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Master Thesis

**British Public Diplomacy as a Means for Establishing
Supremacy- Peaceful Aspect**

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Abstract

In the modern world, and especially in the democratic countries, the communication has become the main tool for gaining approval and legitimacy. Moreover, public communication became the way of representing the country within and without and the way of shaping a country's identity and image. In this context, communication refers to talking to people, but also to countries' acts, which are in and of itself a form of communication. In order to be successful at this way of communicating, the countries adopted the practice of public diplomacy. However, in this work we will not discuss much about the different ways in which public diplomacy can find use in different countries, but we will focus on the case of Britain and the use of public diplomacy for the swift change of British national image. In order to prove particular discrepancies between the past image of Britain, being forged from the 17th to the 20th century and its unique identity, and the present image promoted by public diplomacy at the turn of the millennium, the author will address the main elements of identity and image represented in the past and the prominent features of the present image emphasized by public diplomacy. Additionally, this work will aim to explore the peace initiatives launched as part of public diplomacy endeavours, their importance for the country's reputation and most importantly, their successfulness. There will also be underlined the reasons why Britain had to carry out such drastic changes within its identity and forge a more appropriate image. Ultimately, this thesis aims to prove that Britain's national image presented by public diplomacy is too quickly enforced to be absorbed into identity structure, or to maintain the cohesion of the country. Even though it was recognized as the necessary move in order to establish the country's supremacy in the world of modern liberal values, it harshly damaged the equivalence between image and identity, which in turn caused noticeable mistrust from without and instability from within.

Key words: public diplomacy, identity, image, peace initiatives, Britain

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Introduction

In the rapidly growing and technologized world, the accessibility and quick spreading of information have slowly decreased the power, once imperatively epitomized in the states' governments, and gave it to people. In the modern era, when the number of the interstate wars is approaching zero, the influence of the states which used to be acquired through the empowering feelings of victory over another state and rewarded with the allegiance of its people, is now dependent on other tools for generating and spreading that influence in order to maintain stability within a state and primacy in the international community. The reason why this influence is so important is simple- virtually all spheres of life have become very dependent on the cooperation with other countries. Many would argue that this is the fact which has brought peace to our world in the present, when compared to the period of the violent 20th century, but it has also brought the need for creating new tools for establishing who will get the larger piece of cake. The battle of the 20th century and previous centuries of who has the greatest military has become the battle of who has the best image and identity. As promising as this might sound, it is by no means easy to be in the winning group of this battle. Why is it so? While waging wars is a very destructive tradition in the human history, the governments at least had the rules and manuals at their disposal, created through thousands of bloodstained years and battles. On the other hand, we are not used to peace.

The focus of this master thesis will be Great Britain, which appears as an obvious choice, since it is the prototype of the country which had to change aspects of its identity from belligerent to peaceful in order to maintain its supreme position in the world defined by the liberal values by which interstate wars are not legitimized. From the formation of nation-states, England, later Great Britain and finally the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has been one of the most powerful countries in the world. In the 18th and 19th century, with the rise of the British Empire, it became the center of power and a hegemon controlling a quarter of the globe. The unity of England with Wales, Scotland and, later on, Northern Ireland was accomplished due to their geographic proximity, and not due to their cultural, religious or national bonds. The country formed in such an environment faced discrepancies in opinions, views, values and beliefs, which could have been an insurmountable obstacle for maintaining unity and power. However, this didn't happen, and the country rose to become an empire. This stability was preserved by creating an improvised identity according to which the whole Great Britain consisted of people who are righteous and virtuous, but, as such, obliged to constantly resist the dark forces which threatened

their existence and purity.¹ Therefore, in order to defend itself from those deemed as a threat, Great Britain managed to position itself as a supreme nation through continuous wars. Permanent involvement in the wars of the 17th, 18th and 19th century, and additional participation in the world wars in the 20th century, determined British collective national identity, because while there was a constant threat from without, the British people had to be united from within. Most importantly, the main force and tool shaping its image and identity was war. After the World War II, due to Britain's economic collapse and defeat in the war of opinions with the US, the hegemony was transferred to the US, and the new world order was established. However, the values of modern liberalism were not precisely those epitomized in Great Britain.² But, since the US has become the country pulling strings in the world, especially after the Cold War of ideologies, Britain had two options- either to keep its traditional identity and risk losing power on the international stage, or to stylize its identity, change its worldview and image, so that it fits better in the framework approved by the US. They chose the latter. In order to reshape its traditional identity and image, Britain used newly developed public diplomacy mechanisms. Additionally, with the number of the interstate wars decreasing rapidly, the only "war" acceptable in the 21st century is the one of influence, and Great Britain has decided to be in the winning circle of that one, too. In order to come out as a winner in the battle of influence which determines economic opportunities, political power, and many other aspects of life, Great Britain has presented itself as a modern nation, open to diversity, advanced in technology and leader of modernity.³ And yet, changes within identity cannot come overnight. Its traditional identity which lasted for centuries, from the formation of Great Britain as a country, cannot be so easily erased, and stylized. Because of that fact, in their public diplomacy endeavours and initiatives, this country has often experienced failures or inconclusive results of their diplomatic projects, or only short-term positive results. In spite of the significant efforts, more often than not, Britain continues to be seen as traditional, arrogant, stiff, cold and closed.⁴ Additionally, even though liberal worldview encompasses peace promotion and initiatives, Britain has failed to realize its full potential in this regard, and there have been only few such initiatives. Those which were carried out were often short-lived or ran against the actions of the government. Recent happenings related to the Scotland's referendum on the separation from Great Britain, and Britain's referendum on the separation from the EU, leading to Brexit, leave us wondering about the future and unity of this country. The problem at hand is- whether a country, formed and maintained on the premise of

¹ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 1-442.

² Eric Louw, *Roots of the Pax Americana*, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2010), 1-282.

³ James Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 1-247.

fighting its enemies and unison based on traditionalism, can truly change overnight, or is it a type of a stylized identity suitable for a world without traditional wars and used for parading it in front of everyone to see.

Therefore, the main hypothesis of this master's thesis which the author aims to prove or refute is that the image of modern Britain is created as a part of its stylized identity which has the purpose of presenting it as one of the dominant forces in the world determined by liberal values, without waging a war. The two specific hypotheses which will be used in support of the main hypothesis are the following: 1) The image of modern Britain created by the means of public diplomacy presents a noticeable departure from British identity. The image of Britain forged after 1995 thanks to the public diplomacy, is based on a stylized version of its identity. The equivalence of identity and image is impaired by overly emphasizing certain elements, and avoiding others. 2) Peace initiatives are not a particularly prominent or successful aspect of British public diplomacy.

Some of the main reasons for exploring this topic are shortcomings and oversights of a considerable part of literature in this domain. More precisely, the literature on this topic is somewhat divided. It analyzes Great Britain in terms of disrupted continuity. It is focused either on British identity then or on British identity now. Basically, the period of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century is presented as a formative period for this country. This period is a crucial point in the history of Britain, and coincidentally, this is the time in which Britain embraced the full potential of public diplomacy. It is also worth noting, that we are talking about the country which after the WWII evaluated public diplomacy practices, at the time used by the US, and concluded that they are unnecessary and useless.⁵ In literature, Britain is presented in one of the two ways, which are also the opposite poles- Britain as a belligerent and traditional country, or Britain as a stable, peaceful country, spearheading innovativeness and modernity. However, this kind of presentation can't offer us the complete insight into the true identity and image of this country. I want to look at the period from the beginning of the 18th century till the 21st century as a whole in order to show grave discrepancies in the main elements of British identity re-created in this continuum. On the other hand, I will present some of the main strategies, and activities of British public diplomacy which have an obvious purpose of presenting Britain as a modern and influential country, for the sake of acquiring national profit through positive perception from within and without. This other face of Britain and public diplomacy as a tool for stylizing identity will be supported mainly by the study *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power* written by James

⁴ Telegraph.co.uk, "Arrogant, unfriendly and no sense of humour: what foreign tourists think of the English", September, 2006, www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/736311/Arrogant-unfriendly-and-no-sense-of-humour-what-foreign-tourists-think-of-the-English.html, (accessed March 3,2017).

⁵ Nancy Snow and Phillip Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 22.

Pamment.⁶ Also, to provide the readers with a deeper understanding of the importance of identity and image, the process of the creation of British identity will be put side by side with the theoretical framework of the creation of worldviews posed by Eric Louw in his book *The Media and Political Process*.⁷

In terms of literature, this Master's thesis wants to show that the authors who claim that Britain is a belligerent country, typically traditional or conservative, and that those who claim that it is a modern country, representing stability in Europe and the world, cooperation and innovation, are neither right nor wrong. Britain is both. It aims to prove that the core identity is the one proposed by the former group, and its surface outer layer is the one proposed by the latter group. Unfortunately, due to severe incongruities between the core and the surface, this country and its identity are very unstable.

The scientific aim of this work is to recognize the patterns and steps which a country can follow in order to change its image and certain aspects of its identity from the "inappropriate" one, to a more suitable one in a given context. The work also has a purpose of shedding a light on the processes by which some negative forces from without, such as: war, instilling fear, threatening nation's existence, can lead to some positive outcomes from within, such as: unity among different people, cohesion, sense of shared identity, morality and self-respect. Also it will, reveal some of the main methods by which public diplomacy works, and its importance in the 21st century. Finally, the thesis will aim to evaluate the truthfulness, viability and durability of the quickly forged image as identity presentation which is considerably different from the one long cherished in the past. On the other hand, the social aim is primarily to either prove or refute the hypothesis that Great Britain's modern image is a stylized element of the identity, not particularly equivalent to the one promoted for a long time in the past, but embraced as needed in the time of peace. Since the promotion of modernization as a tool is one of the main weapons in the non-violent battles of influences in the contemporary world, many other countries, such as France and Germany, seemingly follow the same path of Great Britain. The purpose of this thesis is to show where this path could lead if similar patterns as those perceived in Great Britain are applied elsewhere. Moreover, it will point out to some problems which any nation can have with regards to its image and identity in face of the historical continuity which appears altogether with the need for a change. The outcomes of this thesis may serve to different spheres of interest. Primarily, analysts and researchers may find it useful, as well as policy-makers and diplomats facing similar issues. Furthermore, it can provide

⁶ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 1-247.

⁷ Louw, *The Media and Political Process*, (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 195-209.

students and broader audience with guidance as to understanding of what collective identity is all about, why public diplomacy is one of the main weapons of today, as well as, how the battle of supremacy functions in a world without traditional wars.

In order to prove or refute the main hypothesis, the author will use a qualitative method. This includes, but is not limited to: analysis, concretization, generalization, synthesis, abstraction, deduction and induction. The author will describe the problem at hand in the context of historical continuity, and compare the identity and image phenomenon existing in the past and in the present. The views of different authors on the same or similar topic will be compared and contrasted. Additionally, throughout the work, the theoretical analysis method will be used, which encompasses critical analysis of the theoretical assumptions upon which rest different approaches to the research of public diplomacy and immanent critique, critique of the consistency in drawing a series of general and concrete conclusions based on the initial assumptions, and the analysis of the consistency in the argumentation put forward.

The first chapter will be focused on explaining and differentiating some basic terms which will be used throughout the work. The second chapter will take a dive into the process of the creation of a worldview in general, since this is the phenomenon which directly determines the perception of our own identity and identities of others. Public diplomacy as a practice is here viewed as inextricably related to the creation of images, and as such based on the creation of worldviews as codices of acceptable behaviours and opinions. The third chapter will present what are considered to be the roots of public diplomacy, main institutions, and initial ideas behind it. Here will be analyzed a prominent tendency to emphasize British modernity which includes support and openness to collaboration, diversity, youth culture and technological advancements as a way of establishing supremacy on the international stage, without the traditional might of war victory leverage. The following chapter will analyze some of the elements of the British identity from the past. More precisely it will take into account the presentation of Britishness proposed by Linda Colley from the formation of Great Britain in 1707 to 1837. It will additionally point out to the similar elements in the more recent years and identity crisis described by Philip Dodd. The chapter will also describe the main British qualities perceived by other countries, summarized by Anneke Elwes in 1994. Finally, in this chapter we will take a look at other perceptions of British identity and elements prominent before 1995. The fifth chapter will depict the elements of British identity promoted by public diplomacy practices at the turn of the century and in the 21st century. More precisely, it will look for the protruding aspects of British image through the activities, strategies, and aims of the public diplomacy, and the need to constantly change its mechanisms and the way it operates. Also, the author will present the effectiveness of public diplomacy strategies, by

comparing the predetermined aims of public diplomacy initiatives with the outcomes i.e. what picture of Britain they managed to send abroad. Here we will further draw a comparison between public diplomacy and spin-doctoring and point out to their similarity as a potential stumbling block for the public diplomacy operations. In the sixth chapter we will discuss the soft power as a final stadium in the development of British public diplomacy. The author will attempt to prove that there is a clash of the perceptions of British identity. Additionally, the aim will be to reveal the gray areas in which the elements of the identity embraced in the past might emerge on the surface of the identity promoted in the present and in the image which stems from it. The seventh chapter will look at the meaning of Britishness in the context of the more recent events, such as the Scottish movement for independence and the initiative for the separation from the European Union. It will look at the events in the international relations and at Britain's actions through the prism of identity construction and reconstruction. In the concluding chapter, the author will present the answer to the main hypothesis and try to predict some future trends which might emerge in the 21st century Britain.

This, under no account, means that Britain is used as an example of the best practices in public diplomacy and the one which should be imitated. Nor that it is, on the other hand, posed as an example doomed to fail. Britain is not an exception for using the power of public diplomacy for the purpose of changing its identity in accordance with the liberal values, since many other developed and developing countries use it too, and are heavily dependent on its success. As for any other practice in history, for this one too, we need to accumulate enough constructive instructions, various inputs and analyze different information in order to establish how much public diplomacy as a branch can do when it comes to changes within identity and creation of image, and whether it is at all possible to change the core of a country's identity and image. Gaining knowledge by proving or refuting the main hypothesis is precisely the main motivation behind this work.

Basic Terms

In order to understand why it was so important to change the projection of Britain, we first and foremost need to understand what needed to be changed. While sometimes considered similar terms, identity and image are considerably different. They are certainly inseparable, because only when something has the identity, it can also have the image, and vice versa, image cannot be created if there is no identity as the basis. However, identity is what something actually is, in its substance, without taking into consideration some external perception. On the other hand, image is how others perceive the representation of identity in different contexts, including the ways in which the possessor of identity is trying to showcase it and the ways in which those in touch with it

perceive it in accordance with their own values, experiences and beliefs. Image as such does not encompass all the characteristics of the identity, therefore, it is to a lesser or greater extent a selective phenomenon.⁸ We can imagine identity as the night sky full of celestial bodies. On the other hand, image is what an astronomer sees when he looks through a telescope. He can see only certain parts of the sky at the given angle, but the parts which he sees are multiply magnified, hence, they become more visible and prominent. In this metaphor, strategic communication, propaganda, but also public diplomacy are involved in positioning the telescope in the right place for the astronomer to see parts of the sky which are the most beautiful and alluring. If the country wants to change the impression people have about it, the aim is to change both, aspects of the identity and the image. But, since it is easier to change the image as the presentation of the identity than the identity itself, the focus is often on reforming the image. In relations to identity, Slavujevic recognizes three types of image: "Image-representation", in which there is objective equivalence between identity and image," image- distortion" in which the image is based on some true aspects of identity but as a whole it is fairly stylized and some aspects of identity are promoted while others are repressed, and "image-manipulation", in which the image is based on the aspects of identity which objectively don't exist, as well as the equivalence between image and identity.⁹ If we had to categorize the case of Britain, it would belong to image-distortion, since they truly tried to change some aspects of the identity, and their changed image was still based on many attributes of their identity, but in an attempt to change the image drastically, the equivalence between the two had to suffer.

Additionally, the development of British identity and changes within that identity, in this thesis is, is not analyzed solely at the time when it became the focus of public diplomacy, because that wouldn't give the full picture to the readers. As we will see in the following chapters, many authors emphasized the changes in the British identity as a whole and studied the so-called new identity as plucked out of time. However, the differentiation between identity and image should once again be emphasized here, because the logic behind this work is that image can truly change completely over time, but the identity of a country cannot. This is for the simple reason that identity doesn't have the ending point at which we can draw the line and start exploring the new identity which comes with turning over a new leaf. Identity as such is not a static construction which once formed becomes unchangeable. Quite on the contrary, it is very dynamic and aspects of identity can

⁸ Zoran D. Slavujević, *Političko komuniciranje, politička propaganda, politički marketing*, (Beograd: Grafocard, 2009), 96-100.

⁹ *Ibid*, 96-100.

change, but only as parts of the same identity and not as a different one which came in place of the old one.¹⁰

Both, identity and image are inextricably related to a broader sphere of the so-called “country brand concept” which uses the practices of public diplomacy as its channel for operations and potential success. Even though, the notions of identity and image are easily confused, they are often very different, to the point that they can hypothetically be polar opposites. In the words of Juan Carlos Belloso: “«identity» is what a place actually is, its essence, whereas «image» refers to how this place is perceived (perception). We could say that identity originates in the same country, while image refers to the perception of the target audience, so they are two different but intricately related concepts.”¹¹ When it comes to comparing identity and image of a certain country, Belloso further argues that “the image of a country hardly shows its true reality (identity). In fact, there is usually a gap between identity and image (reality and perception), which is often a negative factor.”¹² However, working on brand image of a country through public diplomacy, whether by emphasizing the parts of a real identity which are evaluated as beneficial, or by inventing a completely different image from identity, has become an unavoidable part in the peaceful battle of influences. And Britain is no different than other countries in this respect. If we simplify these notions, we get the following paradigm- in the world where the traditional wars have ended, the countries have developed mechanisms, such as public diplomacy, in order to enhance their image which can possibly, but not necessarily, be considerably different than a country’s national identity, an image which at the same time has the purpose of posing a country as closest as possible to the values encompassed by the broader notion of the legitimized worldview, and most probably the worldview promoted by a hegemon or several most powerful counties of a certain period. The benefits which an attractive image can bring to a certain country are very straightforward and diverse- everything from political to economic advantages and progress in all other spheres in between and related to these two. Basically, overall success of a country and the quality of life can be traced back to the nation brand. For example, “when a multinational decides to set up its corporate headquarters or its distribution centre in a given place, the management can choose based on infrastructure, climate, geographical location, safety, communications, availability and quality of suppliers and qualified workforce, economic environment, openness of the local government to foreign investment and many other items. However, it will be good for nothing if managers (and their families), who are those who have to move, do not feel attracted by the destination. This is

¹⁰ Siniša Atlagić, *Partijska identifikacija kao determinanta izborne motivacije*, (Beograd: Fakultet političkih nauka i Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2007), 11-20.

