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MASTER'S THESIS

The role of the International community in the peacebuilding
process in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide

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Abbreviations

AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
BIT	Bilateral Investment Treaty
CDR	Coalition for the Defense of the Republic
CPCR	Collective of Civil Parties for Rwanda
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
EAC	East African Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FTF	Feed the Future
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
GDP	Gross domestic product
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HIC	High-Income Country
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
LIC	Low-Income Country
MICT	United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
MIC	Middle-Income Country
MRND	National Revolutionary Movement for Development
MINECOFIN	Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
NIF	Neutral International Force
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NORDEM	Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
NST	National Strategy for Transformation
NIRDA	National Industrial Research and Development Agency
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDD25	Presidential Decision Directive
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTL	Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
RRA	Rwanda Revenue Authority
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SACCO	Savings & Credit Cooperatives
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USADF	US African Development Foundation
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAT	Value Added Tax
WFP	World Food Programme

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of the International actors in the peacebuilding process in Ruanda after the genocide in 1994. The accent is on the four International actors and their contribution to the peacebuilding process: the UN, the USA, France, and Belgium. The paper first explores the current political, economic and social situation in Rwanda by analyzing various reports from various independent actors, including International Monetary Fund, Human Rights Watch, World Bank, as well as reports and documents issued by the International actors whose role this paper explores, and Rwanda itself. The paper then focuses on the contribution of the International actors to the current political, economic and social situation in Rwanda, by using the method of content analysis, and a method of the case study of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. This paper gives a broad picture of the role of the International actors towards the Rwandan genocide and post-genocide peacebuilding. Results shown at the end of the research, call for a further discussion on the connection between the International actors in question and Rwanda, in the period during and following the genocide.

Keywords: Rwanda; International actors; Rwandan Patriotic Front; genocide; peacebuilding; reconciliation.

Introduction

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which marked the end of the Thirty Years War, established the system of state relations based on the principle of a state's sovereignty.¹ It implied that states have "absolute supremacy over internal affairs within its territory, absolute right to govern its people and freedom from any external interference in the above matters."² In that sense, "sovereign states are the only legally equal "actors" on the international stage, recognizing no greater authority, internally and externally."³ As a result of multiple factors, the system of state relations defined like this, was not applicable after the end of the Cold War. As Nigel Hogan in the *State Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War era* explains, in the post-Cold War era, this concept of state sovereignty didn't completely match the reality. Furthermore, it is not only the end of the Cold War that brought this change, "the end of the Cold War also coincided with the acceleration of globalization and the "Transnationalization" and "Deterritorialization" of finance, business and terrorism, moving from a "statist" to "polycentric" system of global governance."⁴ All this interfered with the traditional concept of state sovereignty.

Nigel Hogan further explains that after the Second World War, international organizations emerged to reestablish interstate relations.⁵ Members of the United Nations (UN) committed themselves to respect the rules prescribed by the organization.⁶ Countries became economically interdependent, and that, together with the rising of terrorism, forced them to cooperate.⁷ "Previously the majority of terror organizations were situated in a single state with grievances against that state"⁸, while now, "terror groups have members that originate from

¹ Vladislav B. Sotirović, "The Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and its consequences for International Relations", *Open Dialogue Research Journal*, 2017, Online, Available at: <https://orientalreview.org/2017/12/09/peace-treaty-westphalia-1648-consequences-international-relations/> (Accessed 15 Aug 2019).

² Nigel Hogan, "State Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War era", *E-International Relations Student*, Online, Available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/01/state-sovereignty-in-the-post-cold-war-era/> (Accessed 15 Aug. 2019).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

societies all around the world and operate globally.”⁹ Also, after the end of the Cold War, emergence in intrastate conflict appeared and therefore the calls for humanitarian intervention.¹⁰ That emergence “of sovereign states having a responsibility to protect civilians of other sovereign states from harm, became prevalent in the Post-Cold War era, with an increase in human rights rhetoric.”¹¹ At the beginning of the 1990s, a serious intrastate conflict started to emerge in Africa, Rwanda. The conflict escalated in the genocide which took over 800 000 lives in three months. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is remembered as a failure of the International Community, because it could have been easily prevented or stopped, if only that sense of moral obligation to act against human rights abuses¹² emerged in the case of Rwanda, putting aside all the possible excuses.

After the Holocaust, the International Community seemed determined not to allow genocide to occur again. The Convention on Prevention and Punishment on the Acts of the Genocide was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. Despite the fact that the Convention clearly states what the acts of genocide are¹³, and despite the events preceding it, the International actors and hereby we mean the UN, the USA, France, and Belgium, did not prevent nor stop the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. These international actors had information from the ground about what was happening in Rwanda during 1994.¹⁴ Furthermore, following the Rwandan genocide, obligations of the International actors to act upon human rights abuses in sovereign countries¹⁵ was transformed into a principle “Responsibility to protect.”¹⁶

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Genocide is in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, defined as “any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a) killing members of the group, b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” For more information see: “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948”. Retrieved from:

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx>

(Accessed on 2 March 2019).

¹⁴ Much research has been done on the subject of the Rwandan genocide, but the most comprehensive was the one from the Human Rights Watch in 1999 that was published under the name of “Leave None to Tell the Story.” Inter alia, it examined the relationship between the Rwandan genocide and the International Community, where its main conclusions were that genocide was mostly ignored by the International Community who failed to prevent and stop it.

¹⁵ Nigel Hogan, “State Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War era”, *E-International Relations Student*, Online, Available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/01/state-sovereignty-in-the-post-cold-war-era/> (Accessed 15 Aug. 2019).

¹⁶ The principle “Responsibility to Protect” was endorsed in the 2005 World Summit by all members of the United Nations. It is a political commitment to prevent and respond to the most serious violations of International Humanitarian law and humanitarian rights. The three pillars of the principle include: 1.

Considering the conditions under which the genocide occurred, building sustainable peace and reaching reconciliation in Rwanda, should have been the number one preoccupation for Rwandans and the International Community.

Considering that it is widely acknowledged that the International actors have failed in preventing and stopping the genocide and that this theme is widely explored and discussed in the literature, the focus of the thesis will be on the situation in Rwanda after the genocide. In the thesis, we will explore whether the International actors:¹⁷ the UN, France, Belgium and the USA, were actively present in the peacebuilding process in Rwanda, from the end of the genocide in 1994 until 2019. We aim to establish whether the same type of indifference present during the genocide has continued during the peacebuilding process as well. In addition, we will be exploring if positive peace and reconciliation have been reached in Rwanda, which is necessary to secure that another conflict does not erupt.

