherness" relation where it does not exist, can be both good and bad. Good in a sense that it can contribute to the homogenisation within a group and to the establishment of the community. Bad, when "otherness" is invented or reinforced in order to justify political or cultural confrontation. Iver Neumann, finds that there is an on-going production of "otherness" in Europe, namely China and Islam. He also states that one of the most famous hypotheses from the 1990's about the "clash of civilizations", is but a mere political advice that certain communities ought to be more homogeneous.[135] Ironically, Neumann's fear that academia might influence politics too much is an utmost opposite of what most intellectuals claim - that politicians should listen to academia more often, assuming its inherent moral perfection, infallibility and predictability. The dichotomy "self - other" seems to be too strict in defining what a collective identity is, depriving it of many other qualities stemming from an individual's everyday life. Johan Galtung also discusses the problems that might derive from a binary worldview. He argues that formal sciences such as mathematics and logic may contribute to an impoverished perspective on a certain issue, for "if mathematic is viewed as a formal game with one basic rule, that a theorem T and its negation – T cannot be both valid, then there may be violent consequences".[136]

Galtung also proposes a solution throughout his book, although highly dependent on a researcher's desire to be proactive, that might be also applied to interactionism. He elaborates on something that is called a "constructivist peace theory", which is "the systematic comparison of theories with values".[137] Although such an idealism may be seen as unrealistic and even too optimistic, it is the only solution that does not contradict the idea of freedom of research.

---

[135] Iver B. Nojman, *Upotrebe drugog - Istok u formiranju evropskog identiteta*, op. cit., p. 56.
[136] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, op. cit., p. 206.
[137] Ibidem, p. 9.

4. Ethno-symbolism – Understanding Myths

4.1. Special Methodology – A Nation's Name, Myths, Symbols…

The essential difference between modernism and ethno-symbolism is already discussed earlier to a certain degree. A problem one may stumble upon while reading the literature on nations and nationalism is that differences between approaches are very often overemphasized. Even authors tend to assess their fellow's positions as extreme ones, in order to develop their polemic arguments that would completely discredit opponents' perspectives. In the end, even though Gellner named Smith a perennialist, and Smith's perception of Gellner was that the latter completely dismissed ethnic groups from the discussion on nationalism, neither of the two belong to any extreme, and both of them were aware of that fact.[138] Consequential bandwagoning on one or another side, means that one misses the point of discussion and renounces nuances within the theory, without even realizing the differences are not as big as substantial as they may think. One of the "misled" was also Thomas Hylland Eriksen who accepted the vulgar interpretation of Smith's work and wrote that: "Some writers have argued that nationalism and national communities can have profound roots in earlier ethnic communities or *ethnies*, but it would be misleading to claim that there is an unbroken continuity from the pre-modern communities or 'cultures' to the national ones."[139] One thing is to have roots in something, but completely another to write about "unbroken continuity", which is certainly not what Smith argues for.

What he argues is that there are indeed many things that are common to old *ethnie*s and to nations. He describes some of those which he genuinely finds to be the lowest common denominator of the two, but also some that, in his opinion, are falsely described by modernists as "new".

First of all, we need to go through Smith's understanding of what *ethnie* is. Arguably, it can be best done by going through its dimensions, which are, according to Smith: **A common name; a common myth of descent; a shared history; a distinctive shared culture; and association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity.**[140] It is hard to imagine that there was an unnamed *ethnie* at any time, either by themselves or by others. As the most recent example of

---

[138] Milan Subotić, *Na drugi pogled – prilog studijama nacionalizma*, op. cit., p. 76.
[139] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives,* op. cit., p. 129.
[140] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, op. cit., pp. 22-31.

ethnic group name construction, Smith stated the Muslims: "An interesting example of this (of name creation, M.V.) occurred recently in Yugoslavia, where the Muslims in Bosnia decided to adopt the name 'Muslim' as an ethnic designation in the Yugoslav census which requires everyone to name their nationality."[141] Little did Smith know that Muslims were soon to become Bosniaks, a proto-national unit within one multi-ethnic state. Before acquiring other attributes of the nation, it was necessary to unify the population under one distinct, national name.

Another dimension which the most prominent author of ethno-symbolism proposes is a common myth of descent. In his words, it "attempts to provide an answer to questions of similarity and belonging: why are we all alike" in several layers, in a sense that "there are myths of spatial and temporal origins, of migration, of ancestry and filiation, of the golden age, of decline and exile and rebirth".[142] Myths have to be more than fiction. Therefore, it needs to be coherently and professionally narrated and placed in the space-time continuum. "'History' in this sense must tell a story, it must please and satisfy as narrative, it must be all of a piece, like the Homeric epics and Ossian. It must also educate."[143] A distinctive shared culture can be many things, as interactionists and modernists also described. It can be based on language, religion, the difference in dialect (Scottish identity for example) etc. However, Smith believes that one general rule can be applied: "The greater the number of differentiating cultural ties and/or unique cultural traits, the more intense the sense of separate ethnicity, and the greater the chances of ethnic persistence."[144]

Specific territory in ethno-symbolic sense has "three aspects of ethnic homelands: sacred centres, commemorative association and external recognition".[145] Finally, a sense of solidarity is something that profoundly intrigues theorists of nations and nationalism. In fact, it is the key subject of analysis in Anderson's writings. Smith believes that solidarity is one of the few main ingredients of *ethnie* and in order for a group to qualify to be named as such "there must also emerge a strong sense of belonging and an active solidarity, which in time of stress and danger can override class, factional or regional divisions within the community.[146]

---

[141] Ibidem, p. 23.
[142] Ibidem, pp. 24-25.
[143] Ibidem, p. 26.
[144] Ibidem, p. 28.
[145] Ibidem.
[146] Ibidem, p. 30.