¹¹ Juan Carlos Belloso, “Country brand. A differentiation mechanism and source of intangibles”, in *Economy of identity: differentiation and country brand*, issue 05, 2010, 44.

¹² Ibid, 44-5.

why, in a more or less strategic, structured and organised way, all countries, regions and cities develop strategies and actions to manage and promote their image at both domestic and international level in order to have an impact on and change existing perceptions.”¹³ In this particular example we can see the vicious circle which arises. In order to draw investors or owners of big companies, the government and other bodies have to create an alluring image of a country. In return, if the created image manages to draw them to that country, this creates more job and business opportunities which lead to higher profits and standard, lower unemployment rate, and better quality of an individual life. The government which manages to provide better quality of life for its people, becomes legitimized, which results in stability of the country and great political power of the ruling class. On the other hand, if a country doesn't create a positive image of itself it will be only partially successful or not at all in other related aspects. However, good image is simply not enough without good identity. In case of grave discrepancies in what is presented to be true and what is in fact true, country's true identity will be quickly discovered, and its image branded as false and glazed over. Once tarnished, the image slowly recovers, therefore, the aim is not only to change country's image, but to go further and change some important elements of identity. In order to gain influence, Britain as a country described as cold, distant, stiff and traditional, had to adopt new values and refurbish its image, and appear as a modern nation, strong competitor and worthy partner. Hence, what the author argues here is that through public diplomacy, Britain did not try to change only its image, while remaining the same nations it has always been. Quite on the contrary, in order to create a suitable and stable image, it has made an attempt at restructuring elements of its identity, and to a certain extent it has managed to do that. However, the core elements of that identity, as argued before, can't change so quickly and it remains to be seen whether the discrepancies between surface identity and image, and the core will be reconciled and the layers conjoined, or they will fall apart due to the strong forces pulling parts of British identity in the opposite directions. Anyhow, when we put public diplomacy and the need for a change of image and elements of identity in the context, it becomes obvious why Britain as considerably different from what is now termed appealing, had to invest considerable efforts, funds and potentials by the end of the 20th century into creating a new image for itself in order to preserve its superior position in the interconnected globalized world.

Finally, we need to define public diplomacy as the discipline which has glaring similarities with some other practices, but is nevertheless quite distinctive. The field of public diplomacy is very complex and multifaceted, since it uses knowledge and techniques of various other fields, such as: international relations, public relations, communications, traditional diplomacy, and many

¹³ Ibid, 44.

others. Also, public diplomacy is often equated with strategic communication, because both of these have the premeditated intent to persuade people to behave in a certain way and spread a particular message from the government to the masses, in order to enhance the image of the country, especially abroad. However, many authors consider public diplomacy a much narrower term than strategic communication, i.e. strategic communication encompasses public diplomacy as only one of the ways of conveying a particular message to the public.¹⁴ Public diplomacy as a distinct branch from traditional diplomacy appeared in the 1930s¹⁵, but I would argue that it actually existed much longer, though it wasn't formalized and people were often unaware they were using it regularly. However, people often confuse it with the traditional type of diplomacy, or simply use the term diplomacy to cover both these branches. The main difference between these two is that "traditional diplomacy is government-to-government relations (G2G)" employed when, for example, two secretaries of state meet to discuss some issue or sign an agreement." On the other hand, "traditional *public* diplomacy has been about governments talking to global publics (G2P), and includes those efforts to inform, influence, and engage those publics in support of national objectives and foreign policies. More recently, public diplomacy involves the way in which both government *and* private individuals and groups influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions that bear directly on another government's foreign policy decisions (P2P)."¹⁶ In a nutshell, public diplomacy is considerably different because whether initiated by governments or by some other private bodies, in both cases the target addressee is people. Moreover, what differentiates public diplomacy from more standardized addressing of masses is that "effective public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as well as talking".¹⁷ This notion raises diplomacy on a completely new level, because people no longer expect to be told what is right after they have elected their government. Wide masses expect to be heard and for their opinion to be taken into consideration and possibly transformed into new policies. Therefore, liberal democracies have to work constantly on gaining legitimization for their actions. According to Robert Nye's theory, on which British principles heavily lean, public diplomacy has three main aspects. The first aspect is "daily communications" or "day-to-day dimension", which includes explaining to the public current national and international affairs and the target audience are both- local people and international press. It also means that relevant institutions have to be ready to quickly react and disseminate any falsehoods which start spreading in the media.¹⁸ The second aspect is so-called "strategic communication", and

¹⁴ Siniša Atlagić and Aleksandar Mitić, "What is Strategic Political Communication", *Godišnjak*, (Belgrade: Faculty of Political Sciences, 2016), 25-36.

¹⁵ Graham, "Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion", *International Studies Review* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 522-539.

¹⁶ Snow and Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, (New York: Routledge 2009), 6

¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 111.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 107-110.

it implies setting a theme and agenda around which public diplomacy should evolve. This part is something like a promotion of a certain policy which government wants to pursue. And the third aspect is the “development of lasting relationships with key individuals” which is accomplished over a long period of time and through enabling “scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels”¹⁹.

Worldview as a tool for creating identity

As I have already mentioned, being inseparably connected to the notion of identity and especially collective identity of a country, public diplomacy should be perceived as a way of promoting our worldview as the best and the most legitimate. Worldview is one of the most powerful forces for directing people, because it can control our behavior, limit it or push us further, but more importantly it can control our way of thinking. Eric Louw in his book *Media and Political Processes* rightfully insists that this knowledge about worldviews is needed now more than ever in liberal democracies in order to make the masses behave in the preferred way. He recognizes two main techniques for ruling people: “using violence” and “creating legitimacy”. In the current world, the latter is far more needed than the first, although the first is never completely excluded.²⁰ To be seen as legitimate leader, one needs to impose the worldview by which his/her actions are seen as understandable and normal by the majority of people and which at the same time gives coordinates to the masses so that they behave in a way which makes it easier to lead them and which accumulates approval. In Louw’s words it “provides an individual with a fulcrum around which to construct ‘a map’ for guiding his/her life.”²¹ The worldview which we obtain in unnoticeable manner, step-by-step, while we are growing up, also contains certain ideology. But, those ideologies are not simply put on as a stamp on tabula rasa, but we need to be responsive to them and actively engaged in order for them to work.²² In the words of Michael Freedman: “Ideologies are imaginative maps drawing together facts that themselves may be disputed. They are collectively produced and collectively consumed, though the latter happens in unpredictable ways, and that collective nature makes them public property.” The reason why the worldviews attract so much attention and devotion of politicians and governments is the fact that “existing signification systems are raw material from which individuals construct worldviews”, hence “most people can be steered by manipulating the available encoding possibilities”.²³ For example, while slavery was accepted and legitimized in the 17th and 18th century Britain, later in the 19th century, in order to impose itself as

¹⁹ Ibid, 107-110.

²⁰ Louw, *The Media and Political Process*, (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 194-5.

²¹ Ibid, 195.

²² Ibid, 196-7.

²³ Ibid, 198.

the country of freedom superior to the USA who beat them in the Independence War, slavery was abolished as malpractice and severe limitation on human rights. Since the USA at that time still had colonies, Britain posed itself as a liberating country which respects diversity and rights of people who are not part of Britain, in comparison to the oppressive neighbor across the Atlantic. This, of course gave them in return political gain, firstly within Britain where people perceived their loyalty as rightfully devoted to their country, and abroad, since they presented the picture of themselves as rightful judges and advocates of peaceful coexistence and grantors of human freedoms.²⁴ This is one of the examples of how worldviews can change and the idea which is once considered unreasonable, can become the new norm of behavior and thinking. When describing the phenomenon of ideology Michael Freeden writes: “We encounter it as if behind a magic screen, whose removal suddenly enables the initially hidden and pernicious attributes of a doctrine, Weltanschauung or set of social practices to become hideously exposed by the knowledgeable ideology-critic, much as the Emperor’s new clothes dissolved through the eyes of a child”.²⁵

After the ending of the WWII, the US came out as the hegemonic power over all other countries, and its position as the world leader was confirmed after the Cold War. Therefore, the worldview of neo-liberalism they have decided to advocate and promote has become the one that dominates the majority of the globe and is accepted as a regular standard, while any other view clashing with it is perceived as alien or, at least, different from the norm.²⁶ In such a world, it is more profitable for the other countries to fit into the globally recognized view and cooperate with the US and other countries which accept its worldview, than to stray away. Precisely this complexity is what has pushed Great Britain to think about the picture of themselves they want to project to the world, and consequently about their own national identity. The phenomenon of identity created in a certain worldview will be viewed in this work as a socially constructed category, as opposed to identity which is believed to be innate in every person. Identity is here argued to stem from the worldview which is adopted at a certain time by a certain country and individual. In order to understand its importance we need to make a distinction between two types of identity- one being individual identity that distinguishes a person from the rest of the world, which is usually focused on specific habits, customs, hobbies, interests, which makes a person unique as a member of the population, society and groups; the other being group identity, which at the same time unites people of the same groups and divides people of different groups, and includes characteristics such as: ethnicity, gender, religion, social class, etc. In this master thesis’s the attention will be devoted primarily to the second type of identity and in an attempt to shed a light on

²⁴ Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 357-368.

²⁵ Freeden, “Ideology and Political Theory”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, (London: Routledge, 2006), 20.

²⁶ Louw, *The Media and Political Process*, (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 206.

the potential ties and cracks along the lines of British collective identity. As part of Social Identity Theory, Henry Tajfel gives definition of identity as: “a person’s sense of who they are based on their group membership(s).”²⁷ He further explains that group membership is used to enhance our self-esteem which is accomplished either by enhancing the status of your own group or by derogating the status of the members of the other groups, or by both. This further creates the difference between “us” and “them” which further leads to discrimination, stereotyping and, potentially, conflict.²⁸ Although such a definition is quite black-and-white and paints collective identity, wherever occurs in a partly negative light, many postulates of this theory are applicable to the creation and remodeling of British identity. While being engaged in multiple wars, Britain had a constant common enemy, which made the inner structure of its national identity coherent. Once the traditional wars stopped, and the notion of other country as an enemy has become de-popularized by liberal worldview, the ties holding the country together loosened, and some smaller collective identities within a national one appeared. Tajfel’s theory in this context seems quite applicable, because those refreshed collective identities within Britain could perceive other groups within the same country as threatening “others”, with different values and clashing interests with their own.

Roots of the British Public Diplomacy and Britishness

Public diplomacy in Britain arose as a branch of politics which could be used to change and modernize some elements of British identity from within and project such an identity outside of the country’s boundaries as British image. In this work the development of public diplomacy won’t be presented as a completely independent process from other political currents, but it will show that those other processes actually influenced and shaped modern public diplomacy. It will present the period of the development and practices of public diplomacy from 1995, when considerable efforts were invested into its development, to the most recent period of 2016. Here, public diplomacy or people’s diplomacy will be regarded as primarily state’s, but also other actors’, way of communicating with people within and without, in order to “transmit information, ideas, and values that support their interests”, with the purpose of “shaping a target’s preference”. Therefore, instead of using coercion to get what it wants, a state has “to be engaged in argument and persuasion”.²⁹

In order to understand the importance of British public diplomacy and the need to develop it, we need to put it in the historical context. There were two big globalization movements recognized

²⁷ Henry Tajfel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict: The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations”, (Bristol: University of Bristol, 1979), 33-47.

²⁸ Ibid, 33-47.

²⁹ Sarah Ellen Graham, “Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion”, *International Studies Review* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 522-539.

up to the present time. The first one was led by Britain in the time when its boundaries spread so much as to encompass a considerable part of the globe and diverse races and nationalities. Britain was clearly a hegemon in comparison to the rest of the world, including the US which slowly started positioning itself as a power after gaining independence from Britain in the 18th century.³⁰ Globalization led by Britain and its hegemonic power ended after the WWII out of which the US appeared as the new hegemon and leader of the second globalization movement. The transition of power was prompted by Britain's economical weakening due to war³¹, and by the fact that "Britain had clearly lost the public opinion battle". The US successfully launched campaign of delegitimization of British imperialistic values, while at the same time spreading and disseminating its own values.³² With its booming economy and military, the US saw that as an opportunity to impose their values and influence.³³ Hathaway writes: "By 1947... the united Kingdom lay naked before the world, stripped of its status and aspirations, and much of its pride. Like Greece and Rome before it, Great Britain was forced to step aside before younger, more virile nation-states"³⁴ However, what may come as a surprise, is the fact that the transition of power between Pax Britannica and Pax Americana was a peaceful one, supposedly because of their common history, similar cultures and various shared values.³⁵ Yet, Pax Americana also signified a shift in a way international relations would function. Instead of forming an empire resembling the one which Britain had, the US established its informal rule which was enabled "by a complex hierarchy of power relationships and influence"³⁶, which appeared more in line with its highly regarded liberal values. And this is the place, where public diplomacy as an important branch of politics in Britain steps under the spotlight. In order to keep its position as a powerful player on the international stage, Britain had to rethink its identity and its mechanisms for the projection of power in a completely new peaceful battlefield where the main weapon is influence.

The two main trends which contributed to British willingness to reshape the role of its public diplomacy, in general, and of the umbrella organization Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in particular, are: "the confluence of digitization" and "broadened public participation in foreign affairs". The FCO has become the main institution for public diplomacy operations in 1995.

³⁰ Eric Louw *Roots of the Pax Americana*, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2010), 1-37

³¹ Ibid, 3.

³² Ibid, 107.

³³ Ibid, 3.

³⁴ Ibid, 28.

³⁵ R.M. Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership. Britain and America 1944-1947*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1981) in Louw, *Roots of the Pax Americana*, 37.

³⁶ Louw, *Roots of the Pax Americana*, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2010), 19.

It was a governmental department in charge of coordination of “its partners in overseas promotion”- the British Council (BC) and BBC World Service (BBCWS).³⁷

The British Council is an “international organisation for cultural relations and educational opportunities” established in 1934. It is registered as “a UK charity governed by Royal Charter and a UK public body”. Its stated purpose is to “create friendly knowledge and understanding between the people of the UK and other countries”.³⁸ Basically, the BC’s area of work is establishing good relationships and mutual understanding among people of the UK and people of the other countries. Its spheres of operation are “arts and culture, English language, education and civil society” with the aim of designing “more inclusive and open societies”, as well as enhancing “young people’s opportunities”. In practice, its activities include: publication of various cultural materials, improving the process of studying the English language, improving education condition in destabilized regions, arranging gatherings of talented artists worldwide and facilitating the process of student exchange. Currently, the British Council operates in more than 100 countries.³⁹

The BBC World Service is “a public service broadcaster” and it was also founded by the Royal Charter, as an independent organization. It uses TV and radio broadcasting and online news platforms. The BBC currently offers: “9 national TV channels - in addition BBC Three, the first TV channel in the world to switch online in 2016- plus regional programming, 10 national radio stations, 40 local radio stations and an extensive website”.⁴⁰ Its operations are very widespread since it broadcasts in 27 different languages apart from English. The BBC claims that its mission is “to enrich people's lives with programmes and services that inform, educate and entertain”, and their ultimate goal is “to be the most creative organisation in the world”. Finances for the BBC’s broadcasting comes largely from “the licence fee paid by UK households” and additionally, from its “commercial arm, BBC Worldwide as well as a number of other commercial ventures”. The money which the network earns is used for the creation of new broadcasting material.⁴¹

It is also important to mention that while contemporary public diplomacy created its framework in 1995, there were certain events which directly contributed and led to the events and reforms of 1995 and after. Modern public diplomacy started in 1995, with the Fundamental Expenditure Review (FER), and its goal was to establish an efficient apparatus which Britain can

³⁷ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 4.

³⁸ British Council, “Our Organization”, www.britishcouncil.org/organisation, (accessed March, 24, 2017).

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ BBC, “About the BBC”, www.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/, (accessed March 24, 2017).

⁴¹ Ibid.

use for its promotion overseas and within the boundaries of Great Britain.⁴² FER outlined that public diplomacy should unite two different spheres “Information and Culture”.⁴³ Previously, the Duncan Committee’s Report in 1969 encouraged work in both of these spheres, but gave superiority to information over cultural promotion, because the former was thought to be contributing more to strengthening of the government’s policies, hence it was perceived as profitable investment.⁴⁴ At that time, the ruling Conservative Party wasn’t favourably inclined towards the BC’s work, and they repeatedly threatened to dismantle it completely. However, by the end of the 1960s, Britain already had its “overseas information service” whose tasks were: “to support and explain British public policy overseas, but also to project as actively as possible Britain’s culture language and achievements”.⁴⁵ After the Foreign Affairs Committee of 1986 had made an inquiry into the operations of the BC and its cultural program, the FCO enlisted five main goals of cultural diplomacy: “to convey the image of Britain as a creative, well-integrated, and forward looking society based on liberal values- a social and cultural model to be emulated and trusted”, “to inspire respect and understanding for the people of Britain and their achievements”, “to correct wrong and counter unfavourable impressions of Britain”, “to explain British policies and interest to decision-makers and opinion formers overseas” and “to promote British economic interests overseas including the export of British goods and services”.⁴⁶ After the FAC pressed the FCO and the BC to drop the word cultural from cultural diplomacy, because all of its activities fell into the category of regular diplomacy, they decided to make a differentiation between the two semantically similar but different terms. The FCO stated that cultural diplomacy encompassed a range of activities with the purpose of “embracing the whole breadth of cultural and information activity”. Cultural relations, on the other hand, were dealing with “the state of our international relations in cultural terms in parallel with our political and commercial relations”. But, the BC disagreed and defined cultural diplomacy as “the specific use of cultural relations for national, including political and commercial, benefit”, and as the essence of its existence and primary goal “to develop cultural relations” which should “develop over time a greater understanding and appreciation between peoples and institutions for their mutual benefit”.⁴⁷ Such a distinction only heated up the already existing discordance between the FCO as a hand of the government and the BC as a non-governmental institution which collaborated closely with the government. By describing its

⁴² Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 1.