The methodology used in this thesis includes content analysis and case study. In the thesis, we will analyze a range of economic programs of Rwanda and reports on Rwanda's economic progress, as well as reports about the political situation in Rwanda. Next to the content analysis, the research of the role of the International actors in the peacebuilding process in Rwanda will be also conducted through the case study of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

The structure of the thesis will be designated in a way that the research will consist of six chapters. The first chapter will include the theoretical framework of peacebuilding, positive peace, and the process of reconciliation. Under peacebuilding, we will combine deliberations of Johan Galtung, the founder of the discipline of peace and conflict studies, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Through the thesis, we will also rely on Johan Galtung's definition of positive peace. Regarding the process of reconciliation, among the many designations what reconciliation encompasses, we have opted for the one given by the authors of Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, in *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*. They give a broad

responsibility of the states "to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity," 2. the international community's responsibility to assist states in fulfilling this responsibility, 3. the international community's responsibility to use "appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means" in order to protect population from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." Retrieved from: United Nations, "Responsibility to Protect", available at: <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>

¹⁷These three countries and the United Nations are from the author's point of view seen as subjects that could have had the biggest impact on preventing the Genocide. That is why when discussing about indifference towards the genocide and about the peacebuilding process in Rwanda, we will especially focus on these international actors.

understanding of the process of reconciliation, which will direct the course of our research, especially referring to the part where we are analyzing the current political situation in Rwanda.

The second chapter of the thesis will introduce the historical background of the Rwandan genocide, including events and relations that led to the genocide, as well as the character of the genocide. The third chapter of the thesis will consist of four subchapters, and each subchapter will analyze the attitude of one of the International actors (the USA, France, Belgium, the UN) towards the Rwandan genocide. This chapter will highlight the International actors' indifference towards the genocide in Rwanda. The fourth chapter will consist of 3 large subchapters and will introduce the current political, economic and social situation in Rwanda. In addition, the first subchapter will analyze the current political situation in Rwanda, and its critiques. The second one will analyze Rwanda's progress towards achieving its economic goals, and its strategy for economic development. The last subchapter will concentrate especially on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and its role in the process of reconciliation. It will also introduce the role of Gacaca courts, as one of Rwanda's national initiatives in reaching justice. The fifth chapter will build on the previous one, and will explore what measures have been taken by the International actors to help the social and economic development of Rwanda, as well as their response to the existing critiques of the Rwandan government. In the last chapter of the thesis, based on the finding of our research, we will conclude about the International actor's role in the peacebuilding process in Rwanda after the genocide.

1. Theoretical Framework

1. 1. Peacebuilding

In a post-conflict situation like the one in Rwanda, peacebuilding should be the main preoccupation for Rwandan authorities and the International actors. The term "peacebuilding" was coined by Johan Galtung, in *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding*, which is a part of his book *Peace, war and defense: essays in peace research*. According to Johan Galtung, "the mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and should be present as a reservoir for the system itself to

draw upon...More particularly, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where war might occur.’’¹⁸ Galtung warns about the existence of structural violence as an impediment to building sustainable peace. In addition, he gives an example to show us that where direct violence may not exist, structural violence may still be present. He explains the relationship between one big power and a few smaller powers, where the big power has the role of a policeman. He says that “the trouble with that model is that the big power has a tendency to assume some other roles in addition, adding judge, crown witness, executioner, manager, president, field marshal, and so on, so that the net result may be absence of direct violence, but bought at the expense of a frightening amount of structural violence.’’¹⁹ Johan Galtung warns that that is not a structure that will support peace.²⁰ He gives another example of the structures when discussing the European Community countries and Nordic countries. Common for both, the European Community countries and the Nordic countries, is that “there is a norm of equity, no party shall be exploited.’’²¹ However, he says that in the case of Nordic countries, the structure is weak, for there is “merely an annual conference rotating among the capitals with a weak secretariat,’’²² while in the case of European Community, he continues, the structures are much stronger.²³

The term peacebuilding was later brought to attention in 1992 when former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote “An Agenda for Peace.” He introduced the concept of peacebuilding to the UN, as an “action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.’’²⁴ His concept of peacebuilding implies “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war; and in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict.’’²⁵ In addition, the deepest causes of conflict include: “economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.’’²⁶ These three deepest causes of conflict are elaborated in the thesis, and for that, peacebuilding,

¹⁸ Johan, Galtung, *Peace, war, and defence: essays in peace research; Vol2*, 1976, Ejlers, Copenhagen, pp. 298.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid. pp.299.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ <http://www.unpb.org/application-guidelines/what-is-peacebuilding/> (Accessed 17 March 2019)

²⁵ „An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping”, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council, New York, 1992, pp.4 Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/an-agenda-for-peace-preventive-diplomacy-peacemaking-and-peace-keeping-report-of-the-secretary-general/>

²⁶ Ibid. pp. 4.

defined like this, is essential for our research. Furthermore, Boutros Boutros-Ghali explains the connection between peacebuilding, peacemaking, peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy. He points out that “preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.”²⁷

1.2. The process of reconciliation

The three authors of Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, in *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*, define reconciliation as “a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future.”²⁸ They emphasize that reconciliation is both, “a goal - something to achieve - and a process - a means to achieve that goal.”²⁹ As they stated, the *Handbook* is oriented towards the process. According to the *Handbook*, “reconciliation is an over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and so on.”³⁰ Furthermore, the process of reconciliation includes “finding a way to live alongside former enemies – not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately.”³¹ The authors also emphasize that the process of reconciliation, is a “very long-term objective, which can only be reached after all the important ingredients of justice, truth, healing and so on have been addressed.”³² “The overall process in which all these and other issues combine is the reconciliation process.”³³

The authors find politics as an important part of the process of reconciliation. They say that, in its “forward-looking dimension, reconciliation means enabling victims and perpetrators to get on with life and, at the level of society, the establishment of a civilized political dialogue

²⁷ Ibid. pp. 5.

²⁸ Bloomfield D., Barnes T. and Huyse, L., *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*, 1st ed. Stockholm: International IDEA, (2003), pp.12.

²⁹ Ibid. pp. 12.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid. pp. 14.