Smith believes that all of these features of an *ethnie* can also be found in present-day nations. In fact, most of modernists would highly agree with him. Smith's dimensions of an *ethnie* can be fully applied to any nation or a group that strives to be called as such. Even if he also believes in "obvious" differences between Eastern, more ethnic, and Western, more civic nationalism, Smith still argues that even the civic ones share the qualities of an *ethnie*. For its members are attached to a territory and have some sense about it; there is a specific community and solidarity backed up by common laws and institutions; belonging is defined by the citizenship, and most importantly; all the previously stated present the common shared values and culture, or "civic religion".[147] In fact, Smith shows awareness that nationalism struck different areas of the world at different times, which impedes simple classification of nationalisms. Therefore, there were all sorts of nationalism, like "religious and secular, bourgeois, aristocratic and proletarian, conservative and socialist, bureaucratic and populist (etc.)" ones.[148]

Nevertheless, regardless of the form or content that a nation has taken, some other features which old *ethnies* also had, were, according to Smith, inevitable. Whichever nation we try to observe, common myths, memories and values are present. If nation is being built up, it also needs to acquire the said features of *ethnie*, as it is the case with Bosniaks recently. A common, ancient origin is actively being sought for, and present-day individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been connected to the old Illyrians or Iapodes for example. Smith also tries to provide an answer why is this happening. Mostly, it is due to people's need to overcome mortality. In his opinion: "(…) myths and symbols, values and memories, shape the nation-to-be. They are not simply 'instruments' of leaders and elites of the day, not even of whole communities. They are potent signs and explanations, they possess explosive power that goes far beyond the 'rational' uses which elites and social scientists deem appropriate."[149]

The opposing argumentation of modernists is that such communities (*ethnies*) could not exist in a way Smith imagines, and yes, such similar features can be found in modern nations. In fact, Gellner's findings are that it would be almost ridiculous to find agrarian societies to be that culturally homogeneous and solidary. It might be said that the ruling strata had a similar or the same culture ('high culture'), but a large majority of old ethnic community were culturally heterogenous and dispersed. Thus, there could not had been an 'imagined community' before the industrial revolution occurred alongside with capitalism. Hobsbawm

---

[147] Ibidem, pp. 134-136.
[148] Ibidem, pp. 134-135.
[149] Ibidem, p. 201.

presents his A, B and C phases in the nation-creation process, but in his opinion, those only started in the late 18th century, with few notable exceptions which do not break the rule. Eriksen describes how Norwegian nationalism had to be literally invented after the separation of this country from Sweden in 1905.[150] Already described example of how French were made out of peasants, supports this thesis, too.

The thing is that Anthony Smith does not negate that modern-day nations were invented or reinvented. As a matter of fact, he strongly supports modernist perception about the entirely new political society that emerged out of the French Revolution. What he argues is that modernists tend to first underestimate earlier epochs, and then to overestimate modern times in terms of communal qualities of the nation in opposition to *ethnie*. In fact, Smith claims that *ethnie* has also been constantly invented or reinvented. Phases A, B and C were nothing new and cultures which served to back up political units were also old-established. The process of creation of Norwegians was neither the first, nor will be the last with same logic, involving an effort of finding the reason for a community's existence in the past, followed by explanations of the community's greatness, antiquity and legitimacy. *Ethnie* was always legitimized in the same way the nations are legitimized today, by a "constitutive political myth", for which Smith uses a neologism that he popularized - *mythomoteur*.[151] Indeed, some societies were not always homogenous throughout history, and certain claims provided by Gellner could be acceptable. Although, only for some societies. Therefore, *mythomoteurs* were not always communal, or horizontal in a sense that they spread across the entire society. It was enough to have one *mythomoteur*, within a small, elite group of people if someone wanted to justify his 'mandate of heaven'. However, there was always something constitutive that justified the existence of *this* or *that* dynasty. Hence, Smith uses two additional terms in order to describe all the possible embodiments of *mythomoteur*. The one that was attached to the ruler, his family or dynasty, Smith calls *dynastic mythomoteur*, and the other one, attached to the entire communities, *communal mythomoteur*.[152]

Out of numerous examples the author provides, we will take just one that depicts his point the best, at least in our opinion. "Typical dynastic *mythomoteurs* and cultures are encountered in the Frankish realm under the Merovingians and Carolingians. The Merovingians after their conversion to Christianity under Clovis (c. Al) 496) soon adopted a 'Trojan lineage' tracing

---

[150] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives,* op. cit., pp. 123-125.
[151] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, op. cit., p. 58.
[152] Ibid, pp. 58-61.

their line to Aeneas and his wandering hand of exiled Trojans and ancestor of the Romans; this put them on a par with other 'barbarian' kingdoms whose rulers also realized the functions of an ennobling classical pedigree which would make their rule more accept able to their Romanized populations. Soon, this 'Trojan myth of descent' was challenged by and fused with Catholic legitimations, which the usurping Carolingians found especially useful. In AD 754, Pope Paul legitimized Pepin's usurpation in return for Frankish aid against Lombard nobles; Pepin became the chosen of God and his realm '(…) a new kingdom of David. The Frank people,' he said, 'had a special place inscribed in heaven because of its aid to the church, similar to the place the people of Israel had held.'"[153] Later the myth of the chosen dynasty was reinforced by the idea of 'chosen people' when they fought against Saracens in the name of Christianity. It were the same people that had a lineage to the Trojan nobility and were chosen by the Pope, but did not have to kneel before him (at least did not have to until the 13th century). 'Chosen land' was soon added to 'chosen people' and 'chosen dynasty', which, according to Smith, ended in an easy establishment of a French ethnic state. Once dynastic myth soon spread down the societal pyramid, it soon encompassed the entire society.[154] However, Smith does not deny modernization was crucial for the establishment of the French ethno-national state, and accepts the findings of Eugene Weber as legitimate ones. On the other hand, as we already mentioned before, Smith doubts modernist claims about the isolationism of earlier cultures and their heterogeneity, because in his opinion, they lack evidence, while on the other hand, Greek Hellenic communal *mythomoteur*, communal *mythomoteur* of Jews, Armenians and later Russians and others, prove that this might not have been the case.[155]

Hence, modern nation-building must also include the building of the constitutional myth, and explanations that provide the members of a society the story and the reasoning of their origin. Of course, in the Middle Ages, it was done by linking a dynasty or a community directly to the God. However, even though we still have "the chosen nations" today, "with the waning of beliefs in heaven and hell, the privatization of beliefs and the reaction against 'meaningless rituals', the ethnic past of the community has been sundered from its religious anchorage; and men and women had to look elsewhere for that immortality which so many desire. (…) ethnic nationalism becomes a 'surrogate' religion".[156]

---

[153] Ibidem, p. 59.
[154] Ibidem, pp. 59-60.
[155] Ibidem, pp. 61-68.
[156] Ibidem, p. 176.