⁴³ Sir V. Duncan, *Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation 1969-1969*, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1969) in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 25.

⁴⁴ HMG, *The United Kingdom’s Overseas Representation*, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1978), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 26.

⁴⁵ Sir Duncan, *Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation 1969-1969*, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1969) in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 26.

⁴⁶ FAC, *Cultural Diplomacy*, (London: The Stationary Office, 1986), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 27.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 27.

primary, though not only, work as cultural relations, which only contributed to cultural diplomacy, and not as cultural diplomacy per se, the BC managed to preserve its existence and its status.⁴⁸ At this point, it is worth noting, that apart from the BC and the BBC External Services, in this type of diplomacy were also included the Central Office of Information (COI) and the FCO scholarship programme. The total investment in the operations was more than £200 million. By the end of 1990, and in response to the FAC's criticism about its way of supervising, the FCO developed a method of "value for money targets". This basically meant that all subordinate institutions had to present their project and calculate the money they needed, which should be then discussed in terms of whether they fit into broader goals of British public diplomacy.⁴⁹

In 1995, while Britain was still led by the Conservative Party, a complete shift and modernization of public diplomacy happened with the Fundamental Expenditure Review (FER). The FER acknowledged an immense importance of public diplomacy, and the gains it can bring. It completely rearranged public diplomacy, its institutions and hierarchy, and gave it more clear perspective. It was the first time when the spheres of information and culture came to be formally inseparable in the form of public diplomacy.⁵⁰ The FER strengthened the position of the FCO as an institution for oversight and a key player in public diplomacy operations. The FCO could approve or deny grant-in-aid for the operations of the BC and BBCWS and they had to be in line with the FCO's goals. This Review also recommended seizing the opportunities the Internet had to offer⁵¹ and by initiating its first website in 1995, the FCO followed that recommendation.⁵² For the first time Public Diplomacy Division became an umbrella structure for four departments within it: Cultural Relations- with the purpose of steering and controlling the BC, Information Department, News Department and Parliamentary Relations.⁵³ Moreover, the role of public diplomacy at home and abroad was clearly defined. Its operations abroad had the aim "to promote British interests and influence by establishing respect and understanding for Britain and British policies, particularly amongst opinion formers". Public diplomacy within the country had also defined goal to: "to explain Government's foreign policy and how it promotes the UK's interests".⁵⁴ When it comes to the organization, strategy, and definition of public diplomacy, 1995 and the FER were clearly a

⁴⁸ Ibid, 27.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 29-30.

⁵⁰ FCO, *Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Diplomatic Wing) Fundamental Expenditure Review*, (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1995), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 30.

⁵¹ Ibid, 31.

⁵² Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 3.

⁵³ FCO, *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Including Overseas Development Administration: The Government Expenditure Plans 1997-9 to 1990-00*, (London: Stationary Office, 1997), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 32.

⁵⁴ FCO, *Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Diplomatic Wing) Fundamental Expenditure Review*, (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1995), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 31.

turning point. This year laid basis for the developments which would come in the future. Public diplomacy of this period was devised as a concept of “*nation branding*”, and the debates circulating around that notion determined the shape and the direction of public diplomacy in the years to come. The main problem which Britain itself acknowledged was the fact that it was usually perceived as traditional, cold, distant and stiff, which in liberal world weren’t particularly appealing attributes. In order to keep their influence in the international world, they needed to project their national identity as modern, open, entertaining and as accepting diversity.⁵⁵ And here lies the main complexity of British diplomacy efforts. It wasn’t enough to simply change the way of the government’s operations are seen, they had to actually become what they wanted to project. In other words, the change of image was needed, but also the changes within the identity, for the newly forged image to be perceived as truthful. The debate which was developed around Britishness is, to a considerable extent, stimulated by the works of Linda Colley- *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, which finds root of British identity in the 18th and first half of the 19th century, and emphasizes the main phenomena which led to its construction and its main characteristics⁵⁶, Anneke Elwes’s pamphlet *Nations for Sale* which points to the importance of nation branding and highlights the selling points as well as the shortcomings of British image and identity,⁵⁷ and Philip Dodd’s work *The Battle over Britain*, which points out the misconceptions about Britishness and underlines the prominent characteristics of identity which were very emphasized in the past and which could again come to surface and be very useful for the purpose.⁵⁸ These works will be further discussed in the next chapter, altogether with some additional perceptions of British identity and its complexities.

The campaign with which British public diplomacy cut its teeth was *newIMAGES* in 1997. It is described as “the first contemporary public diplomacy campaign”, and “the largest event of its kind to date”. The planning and carrying it out stretched long enough to cover the change of the ruling party from the Conservative to Labour in May 1997, which fortunately didn’t affect the project.⁵⁹ The decision that the campaign should be led in Australia was pushed by the Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. He concluded that there was spreading a negative presentation of Britain, which was further confirmed by the rhetoric in the Australian media.⁶⁰ The main objectives of this campaign were: “to reinforce the dynamic bilateral relationship between Britain and Australia”, to connect people from the spheres of “sports, science, the arts, technology and commerce”, to connect young people, and since the year of the campaign was the BC’s 50th anniversary of existing in

⁵⁵ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 33-59.

⁵⁶ Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 1-442.

⁵⁷ Anneke Elwes, *Nations for Sale*, (London: BMP DDB Needham, 1994), 1-46.

⁵⁸ Philip Dodd, *The Battle over Britain*, (London: Demos Papers) 1995, 1-41.

⁵⁹ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 34.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 33-4.

Australia, to properly mark that year. The campaign was designed to last for a whole year, and Britain wanted to use that year to emphasize the modern, open and fashionable side of its identity.⁶¹ During the planning process, the FCO, the BC and the Department of Trade and Industry showed that they were more than capable of successful and efficient collaboration. The BC was in charge of the cultural aspect of the project, which was actually the main part, and the Political and Commercial departments of the High Commission in Canberra, together with the Consulates-General, contributed by devising a plan for corporate and political topics.⁶² The activities which this huge campaign managed to incorporate are “exchanges, exhibitions, conferences, business events, trade shows, sporting events, workshops, master-classes, art-installations, theatre shows and Internet initiatives”. Additionally, there were organized “major conferences in areas such as Science Policy, British Studies and Britain in Europe”.⁶³ Many students were sent on exchange, others who stayed had the opportunity of meeting the celebrated Royal Shakespeare Company. Thanks to the BC’s funding, Australian galleries had the opportunity of welcoming British works of art, such as *Pictura Britannica* in Sydney presenting modern British art. Britain also presented the “Montage” Internet program and Department of Trade and Industry organized a huge exhibition *UK Now* in Melbourne. In accordance with the FER instructions, the potential of the Internet was used to bring together children from the UK and Australia in “19 Internet projects”. Moreover, the campaign had also its own Internet sites where people could be updated about the happenings in Australia.⁶⁴ When everything is added up, this was a huge project which encompassed 57 cities and towns in Australia, and it was estimated that 3.5 million people in Australia participated in at least some of the activities, which made around 50% of the whole country.⁶⁵ However, we should keep in mind that the effects and successfulness of public diplomacy and its projects are very difficult to evaluate. To measure it, we should have some standardized metric system which would be applicable in different times, spaces and context. This is something which has given many headaches to the British government and to the institutions included in public diplomacy in the 1990s, as well as now. The problem is that influence is not something tangible and measurable which we can put on the beam scale or which we can count, and equally difficult as trying to measure any emotion. In order to be able to prioritize funds allocation, the assessment of the projects has often been reduced to the results of survey, number of views and shares, number of participants or general impression after the project is over. Far from being precise, the assessment of *newIMAGES* was positive, and it was

⁶¹ Environmetrics, *Evaluation of newIMAGES*, (March, 1998), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 35

⁶² Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 34.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 35.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 35.

⁶⁵ David Drewry, *Changing Perceptions: A Presentation by Dr David Drewry to Panel 2000 on 6 May 1998*, in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 36.

considered a success. Additionally, Britain detected “a significant favourable shift in media reporting of Britain”.⁶⁶ Since it was the initial reason why campaign was launched in the first place, it was treated as a mission accomplished.

This campaign seemed to be a tailwind for the future campaigns which would also have the purpose of presenting Britain as a country which managed to encompass all legitimized liberal values, through the use of advanced technology, the Internet, youth culture, popular culture and multinational projects. However, the outcomes were difficult to evaluate and impressions varied from fairly positive to outright negative or simply inconclusive. In the era of the Labour government and Robin Cook, public diplomacy was reformed once again, but that reform brought only the need to even more emphasize British liberal values. New project led by researcher Mark Leonard *Britain*TM had as the agenda to “find a better fit between our heritage and what we are becoming”.⁶⁷ Such an open acknowledgement that Britain as it is, doesn’t have the image that is needed in the present, emphasizes the identity crisis which the country and its people faced at this period. This crisis becomes even more prominent when we take a look at the main points of public diplomacy of this era, which were: “Hub UK”- presenting country as a meeting point of different nations, “United colours of Britain”- with the aim to show that the country is open to multiculturalism; “Creative island” and “Open for business” points aimed to position country as a modern nation which is fruitful for investments and collaboration, “silent revolutionary” and “the nation of fair play”- the points which were intended to put Britain under the spotlight for its good governance and sense of morality.⁶⁸ Again, all parts of the agenda strongly echoed the rhetoric of the US and promoted the values which the US had been defending for a while. Out of this campaign, emerged even a more ambitious one- Cool Britannia. The name itself is to a great extent self- explanatory. Once again, the focus of the public diplomacy campaign was on the country’s progressiveness and modernity. This time, the target audience was not people abroad, but at home, and the campaign evolved around the main political figure in Great Britain- Prime Minister Tony Blair. The campaign was promoted by popular magazines such as Vanity Fair, Newsweek and Time and it was televised as a sequence of gatherings with Tony Blair and popular celebrities of the time from various spheres of interest.⁶⁹ Paradoxically, while campaign appeared interesting to the people outside of Britain, it failed to send its message to its target audience. At home, its program was widely ridiculed and people rejected it, and celebrities who appeared with Blair dissociated

⁶⁶ Ibid, 37.

⁶⁷ Mark Leonard, *Britain*TM: *Renewing Our Identity*, (London: Demos, 1997), 5.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 1-73.

⁶⁹ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 42.

themselves from the Prime Minister, regretting the involvement.⁷⁰ Through this campaign, we can see the attempt of the government and political figures to impose on people new clothes and new image as quickly as possible, for the greater purpose of presenting the country as a trendsetter, a place where everyone, the old and the young, the politicians and the celebrities enjoy everything labeled “cool” in the present day. In 1997, Robin Cook additionally wanted to promote British altruistic values through the message that it was a safe country because it made sure to help other countries and made them safe too. The idea was not only to present the country as moral, but to show through action that its moral outlook stemmed from the actual moves it made. But, the program of this campaign openly stated that as its final aim it had the national economic interest following the string of thoughts that if Britain was truly altruistic country and showed that to the rest of the world, this would be returned by more jobs created within the country and economy boost.⁷¹ This is yet another paradox, but at the same time it confirms that Britain was aware that glazing over through simply branding the country, without the real change within the identity, will be very short-lived. Unfortunately, this realization didn’t help much in the formation of its agenda which appeared contradictory, and even more when the program in which Britain intended to show its altruism “Arms to Africa” scandal happened. Namely, while ensuring the human right protection in Sierra Leone, British government was accused of providing arms to the rebel groups which planned a coup and contrary to the UN’s embargo on arms in Sierra Leone. The Commons put the blame on British senior diplomat Sir John Kerr who knew what was happening and failed to inform Foreign Secretary Robin Cook about that.⁷² This debacle tarnished John Kerr’s reputation, as well as British altruistic intentions, and finally, the situation altogether with the infamous Iraq War led to the resignation of Cook himself.⁷³ In the years to come these and similar failures would provoke suspicion when it comes to presenting Britain as aiming for peace, stability and prosperity in other countries.

Traditional British Identity

In order to realize what a huge shift of British presentation to people within and without was initiated and maintained through public diplomacy, we need to trace back the core British identity to its origins. Branding of Great Britain as a hub of liberal values wouldn’t be so uncommon if it wasn’t so different from what Britain used to represent not so long ago. The author here argues that

⁷⁰ Ibid, 42-3.

⁷¹ Robin Cook, Speech on the Government Ethical Foreign Policy (aka, the ‘Mission Statement’), 12 May, in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 43.

⁷² Nicholas Watt and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Blair challenged on arms supplies for African rebels”, The Guardian.com, February 11, 1999, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1999/feb/11/politicalnews.foreignpolicy>, (accessed March 24, 2107).

⁷³ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 43.

the changes of the aspects of collective identity are in fact possible, and have happened throughout history in many countries. However, if some big changes are imposed on people to accept them within a very limited period of time, and not just to passively accept them as something around them, but to absorb new values as their own, it can easily lead to rejecting those changes as alien from within, and to skepticism about the truthfulness of the changes from without. Therefore, the events of the previous chapter should be put in the context of historical continuity, having in mind that identity is not something which can be forged within a few years, but that it is a product of evolving in certain direction throughout hundreds of years. Metaphorically speaking, if we imagine identity as a building in the everlasting process of construction, the foundation of the building is the core of the identity. The first floors of that building may be quite old-fashioned and something the builders are not very proud of. That doesn't mean that the next floors won't change as the building mechanisms are being perfected. The last built floors might truly be state-of-the-art and pride for everyone living and working on them. Once the builders are more experienced, even the rehabilitation of the old foundation can be implemented in order to change it, modernize it, or make it stronger, but only in a slow and gradual manner. However, it is not possible to simply swiftly change the existing foundation with a completely new one, and hoping that no one would feel the trembling. Such an attempt may result in the collapse of the whole meticulously constructed skyscraper. And here lies the potential threat to the existence of British identity.

Colley's Perception of British Identity

The creation of British identity started with the Act of the Union which united Scotland with England and Wales in 1707. According to Colley the creation of what Britishness was and what it would be in the future also didn't happen overnight. It lasted till the 1837, that is, the beginning of the Victorian era. The book *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* reveals that the primary vehicle behind this unison was constant threat from without, because of which people of Britain were willing to cast a blind eye to some less appealing aspects of the new organization scheme and accept the idea that they are, although quite different among themselves, parts of one whole which needs to be defended from the external enemies.⁷⁴ Colley writes: "What made these themes, mass allegiance on the one hand, and the invention of Britishness on the other, so central during this 130-year long period was a succession of wars between Britain and France".⁷⁵ In order to create consent among people and make them join all these battles and sacrifice their lives, the government had to create the strong sense of belonging to a nation and patriotism among people "as a bandwagon on which different groups and interests leaped so as to steer it in a direction that

⁷⁴ Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 357-368.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 1.

would benefit them”.⁷⁶ Collective identity of Britons came to the fore during this period, and while defining what was “them” they managed to define what was “us”. “They defined themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the world’s most Catholic power. They defined themselves against the French as they imagined them to be, superstitious, militarist, decadent and unfree. Also, as the wars went on, many of them defined themselves in contrast to the colonial peoples they conquered, peoples who were manifestly alien in terms of culture religion and colour”.⁷⁷ Colley further emphasizes that, opposite to widespread belief, what came to be termed British identity wasn’t created due to “blending” of the differences between the English, the Scottish, the Irish and the Welsh, or due to England’s superiority over other regions, but as a response “to the Other beyond their shores”. The fact that they were an island country and that they were predominantly Protestants in face of the spreading Catholic influence, helped them see themselves as different, special, righteous, God-given nation, destined to defend and fight for what was truly good. Their misrepresentation of Catholicism and history perversion allowed them to see the Catholics as enemies. In this context, we can see that even threatening religion was connected to threatening France. In the 18th century Britain started using some approaches which will be devised and professionalized in the 20th and 21st century public diplomacy. Namely, they saw the importance of promoting a good image of their country, and engaged themselves in various charity endeavours and promotion of distinct artworks, for the purpose of boosting their already successful trade operations.⁷⁸ Through the associations concerned with art, such as The Society of Arts, we can see the great lengths to which the Britons went in order to put a stop to everything which had to do with France, or some other European country which could be viewed as their rival. During the Seven Years War in the second half of the 18th century, the meticulously crafted collective identity of the Britons proved to be an extremely powerful force uniting England as the center with its peripheries, as the major part of the British army consisted of the Scotsmen. After victory in that war, the image of the country perceived from within and without was simply self-imposed in accordance with its deeds- “they assumed form themselves the reputation of being the most aggressive, the most affluent and the most swiftly expanding power in the world”.⁷⁹ But, to think that war successes Britain managed to accomplish didn’t leave a mark on their identity, would be simply wrong. When it comes to the national identity which had to be re-modeled now when the British Empire officially encompassed completely different cultures and nationalities, Colley writes: “rather like the frog in Aesop fable which exploded in trying to compete with the ox, at the end of the day they were left wondering if they had overstretched themselves, made nervous and

⁷⁶ Ibid, 5.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 6.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 59.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 103.

insecure by their colossal new dimensions”. The main root, of such a huge identity crisis in the 18th century was that all the Britons took great pride in the fact that they were free people and in their opinion that all other countries should be free, but all of a sudden they were those who robbed many other nations of their liberty.⁸⁰ And precisely in the period of a seeming peace, in the aftermath of the Seven Years War, and in the midst of the insecurities about the characteristics of the national identity, is when serious cracks in the inner composition of the nation appeared. Since, the Scots, as we have previously mentioned, were a major force in the war, they proportionately wanted greater rights in the country in which England held an obvious supremacy. In such an atmosphere England felt threatened so much that its feelings escalated in what was termed “Scottophobia” led by a nationalist, John Wilkes. At that point, in many minds, the sense of Englishness surpassed that of Britishness, showing the weaknesses of the country at the moments of temporary truce. These sentiments had to be surpassed by once again promoting higher loyalties, accepting more Scotsmen into the ruling circle, which in turn enabled inter-regional marriages, and formed something resembling internal stability. But, perhaps, none of it would be so efficient, if there wasn’t a new war, this time with their own 13 colonies on the new continent. What history further tells us is that “worst of all, of course, and uniquely in this period [Britain] lost”, because what would in the future become the US had many allies, while decisively isolated Britain had close to none. Immediately after the war, the collective identity suffered another blow, because Britain ascribed their constant war success to their moral and otherwise superior nature.⁸¹ This defeat had to be internalized with the reasoning that they committed a sin by raising arms on their American Protestant fellows, and that, therefore, they had to get back to the path of righteousness. However, in the following years, this war, as other wars in the past, proved to be a unifying factor of a national identity, which positioned them against the US and other European countries. The whole country, including Scotland, “could now unite in feeling hard done by”. Britain had little time to think about internal division and had to nurture their collective identity, because by 1793, it was engaged in the war with Napoleonic France, which will last till 1815. But fortunately or unfortunately for them, the Britons won that war, too, which helped maintain their exquisite sense of self-worth. The Battle of Waterloo marked a final victory of Britain, its power was confirmed, the British Empire assumed great dimensions, it was the obvious hegemon in the world, and yet the atmosphere within people in the time of peace and feeling of victory was that of disorientation, weariness, anxiety and depression. On that account, Colley explains: “Time and time again, war with an obviously hostile and alien foreign power had forged a semblance of unity and distracted attention from the considerable division and tension within. In a very real sense, war- recurrent, protracted and

⁸⁰ Ibid, 102-3.