³³ Ibid.

and an adequate sharing of power.’’³⁴ Furthermore, “reconciliation process must therefore be supported by a gradual sharing of power, an honouring of each other’s political commitments, the creation of a climate conducive to human rights and economic justice, and a willingness among the population at large to accept responsibility for the past and for the future - in other words, reconciliation must be backed by the recognition of the essential codes of democracy.’’³⁵ The Authors also discuss the role of other countries in the reconciliation process. According to the Handbook, the International Community can contribute to the process of reconciliation in 2 ways. First, the International community is a “potential source of information, expertise and training on reconciliation,’’³⁶ and second, international humanitarian law is “forming a supportive external consensus on issues such as impunity for serious human rights violations, the right to truth, the unacceptability of certain crimes and the need to bring perpetrators to justice irrespective of where their crimes were committed.’’³⁷

The Handbook gives a broad view of reconciliation. Unlike other authors, according to the Handbook, establishing the truth only, is not enough for reconciliation, justice is also essential for reconciliation, those two are “key parts of it.’’³⁸ In addition, the authors distinguish between the 2 approaches to justice: retributive and restorative justice. Retributive justice is based on prosecution³⁹ and punishing of the perpetrators, while restorative justice “works with the full participation of the victim and of the relevant communities in discussing the facts, identifying the causes of misconduct and the defining sanctions. The ultimate aim is to restore relations as far as possible, both between victim and offender and within the broader community to which they belong.’’⁴⁰ Means of achieving restorative justice, include, inter alia, public discussions and group mediations. While exploring international actors’ contribution to the process of reconciliation within Rwanda, we will focus on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as a mean of retributive justice, and, we will also give just a brief overview of the Gacaca courts, a “traditional Rwandan community-based conflict resolution mechanism’’⁴¹, as a mean of restorative justice.⁴²

³⁴ Ibid. pp. 19.

³⁵ Ibid. pp. 21.

³⁶ Ibid. pp. 45.

³⁷ Ibid. pp. 46.

³⁸ Ibid. pp. 14.

³⁹ Ibid. pp. 97.

⁴⁰ Ibid. pp. 111.

⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 116.

⁴² In the thesis we will not analyze broadly the role of Gacaca courts in the process of reconciliation, just a brief overview will be given.

1.3. Positive peace

Johan Galtung distinguishes between positive and negative peace. He defines negative peace as the “absence of violence of all kinds”⁴³, including the absence of direct, structural and cultural violence. Johan Galtung explains that direct violence is intentional and is being pursued by individuals who act alone or within some collectivity.⁴⁴ Structural or indirect violence is, on the other side, not intentional and it is embedded in the society and the world.⁴⁵ Regarding the cultural violence, Galtung explains that its purpose is to legitimize the structural and direct violence. It motivates people to pursue direct violence or to not try to stop the structural violence.⁴⁶ On the other side, positive peace includes direct, structural and cultural positive peace.⁴⁷ Direct positive peace consists of all the basic needs, including “survival, prosperity, freedom and identity,”⁴⁸ while structural positive peace means replacing the repression with freedom, marginalization with participation, exploitation with equality and so on.⁴⁹ Cultural positive peace, according to Johan Galtung means “replacing the legitimization of violence by legitimizing peace,”⁵⁰ in religion, art, schools, universities, law,⁵¹ etc. Defined like this, positive peace is indispensable for every post-conflict society, including Rwanda.

2. Historical background and character of the Rwandan genocide

The main focus of this chapter is on the relations between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, as well as the colonial period in Rwanda and its consequences on common life and social relations inside the country. In addition, I will be depicting the proportions of the genocide during the Rwandan Civil War, its background and its roots.

⁴³Johan, Galtung, *Mirnim sredstvima do mira - Mir i sukob, razvoj i civilizacija*. Beograd: Jugoistok 21 i Službeni glasnik, 2009, pp. 55.

⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 54.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 55.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

2.1. History of common life between three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, their similarities and differences

Rwanda is a small country located in the Central-Eastern part of the African continent, placed in the African Great Lakes region. It is bordered by four countries: Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, and Tanzania. Rwanda is comprised of 3 social groups: Hutus, who represent 84% of the Rwandan population, Tutsis, who comprise 15% and the rest of the Rwandan population are people called Twa, who make up 1%.⁵² The ancestors of Hutus and Tutsis “settled the region over a period of two thousand years”⁵³ and developed common language Kinyarwanda, as well as common culture and religion. Most of the people in the region were cultivators and just a small number of people were pastoralists, who owned a large number of cattle.⁵⁴ During the years, wealth and power were measured in the number of cattle owned,⁵⁵ what led to pastoralists becoming an elite in Rwanda. On the other side, cultivators were more numerous and therefore able to mobilize a large number of people⁵⁶ and gain “importance through the military system.”⁵⁷ The meaning of the words “Hutu” and “Tutsi” derives from this positioning as cultivators or pastoralists. At first “Tutsi” described a person who owns lots of cattle, and later it referred to the elite group as a whole,⁵⁸ while “Hutu” firstly referred to a subordinate person and later to majority of ordinary society.⁵⁹ This belonging to Hutu or Tutsi group wasn’t strict. If a person would show that it has enough cattle, it was able to start identifying itself as Tutsi, instead of Hutu. Also, even most of the people married within the group in which they were raised, intergroup marriages were possible.⁶⁰

Regarding the Twa people, they did not speak Kinyarwanda language, and differences between Twa and the other two groups were very strict. During the genocide, they were also

⁵² These are the percentages for 2019, according to the World Population Review. At this moment Rwanda counts close to 13 million people. During the time of the genocide in 1994 the percentages were similar: Tutsi comprised 17 percent of the population, Hutu almost the rest of the population, and Twa people less than 1 percent.

⁵³ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp.31.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 32.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* pp.33.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

killing and being killed. However, we will not discuss their role in the genocide for it is beyond the scope of our research.

2.2. The colonial period and its consequences

At first, Rwanda was under the colonial rule of Germany, and afterward Belgium. In 1899, Rwanda became a German colony, as a part of East German Africa, and it stayed under its rule until the end of the First World War. From 1919 until 1962, Rwanda was a Belgian colony, since the League of Nations mandated its protectorates Rwanda and Burundi to Belgium when the war has ended.