Anthony Smith accepts that nations are a novelty, because they have some features *ethnies* never had, and also that nationalism is a product of "a triple Western revolution", which included "a division of labour (Gellner), a revolution in the control of administration (every single modernist) and a revolution in cultural co-ordination (Anderson)".[157] However, what he does not accept is that nations could exist without the ethnic bonds that are persistent and durable. Bonds in a sense that people need collective immortality and solidarity as much as they needed it six hundred years ago and that those are not invented "yesterday". On the other hand, he disagrees with the perennialists about the fact that nations existed all the time, only in different times and shapes. Smith believes that cultures are prone to change and reinvention. But what he sees as perennial is exactly the fact that they have been reinvented all the time. As a matter of fact, he claims that: "In no period of world history has ethnicity been altogether absent or *ethnie* played no social role."[158]

4.2. Longue Dureé of Communities

Anthony Smith finds some ideas proposed by perennialists to be also very useful. In fact, that is the peculiarity that differs him from modernists. *Longue Dureé* is surely not the concept developed by the authors of perennialism. It is a notion that is widely known as something that stems from the French Annales School and its most prominent author, Fernand Braudel. Perennialism, on the other hand, appropriates this concept for the study of nationalism. John Armstrong explains that what is perennial, can be understood only if a phenomenon is perceived through a longer period of time. If Christian-Muslim conflict in Europe did not occur for decades, it does not mean that it will not emerge again out of interaction that might be spurred by some crisis, natural disaster, third parties etc. This is where the argumentation of interactionism is widened. When boundaries are either remembered, or regularly maintained, the old cultural contents will prevail due to the efforts of the new generations to reimagine and recreate sense out of the old, widely known material. John Armstrong would not be surprised at all by the rise of the right-wing parties and ideas during the European migrant crisis. In fact, he would probably repeat the thought from his 1982 book, *Nations before nationalism*: "In the Islamic-Christian conflict, a kind of supraethnicity nominally based on religious adherence arose. The way adherents of each of the two universal religions defined their collective identity by reference to the opposed civilization closely resembles the way boundaries of smaller ethnic groups are determined by a process of excluding outsiders. In treating such questions, the

---

[157] Ibidem, p. 131.
[158] Ibidem, p. 210.

perspective of *longue duree* is useful principally for showing persistence of certain underlying values together with their occasional reinforcement or alteration by injection of new elements."[159]

Longue duree is not only connected to cultural contents, but also to the very architecture of the nation-building process. Anthony Smith believes that regardless of what the content may be (but it is mostly the already known one and not entirely new), besides the sterile institutional framework that was particularly popular during the process of decolonisation, a nation-building must include myths, symbols and memories as a prerequisite for bonding and the proper work of institutions. In his own words: "We can see that 'nation-building' is not simply a matter of establishing the appropriate institutions or generating a complex class structure around a communications infrastructure. Nor is it a once and for-all affair. Creating nations is a recurrent activity, which has to be renewed periodically. It is one that involves ceaseless re-interpretations, rediscoveries and reconstructions; each generation must re-fashion national institutions and stratification systems in the light of the myths, memories, values and symbols in the 'past', which can best minister to the needs and aspirations of its dominant social groups and institutions."[160]

There are two issues that need to be elaborated after the above-written quotation. First of all, it makes sense to say there are multi-ethnic states, mainly former European colonies which have not been built around one dominant ethnic identity. Almost the entire African continent and most of South-East Asia might be perfect examples. Nevertheless, it is where the *longue duree* principle should be best explained. Nigeria is often found as an example that breaks the argumentation of ethno-symbolism in half. However, Smith also tries to deal with this issue explaining that: "Quite simple, Nigeria will have to invent ethnic ties and sentiments perhaps by rewriting ethnic histories and conflating ethnic cultures, if the state is to form a nation out of itself."[161] Not that history did not confirm his findings. The Islamist group "Boko Haram" is the biggest threat for the Nigerian state, and it is entrenched in one religion, but also in a single ethnicity, the Hausa one. Ironically, Abner Cohen uses Hausa traders in big cities to explain that a lot of things can be perceived as ethnicities, probably without realizing that there is quite a difference between London brokers and Hausa traders.[162] Even more, Hausa is one

---

[159] John Alexander Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982, p. 286.
[160] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, op. cit., p. 206.
[161] Ibidem.
[162] Abner Cohen, "Introduction: The Lesson of Ethnicity", pp. xix-xx

of the largest African ethnic groups, and there is no a single state that gathers its members, but they are scattered throughout Western Africa, with Nigeria being their most common home-state. The artificial establishment of the Indonesian national ideology "Pancasila" (meaning "five principles") in 1945, by Sukarno who was at the time the president of this Asian country, proves that even some "Third World" leaders were aware the nation has to include more than buildings stuffed with bureaucrats. Yet, the question about the durability of such an invention remains unanswered, because the period necessary for the analysis that includes *longue duree* has not yet expired, at least in our opinion.

Secondly, if one takes the previous quote on Nigeria out of the context of Smith's writings, it would make sense to conclude that there is absolutely no difference between his work and interactionism. However, Smith does not believe that "re-emergence", "rediscoveries", or "recurrence" mean that the cultural background of those who are the agents is *tabula rasa*. In fact, besides the anthropological *longue duree* of ethnic groups and nations that, there is also some sort of the same phenomenon that has deep, psychological background. In addition to the fact that the agents of "rediscovery" use ratio when they pull the old cultural dichotomies and qualities out of the past times, because it is simply the first material they face when reinventing is needed, there is a deeper, psychological explanation of this recurrence. Smith only scratches the surface of this problem by elaborating that: "Each generation, (...) constructs its own social maps and chooses its specific ethnic moralities, but it does not so within limited matrix formed by a strong social attachment to specific 'myth-symbol complexes', particular landscapes and unique ranges of epochs and personages, for these constitute the intrinsic ethnicity of particular *ethnie*. (...) The images they piece together (each new generation, M.V.) and disseminate through the education system and media become the often unconscious assumptions of later generations in whose social consciousness they form a kind of rich sediment."[163]