⁸¹ Ibid, 145-6.

increasingly demanding- had been the making of Great Britain”.⁸² The historical account ends with the beginning of reign of the Queen Victoria, but Colley emphasizes that what defined Britishness from the 17th till the 19th century, remained the hallmark in the 20th century too- “contact with and dominion over manifestly alien peoples nourished Britons’s sense of superior difference”.⁸³ Colley also recognizes the contemporary threat in the “calls for a revival of other, older loyalties- a return to Englishness, or Scottishness, or Welshness” and in “the apprehension with which so many Britons regard increasing assimilation into a more united Europe”.⁸⁴ At the core of the problem lies the identity crisis of today, because “consciously or unconsciously, many of them fear assuming a new identity in case it obliterates entirely the already insecure identity they currently possess”. In the time of peace Linda Colley saw three possible scenarios for the future of Britain- that it will fall apart along its internal boundaries, or it will adapt to the cultural diversity in Europe and embrace the connectedness with the continent, or that it will come even closer to the US in a very unbalanced relationship.⁸⁵ After presentation of the creation of the British identity, Colley’s assessment of the current situation seems to hold true- “If the inhabitants of the United Kingdom are now more conscious of their internal divisions, this conversely is part of the price they pay for peace and the end of world-power status. They are no longer under the same obligation to unite against a hostile Other, against the outside.”⁸⁶ However, while Colley in her book emphasized the need to change the identity due to the incongruity of the past identity in the present time, this thesis argues that there was the need to change the image by changing some aspects of the exiting identity since the nation’s identity doesn’t have a finishing line.

Dodd’s Emphasis on Identity Crisis

Another work which gave to the debate about identity in the process of developing public diplomacy in Britain the sense of urgency was *The Battle over Britain* written by Philip Dodd. While Linda Colley focused on the building of Britishness before the 20th century, Dodd looked for similar patterns in the 20th century, and primarily in the trends and ways of thinking developed in the time of Margaret Thatcher. However, unlike Colley, he perceived nationalism and aversion towards modernity and diversity to be products of the way she ruled and rhetoric she used, and by which Thatcher managed to turn British typical patriotism into British atypical nationalism. And yet, he, too, recognized the need for a change and inappropriateness of British identity in the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. The common ground for Colley and Dodd is the perception that the patterns of behavior and foreign policy Britain led, were pushing its people in

⁸² Ibid, 327-330.

⁸³ Ibid, 377.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 383.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 383-4.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 167.

the wrong direction, and unless it drastically changed, it would lose the battle among other national identities and images in the peaceful world.⁸⁷

Dodd describes the 80s as “the best of time and the worst of time” with Thatcher’s emphasis on developing economy, but at the same time with the decisively nationalist point of view- “a period when Prime Minister seemed to mean it when she said she wanted to put the Great back into Britain, even if this meant war”.⁸⁸ Once again the question of what it meant to be British arose and became the focal point during her governance. According to Dodd’s writing, the main problem at hand in the modern era was that “the British identity stabilised in the late nineteenth century is hardly suitable for the British in the twenty-first century. But nor is another and more attractive identity”.⁸⁹ Whenever Britain decided to reform something it seemed as if it was looking, more often than not, at the examples from its past- “the measure of the success of political future has often been how much like the past it could look”. Thatcher advocated “*purification* and *exclusion*”. Her rhetoric seemed to be aligned with many perceptions of Colley about Britain before the 20th century, and we can see in these perceptions some consistency in British identity throughout centuries.⁹⁰ Thatcher warned people that “enemies were here, there and everywhere”, and emphasized the gap, which Colley also described when writing about Britain before Thatcherism, between internal friend and countryman and external enemy. Dodd summarizes here this view as follows: “Britishness was singular, not plural and it was enough to be one of “them” by not being ‘one of us’ ”. Moreover, he also recognizes the consistency throughout Britain’s history in such a presentation because, as he says, the Britons “long worked on the principle of separating the inside sheep from the outside goats”.⁹¹ Both, Colley and Dodd recognized the same trends in the process of building British collective identity, which did not last for a few decades, but from the formation of Great Britain all the way to the modern age. While enemies changed during all that time- from the Catholics, over the Jews, all the way to the Orientals and the people of the Caribbean,⁹² the story by which Britain endured constant threat from the dangerous “Others” remained the same. Dodd, too, stresses in his article that the war was an important precondition for unifying those who were among themselves quite different, and who would’ve perhaps never been unified. Margaret Thatcher and her policy and rhetoric fit perfectly into that previously formed worldview. She didn’t refrain from openly legitimizing war and violence in the second half of the 20th century- “Against

⁸⁷ Dodd, *The Battle over Britain*, (London: Demos Papers) 1995, 1-41.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 1.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 6.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 18.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 18.

⁹² *Ibid*, 19.

all Britain's foes, without and within, there had to be a call to arms".⁹³ Her proactive, populist approach was very powerful and had profound influence on the British people and their perception of Britishness. Also, Dodd underlines that people in power who replaced her weren't willing to create the story which would explain in different terms Britishness and Britain as an inclusive society consisting of different regions, races, ethnicities, in order to create a platform on which different characteristics can come to the fore. This negligence caused chaos at home in the time when there were no interstate wars outside. People saw the diversity within their own country not as a virtue, but as the enemy from within, visible now more than ever. The black English became the enemy to the white English, and the Scottish, the Irish and the Welsh became the enemy to the English, and vice versa, and at the same time the EU was often perceived as the enemy of the British altogether.⁹⁴ The identity built on the perception of unity based on the existence of an enemy, turned out to be a double-edged sword, and in the time of peace and need for a change dictated by the US, this sword started cutting their own flesh. Out of that atmosphere, the separatist movements arose, because "the current version of Britishness" was often used as a "somekscreen of Englishness", and as a response to that the discussion about the benefits and shortcomings of being part of the EU appeared as a way "to postpone once again having to come face to face" and "another excuse for amnesia about the historical connections of the British with other parts of the globe" which would probably end with a strictly rejected conclusion that Britain is not pure⁹⁵ However, unlike Colley which presents as the solution to this identity crisis reformation of British identity, Dodd puts forth the idea of emphasizing certain traits of that past identity. These traits which in his opinion existed, apart from the belligerent nature, patriotism and traditionalism were: diversity, because the Britons were always in touch with other nationalities, openness to new ideas and novelties proved through importing ideas from Europe in the 18th century, mobility, evident by the constant travelling of Britons and their fondness towards sea, modernity, visible in their taste for fascinating and often eccentric fashion, technical advancement, music, art, and many other traits which are more suitable in the world dominated by liberal values. The author ended this article on a positive note. He believed that his countrymen are willing to accept this new form of identity, and change the perception of Britishness from "something immovable as a monument" to the newer version "as something provisional and capable of transformation as wave".⁹⁶ In many respects Colley's and Dodd's presentations of British national identity are matching. However, they did prescribe slightly different cures for the identity crisis. And while Colley's prediction of the future is somewhat inconclusive, Dodd's perspective is much more optimistic and promising.

⁹³ Ibid, 20-21.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 1-40.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 34.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 39.

Nevertheless, the same question which Colley posed in her book, appeared also in Dodd's work- "the question of whether a single unifying identity- the British People- is ever possible outside of the conditions of war, when the enemy is opposed with a call to arms", altogether with the question which probes British tendencies towards modernity and openness- "even if it were possible, would it be desirable".⁹⁷ The presentation and analysis of these two works, of Colley and Dodd, serve to give the reader the impression about the atmosphere and dilemmas which appeared at the turn of the century with the need to reconcile British past identity and present need for a change through public diplomacy. Many conclusions and suggestions from these two works are adopted in public diplomacy, but when it comes to the efficiency and durability of the remedy prescribed, the jury is still out. Whether this will turn out to be an elixir of life or a band-aid on the wound is yet to be seen.

The Past as the Problem of the Present

Incontestably influential as Colley and Dodd's works were and still are, they were by no means the only ones who studied, explored and wrote about British identity and image after the Cold War was over. While they might have had different approaches to what Britishness actually is and where to go from there, some similar messages and conclusions kept popping up. They could be often summarized as: inaptitude of British national identity and image in the modern world. At the turn of the century, Britain was a single boat in the middle of the ocean, with passengers often disagreeable with each other. On one side there was a steamship with the US flag firmly anchored and on the other the fleet of European countries used to living in the intertwined surrounding. On that isolated boat, Great Britain had to see the problem of its passengers before it determined how to behave towards the steamship and towards the fleet. Nonetheless, it is often easier to see black-and-white picture of "us" and "them", and to be in conflict with the otherness, than to see the problems at home and not know who is "us" and who are "them".

The feeling of inadequacy was also expressed in the pamphlet "Nations for Sale" written by Anneke Elwes for the purposes of the advertising agency DDB Needham. She found the basis of British identity in the past as well as the tendency to stick to that past in the present. Mark Leonard also recognized Elwes' contribution to the discussion about British identity and BritainTM campaign, particularly because she put on the agenda the topic of nation branding.⁹⁸ The primary focus of Elwes's pamphlet was precisely on the nation branding and on exporting the identity and image and whole nations like products, which is precisely what is happening in the highly competitive globalized market. The national identity is what constitutes the potential for selling products based

⁹⁷ Ibid, 6.

⁹⁸ Leonard, *BritainTM: Renewing Our Identity*, (London: Demos, 1997), viii.

on their origin and therefore, the potential for boosting the economy. On this account Elwes wrote: “National heritage, or even just national associations are often an intrinsic part of a brand’s make-up, and well-handled, can often help steal an edge on the competition”. In order to explain Britain’s place in this competition, the author describes the countries as if “they were brands and evaluates their strengths and weaknesses”⁹⁹ She describes Britain as “entrenched in the past- tradition and stability based on unchanging values”. She recognizes only “few associations with progressiveness, little ability to market innovation”. However, in the time when she wrote the pamphlet, she already discerned the direction in which Britain wanted to push its image, and the “need to play to newfound strengths based on reality of Britain today especially inventiveness, originality and individuality/self-expression”¹⁰⁰ Such claims further strengthen the perspective that Britain saw the need to find the elements of its identity which, if pushed to the foreground, would be a good fit in the world of liberal values. The author also mentioned that the way in which other countries see a particular country can sometimes be in clash with how that same country sees itself. Some of the common descriptions of Britain, mentioned in the results of the survey conducted in various countries, were “an independent continent” and “closed to foreign trends and immigrants”. Additionally, when it comes to close cooperation which started flourishing by the end of the 20th century, Britain was unfortunately still perceived as “contrary, always doing the opposite to everyone else”¹⁰¹ As previously mentioned, Britain’s inability to adapt to the liberal values, probably lied in the contradictory aspects of its identity highly regarded in the past. When it comes to British image in the end of the 20th century, Elwes writes: “Most countries have time-honoured rituals, but England has the edge here, famed for its ability to preserve tradition and keep history alive”. She concludes that- “Britain’s attraction is without a doubt rooted in the past”.¹⁰² Different continents see Britain differently, but what is mutual is that they keep connecting Britain with something related to its tradition and history, and more often than not, Britain appears as an isolated, reserved country, not in line with the values of modern liberalism. For example, Asia expressed its impression of Britain in the following manner: “Even the weather seemed to echo Britain’s backwardness- cold, wet, dark and wintery”. In Western Europe, people noticed that Britain has its modernizing potential but also “acknowledged the unique English countryside and religious respect for tradition and conservation”.¹⁰³ In contrast with slightly favourable image in Europe, Britain in Australian continent is perceived as “aggressive and war-mongering: bad at

⁹⁹ Elwes, *Nations for Sale*, (London: BMP DDB Needham, 1994), 1.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 3.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 18.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 18.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, 19.

losing and being upstaged and generally unwilling to move with the times”.¹⁰⁴ In the US, Britain is still seen as a traditional country, but for them this feature bears appeal in itself: “Britain presents a sense of stability based on unchanging traditional values, law and order, conservation, classical education and an old democratic tradition.” In summary, the survey showed that Britain, as it is, is “a dated concept”, but for a long time Britain played the card of its tradition and seemed very reluctant to let it go- “the traditional, the picture postcard image has its attractions and sells well, and so Britain continues to sell it”. In the eyes of the rest of the world “British output may be relatively good quality, value for money and long-lasting but it is not seen as excellent, attractively designed, technologically advanced or innovative”.¹⁰⁵ Also, when it comes to British attitude towards war and peace, Britain was seen like “a small nation that would still love to rule the waves”.¹⁰⁶ The survey depicted both, British perceived isolationism and low tolerance towards “the others”. “The British are uncomfortable with the unknown, the unfamiliar, the foreign. They are not open to others or to new experiences. They insulate themselves from their own social classes as well as from the rest of the world, and foreigners within Britain are treated as a class apart, they are tolerated but not integrated.”¹⁰⁷

In the pamphlet, the author contended that Britain needs to stop exporting traditionalism in order to fit in the world of today.¹⁰⁸ This conclusion was by no means random. While some of the descriptions given by other countries might’ve sounded like compliments a couple of decades before that, in the time of the Internet expansion, interconnections, multiculturalism, enhanced mobility, co-dependence and modernity, not so much. A sight of an uptight white Brit drinking tea at five o’clock is interesting to see, but you would think twice about sitting at that table with him. And even though this picture of the British is highly based on stereotypes and prejudices, this was what the rest of the world saw as the image of Britain, and the image was important for identity development as well as for everything else. Mark Leonard took these remarks seriously in the process of refurbishing British image and identity through public diplomacy, but so did the others who saw the importance of advertising a country to the benefits of their people.

When it comes to the problem described in the introduction of this chapter, Elwes’ focus is primarily on British traditionalism in the world of modernity. But, we need to cover the second, equally important part of the problem, and that is British perception of “otherness” in the world of connectedness. Robin Cohen wrote on this topic and maintained that “a complex national and social

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 21-2.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 24-5.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 27.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 28.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 1-46.

identity is continuously constructed and reshaped in its (often antipathetic) interaction with outsiders, strangers, foreigners and aliens – the ‘others’. You know who you are, only by knowing who you are not.”¹⁰⁹ In his article, Cohen described the problem of Britishness at the end of the 20th by presenting instability of identity and uncertainty about what it encompasses- “indeterminacy can be thought of as a series of blurred, opaque or ‘fuzzy’ frontiers surrounding the very fabrication and the subsequent recasting of the core identity.” First of all, there was the problem of regional identities within the one national, i.e. the problem between England and the so-called “Celtic fringe”- Scotland, Wales and Ireland. Scotland has always been seen as a threat, and when nationalist currents strengthened, the identity crisis was deepened with the movement for independency from Britain.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, England confidently ignored the sentiments which were accumulating in the previous decades, hence, was unprepared for the debate about the position of Scotland. Wales as part of the United Kingdom which had never actually been the kingdom, doesn’t see economic prosperity without England as Scotland does. Therefore, their relationship is fairly unwavering, except for the occasional outbursts directed at English superiority, typical for sporting events, and English despise for the Welsh language as part of the English curriculum. It is not to say that there are no separatist movements in Wales, but they are far less likely to disturb the English than the Scottish movement.¹¹¹ In parallel, the situation with Ireland is often unnerving for England. The animosity existed throughout centuries on both sides. Ireland put the blame on the English elite for the famine they experienced, and England saw them as stain on their untarnished Protestant identity, since it is predominantly Catholic region. Throughout the 20th century there have been numerous violent clashes between the Irish Republican Army advocating separation of Northern Ireland and the Loyalists, protecting the unity. And while there have been some attempts to establish peace, the efforts and the outcomes were partial and ultimately, insufficient.¹¹² Secondly, the uncertainty about the boundaries of British national identity and disharmony at home was even more emphasized with the attempts to decide what Britishness meant in respects to the other countries. The identity thought about as belonging to the white people after the WWII became markedly non-white. With coloured people from Commonwealth migrating into Britain and giving independency to colonies and previous dominions, Britishness was no longer the privilege of the white. Additionally, the entering into the EU, the European Economic Community at the time, deprived them of the myth about a completely independent and self-serving country in the 20th

¹⁰⁹ Robin Cohen, “Fuzzy Frontiers of Identity: The British Case”, Social Identities, Abingdon: Taylor and Francis Group, 1995, 1-22.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 1-2.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 1-10.