During its colonial rule, Belgium took important measures that were about to influence the relations in the country. The measures were taken due to a process of restructuring the administration in the country, and, due to its familiarity with the theory of ethnic superiority, which was actual in that time and taking a swing in Europe.⁶¹

As Alison Des Forges describes in the Human Rights Report on the genocide in Rwanda: *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, Belgian colonialists decided to reorganize the administration of Rwanda, so it would be easier and less expensive to rule the country.⁶² As a result, Belgium has limited the number of administrative officials, and decided that only Tutsis would hold those posts. Next to the administrative measures, Belgium prohibited crossing from Tutsi to Hutu group, while simultaneously excluding Hutus from the higher education.⁶³ In addition, Hutus were “systematically removed from positions of power.”⁶⁴

Belgian colonial rule will, inter alia, be remembered for putting ethnicity in identity cards. Deriving from appointing Tutsis on high administrative positions, Belgium found it necessary to establish exactly who was Tutsi and who Hutu.⁶⁵ In addition, it conducted a census in 1993, where people had to declare themselves whether they were Tutsi or Hutu, and that

⁶¹ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp.34-37.

⁶² The two reasons for reorganizing the administration were because “the multiple hierarchies which had allowed the ruler to maximize his control by playing off rival officials now permitted both ruler and his subordinates to evade control by the colonialists”. In addition, it was expensive for the ruler to finance a large number of administrative officials. Retrieved from: Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp.34

⁶³ Fred Grunfeld, Anke Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp.29.

⁶⁴ Ibid. pp.28.

⁶⁵ Ibid. pp. 29.

information was put into identity cards.⁶⁶ Unlike Hutu, Tutsis welcomed it.⁶⁷ This led to the “discrimination against the Hutu population in all aspects of daily life, which forced hundreds of thousands of Hutu to flee to neighboring countries.”⁶⁸

Tutsi minority rule was maintainable until the 1950s. On one side, Hutus were dissatisfied with their subordinate position, while on the other, Belgium, faced with the end of colonial rule and pressured by the UN, started to change its politics toward Hutus.⁶⁹ It saw that it was necessary to democratize the country. It started appointing more Hutus to administrative positions, that were before held by the Tutsis, and it also began changing its politics towards the assessment to the education of the Hutus.

These measures were not enough for Hutus who saw that situation as an opportunity to come out of their subordinate position. The result was the “Hutu revolution” that lasted from 1959 to 1961. The revolution began on Nov. 1st 1959, “when a rumor of the death of a Hutu leader at the hands of Tutsi perpetrators, led groups of Hutu to launch attacks on the Tutsi.”⁷⁰ The attacks continued and a large number of Tutsis were forced to leave the country. In 1960, following the decision of Belgium, the elections were held in Rwanda. The winning party was identified exclusively with Hutus: Parmehutu. Its leader, Gregoire Kayibanda, Hutu, has become the Prime Minister of the provisional government.

Next year, in September 1961, the United Nations held a referendum in Rwanda, where people voted whether to keep the monarchy or to establish a republic. Rwanda became a republic, and in 1962, after Belgians left the country, it declared as an independent state. Besides Tutsis fleeing the country, these years were marked by the attacks from Tutsi refugee warriors, the Inyenzi⁷¹, who invaded Rwanda in 1961 and 1962.⁷² As these attacks followed

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Historians are divided into two groups regarding relations between the Hutus and Tutsis before colonization. One group is of the opinion that distinctions that existed because Tutsi tended to be cattle owners and Hutu were usually cultivators, were not rigid. Instead, European colonizers, first Germany and then Belgium sharpened ethnic division between them. The other school of thought is of the opinion that even before the colonizers came, a strong racial system already existed and colonial powers only formalized it. For more on this see: Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 5-7.

⁶⁸ Fred Grunfeld, Anke Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp.29.

⁶⁹ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp.39.

⁷⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Rwanda-genocide-of-1994#ref1111304> (Accessed 2 March 2019).

⁷¹ Inyenzi or cockroaches was the name Hutus gave to Tutsi guerrillas who invaded Rwanda in the 1960s. Later, this term referred to the Rwandan Patriotic Army.

⁷² Howard Adelman, Astri Suhrke, *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1999. pp.7.

on, Hutus continued to attack the Tutsis that stayed in the country, while Gregoire Kayibanda was implementing politics towards Tutsis, similar to the one implemented towards the Hutus before: “he installed a quota system providing that only 9 percent of Tutsi were allowed access to education and employment. Many Tutsis were thrown out of their jobs.”⁷³ This situation led to the number of Tutsi refugees fleeing to Uganda and other neighboring states, to dramatically increase⁷⁴ while at the same time more than 20,000 Tutsis were killed. Two important events that followed include: General Juvenal Habyarimana and his party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development(MRND), coming to power in 1973, and, the civil war that has begun on 1st of October 1990, after Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF) have invaded Rwanda.

2.3. Rwandan Civil war and Rwandan genocide

Rwandan Civil War was a conflict between the Rwandan Armed Forces(FAR), representing the government of Rwanda, and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF). RPF was formed from Rwandan exiles in neighboring countries, mostly children of the first Tutsi exiles from the start of the Hutu revolution. The Civil war started on 1st of October 1990 when the RPF invaded Northern Rwanda from Uganda. With the help of foreign troops,⁷⁵ the Rwandan army defeated the RPF by the end of October. The RPF began a guerrilla war that lasted until the negotiation in 1992. Media and the “Hutu Power Ideology” had an important role in the civil war and genocide. Newspaper Kangura, Radio Rwanda which was the state media, as well as Radio TÉLÉvision Libre des Mille Collines(RTLM), were all inciting hatred in the country. Their role in the genocide was tremendous. Through the media, Hutus were taught to hate Tutsis. The media was spreading claims about Tutsis having a plan to kill Hutus in order to come to power again, or that they were taking away Rwanda from Hutus.⁷⁶ Furthermore, the media claimed that the Tutsis in the country were in close collaboration with the RPF, and were planing a genocide against the Hutus.⁷⁷ In 1992, as a result of the pressure from opposition political parties in the country, as well as human rights organizations and protests in Rwanda, the negotiations between two parties have been started. On the 4th of August 1993,

⁷³ Fred Grunfeld, Anke Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp.31.

⁷⁴ In this period, some 20,000 Tutsis were killed and even more fled the country.

⁷⁵ France sent 5,200 troops to Rwanda, to aid the Rwandan army.