There are authors who more profoundly theorize the impact psychology has on cultural practices. Johan Galtung views civilizations as cultures in their broadest embodiment, which are built upon the deep sediments of the collective mind. He finds that *cosmologies* or *deep cultures* are "collectively held subconscious ideas about what constitutes normal and natural reality". [164] Galtung also creates his own theory of civilizations, where he holds that there are at least seven that differ between them in a way that member of one or another has a completely

---

[163] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, op. cit., p. 207
[164] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization,* op. cit., p. 211.

dissimilar understanding of seven spaces of human existence, which are: Nature, self, society, world, time, transperson and episteme.[165] In practice, it means that Johan from Berlin believes "naturally" that society should be vertically and hierarchically organized, for he belongs to the Western *deep culture*, and Tenzin from Tibet believes in horizontal harmony that would be more prone to nurturing equity. Galtung's logic may be useful if one descends to the lower floor of ethnicity and to apply the same theoretical principles on nations, or ethnic groups. That means that each separate culture may have created a potential for different understanding of the spaces of existence, and that humans tend to recreate old patterns without even realizing or rationalizing it. Unconsciously, as a natural way of doing things.

Another author tries to find the very material that makes people capable of constantly reinventing and maintaining nations. Michael Billig notices that at the time of his writing, there was "no readily term to describe the collection of ideological habits which reproduce established nations as nations", so he presented the term *banal nationalism,* "to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced".[166] He also adds that: "Daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged, in the loves of its ordinary citizenry."[167] Billig is convinced that nationalism is banal, for it gains its strength in ordinary things, often unnoticed ones, which makes us believe that nationalism is natural. Those "things" can be so various that cannot even be detected. From the way of talking and thinking about the nation, over a flag on a building, sports, songs, all the way to the postal stamps, language standardizations etc. Even though he restricted himself into studying the Western, firmly-established nations, the logic that everyday banal interactions, rituals and symbols serve as reminders of "who we are" can certainly be extended to even the smallest ethnic groups. On the other hand, nations have probably permeated lives of their populations with such complexity, strength and subtlety in a way that no ethnicity did before, which is a mere consequence of modernity.

Both Galtung's and Billig's findings could be complementary to the Smith ones. Even though Billig is considered to be either a modernist or is often qualified under the "new approaches", which we saw earlier, it seems that his claims would undoubtedly fit in Smith's theory. Nevertheless, the only missing peace in "the new approach" is that it does not deal more with the older ethnic group appearances.

---

[165] Ibidem, p. 213.
[166] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, op. cit., p. 6.
[167] Ibidem.

4.3. Too much culture?

We consider ethno-symbolism to be the most comprehensive theory of nationalism, which we believe is mainly the result of the initial intention of its most prominent author, A. Smith. He tried to find a way then to reconcile hitherto two opposed mainstream approaches. Essentially, we believe that Smith managed to fulfil this task. Nevertheless, criticism of his work has occurred over time, as it naturally happens with most theories.

The first critique is directed at practical consequences that ethno-symbolism produces. Authors who study nationalism are mostly anti-nationalists in a sense that if something is objectivized and deconstructed, then it is hard for one to remain attached to a phenomenon "smashed to smithereens" by their theoretical argumentation. Surely, it is hard to assume this has always been the case, but one of the biggest objections to Smith is that his theory has dangerous implications on politics. It comes from Montserrat Guibernau who argues that ethno-symbolism places values, symbols, myths, heroes and tradition at the centre of its study, and this is perilous, because nationalist ideologies view them as crucial components of their doctrines. Moreover, the very fact the science claims the inevitability of these cultural traits for every nation to be, only serves to reinforce the legitimacy of potential destructive force "For instance, the findings of ethno-symbolism, in an intended or unintended manner, are likely to turn into formidable assets to be employed as legitimizing elements for a nation demanding self-determination. Proving that the community has pre-modern roots and that its culture shows a certain degree of continuity is a key objective for the creators of the nationalist doctrine."[168] Johan Galtung also provides an insight into how dangerous and violent can myth, symbols and interpretations of history can be. He explains it through the concept of cultural violence under which: "We mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.[169] Political, historical and psychological strength of nationalism is indeed tremendous, and every reminder that cultural aspects of a nation are of its utmost importance are, thus, dangerous. On the other hand, the ease with which myths, symbols, histories, names etc, are deconstructed and the simple

---

[168] Montserat Guibernau, "Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: a critical assessment", in *Nations and Nationalism 10 (1/2),* ASEAN, 2004, pp. 125-141, p. 127.
[169] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, op. cit., p. 196.

psychological explanations of their strengths, underline the philosophical weakness nationalism inevitably faces.

It is a similar critique as the one directed at interactionism. If Smith stopped writing after *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, the criticism of such kind would probably be unjustified. However, this author is considered to be one of the most productive ones for he wrote volumes of literature on nationalism afterwards. In his later works he indeed lessened the emphasis on political features of the nation and increased his attention on cultural aspects of the phenomenon. The difference can be seen if one compares his definitions of the nation from the 1991 book, *National Identity*, and the one he offered in 2002 in an article titled "When is a Nation?". Guibernau lists the differences as follows: "Three major changes can be identified when comparing the two definitions. In the most recent one: (1) the 'mass' character of public culture has been eliminated; (2) reference to a 'common economy' has also been removed; and (3) 'common legal rights and duties for all members' have been replaced by 'common laws and customs'."[170]

All that leads us to the second problem of his work. Constant accusations about of theory being perennialistic, in the end led to the polarization of the field. Even authors themselves, maybe even under the pressure of academic debates, started advocating something that they were firmly against initially. The example of Smith's wanderings with the definition of the nation maybe expresses this change the best. He also planted the seed for a potential change in *The Ethnic Origins*, when he enclosed the findings with a strong opinion: "If there was no model of past ethnicity and no pre-existent *ethnie*, there could be neither nations nor nationalism."[171] Such a claim diverges from earlier, more balanced ones in the same book.