¹¹² Ibid, 1-10.

century.¹¹³ The countries of Commonwealth would also start making arrangements with other countries which does not include Britain, and their core identity would come to be their own, and not the derivative of British identity. Therefore, on one front, Britain would have to accept new side to its identity- as the country of the EU, and on the other front, it would lose parts of its old identity- as it experienced the “slash at the old umbilical cord” with the countries of Commonwealth.¹¹⁴ Thirdly, when it comes to the image of Britain abroad, Cohen writes that “the British abroad provided a crucial expression of (and gave vital reinforcement to) the evolution of a British identity in general and an English identity in particular.” Public presentation and representation of Britain brought two related phenomena- Britain “made the English abroad more English than the English at home”, and “at the turn of the century, the separate English and Celtic identities were more easily overcome abroad than at home”.¹¹⁵ As such an image turned out to be impossible to maintain and quite impairing for the domestic cohesion, the presentation had to be changed, which brought additional changes to the British identity. The rapid spread of English-like institutions and practices, and more importantly, English language, originating in Britain, but spreading more recently through the USA’s prominence, contributed to the even greater confusion of what Britishness is and where it stops. Cohen summarizes the identity problem between Britain and the USA as follows: “a cousinhood between the British and many Americans remains: a fuzzy frontier somewhere between a selfhood and an other-hood”.¹¹⁶ In the midst of the ambiguity about their national identity, Britain reconciled with the perception that Britishness is no longer easily equated with whiteness, and accepted that there is a vague line which limits Britishness from American-ness, but perhaps the unavoidable mystery was in regards to the Britishness when put next to European-ness. It was the continent with their historical arch-rival France as one of the most dominant powers. Refraining from Europe can be described with the English saying “Foreigners start at Calais” and since this was the message sent out to Europe, the message was reciprocated on their part also. Cohen asserts that many countries in Europe perceive Britain as “reluctant Europeans, stubbornly monolingual, still tied to the dreams of Empire and to the apron strings of the USA”. Therefore, it is no wonder that Charles de Gaulle opposed Britain being part of the ECC.¹¹⁷ The primary reasons behind his position were the possibility of disturbance of peace in Europe and strong dependency on the US which would come altogether with Britain. “For him, admitting the UK to the European club was as foolish as the Trojans breaking down their city walls to admit the wooden horse of the

¹¹³ Ibid, 1-10.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 1-10.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 1-16.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 16.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 16.

Athenians.”¹¹⁸ And it is not to say that Britain didn’t give Europe in general and France in particular, the reasons for such an attitude. The refusal to coordinate on various matters such as Euro as the common currency, lack of support for European social policy to its own benefits, siding with the NATO instead of Franco-German scheme of mutual protection and harsh immigration policy on the European citizens, created an unfavourable image of Britain and brought upon mistrusts about British identity being part of Europe. History tells us that Britain gave in and joined the ECC consisting of 11 primary members at the time, but grave discrepancies remained so great “that even after two decades of membership of the EEC and its successor bodies an old dilemma can still be posed. Can the British ever become Europeans?”¹¹⁹ Instead of using its power and position in Europe to promote equality, diversity and multiculturalism, “the British government seeks only to outbid the ‘11’ in its fervour to exclude non-white third-country nationals from the EU.”¹²⁰ Finally, apart from all previously mentioned boundaries, “the Celtic, the Dominion, the Commonwealth, the Atlantic and the European” don’t give the full picture, until we include “the alien frontier”. And perhaps the gravest complexity is that there is no strict definition of who is counted as alien in relation to the British. Whoever the alien or simply “the other” in British history might’ve been, Cohen insists that the dichotomy between “the self” and “the other” is “the warp and woof of all British migration history and the basic ingredient of a British identity.”¹²¹

It is precisely in this pondering, confusing, anxious and mind-wrenching atmosphere with regards to the national identity at the turn of the century, that public diplomacy appeared. It was not so much about the potential of public diplomacy as a mechanism for nation-branding, image-shifting and identity-modifying, although it was undoubtedly great, as much as it seemed like a new invention on which a nation can cling onto in the time of complete disorientation. Public diplomacy appeared as the perfect opportunity for identity change in the time of identity crisis and Britain took it, but in a rush to resolve the issue, Britain optimistically overlooked the limits of this practice.

Main Elements of British Modern Identity and Public Diplomacy

After we have described what Britishness was throughout history for the British people and for those in contact with them, and the identity crisis which ensued near the end of the 20th century and after the Cold War, the events regarding public diplomacy from the second chapter become clearer. We can see what kind of thinking and feeling brought upon the fuss about formalizing and directing British public diplomacy. The author of this thesis argues that the core of the British

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 16.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 18.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 18-20.

¹²¹ Ibid, 20.

identity had been built for a long time on the premise of traditionalism and unity in the face of its numerous enemies. However, in the world of liberal values, Britain decided to present itself through public diplomacy as a modern nation whose superior position is impossible to challenge even with the new world order. How they did that and to which extent they succeeded in their intentions will be analyzed further on.

Steps towards Modernization

In this chapter we will mention some of the initiatives which had as the main goal the task to paint Britain in the modern, fluorescent colours which fit perfectly into the artistic scheme of legitimized liberal values.

In 1998, the BC gave impetus for the MORI research which came to be called Through Other Eyes. The purpose of this research was to see how Britain was perceived by the young people. It aimed at revealing the strong sides of British image which needed to be more strongly emphasized in the future and the weak sides which should be improved. The research revealed that while Britain was seen as excelling at education and entrepreneurship, it was not seen as particularly inventive, artistic or modern in general.¹²² In response to the research results Great Britain became particularly keen on changing that conception or misconception. And so, by the year of 2000 the Britain Abroad Task Force (BATF) was formed and began its operations with the purpose “to help improve perceptions of the UK around the world, especially amongst the general public and particularly young people” and to become “an inclusive forum for the exchange of ideas”.¹²³ In the BATF’s target audience and aims, the tendency towards modernizing image and identity becomes self-evident. But, it is important to mention that the “core mission was to improve and update foreign perceptions of the UK in order to boost trade, investment, tourism and education”.¹²⁴ In this example, we can see the self-centered campaign which presented itself as a vehicle for promoting connectedness among people, openness and acceptance of differences, but for the quite egotistical reasons. It would be wrong to say that other countries campaigned simply for the purpose of campaigning or to say that other countries have high moral and ethical causes behind all their diplomatic initiatives. However, the fact that Britain’s campaign in the beginning presented its self-serving interests might’ve been the cause of mistrust with regards to the British diplomatic intentions and presented image in the future. On the other hand, such a strategy was not atypical, and quite similar agenda and goals would appear more than a decade later in the campaign

¹²² Robert Radcliffe, *Through Other Eyes: How the World Sees the United Kingdom*, (London: British Council, 1999), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 48-9.

¹²³ BATF website, “What Does the Britain Abroad Task Force Consist of”, 2002, in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 53.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, 53.

GREAT.¹²⁵ This phenomenon might point to the fact that Britain perceived this approach as the right one and only looked for the means to apply it in the right way, or it might point to the fact that Britain's core identity kept emerging on the surface, and Britain wanted to be truly modern, open and cooperative, but didn't have enough trust in others to move away from the long cherished primarily national goals.

Apart from official campaigns, there was also an important aspect of British plan to modernize itself, and this is- technology. Quite early, from the formal beginning of British public diplomacy as we know it, the British government, and key diplomatic institutions had recognized an immense potential of the Internet as the way of quickly spreading particular messages to the wider audience abroad and at home. This is why they put huge emphasis on developing the websites, as a way of directly communicating with people, and before forwarding the news to the journalists.¹²⁶ This gave the government and the institutions the opportunity to tell the story from their own perspective and attach to the news the feelings and attitudes they had about certain information. It was not to say that websites became the only means for communicating with broader audience about diplomatic plans and goals, but it became certainly a very prominent one. The umbrella organization-the FCO- appeared online for the first time on 1 May in 1995. And very quickly it became obligatory for all British Embassies abroad to have their websites and make good use of it. From the simplified version of the FCO's website in 1995 called "FCO ON-LINE" which published "the FCO Daily Bulletin and an archive of speeches, publications and treaties", the public diplomacy embraced wide possibilities of the Internet, and in 2001 there was the advanced i-UK "web portal providing a single point of entry to the UK's official online profile for those interested in visiting, doing business, studying or learning about British culture".¹²⁷ British public diplomacy over time used more and more Internet channels and for different purposes, and in the beginning of the 21st century, the additional tool was created in the form of E-diplomacy by which the Internet became the two-way street in the diplomatic world- used for sending the messages, as well as for communicating and researching the target audience.¹²⁸ And the websites, portals, forums and other online engagements of British public diplomacy were widely accepted and fairly successful in reaching numerous peoples. By the year of 2003, Britain had its Digital Diplomacy department which together with Miliband encouraged British ambassadors to start blogging and thus, created a platform for the more transparent presentation of government's decisions and policies and for the

¹²⁵Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 54.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 56.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 56-7.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 80.

improvised debates between the officials and the public for the purpose of enhancing them.¹²⁹ However, we can argue here that the Internet activities, content and campaigns presented online were also turned to a great extent to some national causes of drawing finances into the country, and very little to cooperation with other countries for the purpose of achieving some greater cause out of which many countries would draw benefits. It is not that Britain was utterly selfish, and many other countries certainly profited from some of these initiatives and online presentations. And yet, the purposes of the campaigns and the Internet portals, often carried realist message that the world order was still a zero-sum game, and that benefits of other countries drawn from British actions were often only a by-product of what Britain intended to achieve for itself. In lieu with this notion appears a logical question of whether a country in a modern world based on mutual goals and cooperation, can be thought of as truly modern if it lacks these important aspects. It probably can, but only after a thoughtful reconstruction and adaption of national image and after a far longer period of time.

In the beginning of a new millennium, Britain probably saw this paradox of how they wanted the world to see this country, and what they were actually doing to accomplish that, and changed the strategy. From focusing on British image after 1995, they moved the focus to its influence. On this account, Pamment writes that “a conceptual shift away from image projection was closely tied to issue-based, campaign-style approaches to pursuing multilateral diplomatic objectives”.¹³⁰ The emphasis here should be on “multilateral” aspect, suggesting that Britain saw its own diplomatic initiatives as perceived too self-serving and monolithic to be considered modern. Mark Leonard in this period played once again one of the key roles in reforming British public diplomacy, being the head of The Foreign Policy Centre of the time. In the report of 2000 *Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society*, he confirmed what I have stated before, by insisting that “Public diplomacy can no longer be seen as a bolted-on extra to traditional diplomatic activity”.¹³¹ If we start from the position that this statement precisely reflected the state of nation at the beginning of the new century, this can show us the identity crisis which ensued and which Britain tried to overcome through public diplomacy. Yet, at the same time, it shows us that the crisis didn’t simply circumvent around the sphere of diplomacy, but was also very prominent there. Namely, while Britain tried to present public diplomacy as something fairly unique and quite distinctive from the traditional tools of regular diplomacy, it tended not to stray too far away from it, i.e. to be close to the core British identity and historically accepted ways of communicating with

¹²⁹ Ibid, 137-8.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 66.

¹³¹ Mark Leonard and Vidhya Alakeson, *Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society*, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2000) , in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 64.

those termed “others”. Be that as it may, Britain still tried to break the habits, and the change of attitude is visible in the proscribed plan of public diplomacy summarized as “moving from bilateral issues to global issues that affect everybody” which was even more prompted after 9/11, and cooperation with others on issues like “terrorism, global economic crises, pandemics and climate change”.¹³² It is worth noting that in October 2001, and in the aftermath of 9/11, Britain wanted to show the support to their over-Atlantic neighbours with the diplomatic campaign which actually seems to be more in line with British previous identity. Namely, the campaign’s original name was UKinNY and the aim of campaign could not be really perceived as giving support and helping the USA, because the intent of the campaign was “to showcase innovative products that represented British talent and creativity”.¹³³ Therefore, the plan was to use this opportunity to once again show that Britain was a modern nation, turned to new invention, originality and art, and yet many could argue that it wasn’t either the right time or place for this type of campaign. Only after some discussions, did Britain also see the discrepancy of the campaign with British new acknowledged diplomatic goals. Consequently, it was renamed and became UKwithNY and the new plan was “a show of solidarity” but still “with a hint of commercial opportunism”. And when we take into account the fact that business meetings and conferences and presentation of British modern design occupied a significant part in the revised version of that campaign,¹³⁴ it appears that solidarity was pushed slightly into the background and British economy in to the fore.

In the future years, Britain still tried to focus on promoting itself as a modern cooperative nation, but not without experiencing the pulls towards its core identity. The example of this could be the dissolution of the previously mentioned diplomatic body BATF which had the purpose of emphasizing British innovations, contemporary arts and creativity, and creating instead the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board (PDSB) whose agenda was significantly different. The creation of PDSB seemed like a step back since the chief priority was again to paint Britain in a more positive light for the main purpose of boosting British economy. This was not in line with the previously stated diplomatic goals of working on the common problems for the mutual benefits,¹³⁵ but on the contrary, in line with the self-preserving philosophy. To put it simply, the PDSB wanted to go for the modern image and be engaged in the activities that would leave that impression, but the ultimate goal remained traditional, national, resilient. The impact of the public diplomacy initiatives and their effectiveness, when it comes to the proposed agenda, is difficult to establish, since there is no precise gauge for measuring people’s feelings and perceptions. Therefore, the measurement of

¹³² Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 65.

¹³³ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 67-8.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, 67-8.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, 83.

effectiveness of a campaign came down to general impression of the people involved and more often, surveys. In this particular period, even the surveys showed that the approach of Great Britain was far from perfect. For example, in 2003 and 2004 they showed that after the launching of the report *Through Other Eyes*, the perception of Britain abroad actually deteriorated, and that it was “not considered particularly trustworthy”. Those in charge ascribed that to the involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and comforted themselves by maintaining that such an attitude wasn’t reflected in the decisions and actions of other countries in cooperation with Britain.¹³⁶ Whether this perception was truly linked to the wars or to other contradictory diplomatic moves is not clear, but the message we can draw out from this is that certain approaches of British public diplomacy simply didn’t give the results that Britain had expected. And as much as the government was trying to find the reasons for little or no success in presenting Britain as the hub of liberal values in some external factors which contributed to it, it couldn’t shut its eyes completely. Therefore, many other reformations ensued, including yet another dissolution, this time of the PDSB, instead of which new board- the PDB,¹³⁷ came in place. But whichever board was in charge, the agenda revolved around presenting Britain as a modern and overall peaceful nation.

One of the most important campaigns, which additionally proves this reasoning, was *Think UK*, which was carried out in China in 2003 and 2004. The aim of the campaign echoed those of the previous campaigns- to leave the “impression of a modern, innovative UK”.¹³⁸ But, the reasons behind the choice of country where the campaign would be carried out again reflected primarily national reasons. In the previously mentioned report *Through Other Eyes*, out of all researched countries the Chinese view of Great Britain was at the bottom, and British government saw China as the growing power with which they should have good relations and from which they should have benefits, and the choice seemed obvious. The events of this long campaign targeted mainly young people in large cities, and included “touring exhibitions, performances, interactive and media projects, conferences, discussion forums, national competitions and business events”. Some of the major events were *UK-China Challenge*, a competition of the teams consisting of the British and Chinese students, *the UK International Financial Services*, a quiz organized on the Internet for the purpose of showcasing the advancement of the UK’s financial sector, *Red Hot Wheels*, a showcasing of the British cars, *Writer’s Train*, an organized journey for the British and Chinese writers, which was later turned into a documentary.¹³⁹ There was also the tendency to include as many people as possible from the spheres apart from politics and business. This is why “the U.K.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 85-6.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 88.

¹³⁸ FCO and British Council, *Think UK Final Report*, (February, 2004), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 89.

¹³⁹ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 90.

campaign paired its technology expo in China with a public competition to build a robot” and “instead of a typical art exhibit, a British sculptor worked with Chinese villagers to create a sculpture garden of 100,000 palm-size figures molded out of the bright red clay native to their region”.¹⁴⁰ After the campaign ended, the British once again had to face their limitations. While there was a great number of participants, and widespread media coverage, the surveys suggested that it didn’t bring directly wanted results. It was not even the case that the perception about the UK remained the same, but the perception actually deteriorated by 7%, and at the same time the perception of “the country as creative and innovative ”decreased by around the same percentage.¹⁴¹ The government again understood such outcomes as a result of the infamous Iraq War and insufficiently coordinated work of the PDSB. Pamment maintains that this campaign “provided the Government with data that was ultimately unsuccessful in supporting the case for public diplomacy, producing little demonstrable impact despite its high costs, ambitions and the levels of energy expended”.¹⁴² On the other hand, it is important to notice that not everybody agrees with such an evaluation. Zaharna suggests: “The value of Britain’s relationship-building campaign in China was not reflected in the public opinion polls, but rather in the links created between British and Chinese participants and the foundation the initiative created for future relationship-building activities”.¹⁴³ Be that as it may, these results in practice meant further reformation with the attempts to find what had gone wrong, but looking back from the present moment into the beginning of the millennium we can argue here that it was not about the wrong practices or the wrong location at a certain time, or the operations of the inapt board, but the very wrong attitude. Public diplomacy at the time didn’t go slowly, trying to make changes within British identity and create better image brick by brick and in the manner it was built in the past. It seems as if the country simply wanted to change its clothes without anyone noticing it- quickly remove the old one, hide it where nobody can see it, and put on some shiny new one. But, image is not like clothes, it goes much deeper, hence, while the image maybe even changed on the surface, it needed a lot more time to change the aspects of identity itself and even then some memorabilia of the past days would remain. Such a swift change only accomplished to make the country unstable, and led to various partially successful, inconclusive or unsuccessful campaigns. As it was difficult to change the British vision of Britishness, it was equally difficult to change the vision of the overseas nations of Britishness, and they simply couldn’t accept it as a modern and purely liberal nation.