⁷⁶ Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 86.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 86-95.

negotiations were concluded with the UN-sponsored Arusha Peace Agreement, between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF.⁷⁸

The Arusha Peace Agreement covered five following areas: “the establishment of the rule of law; the transitional institutions to govern until elections could be held; the repatriation of refugees; the resettlement of displaced persons, and the integration of the two opposing armies.”⁷⁹ The transitional government would include three blocks: RPF, president Habyarimana and his party MRND, and block of other four political parties operating in Rwanda. Regarding the integrated army, “the Rwandan government was to provide 60 percent of the troops, but would have to share command posts fifty-fifty down to the level of battalion with the RPF.”⁸⁰ The agreement also provided that the UN should have a broader role and monitor the implementation of the Agreement, through the Neutral International Force(NIF). Tasks of the NIF, during the transitional period of 22 months, inter alia, would be: “to assist in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, especially through the supervision of the protocol on the integration of armed forces of the two parties”⁸¹, “to guarantee overall security of the country and verify the maintenance of law and order, ensure the security of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to assist in catering to the security of civilians... to assist in tracking arms caches and in the neutralisation of armed gangs through the country, undertake mine clearance operations, assist in the recovery of all weapons distributed to or illegally acquired by civilians, and monitor the observance of the cessation of hostilities.”⁸² Nonetheless, the NIF was to “supervise the demobilization of those servicemen and gendarmes who were not going to be part of the new armed forces...to be informed of any violation of the cease-fire and track down the perpetrators.”⁸³ In September 1993, the two parties, Rwandan government and the RPF, have met with the Secretary-General of the UN in New York, where they highlighted how important it is to establish transitional institutions and

⁷⁸ President Juvenal Habyarimana didn't want to sign the Agreement, but he was pushed to so by France and World Bank who informed him that they would withdraw their financial assistance if he don't sign the Agreement. Retrieved from: Des Forges, Alison, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp. 162.

⁷⁹ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp. 162.

⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 163.

⁸¹ Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, United Nations, 1999, pp. 6, Available online:

https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257 (Accessed 2 Feb.2019).

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

to deploy the international force as soon as possible.⁸⁴ They warned that “any delay might lead to the collapse of the peace process.”⁸⁵

However, United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), was deployed much later than the parties asked for. UNAMIR came to Rwanda in December 1993. Its task was to make sure that the new government is installed. The government was first supposed to be installed in January 1994, but it was postponed a few times. For the first time, it was postponed “to February and then postponed again to March 25, and then again to March 28, and then again to early April.”⁸⁶ What followed was shooting of the President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane on 6th of April 1994, and that is how the genocide has begun.

On 6th of April 1994, president Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, while he was returning from Dar es Sallam together with the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, where he allegedly agreed to establish the transitional government.⁸⁷ Even though it is still unknown who has shot the plane, the Rwandan army accused the RPF of the shooting. A few hours after the plane crash, the slaughter of the people has begun. The genocide in Rwanda lasted from April 1994 to July 1994. During those three months, around 800 000 people were killed. Two Hutu extremist organizations Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi committed the genocide against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus.⁸⁸ The Interahamwe (“those who attack together”) was formed in 1994 as the youth wing of the MRND (the National Revolutionary Movement for Development), the ruling party of Rwanda, and enjoyed the backing of the Hutu Power government. The Interahamwe were the main perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. Impuzamugambi (“those who have the same goal”) was a Hutu militia formed in 1992. The Impuzamugambi was controlled by the leadership of the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) and recruited its members from the youth wing of the CDR. Shortly after the plane crash, the killing of Tutsis has begun. “The Presidential Guard, the army, the gendarmerie and the Interahamwe were going from house to house with lists of names”⁸⁹ of Tutsis that were about to be killed. The presidential guard also started putting roadblocks in Kigali so Tutsis wouldn’t be able to escape. They were being driven “out of

⁸⁴ Ibid. pp.7.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp.187.

⁸⁷ Ibid. pp.255.

⁸⁸ Moderate Hutus include Hutus who were against Habyarimana’s politics and those Hutus who didn’t want to kill Tutsis.

⁸⁹ Fred, Grunfeld and Anke, Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp. 159.

their homes to government offices, churches, schools or other public sites, where they would subsequently be massacred in large-scale operations.’’⁹⁰ Everyone who was Tutsi was killed: men, children, and women who were “often raped, tortured and mutilated before they were murdered.’’⁹¹ Hutu civilians, who were killing their Tutsi neighbors, co-workers, and friends had a big role in the genocide. Previous connections between them weren’t important in that atmosphere of hatred. In their intentions to kill Tutsis, they were using machetes, which the government imported before the genocide. Activities of the RTLM Radio were even more intensified during the genocide. Names of Tutsis have been read, so Hutus would know whom to kill. Besides Tutsis, Hutus were being killed as well. In their advance through Kigali, the RPF soldiers, killed “dozens of political and military leaders, many of them past government employees or persons close to Habyarimana’s political party. They killed family members, including women and children, in a number of these cases.’’⁹² According to the Amnesty International, around 60 000 Hutus were killed during the genocide. The genocide has ended when RPF army entered Kigali and surrounded it, on 4th of July 1994.

3. International actors’ indifference towards the Rwandan genocide

This chapter will depict how the international actors: the UN, France, Belgium and the USA, have contributed to the Rwandan genocide. Firstly, I will be highlighting the UNAMIR and its limitations, together with the United Nations’ bad administration. What will follow is the discussion about France and its role in supplying arms and supporting the interim government, as well as the role of Belgium as the ex-colonial ruler in Rwanda. The chapter will be concluded with the analysis of the USA and its inactivity during the genocide.

3.1. UN’s failure in the Rwandan genocide in 1994

Speaking of the United Nations response to the crisis in Rwanda, a few points of failure are noticeable. They include UNAMIR’s late implementation in Rwanda, the lack of resources

⁹⁰ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp. 9.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* pp.10.

⁹² *Ibid.* pp.14.

for UNAMIR to deal with the situation on the ground,⁹³ UNAMIR's limited mandate, and administration of the UN.

United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was implemented later than the conflicting parties asked. When in September 1993, the Rwandan government and RPF asked for a fast establishment of transitional institutions and the international force numbering 4 260⁹⁴, the UN wasn't able to respond to their demands. The UN Secretary-General argued that "it would take at least 2-3 months"⁹⁵ to establish such force, even if that force would've been approved. Until then, the Rwandan Government and the RPF would have "to respect the cease-fire."⁹⁶

UNAMIR also suffered from a lack of capacity. As the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the UN during the genocide in Rwanda found, UNAMIR "lacked well-trained troops and functioning material."⁹⁷ Furthermore, the UN employed less force than it was necessary. UNAMIR counted around 2 500 soldiers, even though the UN military expert has recommended a force numbering 8 000.⁹⁸ As Independent Inquiry explains, deployment of UNAMIR came in a time when the UN, following the end of the Cold War and emergence of the intrastate conflicts, increased the presence of its peacekeeping missions, and, as a result, was in a difficult financial situation.⁹⁹

Another deficiency of UNAMIR was its limited mandate. When the genocide started and Rwandans asked for help, UNAMIR was not able to help them. Established by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 872, on 5th of October 1993, UNAMIR's purpose was to help the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Its mandate was to: "1)assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; 2)monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; 3)monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; 4)assist with mine-clearance; and 5)assist in the coordination

⁹³ "Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda", United Nations, 1999, Online:

https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257 pp. 30, (Accessed 3 March 2019).