Another question can also be raised, and the same quote can be used to point out the problem. What happens with nations that did not have any similar pre-existing *ethnie*, but create nationalism from scratch? What would Smith say about Indonesian national ideology, invented seventy years ago, and still functioning? Was there maybe not enough time to use *longue duree* principle in order to understand all the possible ramifications, or maybe Indonesian case is the perfect one to apply interactionism in a sense of studying the moment of cultural content creation on already established boundaries of one society? This can be left opened to

---

[170] Ibidem.
[171] Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, op. cit., p. 214.

discussion, but can surely be the direction in which future critiques can be articulated, either for modernism or ethno-symbolism.

5. Is an Interdisciplinary Paradigm Possible?

Reading through the literature on nationalism can be indeed a mind boggling and at moments an experience of intellectual schizophrenia. In our opinion, it happens because almost all authors tend, as we argued earlier, to lay emphasis on one or another aspect of nationalism. In most cases, they do it as if there is only one perception of nationalism possible, and it always appears to be the one advocated by an author himself. A reminder that the author stresses only one aspect of nationalism is in most cases neglected. This theoretical "fatality" is a characteristic of the most of modernist and especially perennialist and primordialist works. Such an exclusivity of the latter probably led Rogers Brubaker to a conclusion that primordialism is "a long-dead horse" and that "no serious scholar today holds the view that is routinely attributed to primordialists in straw-man setups, namely that nations or ethnic groups are primordial, unchanging entities".[172]

It was a logical step to invest an effort in an attempt to assemble exclusive parts of each of the two dominant theories of nations and nationalism in the 80s. That is exactly what Anthony Smith did. He extracted the employable core of perennialism in order to remind this overwhelming theory to be aware of people's incongruity with the notion of objective material resources, or the necessary functions of the system. Social structures are also affected by the strong forces of cultures, which every nation nurtures for itself, ending in structural variety of states, societies, regions etc. Nevertheless, Smith was also well aware of the contribution that modernism has for the theory, thus, listing the unquestionable arguments provided by the authors of this approach: "Such is the force and sweep of Ernest's own theory that nobody can fail to be convinced of the centrality and ubiquity of nations and nationalism for the world we live in. Ernest has revealed the sociological foundations of our world of nations and shown us why nationalism must remain a vital and enduring force in the contemporary world. His originality consists in demonstrating why the link between culture and politics is so intrinsic to the modem world and why it must generate so much passion."[173]

Exactly the fact that Gellner discovered "the sociological foundation of the world of nations" speaks more than enough about his contribution. Moreover, detection of the crucial structures shaping the national world on macro-level, reveals which features of change, in the more and

---

[172] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism reframed – Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 1996, p. 15.
[173] Anthony Smith, "Memory and modernity: reflections on Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism", op. cit., p. 386.

more globalized surrounding should we pay attention to. For example, if the change in division of labour (in the industrial society) meant the tectonic changes in the organization of society, then we should not be mute to the voices which argue political power is shifting towards the supranational level, consequently leading to a new change in division of labour.[174]

Benedict Anderson with his radical theory, contributed to the understanding of the influence that an entirely new system of informational structure, emerged out of capitalism, had on the development of an unprecedented homogeneity. The increasing ease of the information flow generated a possibility to think and act more uniformly on large territories. Anderson's most important contribution is an explanation of the change in mind of an individual, propelled by printing capitalism, which was so revolutionary that one accepted the structures of governance like his own, also as never before. Nationalism was, thus, a phenomenon that permeated human existence in its totality. If we perceive tendencies of the contemporary world, Anderson's arguments can also find a fertile soil for revitalization. A new informational infrastructure dominates human everyday – The Internet. Intuitive logic would argue that if Internet is free and limitless, then a potential for the creation of a global nation is already here. However, current debates show that the Internet is a double-edged sword, since its manifestation may lead to an entirely different direction. People are not generally open to unknown and they use their freedom to interact with those who are similar and share the same views. Even more, the Internet has become a perfect space for *dichotomization* to occur. Nevertheless, Anderson pointed out the importance communications infrastructure has on the creation of nations in an unprecedented way.

All other modernists, Hobsbawm, Nairn, Hechter, Brass etc. derive their approaches from Gellner's theory. Gellner's altitude of abstraction was so high that the material left for research on lower levels was overwhelming. Not one of these authors denies the claims of their sociological authority, but only builds-up around his claims. Hobsbawm for example, deals with the phase C of historical development of nationalism (when "nationalist programmes

---

[174] For example, William I. Robinson is convinced that the only purpose of the existence of states is for global capital to maintain control over the masses. All of this happens because masses are becoming "obsolete labour force" and it is better that guilt for such a state remains within nations than to blame some abstract global powers or shift of division of labour. See: William I. Robinson, *Global Capitalism and Crisis of Humanity*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014. For the shift in power from nations to the global structures see: Ulrich Beck, *What is globalization,* Cambridge: Polity press, 1999 and Eric Hobsbawm, *Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism*, Little, Brown and company, Boston, 2007.

acquire mass support that nationalist always claim they represent").[175] Nairn detected another phase in the 20th century when the former European colonies sought for independence. Other authors also dealt with the specific outcomes of the world system, consisted of national-states units. The ideal of many communities was to become one of those units, due to various reasons. Sometimes because the groups were struggling over the scarce resources and sometimes for the reason that nationalism was the only way out of the oppression. The status of the nation carried many benefits that otherwise would not be available. That is what both Brass and Hechter argued. Yet, all these historical manifestations of national struggles, processes and characteristics made sense only within the Gellner's structural-functional realm. Therefore, they are all complementary among themselves in a way that none of them is mistaken or denies another, but simply deals with different manifestations of the same phenomenon, in different phases, different spaces and times.

However, Gellner's big picture confronts with another paradigm – that of ethno-symbolism. Again, the two are in no way mutually incompatible. Subotić claims that without the legal-political centralization of the state, the cultural coordination and public culture (primarily the education system), and without the capitalist market (which unifies social classes into one community), *ethnies* cannot be transformed into nations. On the other hand, the importance of these modernist key ingredients of the nation-building process are not diminished, if the essential significance of the cultural and symbolic material, with which the very process historically started, is also emphasized.[176] What ethno-symbolism also offers is a distinct methodology that can be used to study qualities of each nation separately. A nation's myths (constitutive ones, of golden ages, of territories, of dark ages, rebirth, heroes etc.), name, symbols and their historical contexts are of a great importance when a nation interacts with another. Also, even when those myths are not socially relevant in one, two or three generations, there is a great probability that the first significant interaction caused by migrations or wars, natural disaster etc., will produce myth-symbolic recurrence of the earlier generations. This is exactly the argument that can be further supported with a firm anthropological basis, which interactionism offers.