¹⁴⁰Rhonda Zaharna, “Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives: Information and Relational Communication Frameworks”, in Snow and Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, 92.

¹⁴¹ FCO and British Council, *Think UK Final Report*, (February, 2004), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 90.

¹⁴² Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 90-91.

¹⁴³ Rhonda Zaharna, “Mapping out a Spectrum of Public Diplomacy Initiatives: Information and Relational Communication Frameworks”, in ¹⁴³ Snow and Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, 92.

In the years to come, Britain did not give up on their plan of showing the new face of Britain through public diplomacy. We can argue that if at a certain point they had gone into details of what was wrong with the new presentation, they would have been able to eliminate the problem, or simply soften the edges of the drastic shift in the image created historically and the one promoted near the end of the 20th century. But, they decided to act on the results they received and keep reforming public diplomacy bodies. And so, in 2009 the PDB was dissolved and replaced with the new body of the Communication Directorate¹⁴⁴ and brand new strategy but aiming to send the similar message- that Britain is open to diversity, innovation and cooperation with others for the purpose of bringing peace and stability to other regions. The new strategy was imagined as “a new paradigm of “two way” dialogical engagement with the array of organizations and actors now integral to achieving foreign policy goals”.¹⁴⁵ And here we can see the example of an improved strategy of communication with the public, but for the purpose of the strictly local goals, to draw the approval for the legislation that government plans to push. And it is not to say that this goal is not also one of the main purposes of the public diplomacy in general and present in other countries. Of course it is, and it shouldn't be dismissed as something negative, because we live in the world of interconnected democracies where legitimization for policies and actions should be accrued, and this is one of the ways to do it. However, British agenda constantly revolving around its own goals, but presenting itself through something for mutual benefit, often made it seem untrustworthy about its plans like a wolf in sheep's clothing.

One of the biggest endeavours in the sphere of the public diplomacy was the promotional campaign for London Olympics in 2012 and the series of events which preceded the Olympic Games. The idea was to use this unique opportunity to “showcase modern Britain as the open (welcoming, diverse, tolerant), connected (through our involvement in the UN and G20, politically, geographically, in terms of trade and travel), creative and dynamic place it really is”.¹⁴⁶ Such an agenda didn't come out of the blue, and the emphasis to show the true colours of Britain seems like a message to their own people regarding how they should behave and think according to the current British needs and dependencies on other countries. The whole strategy was actually a response to the polling results of the *Public Diplomacy Group*, which found out that the British are still sometimes seen as “arrogant, stuffy, old-fashioned and cold”,¹⁴⁷ none of which were the characteristics desirable in the liberal worldview. The amount of funds spent and the number of

¹⁴⁴ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 114.

¹⁴⁵ James Pamment, *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Evaluating Policy and Practice*, (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 1-184.

¹⁴⁶ FAC, *FCO Public Diplomacy: The Olympic and Paralympic Games 2012*, (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2011), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 145.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 145.

events organized were great. It was estimated that 52 public diplomacy events were carried out in many great cities of the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia. One of the main events was the campaign *See Britain (Through My Eyes)* which involved series of movies with celebrities of other nations living in the UK. In 2010, there was a campaign in which the staff of the British Embassies abroad and some other organizations ran in support of sports and for the purpose of raising money for charities.¹⁴⁸ A very expensive part of the Olympics public diplomacy campaign was building the so-called “Seed Cathedral” in Shanghai, which was “the 60-feet-high construction” made out of “60,000 fibre-optic rods, each representing a plant seed”, and it was supposed to “mirror the Royal Botanical Society’s *Millennium Seedbank* project which aimed to collect a seed from each of the world’s plant species”.¹⁴⁹ This building seems like one of the greatest metaphors of the missteps in the British public diplomacy- it was huge, marvelous and shining, aiming to present the country as the home of the contemporary ideas, art and architecture, but when people came inside of it, they discovered that it was an empty promise. Namely, Britain announced it as “an architectural marvel”, but “visitors were disappointed by the lack of things to do”. The press evaluated the building with the statement: “the pavilion appears to have been a victim of its own hype”.¹⁵⁰ The building became the subject of ridicule of strong news outlets. On this account the Guardian wrote: “After queuing for up to five hours in the blazing heat, all expectant Chinese visitors have discovered inside the prickly pavilion is ... well, nothing. No enticing British exhibits, no music, no welcome drinks and snacks, not even a film, much less a presentation showing the best of British design and innovation, or all the zillions of things the British buy from the Chinese. Perhaps there should have been a warning sign outside.” And the criticism which came from inside Britain itself didn’t stop there. It was further claimed that “while its design is certainly exciting, the pavilion is not meant to display anything other than itself” and that “you need to offer visitors something a little more, in fact a lot more, than even the most alluring nothing”.¹⁵¹ The new miracle of a building was like the reconstructed British identity, exhibited to be seen by many, with the hope that nobody would try to see what’s on the inside. Pamment evaluated the whole Olympics campaign as “peculiarly uninspired and dislocated from the major thrust of public diplomacy theory”.¹⁵²

During the Coalition Government in 2010, the economic crisis hit Britain and they had to cut the budget for the public diplomacy opportunities, and reduced it to the so-called “targeted

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 146-7.

¹⁴⁹ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 148.

¹⁵⁰ Malcom Moore, “Shanghai Expo: British Pavilion Disappoints Visitors”, The Telegraph, May 4, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/shanghai-2010-expo/7676620/Shanghai-Expo-British-pavilion-disappoints-visitors.html> (accessed May 07, 2017).

¹⁵¹ Jonathan Glance, “Shanghai Architecture Expo: an Empty Experience?”, The Guardian, May 5, 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2010/may/05/british-pavilion-shanghai-expo> (accessed June 24, 2017).

¹⁵² Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 149.

national promotion” approach. Nonetheless, with the finances they had available, Britain pursued different strategy, but the similar aims. The main campaign which aimed to set up Britain as a representative example of the modern world was “the Royal Wedding”- the wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton which was to be held on April 29, 2011.¹⁵³ Through that campaign the British government wanted to reconcile British traditionalism and Britishness epitomized in monarchs, with the liberal values, presented in the inclusion of wide masses in the wedding, either directly or indirectly, and show that these two aspects go hand in hand. The greatest attention in the campaign was devoted to the media- there were pre-made sound-bites and messages spread to local media outlets, videos of previous campaigns such as those from the Olympics, additional promotional material of Great Britain, photos of the happy couple, and constant encouragement for the audience to use the social media for the maximum effect. Additionally, there were briefings for the press, various blogs, different competitions which included the public masses, charities, and the open book for congratulations.¹⁵⁴ However, Pamment here writes that the campaign represented “a return to an earlier style of promotional activities and their obsession with “modernising” the image of the UK”.¹⁵⁵ On the wave of the promotional campaigns which started with the Olympics and was continued by the Royal Wedding, Britain decided to organize another campaign which would enhance their image and repair tarnished reputation after the riots against the Iraq War and misinformation of the public. This was the campaign GREAT with the slogan “*Britain is GREAT*” which was intentionally linked to the US’s public diplomacy campaign- “I ♥ NY”. The idea behind GREAT was to create somewhat universal brand and promotional material which can be used in the future in different campaigns and which people would relate to the slogan.¹⁵⁶ And while Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt claimed that “This is not about rebranding Britain”,¹⁵⁷ I would disagree. There is a thin line, or virtually no line at all when it comes to public diplomacy and managing national image, and in the case of Britain, more often than not, the campaigns presented the face of Britain which was drastically dissimilar to the one presented to the public at home and abroad for centuries. The explanation of the campaign’s purpose as “the traditional challenge of relating Britain’s past to its present and future”, further supports the previous statement. Britain targeted key countries which could contribute to its economy with the magnificent number of 200 events worldwide. Through these events, the coordinators slipped the slogans which would once again emphasize that Britain is superior even if it’s no longer an empire and winning a war, such as

¹⁵³ Ibid, 159-168.

¹⁵⁴ PDSCD, *Royal Wedding: International Communications Plan*, (unpublished, 2011), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 169-70.

¹⁵⁵ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 170.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 171-4.

¹⁵⁷ BBC News, “London 2012: David Cameron launches 'Great' Campaign”, September 22, 2011, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-15019587>, (accessed June 29, 2017).

“Countryside is GREAT”, “Sport is GREAT”, “Knowledge is GREAT”.¹⁵⁸ The Prime Minister David Cameron explained the approach by saying "This campaign is simple. There are so many great things about Britain and we want to send out the message loud and proud that this is a great place to do business, to invest, to study and to visit."¹⁵⁹ The campaign was perceived as an achievement because “the GREAT campaign has successfully attracted endorsement and sponsorship from the private sector.”¹⁶⁰ However, we should keep in mind that the loudest criticism of this campaign came from the bearers of the proposed identity and image, i.e. from the inside where Cameron was accused of sending “mixed messages” through the campaign, turning blind eye to riots, creating opposing statements for the people within and without, and anticipated the dismissal of the campaign by the other countries as showing off at the time of crisis. Dave Trott proposal of the alternative for promotion of London overseas as "the most exciting city in the world right now because it is out of control" testifies to the negative perception which surrounded the campaign.¹⁶¹

Peace Initiatives

So far we have covered various attempts of Britain to present its identity as perfectly fitting into the world of liberal values, and not just as moderately appropriate, but still as one of the leading nations when it comes to the legitimized worldview. Missions effectiveness put aside, there were numerous campaigns promoting Britain as open, modern, inclusive, innovative, diverse and technologically advanced. However, one of the main parts of liberal worldview includes promotion of peace for all and active engagement in accomplishing that. Here, it is important to mention that we are not talking about liberal worldview in regards to the US since it has often distorted what aiming for peace means, but about liberal worldview by the book. In theory liberals see the world as composed of humans of equal rights who should live in peaceful and cooperative environment. In other words: “The essence of Liberalism is self-restraint, moderation and peace”.¹⁶² However, this aspect of liberal worldview, as unavoidable as it is, seems to be in a striking contrast with British history and identity and image born out of it. Therefore, the author here argues that in public diplomacy endeavours, while trying to present itself as a peaceful country, Britain disregarded this important aspect of being the true representative of liberal worldview. More precisely, Britain had

¹⁵⁸ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 174-5.

¹⁵⁹ BBC News, “London 2012: David Cameron launches 'Great' Campaign”.

¹⁶⁰ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK Trade & Investment, VisitBritain, British Council and Cabinet Office, *Exploiting the UK Brand Overseas*, (National Audit Office, 2 June, 2015), 7.

¹⁶¹ Dave Trott in Jessica Satherley and Martin Robinson, “Is Britain Great or Broken? Critics Accuse Cameron of Delivering Mixed Messages as £500,000 Tourism Poster Campaign is Rolled Out”, Daily Mail, September 22, 2011, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2040364/GREAT-Britain-David-Camerons-tourism-poster-campaign-delivers-mixed-messages.html#ixzz4gQfc713S> (accessed June 2017).

¹⁶² Stanley Hoffman, in John Baylis, Patricia Owens, Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 117.

only several peace initiatives and there were rarely in focus of its efforts, thus, it did not use the potential it had for bringing peace and stability to other countries. Additionally, the campaigns which could be understood as aiming for peace either failed in some important aspects or were inconclusive as to its results. The reasons for that were either uncoordinated moves of different institutions or public diplomacy initiatives which ran opposite to the government's actions or appearing as the extended arm of spin-doctors and their perception manipulation. In the 1990s, Mark Leonard announced that British public diplomacy will be concerned with altruistic goals for mutual benefit, the agenda which would be echoed also in the 21st century, and the Prime Minister Tony Blair supported it.¹⁶³ However, there were several crises which marked such statements suspicious. Now we need to take a step back and see where the roots of skepticism lie when it comes to various British peace initiatives at the turn of the century.

There are obvious differences in the notions of strategic communication and public diplomacy, and propaganda. While traditional propaganda is more like talking at people instead of with people, in public diplomacy the public has the voice and is expected to use it.¹⁶⁴ Nye also claims that propaganda, i.e. spinning, and public diplomacy are two different things- "Simple propaganda often lacks credibility and thus is counterproductive as public diplomacy. Nor is public diplomacy merely public relations. Conveying information and selling a positive image is part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies".¹⁶⁵ And it's not the case that Nye was wrong, but what he was defining was how public diplomacy should look like, but in the case of Britain, especially when it comes to peace or stabilizing missions, the line was thin. Even Leonard noticed that many critics defined public diplomacy as "a mere euphemism for propaganda".¹⁶⁶ So-called 'PR-ization of politics' or spinning phenomenon led by professional spin-doctors first appeared in the US, but it was quickly accepted by other powerful countries, especially those which wanted to keep its supremacy in the new world order, such as Britain. Spinning presents "a multi-prong set of strategies and tactics geared towards putting a positive spin on the politician one works for and a negative spin on the opposition."¹⁶⁷ While journalism could be subjective and objective, spinning is always subjective because it is created to present the person, party, government or some other entities in the best possible light. The outcome of spinning is "politics as a (poll-driven) smoke-and-mirrors show, geared towards permanently entertaining and distracting the masses within a 24-hour,

¹⁶³ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 65-6.

¹⁶⁴ Atlagić and Mitić, "What is Strategic Political Communication", *Godišnjak*, (Belgrade: Faculty of Political Sciences, 2016), 34.

¹⁶⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 107

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 107.

¹⁶⁷ Eric Louw, *The Media and Political Process*, (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 145-163.

multi-channel television environment”.¹⁶⁸ It is also worth mentioning that “spinning a story involves twisting it to one’s advantage, using surrogates, press releases, radio actualities, and other friendly sources to deliver the line from an angle that puts the story in the best possible light.” People are not unaware of the existence of spin-doctors and their routines, and they know that the stories which government feeds them are often increasingly distorted in its favour, therefore, it is logical that they feel a dosage of mistrust towards such presentation. The fact that spin-doctors are hired for their professional knowledge and not for their belief in the cause, contributes to the negative context in which political PR is put.¹⁶⁹ Once the public diplomacy started using similar mechanisms, repeated the stories of the spin-doctors perceived by the public as fabrications, and became similar to it in general, the agenda of public diplomacy lost its credibility. Spinning phenomenon came to Great Britain with Margaret Thatcher who borrowed some parts of this system from Ronald Reagan. However, the system became perfected during Blair and its team of spin-doctors, consisting of: Peter Mandelson, Alastair Campbell and Charlie Whelan.¹⁷⁰ One of the first crisis which occurred during Blair in office was the war in Kosovo and coincidentally precisely at that time British public diplomacy tried to pose as a catalyst for a positive change in the world. And yet, in Kosovo, the media and journalism suffered serious censorship, control and limitations, which only contributed to fueling the conflict by presenting it in a black-and-white manner. Historian Alistair Horne insisted that: "Kosovo ... turned out to be the most secret campaign in living memory",¹⁷¹ journalist Jake Lynch stated: "We were given lots of material but no information",¹⁷² journalist Peter Dunn evaluated the situation as "the first international conflict fought by press officers"¹⁷³ and General Sir Michael Rose insisted that in the Kosovo conflict "rhetoric has taken over from reality".¹⁷⁴ During that time public diplomacy did not help present the more objective picture, and it was particularly dubious situation since the BBC, as one of the main institutions of public diplomacy, had a long history of high-quality and unbiased reporting. Additionally, instead of calming and stabilizing the region, the UK government decided to join the NATO bombing in 1999, and explained that to the public with particularly striking villain-victim categorization, which Britain was very famous for in the centuries before. Blair explained the situation by saying "It is to get in and hit Milosevic and his murderous thugs very, very hard. This is what we intend to do," and "There are risks to our forces. And, as I said when this campaign began, there are also risks to Kosovo Albanians." And when faced with the criticism directed at the

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 152.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 144-170.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, 157-9.

¹⁷¹ Alistair Horne, in Phillip Knightley, “Fighting dirty”, The Guardian, March 20, 2000, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2000/mar/20/mondaymediasection.pressandpublishing>, (accessed July 10, 2017).

¹⁷² Jake Lynch, in Phillip Knightley, “Fighting dirty”, The Guardian.

¹⁷³ Peter Dunn, in Phillip Knightley, “Fighting dirty”, The Guardian.

¹⁷⁴ Michael Rose, in Phillip Knightley, “Fighting dirty”, The Guardian.

intervention and the consequences in the form of civilian suffering, the government responded: "The refugees are not fleeing from the Nato bombs. It is not the Nato bombs that are destroying their homes, burning their villages and putting pistols to their heads".¹⁷⁵ In this inflammatory and emotional rhetoric loomed the long-cherished division, as a sign of the identity elements promoted in the past not being entirely gone. There were "us" and "them", "us" this time epitomized by NATO and determined by the world leader US, and Britain simply joined the bandwagon continuing the tradition of being on the side they deemed to be rightful and moral and attacking the perceived "others", this time the Serbs. During the war, Blair's spin-doctor got to be in charge of the communication on behalf of NATO, and was in charge of "the creation of sound bites for NATO speakers, the monitoring of the European opinion leaders, the central creation of op-eds and debate pieces, and the intensified coordination of all alliance member activities".¹⁷⁶ Such an approach of creating specific context in which stories were put was already institutionalized in the government operations, but now it also involved the public diplomacy branch.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, it became quite speculative if there was any difference between the one-sided presentation of conflicts on the part of the government officials with spin-doctors, and public diplomacy representatives and institutions, since the presentations were often matching and people coordinated.