⁹⁴ Ibid. pp. 7.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid. pp. 30.

⁹⁸ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, Online: https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Leave%20None%20to%20tell%20the%20story-%20Genocide%20in%20Rwanda.pdf (Accessed 3 March 2019).

⁹⁹ "Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda", United Nations, 1999, Online: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257 pp.39, (Accessed 3 March 2019).

of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.’’¹⁰⁰ As the situation in Rwanda was changing, its mandate was being renewed. However, the purpose of UNAMIR stayed the same overall: to observe the peace process, even though the situation in Rwanda was far from peaceful. As the Independent Inquiry stated, “the United Nations mission was predicated on the success of the peace process. There was no fall-back, no contingency planning for the eventuality that the peace process did not succeed.’’¹⁰¹

The UN’s bad administration came to the surface with the January 11th cable. On January 11th, 1994, general Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR, sent a telegram to the UN headquarters, informing them of what was about to happen in Rwanda. The telegram was addressed to General Baril, the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and it was entitled “Request for protection for informant.” The telegram contained three important information which Dallaire got from an informant from the Interahamwe militia. The first information referred to a plan to provoke Belgian peacekeepers to use the force and then to kill them. The aim was to withdraw Belgium from Rwanda.¹⁰² The second information was regarding to the Interahamwe militia training of 1 700 men, that were ready to slaughter Tutsis in Kigali.¹⁰³ The third information was related to a “major weapons cache with at least 135 weapons (G 3 and AK 47)’’¹⁰⁴, which informant was ready to show to the UNAMIR. In the cable, Dallaire also expressed his intention to act as fast as possible by capturing the weapon, and proposed that protection was to be given to the informant and his family.¹⁰⁵

By sending the Cable directly to General Baril, Dallaire has broken the procedure, causing the information not to be given higher priority and shared with the Security Council.¹⁰⁶ Even so, other UN senior officials that where in charge with the Cable and information it contained, haven't done much in giving a free hand to Dallaire. They found that acting upon

¹⁰⁰ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamirM.htm> (Accessed 10 May 2019)

¹⁰¹ “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda”, United Nations, 1999, pp. 31, Online:

https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257 (Accessed 3 March 2019).

¹⁰² Fred, Grunfeld, and Anke, Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp. 164.

¹⁰³ Ibid. pp. 10.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda”, United Nations, 1999, pp. 10, Online:

https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257 (Accessed 3 March 2019).

¹⁰⁶ For more information see: Fred, Grunfeld, and Anke, Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp. 97-99.

this, would be beyond the UN mandate¹⁰⁷, and that they could not trust the informant.¹⁰⁸ More specifically the response of the Headquarters was that president Habyarimana should be informed about the activities of the Interahamwe, and that Dallaire “had to insist that the President take immediate action and that he inform UNAMIR within 48 hours of the steps that he had taken, including the recovery of arms.”¹⁰⁹

When non-permanent members of the Security Council: Czech Republic, Spain, New Zealand, and Argentina, received information about the content of the Cable, they saw that “the slaughter was a genocide that must be stopped,”¹¹⁰ and called for a stronger mandate of UNAMIR. As the Human Rights Watch in their report on Rwanda stated, if these countries were informed in time “they might have found their voices in time to have called for firm measures to avert the violence.”¹¹¹

3.2. France and its support for the regime in Rwanda

The role of France in the Rwandan genocide was mostly manifested through its support for the regime of president Juvenal Habyarimana. It included military assistance, army training and arms supplying.

Regarding the military assistance, France was sending reinforcement to the Rwandan government when it was necessary, including sending a corps of 5 200 soldiers when the RPF invaded Rwanda on 1st of November 1990, or sending 500 French troops to stop the advance of the RPF in February 1993. Furthermore, France was sending its troops to train the Rwandan army. French troops in Rwanda included two groups: the Notoit detachment and a military assistance mission.¹¹² The Noroit detachment was there to protect French citizens including their evacuation. Even so, its purpose is questionable, because the number of French

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. pp. 102.

¹⁰⁸“Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda”, United Nations, 1999, pp. 11, Online: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257 (Accessed 3 March 2019).

¹⁰⁹ Fred, Grunfeld, and Anke, Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007 , pp.100.

¹¹⁰Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp.19.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid. pp.152.

citizens in Rwanda did not require that much force within the detachment.¹¹³ On the other side, purpose of the military assistance mission was to train Rwandan soldiers. The trainings were so intense, that the Rwandan Government Army has grown from “5,200-strong in 1990 to 35,000 in 1993”¹¹⁴. Furthermore, “some of these French-trained soldiers passed on their knowledge to the party militia Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi.”¹¹⁵ Military cooperation between France and the Rwandan government did not stop here. The responsibility for military operations was put in French hands. Lt. Col. Jean-Jacques Maurin, head of the French military assistance mission, was assisting the “Rwandan chief of staff in such tasks as drawing up daily battle plans, accompanied him around the country, and participated in daily meetings of the general staff.”¹¹⁶

The next point of the French support for the regime regards the distribution of weapons. As Mel McNulty appoints in *French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda*, French military support for African regimes was “built in the first instance on the defense treaties and military assistance accords.”¹¹⁷ In 1975, France and Rwanda signed a military technical assistance accord, which entailed “transfer of arms and military equipment from France to Rwanda worth about FF4m (£0.5m) per year.”¹¹⁸ In 1992, this military technical assistance accord was amended to include the Rwandan armed forces “as eligible for French assistance.”¹¹⁹ During the Rwandan civil war from 1990 to 1994, France has transferred heavy weapons to the Rwandan Government Army, including “three Gazelle helicopters with spare parts, as well as spare parts for French-manufactured Panhard automatic machine guns.”¹²⁰ After the Rwandan army beaten the RPF in 1990 and forced it to change its tactics “from conventional war to guerre mobile,”¹²¹ the type of weaponry that France was supplying Rwanda with, changed as well. Since then, France was transferring mostly “small caliber light weapons and

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Mel, McNulty, “French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda”, *Crime, Law & Social Change* 33: 105–129, 2000, pp. 110.