Interactionism reinforces the argumentation of ethno-symbolism in a sense that it advocates almost primordial point of view, that ethnicity is a necessery consequence of group contact. It is just that we are not sure when and where will certain traits become socially relevant and,

---

[175] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, op. cit., p. 12.
[176] Milan Subotić, *Na drugi pogled – prilog studijama nacionalizma,* op. cit., p. 70.

thus, produce ethnic groups, nations or even civilizations with distinctive cultures. Ethno-symbolism gives at least partial, yet, very convincing argument that when a group is once established, it is highly realistic its reaffirmation or reestablishment will be based on previous cultural material. Thus, if one studies qualities of a group using the of methodology offered by Smith, then one has a good chance of predicting which features will become socially relevant. Additionally, Smith agrees symbols, myths, history etc, are used by elites as resources in order to achieve political goals. However, the fact interactionists (Eriksen) added that even the political goals of the entire ethnic groups can be irrational, strengthens Smith's argumentation even more, for he believes cultures often go beyond the rational uses.

Interactionism provides a sovereign explanation about the group formation, but ethno-symbolism clarifies its re-emergence. At the same time, the former does not deny the findings of the latter and *vice versa*. On the contrary, even Frederik Barth, as explained earlier, considered ethno-symbolism to be complementary with his own views on ethnicity and nationalism.

Nevertheless, the differences in approaches are existent. They are even more emphasized in literature, due to a tendency of academia to simplify perceptions of those who are the most influential in order to proliferate knowledge as much as possible. Anthony Smith, who himself became a victim of zero-tolerance towards the nuances, is one of the rare who attempted to seek for complementarity of "opposed" views. We believe that his complementarity can be developed even more - starting from agency that is inspired by inner structures (deep cultures, collective unconsciousness, primordial bonding due to interactions…), which interacts with external structures that have their own inner logic (capitalism, industrialisation, division of labour…) and consequences of interaction of the two etc. If Thomas Hylland Eriksen finds theory of structuration to be a solution that can be used to explain how earlier oppositions in theory of nationalism could be solved, it means that the development of any future opposed views about nationalism might found sociological background in the more developed version of Giddens' approach[177]. The evolution of theory of nations and nationalism can move into the similar direction as it is the case with the theory of structuration. A firm basic theory about

---

[177] Like that of Rob Stones, who claims Anthony Giddens provided a theory that can still be very useful, even though it has been widely criticized in the last couple decades. Only it should be more developed in a sense that it should move from general ontology, towards the concrete one, where the task of a researcher would be to defines external structures, internal structures, active agency/agent's practices and outcomes of each analysed society. Stones' developments are also known as "Strong structuration theory", for it seeks concrete ontology. See: Rob Stones, *Structuration Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005.

which aspects of nationalism are the most salient ones, should be established, before entering into the phase of studying each nation separately. In our opinion, a complementary use of modernism, interactionism and ethno-symbolism has the best explanatory potential. We do not advocate "one Euclidian theory", which Smith is so against, but we do believe that exactly these three approaches to nationalism are more potent than others and combined, can offer more nuanced and fruitful outcomes.

One additional incentive for advocating complementarity of the three general approaches stems from peace studies and the superior authority of this discipline, Johan Galtung. He argues that three types of violence – cultural, structural and direct[178] – can be placed in angles of a triangle, where each corner can be a spark which flamed violence.[179] Moreover, cultural violence, if exists, generates the other two, while structural can lead to the rationalization of a society's segregation through culture, and can again cause direct violence. Finally, a mere interaction between any two groups can spur violence, leading to the later dichotomizations and the establishment of boundaries and following structural and cultural violence.[180]

When researching about nationalism, in our opinion, one should always apply an analysis of structures and functions of one society, as those may be potential sources of violence or sources of a conflict resolution and peace-building. For example, Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter in their neo-Marxist, modernist approaches, explain how a system (World system or national system) can rely heavily on the fact that a society is divided into nations or ethnic groups, in order to create the division of labour based on ethnic belonging. .[181] If a person is from Bangladesh or Pakistan, he will be perceived as a human resource that naturally accepts low paid jobs that no citizen of (e.g.) a Gulf state wants. In fact, people from Pakistan or Bangladesh will be forced to seek for jobs outside their respective communities, either because the labour markets in those two countries are satiated, or because average wages are much lower than the lowest wages in Gulf countries. Therefore, World's economic centres not only exploit the existing ethnic and national divisions, but they insist on them, as structures are designed that

---

[178] Galtung defines structural (indirect) and cultural violence as following: "Indirect violence comes from the social structure itself – between humans, between sets of humans (societies), between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world", while cultural violence exists in "religion and ideology, language and art, in science and law, in media and education. The function is simple enough: to legitimize direct and structural violence". See: Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization,* op. cit., p. 2. The same logic applied to violence can also be applied to peace. It can also be cultural, structural and direct, and the same examples that are mentioned above for violence can be used for peace, just in the mirror image.
[179] Ibidem, pp. 199-201.
[180] Ibidem.
[181] See: Tom Nairn, *The break-up of Britain*, op. cit., pp. 337-363, and Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966,* op. cit.

identities already "predefine" the kind of a job is Pakistani or Bangladeshi suited for. Neo-Marxist approach is only one of many stemming from modernism, that can be applied to the structural-functional analysis of real historical cases of nationalism. However, structural violence can be as well rationalized and enforced through culture - through myths, symbols, memories, feelings of attachment etc. The structural dimension can be completely blurred by cultural contents and nationalism, where individual would perceive one's superiority and exceptionalism as 'natural', God given.[182] For example, the citizens of Gulf states can create myths about their exceptionalism and superiority over other races and nations. The sources of the division of labour do not have to be perceived by ordinary citizens as structural ones, but as normal, for their cultures, symbols and histories explain their superiority. Therefore, neither ethno-symbolism, nor modernism or interactionism should ever be perceived as separate and opposing views on one topic, but as powerful explanatory force only when combined. Ethno-symbolism, in our opinion, will offer an explanation, why is a certain world-view (e.g. of one nation's exceptionalism) dominant in one society and how it is being used to reproduce national stereotypes and what is the nature of the myth-symbolic content (whether a nationalism is violent, peaceful, constructive, etc). Interactionism can serve as a research tool, in a sense that it offers the explanation where the potential sources of conflict or of peace are created and maintained – in boundaries. Finally, modernism offers a larger, macro perspective on why interactions even occur (e.g. due to industrialisation).