After the 9/11 attacks, Britain decided to play an even more important role in the domain of public diplomacy, and especially in building mutual security. For this purpose, Mark Leonard published, the sequel of *Going Public*, entitled *Public Diplomacy* in order to explore the options of cooperation across different public and government sectors among different countries. In his study *Public Diplomacy*, Leonard wrote: "In an environment where citizens are skeptical of government and sensitive about post-colonial interference, public diplomacy institutions need to be much more interactive - building long-term relationships and understanding target groups rather than delivering one-way messages."¹⁷⁸ This seems like an altruistic approach, but the agenda becomes more ambiguous as we go further, because the next on the list of guidelines is the instruction that: "Public diplomacy should be focused on the countries which are most relevant to our interests". Further on, Leonard makes the distinction between competitive and co-operative diplomatic efforts, and, indeed, emphasizes the importance of working together for mutual benefit.¹⁷⁹ But this too, is done a bit clumsy. Leonard states that Britain needs "to choose the countries for competition according to

¹⁷⁵ BBC News, "UK steps up Kosovo force", March 30, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/307715.stm, (accessed July 14, 2017).

¹⁷⁶ Nicholas J. Cull, *The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989-2001*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 66.

¹⁷⁷ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 66.

¹⁷⁸ Mark Leonard with Catherine Stead and Conrad Smewing, *Public Diplomacy*, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2002), 6-7.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 6-7.

clear criteria, and to prioritise resources accordingly” and immediately afterward, when talking about the efforts in the developing countries, he states: “...we call for a consolidation of resources into a co-ordinated multilateral programme and an end to damaging competition”.¹⁸⁰ In these instances the clash between what Britain was, and we can even argue-had to be in the past, and what it wanted to be in the present and future, becomes almost tangible. Moreover, Britain once again gave primacy to their historical partners- the US, which was, even immediately after the Independence War considered their own, that is, belonging to the formation of “us”, instead of showing more interest in building networks with its other continental neighbours. On the account of this reformed public diplomacy agenda, Pamment wrote- “A weakness, however, is the close association with US debates on public diplomacy and a relative lack of interest in the activities of immediate European neighbours, France and Germany”.¹⁸¹ Once again we can see the particles of the historically built British identity and image, and that they were still very present in British decisions and actions. Even in this new context of peaceful European country, liberal world order and tendency to pose as the country of modernity, innovation and stability, Britain acted quite contrary to the image they were trying to build, and chose close cooperation with the traditional ally, the US, while distancing itself from the traditionally perceived “other”, France.

However, it was very difficult to pose as the country of peace and stability in the midst of an even greater crisis that the 9/11 provoked, and it was the Iraq War of 2003. Tony Blair and its government decided to give an unwavering support to the US in the so-called “war on terror” provoked by the 9/11 attacks. In the years to come this move of the British government would often overshadow various public diplomacy attempts and its image would be tarnished in the eyes of the overseas nations. The decision to join the war was summarized as “...arguably the most important decision that Tony Blair ever made. It was also, arguably, the worst.”¹⁸² In order to legitimize the war on Iraq, Blair used the pretense of Iraq having the WMD and developing a nuclear bomb, even though the Iraqi government claimed the opposite. In this chaos arose what appeared to be “the most contentious questions of the whole Iraq debacle - did Tony Blair lie when he claimed that there were WMDs still in Iraq?” The rebutting evidence came too little too late, and only after Iraq was already harshly attacked. “Over the years, the suspicion that he did has hardened into certainty. To many people the entire case against the war is encapsulated in the two words: “Blair lied.” To doubt that he lied is to be an apologist for war.”¹⁸³ However, the pure fact that the British

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 23.

¹⁸¹ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 69.

¹⁸² Andy McSmith, “Chilcot Report: The Inside Story of How Tony Blair Led Britain to War in Iraq”, Independent, July 4, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/chilcot-report-iraq-war-inquiry-tony-blair-george-bush-us-uk-what-happened-a7119761.html> (accessed August 3, 2017).

¹⁸³ Ibid.

government possibly used false or distorted facts highly affected future communication with the public. On a more positive note, Britain showed that the identity of a nation couldn't be represented solely by political actors, and ordinary people went to the streets and protested in large numbers against the war in Iraq. It was estimated to be "the UK's biggest ever demonstration with at least 750,000 taking part, although organisers put the figure closer to two million".¹⁸⁴ Additionally, the nation showed that they can be united not only if there was an external enemy, but that they can stand together in face of the wrongdoings and misjudgment of its own government. In the midst of this crisis Robin Cook resigned. His interpretation of the anti-war protests seemed to be in line with British past image because he claimed that "They [the protestors] do not doubt that Saddam is a brutal dictator, but they are not persuaded that he is a clear and present danger to Britain."¹⁸⁵ However, subsequent pressure of various politicians, groups and the public which led to the Hutton Inquiry and later on, the Chilcot Inquiry could show us that the British didn't take the situation so easily and forgot about it as soon as the British troops withdrew. When the situation started unwinding, the BBC jumped in with the report pointing to the fact that "an intelligence dossier on Iraqi 'weapons of mass destruction' had been 'sexed up' as part of a PR drive to justify the 2003 Iraq War". The Hutton Report cleared Blair and pointed the finger at "the BBC for poor journalistic practices". The BBC had to accept to apologize, and in order to save Blair's reputation, his spin-doctor Alastair Campbell resigned, but in the eyes of the public Blair was far from clear, and this was how he would be remembered in the years following the scandal.¹⁸⁶ On the other hand, in the eyes of the international community, it was difficult to clear Britain as a whole and to reassure it that Britain would in the future stand by what is right and not by what is American. After the war was over Mark Leonard published *British Public Diplomacy in the Age of Schisms*, and using the events leading to and surrounding the Iraq war depicted "Britain's failure to live up to the ethical image it had so eagerly projected".¹⁸⁷ In the light of these happenings, public diplomacy had to be restructured yet again. The Phillis Review revealed "the three-way breakdown in trust between government and politicians, the media and the general public", and the roots of it in the identity structure, stating that "traditional culture of secrecy in British government has not helped this breakdown". The guidelines of this Review proposed as the new goal to repair the tarnished reputation by establishing "trust in, and the credibility of, government communications".¹⁸⁸ The situation which prompted the Review was the fact that the public now related the spinning

¹⁸⁴ BBC News, "'Million' march against Iraq war", February 16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2765041.stm, (accessed August 3, 2017).

¹⁸⁵ Andy McSmith, "Chilcot Report: The Inside Story of How Tony Blair Led Britain to War in Iraq", Independent.

¹⁸⁶ Louw, *The Media and Political Process*, (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 160.

¹⁸⁷ Mark Leonard, Andrew Small with Martin Rose, *British Public Diplomacy in the 'age of Schisms'*, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005), in), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 100.

¹⁸⁸ Bob Phillis, *An Independent Review of Government Communications (the Phillis Review)*, (London: Cabinet Office, 2004), 2.

techniques used for deception to the government, and the government communication to the public diplomacy activities, therefore, public diplomacy itself was perceived as one way of spinning the stories in a way that government would like.¹⁸⁹ For this reason, the BC refused the agenda of the public diplomacy institutions working strictly in line with government policies, insisting that being related to the current government and Blair was tarnishing its own reputation and the efforts they invested into creating bonds between the UK and other nations. In spite of the BC's rejection of its institution being tied to the government operations, the Carter Review which followed completely disregarded the WMD scandal and the Phillis Review's proposed agenda and insisted on turning the "information and engagement with foreign citizens into tools for achieving governmental objectives" and "attitudes and perceptions- central to earlier definitions- were dropped entirely". There was also the newly proposed system of evaluation of diplomatic activities by which "achievement of the government would act as the sole measure of success".¹⁹⁰ It is no wonder that peace initiatives couldn't flourish in the atmosphere which ensued. This new framework moved public diplomacy away from rebuilding British image and establishing "intercultural dialogue aimed at creating mutual understanding and respect", and diplomatic institutions were pushed to "accept and support the overarching political direction of the government of the day".¹⁹¹ The Carter Review seems like a visit of ghost of the Christmas past, reminding the British that there were still those who preferred self-reliance, focus on national goals and isolationist or self-serving politics.

Even though the peace initiatives were not perceived as important as other campaigns aiming at developing business, tourism and presenting Britain as innovative, it wouldn't be objective to say that they didn't exist at all. Near the end of the first decade of the 21st century, there were some campaigns which could be filed under peace initiatives. They were in the form of the PD Pilots, such as such as "Promoting liberal democracy and making the world safer" intended to be carried out in Jordan, Nigeria and Pakistan, and "Addressing climate change" proposed for Brazil, Canada and China. They were led by the PDB before it was shut down and replaced, and although there was no generally applicable evaluation system as to their effectiveness, there was the impression that they were a success. In spite of that, the bodies involved in these initiatives evaluated it afterwards as "disproportionately time consuming and expensive".¹⁹² In the following years, there were several advocates of the collaboration on global issues which one country alone couldn't solve. This is why, especially the initiatives addressing climate change, would often be on

¹⁸⁹ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 96-7.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 97-9.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid*, 99.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 113-4.

the public diplomacy agenda.¹⁹³ We could stop here to argue that the decision to direct its efforts and contribute to the creation of the more stable world through the advocacy for the environment protection and stopping the climate change was the right path for Britain. This sphere was and is of crucial importance for the whole globe and protecting the climate can contribute to developing agriculture, combating famine, droughts and poverty. At the same time this sphere is not too much in clash with British core identity and image promoted in the past and gave them a neutral space for probing its possibilities and power, and for the common benefits.

The public diplomacy campaigns on this topic followed the publication of Nicholas Herbert Stern's *The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review* which revealed the damaging effects of the emission gasses in the developing and developed countries. Additionally, it revealed that by investing the very small percentage of the GDP in the present, the countries could prevent the losing of high percentage of the GDP in the near future.¹⁹⁴ The UK even established the permanent body concerned with climate change called The Climate Change Organisation or The°Climate Group which was recognized as the charity organization in 2004 with the official mission "to catalyse business and government leadership on climate change in order to put the world on track for a low carbon economy".¹⁹⁵ Its program on the international level included initiatives in the US, some countries of Europe, Australia, India, Mexico, Canada, and some countries in the Latin America. The campaigns were tailor-made in accordance with the needs of the different areas and the overall evaluation was positive.¹⁹⁶ However, it should be mentioned that these attempts didn't go smoothly everywhere. For example, in Canada, there was a mixed approach. While the FCO and High Commission were putting pressure on the Canadian government to change its policies, the BC worked with children and young adults in a "de-politicized methods of outreach".¹⁹⁷ The whole initiative revolved around the perception that "climate change was a threat to Canada, and that those who engaged with the question were future leaders ready to grasp the business opportunities presented by policy change". While the initiative was well accepted among the general public of Canada, the Canadian government accused the UK of "meddling in internal politics and of briefing against the government".¹⁹⁸ Additionally, the Stern Review itself, as a framework for acting on this topic, was sometimes harshly criticized and rejected. For example, in the study *What Is Wrong With Stern?*, professor Richard Tol emphasized that Sir Nicholas Stern didn't have enough experience to be "portrayed as an expert", that it was misleading to present him "as independent, although he was

¹⁹³ Ibid, 119-20.

¹⁹⁴ Nicholas Herbert Stern, *The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4-601.

¹⁹⁵ The°Climate Group, *Report of the Board of Trustees*, (London: British Ecological Society, 2007), 1-39.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, 1-39.

¹⁹⁷ Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 125-6.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 125-6.

a senior Treasury official and had been a civil servant, first with international organisations, and latterly in the UK, for 12 years and was supported by a team of civil servants”. The content of the review and the scientific facts exposed were questioned or revealed as erroneous, and the errors were ascribed to Stern’s “ideological bias”.¹⁹⁹ Additionally, the review’s approach was criticized for mixing “the normative and the positive”. The academic community of the UK was criticized for not reviewing and correcting the mistakes before the Review was published and for being subjective by allowing that the only critique directed at the Review come from abroad and none of it from within the country. Also, Nicholas Stern was criticized for not engaging in the academic debates concerning the suspicion surrounding some of his findings.²⁰⁰

Further attempts to position Britain as a peaceful hub continued in the following phases of public diplomacy. The strategy announced in 2008 revolved around the concept of strategic campaigns which had clear promotional agendas. It bore the name *Better World, Better Britain*, and many activities aimed at “supporting managed migration”, “counterterrorism, preventing and resolving conflict, promoting a low-carbon, high-growth economy and developing international institutions”.²⁰¹ This agenda was intertwined with the modernizing attempts in the form of Digital Diplomacy as a form of public communication with the aim of using social networks to the fullest. Such an approach found its basis in the ideas of Joseph Nye and what will be called soft power. It is worth noting that the protection of environment remained the sphere of public diplomacy which drew most attention and finances, especially around the time of the Copenhagen Accord.²⁰² This sphere, perceived as contributing to global peace and stability, and simultaneously as a proof of accepting the challenges of the 21st century, was at the same time the desired part of a new image which clashed the least with the old one. In part, this can be contributed to the fact that the environmental challenges we are facing today were not prominent in the past centuries, and the way in which a country faced these new challenges was original and presented on a clean slate.

However, we should also take a look at the more recent happenings and the activities which are more traditionally associated with promoting peace. The second decade of the 21st century was marked with the Arab Spring. In alignment with the image the UK wanted to promote, the government launched the Arab Partnership Department with the main goals proposed by the FCO. The main aims of the activities were “to support peaceful political, economic and social reform in the Middle East through the work of the Engaging with the Islamic World programme fund”. The

¹⁹⁹ Richard Tol, in Peter Lilley, *What Is Wrong With Stern?*, (London: The Global Warming Policy Foundation, 2012), 3-4.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 3-4.

²⁰¹ FCO, *Better World, Better Britain*, (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2008), in Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 133.

²⁰² Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 136-141.

UK decided to support legitimate government and promote democracy which will be tailor-made for the culture which should adopt it. Additionally, the approach was imagined to be proactive, engaging the local representatives and respecting legal boundaries of the given country.²⁰³ The program of the FCO's campaign had three main themes: "Human development, promotion and projects", "Citizen participation, local cohesion and stakeholder concept" and "Positive enabling environment". The initial activities were focused on Tunisia and Egypt, but the campaign later spread with the spread of the Arab Spring. It involved many meetings of the officials, attempts at sustaining a fruitful dialog with the heads of the countries, as well as condemning the violence and doing the follow-ups on the situation and spreading the word through media channels, especially the BBC with its Arabic language broadcasts.²⁰⁴ The involvement in the Middle East continued in the years to come, but Britain's intentions, actions or inactions continued to be interpreted as self-serving, limited or simply, selfish. On account of the initiatives of the UK during the Arab Spring, Chris Doyle, the director of the Council for Arab-British Understanding wrote that self-serving goals of the UK were evident in 2011 when while promoting reforms in the region, PM David Cameron appeared in Egypt with "eight representatives of arms firms en route to the Gulf". Additionally, what were supposed to be great investments into peaceful resolutions turned out to be 5 million pounds or "less than city banker's annual bonus". Doyle expressed the opinion that the image and identity of that country, have not changed in the modern era and that they were very much in consistency with its imperial image built for centuries in the past.²⁰⁵ Anything other than that, to the rest of the world, seemed like glazing over the facts widely known- "Britain still has its imperial style delusion, pushing regime change, deciding who is legitimate and who is not."²⁰⁶ When it comes to the main features of British traditional image from the past and a modern image prominent in the more recent years, Doyle too recognizes striking discrepancies in regards to its identity. The initiatives in the Middle East serve as one additional factor which is to be taken into consideration when trying to evaluate the plausibility and durability of the presented British image. Doyle insists that: "British Middle East policy has never been consistent or even ethical. And that is almost certainly an unrealistic goal, but it should aspire to narrow the gap between perceived interests and its proclaimed values, though it has to be clearer what both are in the first place."²⁰⁷

²⁰³ FCO, *British Foreign Policy and the 'Arab Spring': The Transition to Democracy*, Sessions 2010-12, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaif/writev/Arab/as07.htm>, (accessed August 6, 2017).

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Chris Doyle, "Neither Consistent nor Ethical: Britain's Middle East Policy", *The New Arab*, June 6, 2017, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/6/6/neither-consistent-nor-ethical-britains-middle-east-policy>, (accessed August 18, 2017).

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

Soft Power as the Clash of the Past and the Contemporary Image

Before we finish the story about the development and phases of the British public diplomacy, we need to take a dive into the ideas behind its final stage- Soft Power. The approach termed soft power initially appeared in the US, when it was proposed by Joseph Nye, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of the Kennedy School of Government.²⁰⁸ The ideas he proposed were readily accepted in the UK and implemented in its future initiatives.

Nye described soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced”.²⁰⁹ Therefore, the countries which would hypothetically reject the values seen as seductive in the end of the 20th and in the 21st century could end up as the outcasts of the global society. Furthermore, soft power was often associated with peace, and adopting it meant that the country was in the winning circle of the countries on which the peaceful world of tomorrow depended. On that account, Nye writes: “Winning the peace is harder than winning a war, and a soft power is essential to winning the peace”²¹⁰. We mentioned that the UK needed to change its image in order to remain one of the leading countries in the modern world, and Nye explains why it is so. He presents the current world affairs as the game of chess with three dimensions- economic, military and soft power. Hard power is still very important, but only one of the dimensions in this game. Nye insists that those who always impose power by winning a war “mistake necessary for the sufficient. They are one-dimensional players in a three-dimensional game. In the long term this is a way to lose, since obtaining favorable outcomes on the bottom transitional board often requires the use of soft power asset”.²¹¹ Britain didn’t have any other choice but to learn how to play this game in order to avoid the checkmate. And it is no wonder that they put so much emphasis on public diplomacy in the race for power, having in mind that the soft power is derived from a country’s “culture”, “political values”, and “its foreign policies”.²¹² It should be mentioned that what Nye termed soft power didn’t come into being in the modern era. Britain, even in its imperious and belligerent years, worked on its immaculate national identity and image and took great pride in it, as we were able to see in the first chapters. However, “hard power and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other”. Britain’s imperial growth and the fact that they almost always won the wars they waged gave them appeal which was in itself a very prominent kind of soft

²⁰⁸ Nye, *Soft Power*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 1-191.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, x.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, xii.