¹¹⁵ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp. 153.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Mel, McNulty, “French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda”, *Crime, Law & Social Change* 33: 105–129, 2000, pp. 108.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. pp. 109.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. pp. 110.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid. pp. 111.

ammunition, including assault rifles, anti-tank rocket launchers and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition of all calibers.’’¹²²

In its intention to supply Rwanda with weapons, there are allegations that France was using third parties. In 1992, there was an arms transfer between Rwanda and Egypt, which allegedly was financed by a French bank Lyonnais. Notably, there was “a \$6 million contract between Egypt and Rwanda in March 1992, with Rwanda’s payment guaranteed by a French bank (the state-owned Crédit Lyonnais).’’¹²³ The president of this state-owned bank had denied the accusation.

Furthermore, France continued to supply Rwanda with weapons during the genocide as well. On the 8th of April 1994, France has delivered Rwanda a military aircraft.¹²⁴ Also, it did not respect the UN arms embargo from May 1994. According to the Human Rights Watch, France did not suspend arms flow to the Rwandan Armed Forces right after the UN embargo. Instead, it used Zaire’s Goma airport to deliver arms.¹²⁵ France’s explanation was that it was only finishing the arms transfer that was agreed before the embargo.

3.3. Belgium’s contribution to the genocide in Rwanda

Belgium’s role in the genocide in Rwanda encompasses the colonial period, starting from the administrative changes in the country, reserving the high education for Tutsis only, issuing ID cards with the information about belonging to one or another group, fast shifting of support from Tutsis to Hutus, all the way to the withdrawal of its troops from UNAMIR and urging for complete termination of UNAMIR’s mandate.¹²⁶

Belgium’s attitude towards UNAMIR was not uniform. In the months preceding the genocide, Belgium was supportive towards UNAMIR while urging for strengthening its mandate. Furthermore, in 1993, when different reports on the situation in Rwanda started to reveal the killings, Belgium went as far as recalling its ambassador for consultations. As a reaction on the 11 January cable, Belgium urged in the UN for Romeo Dallaire to be given “greater

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid. pp. 114.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid. pp. 119.

¹²⁶ This chapter will analyse the role of Belgium from the start of the genocide in 1994, for its role in the colonial period is already analysed in the previous chapter.

freedom of action and to demand faster progress from Habyarimana.’’¹²⁷ In addition, in March 1994, in a discussion about the new term for UNAMIR, in the UN Security Council, Belgium proposed UNAMIR’s mandate to be strengthened. However, it did not succeed in its intentions since it did not convince France and the USA to follow the proposal. Belgium had its troops in Rwanda and therefore more responsibility. Belgium sent its troops to participate in UNAMIR despite the fact that anti-Belgian feelings, deriving from its colonial rule, were still present. Those feelings were followed by anti-Belgian incidents as well as the role of hate radio in reinforcing the bad atmosphere related to the Belgian peacekeepers.¹²⁸

At the beginning of the genocide, on 7th of April 1994, ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed. Being worried for its nationalists in Rwanda, Belgium at first continued with its efforts to strengthen UNAMIR’s mandate, and was even considering to send more Belgian troops as the evacuation force for its nationalists.¹²⁹ After not succeeding in its intentions, Belgium has made a decision to withdraw on April 15th, and has soon pushed for a complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. Belgium was of the opinion that the peace process and Arusha Accords had collapsed and therefore there was no longer a reason to be there,¹³⁰ not only for Belgium, but for UNAMIR as a whole. In addition, Belgium was urging the Security Council members to withdraw UNAMIR. In its letter to the Security Council, a Belgian official made a statement: “it is obvious that under these conditions (widespread massacres and chaos) the continuation of the UNAMIR operation has become pointless within the terms of its present mandate. In any event, the continued presence of the Belgian contingent would expose it to unacceptable risks.... In conclusion the Belgian Government is of the opinion that it is imperative to suspend the activities of UNAMIR forces without delay.’’¹³¹

3.4. The inaction of the USA during the Rwandan genocide

The USA policy towards the Rwandan genocide is remembered mostly for not allowing the

¹²⁷ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp.249.

¹²⁸ Fred, Grunfeld, and Anke, Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp. 147.

¹²⁹ Ibid. pp.183.

¹³⁰ Ibid. pp. 189.

¹³¹ Ibid. pp. 192.

stronger mandate of UNAMIR. The USA has multiple times voted against the proposals for broadening the mandate of UNAMIR in the UN Security Council. This American attitude towards the genocide in Rwanda is known to be influenced by the following factors: increased share of funding for the UN mission and bad experience from Somalia, including the US Presidential Decision Directive (PDD25). As Thomas Weiss explains in his book *Military-Civilian Interactions. Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect*, the position of the USA towards Rwandan genocide “was based on two points of contention: first, a desire to avoid paying for an operation that it believed would inevitably fail; second, the new US policy under PDD-25, which argued against intervention in areas and countries outside of U.S. strategic interest.”¹³²

After the end of the Cold War, emergence in intrastate conflict and calls for humanitarian intervention have increased¹³³ and therefore the UN peacekeeping missions in the conflicting areas. The USA has taken the biggest share of financing the UN missions, and its attitude towards Rwandan genocide was led by this financial moment. “At the time of the Rwanda deployment, with a staff of a few hundred, the UN was posting 70,000 peacekeepers on seventeen missions around the world. Amid these widespread crises and logistical headaches, the Rwanda mission had a very low status,”¹³⁴ within both, the UN and the USA.

Another concern of the USA was that Rwanda could be “another Somalia”. After they have been sent to Somalia as a part of a humanitarian mission, 18 American soldiers were killed on 3rd of October, 1993, and their bodies were dragged through the city of Mogadishu.¹³⁵ This event has caused the developing of a Presidential decision directive (PDD25) that regulated the USA peacekeeping missions. It included 16 factors that policymakers in the USA had to discuss about before deciding whether to send their soldiers in peacekeeping missions. As it is commonly believed, the aim of the PDD25 was “the United States to get less involved in the

¹³² Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions. Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005. pp. 103.

¹³³ Nigel Hogan, “State Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War era”, *E-International Relations Student*, Online, Available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/01/state-sovereignty-in-the-post-cold-war-era/> (Accessed 15 Aug. 2019).