One sided theoretical analyses of nations and nationalism do not serve a good purpose. The emphasis on one approach can only lead to a partial understanding of the two phenomena, risking the potential academic blindness towards the other aspects of multi-layered concepts. If one only modernism is used to explain one nationalism, the political strength of ethnic bonds, myths and symbol can be neglected, leading to a diminished possibility to eventually predict the behaviour of one nation in the moments of interactions. However, one-sided ethno-symbolic interpretations of nations can enforce the superficial justifications for violence, neglecting the deeper, structural reasons for social injustices.

---

[182] Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization,* op. cit., p.

Conclusion

This work had two main aims. The first one was to offer an overview of the most relevant Western theoretical approaches to nations and nationalism in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st and to extract and describe their relevant and timely conclusions. We believe that the first chapter answered the task in an appropriate manner, for primordialism/perennialism, modernism, ethno-symbolism, interactionism and post-modernism are detected as key and most influential approaches at the same time. However, post-modernism and primordialism/perennialism are not analysed in depth in the rest of the work, for we provided our argumentation why these two do not have the explanatory potential of modernism, ethno-symbolism, or interactionism..

The second aim was to provide an analysis regarding the theoretical compatibility of modernism, interactionism and ethno-symbolism. The three approaches were analysed more thoroughly by dedicating one separate chapter to each of them. Modernism was the topic of Chapter 2, where we found Ernest Gellner is at the heart of this approach, mainly because his theory deals with nations and nationalism on more abstract level than any other theory of the same view. Also, we believe most other modernists, if not all of them, rely on Gellner's conclusions. Additional space in Chapter 2 is dedicated to the theory of Benedict Anderson, because he presents a non-conventional view within modernism, but also emphasizes the importance informational infrastructure, and their influence, on people's perception of collective identities. Finally, the criticism of modernism was a necessary component in order to understand which deficiencies of this approach may be compensated with other theories.

The third chapter analysed interactionism as much as the thesis allowed. The findings of Frederik Barth were first elaborated, for he is considered to be the founder of the approach. Later on, developments and further main contributions of other social anthropologists such as Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Iver Neumann, were added to the original theory. We dealt with interactionism immediately after modernism, because, as explained, some authors believe that the former is also one of the approaches within the latter. However, a special contribution social anthropology has to add to the theory of nationalism, and its conclusions, which we believe bridge modernism with ethno-symbolism, propelled us to elaborate on interactionism immediately after Chapter 2. Besides the same pattern at the end of the Chapters 2 and 3, where we tried to establish what might be missing from the two theories, and can be added from other theories, we concluded that interactionism expands the theoretical explanatory

potential of nations and nationalism. This potential is expanded with the concepts of ethnic boundaries and of dichotomization, but also with the acceptance of the fact that phenomena such our main topic, can be best understood if viewed from the perspective of the *longue duree* concept. Additionally, interactionism provided arguments for the claim that in the end, something primordial might exist in nationalism, yet, not in a cultural, but in a psychological sense. This primordiality lies in the eternal *self-other* mechanism which creates and maintains the boundaries between societies.

In the fourth chapter, we tried to fill in the gaps left empty after the criticism of the previous two approaches. It was done by introducing the main concepts of Anthony Smith, who is considered to be the highest authority in ethno-symbolism, and the entire field of nations and nationalism. We consider his arguments about the necessity of emphasizing the cultural aspects of nationalism more than justified. His distinct methodology for studying cultural aspects of nationalism is also presented. In addition, we found his argumentation about the old *ethnies* as origins of present-day nations to be very convincing, as well as his modernistic conclusions about the political novelty of the nation. Nevertheless, that does not mean the logic of national communities is new as well. Moreover, we accepted that the usage of *longue duree* concept is essential for the theory in general. In the end, we underlined that ethno-symbolism bears some inherent dangers, for it can be used by the propagators of extreme version of nationalism to legitimize their perilous world-views and reduce nationalism to some "objective and undeniable truths".

The final chapter is a sort of a meeting point for the three approaches, where an effort was made to clarify their complementarities. Besides the emphasis on the key points where the three meet, we also tried only to imply the potential usage of each in the future. However, we did not go deeper into this, for it would require at least another work for itself. We believe that the final chapter proved that there is no doubt about whether modernism, interactionism and ethno-symbolism are compatible. Even more, we stressed our belief that they offer the widest explanation of the phenomena, only when combined.

Therefore, we believe both our general hypotheses and the specific ones proved to be correct. First of all, the main approaches to the concept of the nation and nationalism are theoretically compatible, meaning the essential theoretical findings in each one of them are not mutually exclusive.

Second, they are compatible in a sense that was proposed by the specific hypotheses. Modernists have given us the most comprehensive sociological macro perspective on the logic of the nation and nationalism within the wider set of social structures and functions of the 19th and 20th century. Interactionists provided us with a convincing anthropological insight that nations and nationalism are products of both human's universal tendency towards the creation of boundaries of "our" group and tendency of using group sentiments and symbols as political resources. Ethno-symbolism explained cultural, historical, psychological and political strengths of nations and nationalisms, but at the same time their philosophical weaknesses, showing us the strengths and the weakness are not mutually exclusive

In the end, we believe that the work fulfilled the two set aims. We also tend to believe that we managed to prove the hypotheses which propelled the need for such a theoretical research.