²¹¹ *Ibid*, 5.

²¹² *Ibid*, 11.

power, or as Nye puts it “hard power can create the myths of invincibility or inevitability that attract others”.²¹³ However, when the world reached something resembling peace, they realized the price of wars, and wanted to avoid them at all costs.²¹⁴ This was the time when countries had to find a new source of soft power, apart from the appeal of the hard power, and it was even harder for Britain since they were no longer those who pulled the strings. However, the swiftness with which Britain changed the source of their soft power gave the whole structure of country’s power imbalance. The point is that it seems hardly improbable that the country which drew its power from war success, now draws it from the ability to bring peace. Nye insists that with the advent of propaganda, as well as other types of communication between the governments and the public, people became very able to notice truths and falsehoods, and “credibility” turned out to be “the crucial resource”.²¹⁵ Therefore, even if the intention of the British government to change the national image was a selfless act, the speed with which it happened made them lose credibility at home and abroad, which in turn lessened the amount of soft power which they could potentially generate. Nye also mentions the ways in which the countries which are used to exercising hard power could distract soft power from it in the peacetime and it is through “a broad range of officer exchanges joint-training, and assistance programs with other countries”,²¹⁶ which possibly could’ve been more applicable in the case of Britain, having in mind their past reputation.

In the report called *Persuasion and Power in the Modern World* published by the House of Lords in 2014 and evidently influenced by Nye’s theory, Britain more recently recognized that niche through which they could accumulate soft power from the prominence of the country’s hard power. They summarized the suitable new approach to public diplomacy as follows: “we do not see the use of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ methods in the projection of a nation’s power as alternatives, but as mutually reinforcing”. They gave the name to this relation of hard and soft power ‘smart power’ and described it as “the use of both traditional and modern instruments of power to project and gain influence in a fast-changing world”.²¹⁷ In their words the echo of Nye’s perceptions could be heard and very often their conclusions were quite similar to his own, but more adapted to their particular situation. In this report the Committee emphasized the dangers of binding the policies too closely to the US and appearing as the extended arm of the US. It was noted that Britain now has two important but different roles-it was still the US’s ally, and had the membership with distinctness in the EU. Additionally, the soft power potential coming from membership in the EU was recognized

²¹³ Ibid, 25.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 15.

²¹⁵ Ibid, 10.

²¹⁶ Ibid, 116.

²¹⁷ Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, *Persuasion and Power in the Modern World*, (London: The stationery Office Limited, 2014), 1-14.

in the report because it offered “major opportunities for the UK to work with many allies, at both governmental and popular levels, throughout the European Union to strengthen and adapt the Union’s 21st-century role.”²¹⁸ The overall message of the Report was that the UK needed to distance itself a bit from the US for the purpose of establishing a better network in the world with multiple prominent players and for the purpose of mutual “security” and “prosperity”.²¹⁹

Evaluation and Discussion

The conclusions and propositions presented in the Report could possibly work well in the nowadays framework and international dynamics. However, here once again the fragility of the newly forged image and the inability to simply change identity of a country came into picture. This became evident only two years after the Report. While the greater cooperation and coordination was presented as the key to success, on the 23 June, 2016, Britain voted in the referendum to leave the European Union and start the complicated and somewhat painful process called ‘Brexit’. According to the proposed timeframe, the UK is scheduled to leave the EU in March, 2019.²²⁰ In the meantime, it is expected to carry out the reforms which would affect all spheres of life from economy to law, in an attempt to disentangle the ties of the European collective identity and to reach the one possessed by the UK only. In this discussion about identity and image, it is important to notice that this was not the opinion imposed by the ruling party, since the PM David Cameron was one of the loudest advocates of the option to Remain.²²¹ The referendum showed the sentiments of the people, and especially older generations who lived through the period of transit between the old and the quickly coined new image, and rejected the new one as the alien form. To put an even greater emphasis on the need to reject some liberal values, David Cameron was replaced with the leader of the Conservative party, Theresa May.²²² Her actions in the eyes of the world demonstrated going back to the old patterns and partners. Namely, while the Report of 2014 insisted on distancing the UK from the US for the purpose of creating better connection with the rest of the world, in the aftermath of Brexit, the UK acted in a way which was historically more typical for them. On this account, Chris Doyle wrote: “The hasty visit of Theresa May to Washington only days after the inauguration of President Trump also highlights the dependency of Britain on the US, something that Brexit may only exacerbate.”²²³ When it comes to public diplomacy in particular the soft power

²¹⁸ Ibid, 14.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 1-24.

²²⁰ Alex Hunt and Brian Wheeler, “Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU”, BBC News, September 5, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887>, (accessed August 20, 2017).

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Doyle, “Neither Consistent nor Ethical: Britain’s Middle East Policy”, The New Arab, June 6, 2017, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/6/6/neither-consistent-nor-ethical-britains-middle-east-policy, (accessed August 18, 2017).

which the EU projects cannot be easily dismissed. Joseph Nye insists that “the European Union as a symbol of a uniting Europe itself carries a good deal of soft power”. He explains that by saying: “The idea that the war is now unthinkable among countries that fought bitterly for centuries, and that Europe has become an island of peace and prosperity created a positive image in much of the world”.²²⁴ And the proof of the strength of its power becomes visible in the survey conducted in the US which concluded that “nine in ten agree that the EU can help solve world problems through diplomacy, trade, and development aid even though it is not as militarily powerful as the US”.²²⁵ Therefore, by leaving the EU, the UK has lost an important source of soft power which was not related to their hard power and the one which could’ve brought them the final severance of the remains of the past image. In the face of the challenges of the 21st century in general, and migrant crisis in particular, the country demonstrated that such a break-up would be too painful to bear. Additionally, Brexit did not only point out to the existing traits of the past national image and important elements of identity and to the fragility of the new one in terms of the relationships and partnerships outside of the country, but also in terms of the instability within. We previously described the way in which the national identity of the UK was built by patching together quite dissimilar units into one whole and in face of the dangers of the hostile “others”. It was imaginable that such a unity would be tested in the peacetime, and Brexit turned out to be a very bitter exam. The reason why it is so is the fact that the concealed cracks along the inner identity were revealed in regards to different standpoints on the membership in the EU. While formally the majority of the whole UK voted to Leave, the Northern Ireland in their referendum voted “56% for Remain and 44% for Leave”, and Scotland even more drastically “backed Remain by 62% to 38%.”²²⁶ This provoked the First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon to push “for a second independence referendum before the Brexit package has been finalized”, and Sinn Fein to do the same in the Northern Ireland by proposing “a referendum on leaving the UK and joining the Republic of Ireland as soon as possible.”²²⁷ Whether the country as a whole will endure the internal and external pressure imposed by the new challenges remains to be seen. But, what cannot go undetected is the fact that the imagined new image and new elements of identity suddenly created on the basis of liberal values such as tight connectedness and global instead of national priorities, posed a blow to the nation created with markedly different reputation..

²²⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 77.

²²⁵ German Marshall Fund and Compagnia di San Paulo, Transatlantic Trends 2003, “Topline Data- Survey Results”, in Nye, *Soft Power*, 78.

²²⁶ Alex Hunt and Brian Wheeler, “Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU”, BBC News, September 5, 2017.

²²⁷ Ibid.

With regards to the public diplomacy campaigns led for the purpose of presenting Britain as a hub of modernization, as previously stated, there is no measurement system which would be precise about their success. But, since the public diplomacy is related to creating positive impressions about a country, we could take a look at how much or how little Britain managed to move away from its traditional image.

Apart from the already mentioned institutions and organizations within the framework of British public diplomacy, there have been many smaller ones in charge of distinct tasks. One of these is VisitBritain, in charge of “promoting Britain overseas”. In 2006 this organization conducted a survey abroad and it came to the conclusion that what foreign people mostly perceived as admirable and appealing was actually related to the identity aspects prominent in the past and not to the recently embraces values. The results showed that what contributed to Britain’s positive image were “ancient traditions”, “historic buildings”, “Royal family” and “rich cultural heritage”. On the other hand, while Britain was trying to promote its modernization and openness, it actually came across as quite unwelcoming.²²⁸ According to this survey people thought that the British are “arrogant, unfriendly and have almost no sense of humour”. It was also ranked poorly in the category “countries likely to offer the most friendly welcome”.²²⁹ The survey showed that the remains of the past image cost their present reputation in the present, because when evaluating Britain, “countries with a history of political conflict with Britain were particularly dismissive”. In regards with British peacefulness as a trait of the modern image “the respondents surveyed were similarly unimpressed by Britain's system of government, its record on human rights and its foreign policy stances”.²³⁰ The organization VisitBritain also concluded that the British are “let down somewhat by perceptions about behaving responsibly in areas of international peace and security”. The overall impression of the survey was that there was still a long way to go if Britain was to change its image projected in the world.²³¹ The survey also pointed to the fact that no matter how invasive, progressive, financed or precisely tailored diplomatic campaigns and public communication may be, the perceptions are not modified overnight. If Britain wants to keep going in the direction it chose at the turn of century, the first trait that it needs to incorporate in its identity is- patience.

In December 1012, the New Statesman published the results of the poll by Ipsos MORI conducted upon the request of the British Council and for the purpose of perceiving and evaluating

²²⁸ Telegraph.co.uk, “Arrogant, unfriendly and no sense of humour: what foreign tourists think of the English”, September 12, 2006, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/736311/Arrogant-unfriendly-and-no-sense-of-humour-what-foreign-tourists-think-of-the-English.html>, (accessed March 16, 2017).

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

British reputation abroad. The poll revealed that “the further you travel away from Britain, the better Britain looks”. The poll was commissioned after the public diplomacy campaigns such as the Olympics and the Diamond Jubilee as a way of marking the progress. The general conclusion was that “the world see Britain in a pretty positive light” because it is seen as “a country committed to culture and the arts”, and with “strong democratic values and institutions” and “a good standard of living”.²³² However, the closer one gets to the focal point of British identity, the more they see the instability of that identity and the mistrust with which it is perceived. And so, the European countries near the UK have “a rather less positive view”, ascribed to the fact that “they are hardly hearing and seeing British confidence”. What is the most striking and points the most to the identity crisis are results drawn from Britain itself. Basically, the most negative perception about Britain is noted in- Britain. Ben Marshall, Research Director at Ipsos MORI concludes: “There is no getting away from the relatively poor self-assessment the British people give Britain”.²³³ This becomes especially true when it comes to evaluating the country in terms of economic cooperation, partnerships, investments and economic prospects.²³⁴ The results of this poll bring an important message about the productivity, as well as, limitations of public diplomacy campaigns. It shows that the change has to come from within if it is to withstand in the long run. In the case of Britain, the sudden changes within identity proved to be the most difficult to digest for the British.

In one of the most recent surveys of the Ipsos MORI conducted for the British Council, the negative impact of Brexit appeared obvious. Possibly, this is because for people and countries around the world, this appeared as a break-up with the desired values of close cooperation and mutual efforts preferred in the 21st century. The research revealed that after referendum “the UK’s people were perceived more negatively”. The negative points were added “when people were asked to agree with whether people from the UK valued diversity” and whether they “were open and welcoming and tolerated those with different faiths and beliefs”.²³⁵ At the time when debates on the influx of migrations heated, it was marked “the rise in hate crimes by 41 percent in July 2016”. It is also worth mentioning that people of the UK appeared more trustworthy than the UK government which was seen in a more negative light in the aftermath of the referendum.²³⁶ Additionally, in the category of peace and stability initiatives, the consequences of Brexit were also marked. “Fewer people agreed that the UK government works constructively with others around the world (this fell

²³² Ben Marshall, “How does the rest of the world view Britain?”, *NewStatesman.com*, December 19, 2012, <http://www.newstatesman.com/staggers/2012/12/how-does-rest-world-view-britain>, (accessed March 2, 2017).

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ Elizabeth Cameron, “How do young people from other countries see the UK?”, *British Council*, June 23, 2017, <https://www.britishcouncil.org/voices-magazine/how-do-young-people-other-countries-see-uk>, (accessed August 23, 2017).

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

three per cent, to 50 per cent), that it treats the UK's people fairly (this fell two per cent to 48 per cent) or that it contributes its fair share of aid to developing countries (this fell three per cent to 42 per cent)".²³⁷

It is still too early to say how Brexit will affect British identity and image in the future. At this point, almost everything seems possible. It might happen that Britain opt for "soft" exit from the EU, and remains in the close connection to it. In that case the changes might be less dramatic and Britain would continue to be seen as an unavoidable part of the European community. However, it might opt for a "hard" Brexit and come even closer to the US, in which case the changes of its image and within its identity might be more significant. However, the fact that Brexit itself happened, points to the national doubt as to whether the newly imposed image and new elements of identity should be fully accepted or simply rejected because of the lack of some important traits from the past one. The good thing about national identity is that there are never only two options, and maybe the key to the stability of the identity for Britain lies in the mixture of the two. While Brexit might seem like a devastating blow for the whole EU, for Britain itself, it may turn out to be a great opportunity to re-evaluate its basis and forge the image which will be more acceptable for all parts of the UK in the time of peace. Alternatively, this point in time might signify the end for the UK as we know it, and the period after which the identities which composed the national identity might appear separately and independently.

Conclusion

In this thesis, we went back to the period when Britain and the United Kingdom were formed in the midst of wars which raged through Europe. While describing the particular circumstances in which this union of somewhat incompatible units was created, we were able to perceive why the formation of a unique and shared identity imposed itself. This nation turned out to be a very strong and durable one because its identity was forged in the worst of times. However, what was once the benefit and advantage, in the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century turned out to be a setback. The main problem lied in the fact that identity and image created in war and for war, struggled to survive- peace. Here, the intention is not to say that the British identity contains such a belligerent traits and that the nation likes to combat, so that it functions only through combat. It is actually quite contrary. In order to maintain its inner stability and peace, this country had to develop the important elements of identity and image, stemming from it, which would seem very aggressive from the outside, and which would keep its inside unity by prevailing in the battle with the "hostile Other". The units within the Kingdom have many ties connecting

²³⁷ Ibid.

them, but the strongest ones came from wars. The English, the Scottish, the Welsh, the Irish are like the war veterans. They belonged to the same team during the war, they kept each other's back, they helped each other, they defended each other even when they didn't like each other, and ultimately, this is how they survived. The war ended. Immediately after the war they had many stories to tell about the glorious times when they won all those battles. But then, the new generations came. To them the war was just a story, not a reality. The UK was no longer on the top of the world. They were born into the new ideologies and values dictated by another country- the US. Therefore, in order to keep its appeal, led by the vision of the younger generations, Britain had to change the way it perceived itself in order to be one of the countries which draw their power from attraction. The fact that some of the traits of the liberal ideology were so distant from their long-built identity and image was a huge obstacle. But, at the same time adopting them was an obligation, not really a choice.

Public diplomacy as a vehicle for changing identity and image, as its manifestation, is a very useful tool. Particularly because while changing the opinion and perspectives abroad you can change them at home and vice versa. However, in the case of Britain, as we saw, the same campaigns sometimes resonated quite differently at home and abroad. Public diplomacy is a way of communicating with people in the very connected and digitalized world. And while it is probably one of the most efficient ways of communication between governments and people, it is at the same time one of the most difficult practices, because it is communication through action. The pure notion that Britain has strongly embraced the vehicles of public diplomacy after the initial dismissal of these practices testifies to its will to keep up with the values of modern liberalism and with the modern challenges. Yet, the change which was to be accomplished through it was imagined to happen too suddenly and by cutting many ties with the past.

With regards to the proposed main hypothesis and specific hypotheses the given analysis suggests that they hold true. When we take into consideration the identity and image which were built for centuries in continuity and as a response to constant wars, and the image which Britain is trying to promote at home and abroad now, we can realize that the equivalence of the two is severely impaired. Additionally, public diplomacy initiatives, as we were able to see, often served the purpose of transforming British image. In order to be in line with the newly promoted values, this image also had to encompass various peace initiatives. However, upon evaluating public diplomacy activities which were carried out, the author concludes that their number is quite disproportionate when compared to the activities aiming to present Britain as the modern nation, and that they were mostly partially successful or inconclusive. The inference is that the main hypothesis is confirmed after putting the public diplomacy initiatives in context of the given

timeframe. Their purpose of presenting a fairly different image of Britain in order to secure the superior position of the country, in the new world order, becomes an unavoidable conclusion.

The British government spent a lot of time and energy trying to create the best image, practices and campaigns, but spent too little taking into consideration the ordinary people from within and without. If you want to showcase the country as spearheading the innovation, modernization and peacefulness you have to do that through people, because “to get people to change their behaviour, ultimately you have to understand what’s currently getting in their way.”²³⁸ What has been standing in the way of the British people was the continuity of identity and existence of old image. Britain is a resilient country and the one which has resisted many challenges for centuries and often came out as a victor. This period might be the turning point for them and lead them to dissolving the common identity, or simply the opportunity for them to add new elements to it and forge a more suitable image, which is more in continuum with their past. In the world where communication is the base, the public is the judge.

²³⁸ Arlo Brady, “Are We Really the Most Innovative?”, Huffington Post, August 22, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-arlo-brady/are-we-really-the-most-innovative_b_3794481.html, (accessed August 17, 2017).

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