Additionally, we invested an effort into permeating the complementarity with strong ethical position stemming from peace studies. First of all, the entire thesis is based upon a belief that opposing views are not necessarily conflictual ones, but can be complementary in a sense offered by Galtung, through his *yin/yang* metaphor. Secondly, we argued every research should be backed up by *constructive peace studies,* meaning each theoretical work should be also an ethical one, through preventing self-fulfilling prophecies of the researches and overemphasizes of cultural factors in nationalism, but also that each work should tend to construct and offer solutions for the problem detected. We believe the complementarity explained can be perceived as one of the solutions how to treat the theory of nations and nationalism. Finally, Galtung's description of inseparability of direct, structural and cultural violence, but as well as peace, only reinforces (at least what is claimed in this thesis) the inseparability of the approaches to nationalism analysed in this thesis.

The future of nations and nationalism seems more certain than ten years ago. If the first decade of the 21st century swarmed with predictions that nations are about to die out, the 2010s swarmed with the opposite claims. On the one hand, turbulence and potential ruptures the new industrial revolution carries with it, are more and more causing people to adhere to their fellow co-patriots and to seek for the solutions within the known and close cultures. On the other hand, the elites and middle classes of the developed world use all the opportunities to benefit from cheap travels, commodities and the expansion of communications. A new, globalised world is emerging, parallel with the consolidation of emerging obsolete labour force on the edges of the economic centres. However, contrary to what Marxists would believe, our opinion is such a

consolidation will not be reinforced by class consciousness, but by national, ethnic and other identities which offer solutions and interpretations outside the rational, material reality. What can be a role of an engaged intellectual is yet another question to be answered. For now, possibilities of an individual, or of small communities, stretch only to efforts of interpreting national myths, symbols and histories, in more moderate and reconcilable manner.

References:

1. Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of Nationalism*, Revised Edition, Verso, London-New York, 2006

2. Armstrong, John Alexander, *Nations before Nationalism*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982

3. Bakić, Jovo, *Teorijsko-istraživački pristupi etničkoj vezanosti (ethnicity), nacionalizmu i naciji*, Sociologija, Vol. XLVIII, no. 3, april-jun 2006, pp 231-264

4. Barth, Frederik, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1969

5. Beck, Ulrich, *What is globalization,* Cambridge: Polity press, 1999

6. Billig, Michael, *Banal Nationalism*, SAGE Publications, London-Thousand Oaks-New Delhi, 1995

7. Breuilly, John, "Introduction", in Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 2nd edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-New York, 2008, p. xvi

8. Brubaker, Rogers, *Nationalism reframed – Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 1996

9. Brubaker, Rogers, "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism", John Hall (Ed.), *The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism,* Cambridge, 1998, pp. 272-306, p. 273.

10. Cohen, Abner, "Introduction: The Lesson of Ethnicity", Abner Cohen (ed.) *Urban Ethnicities*, pp. ix-xxiv, p. xix

11. Collier, David Hidalgo, Fernando Daniel and Maciuceanu, Andra Olivia, Essentially contested concepts: Debates and applications, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11(3), October 2006, pp. 211–246

12. Connor, Walker*, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press,* Princeton, New Jersey, 1994

13. Domentijan, *Žitije Svetog Save,* Srpska književna zadruga, Beograd, 2001

14. Ekmečić, Milorad, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije – Tom I*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1989 Beograd

15. Gallie, W. B, "Essentially Contested Concepts", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56, 1955, pp. 167–198, p. 169. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/4544562 (Accessed on July 1, 2017)

16. Galtung, Johan, *Peace by Peaceful Means – Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, PRIO and SAGE Publications, London, 1996

17. Gellner, Ernest, "Ernest Gellner's reply – Do nations have navels?", in *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 2, No.3, ASEN, 1996, pp. 366-370.

18. Gellner, Ernest, Breuilly John, *Nations and Nationalism,* 2nd edition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-New York, 2008

19. Guibernau, Montserat, "Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: a critical assessment", *Nations and Nationalism 10 (1/2),* ASEN/John Wiley and Sons Ltd, pp. 125 – 141, 2004

20. Hechter, Michael, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966,* University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, 1975

21. Hobsbawm, Eric, *Globalization, Democracy and Terrorism*, Little, Brown and company, Boston, 2007

22. Hobsbawm, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2016

23. Hobsbawm, Eric, Ranger, O. Terence, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, 1992

24. Hylland Eriksen, Thomas, *Ethnicity and Nationalism – Anthropological Perspectives*, Third edition, Pluto Press, New York, 2010

25. Merton, Robert, "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy", *The Antioch Review, Vol. 8, No. 2*, Antioch Review, Inc, 1948, pp. 193-210, Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4609267

26. Nairn, Tom, *The break-up of Britain*, NLB and Verso, London, 1981

27. Nojman, Iver B, *Upotrebe drugog - Istok u formiranju evropskog identiteta*, Službeni glasnik, Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, 2011

28. O'Leary, Brendan, "Ernest Gellner's diagnoses of nationalism: a critical overview, or, what is living and what is dead in Ernest Gellner's philosophy of nationalism?", in: John A. Hall (ed.), *The State of the Nation. Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 40–88

29. Özkirimli, Umut, *Theories of Nationalism – a Critical Introduction,* 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010

30. Renan, Ernest, "What is a Nation?", text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?,* Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992. (translated by Ethan Rundell), http://ucparis.fr/files/9313/6549/9943/What_is_a_Nation.pdf (Accessed on July 12, 2017)

31. Richmond, Oliver P, *Failed Statebuilding – Intervention, the State, and the Dynamics of Peace Formation*, Yale University Press, 2014

32. Robinson, I.William, *Global Capitalism and Crisis of Humanity*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014

33. Smith, D. Anthony, "Memory and modernity: reflections on Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism", in *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 2, No.3, ASEN, 1996, pp. 371-388

34. Smith, D. Anthony, *National Identity*, Penguin Politics and Current Affairs, London, 1991

35. Smith, D. Anthony, *Nationalism and Modernism*, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003

36. Smith, D. Anthony, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford UK - Cambridge USA, 2002

37. Stones, Rob, *Structuration Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005.

38. Subotić, Milan, *Na drugi pogled – prilog studijama nacionalizma*, Institut za društvenu teoriju i filozofiju, Filip Višnjić Beograd, 2007

39. Weber, Eugene, *Peasants into Frenchmen – The Modernisation of Rural France 1870-1914*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1976