¹³⁴ “Bystanders to Genocide”, *The Atlantic Magazine*, Online, Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/> (Accessed 15 Jun 2019).

¹³⁵ “On October 5, 1993, two days after the Somalia firefight, the United States reluctantly voted in the Security Council to authorize Dallaire's mission.” Retrieved from: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/> (Accessed 15 Jun 2015)

peace-keeping missions,’’¹³⁶what also influenced its attitude towards the mandate of UNAMIR.

After the information from the 11 January cable was officially shared with it, the USA responded that it will not support any aggressive peacekeeping.¹³⁷ The killing of 10 Belgian peacekeepers on 7th of April 1994, gave the USA the opportunity to connect this happening to the happenings in Somalia.¹³⁸ On 10th of April the USA nationalists and diplomats were evacuated. According to Jared A. Cohen “not only did the United States not advocate a response to the genocide, but the U.S. mission to the United Nations also, under orders from the secretary of state, discouraged any international response by lobbying the Security Council for a withdrawal of all UNAMIR troops.’’¹³⁹

On 17th of May 1994, the UN Security Council approved reinforcement of the UN mission in Rwanda: UNAMIR II, with the force numbering 5 500 troops. Before its establishment, the USA was firmly against the plan for strengthening UNAMIR. Its position was that the USA “is not prepared at this point to lift heavy equipment and troops into Kigali.’’¹⁴⁰ Even though it finally agreed to support UNAMIR II, the USA sent its promised resources when the genocide has already ended. The USA “delayed shipment of committed resources until one month after the genocide.’’¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Fred, Grunfeld, and Fred, Huijboom, *The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*, Transnational Publishers, 2007, pp.192.

¹³⁷“Bustanders to Genocide”, *The Atlantic Magazine*, Online, Available at:<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/> (Accessed 15 Jun 2019).

¹³⁸Jared, A. Cohen, *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007, pp.5.

¹³⁹ Ibid. pp.5.

¹⁴⁰US Department of State, cable number 127262, to US Mission to the United Nations, New York, “Rwanda: Security Council Discussions”, May 13, 1994, Online, Available at: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw051394.pdf> (Accessed 10 May 2019).

¹⁴¹Jared A. Cohen, *One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007,pp.8.

4. The political, economic and social situation in post-genocide Rwanda

This chapter contains the analysis of the current political, economic and social situation in Rwanda, as well as the attempt to identify possible problems in these spheres.

4.1. Paul Kagame's politics and his attitude towards his political opponents

On one hand, the political situation in Rwanda is claimed to be stable, while on the other, there are allegations about the intimidation of political opposition and journalists, as well as the unfair electoral process.

Rwanda's president Paul Kagame, who has been in that position since the end of the genocide is being praised by the International actors as someone who ended the genocide and brought stability to Rwanda. His party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, maintains an absolute majority of political positions in the country. Also, the government has launched a campaign against what is in Rwanda known as "sectarianism" and "genocide ideology". In order to prevent possible future violence, new laws were passed: in 2002 a Law against divisionism (in Rwanda known as sectarianism) was passed,¹⁴² in 2003 Law Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes was also passed, and in 2008 a law criminalizing "genocide ideology" was brought. Even so, some say these laws are used by the government to intimidate the political opponents and civil society groups, and to limit the freedom of the media. In addition, this part of the thesis is dedicated to examining the political situation in Rwanda, with a special accent on the above-mentioned accusation. In accordance to that, we will introduce numerous critiques regarding the political process in Rwanda. They include cases related to the intimidation of Paul Kagame's political opponents, unfair political process, restrictions of media freedom, and the use of the anti-genocide legislation in political purposes. Special attention will be paid to the 2015 Constitutional referendum, which allowed the current President Paul Kagame to possibly rule in Rwanda until 2034.

¹⁴²In the 2002 law against sectarianism in Rwanda, it is stated that: "the practice of sectarianism is a crime committed by any oral or written expression or any act of division that could generate conflicts among the population or cause disputes." Retrieved from: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/rwanda0708/7.htm> (Accessed 10 May 2019).

2003 Presidential elections

In 2003, direct presidential elections were held in Rwanda. The elections were important because they were the first direct presidential elections since the genocide. The elections were held on 25th of August 2003, and Paul Kagame¹⁴³ was the one to win, taking 95,05 % of the votes. Flaws noted regarding these elections include intimidation and arresting of the political opposition. First was the case of presidential candidate Faustin Twagiramungu.¹⁴⁴ The National Electoral Commission(NEC) accused him of spreading divisionism in his campaign. At the same time, the incumbent president Paul Kagame did the same when accusing him of “urging Hutus to vote along ethnic lines.”¹⁴⁵ Independent reports on the 2003 elections in Rwanda, like the one conducted by the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights(NORDEM), confirm that Faustin Twagiramungu was being intimidated, when reporting that “during the presidential campaign, the NEC seemed to concentrate its efforts on following the moves of candidate Faustin Twagiramungu”¹⁴⁶ and that he “was repeatedly summoned to the NEC, accused of spreading “divisionism” in his campaign material and for calling on the sentiments of fellow Hutus to boost his standing.”¹⁴⁷ On the other side, Twagiramungu was complaining about fraud during the pooling and that he and his supporters were “deliberately intimidated and harassed.”¹⁴⁸

Another case concerning the 2003 Presidential elections was the arresting of Charles Ntakirutinka. In 2001 he participated in creating a new opponent political party, the Democratic Party for Renewal. In 2002, one year before the presidential elections, he was

¹⁴³ In 1994, Paul Kagame was appointed vice-president, while Pasteur Bizimungu was appointed president. After Bizimungu’s resignation in 2000, Paul Kagame was appointed as the president by the Transitional National Assembly.

¹⁴⁴ Faustin Twagiramungu was a prime minister in the first Rwandan post- genocide Government. He returned from Belgium where he was in exile and announced that he will run for the 2003 presidential election. He was the founder of the Republican Democratic Movement. However, considering that his party was dissolved by the Rwandan parliament, he ran as an independent candidate in the elections. During his exile in Belgium, he accused the RPF government that it was guilty of the genocide as much as the Hutus. For more information see: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3006622.stm> (Accessed on 5 May 2019).

¹⁴⁵“Rwanda Holds 1st Multi-Party Presidential Election-2003-08-25”, *VOA News*, Online, Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/archive/rwanda-holds-1st-multi-party-presidential-election-2003-08-25> (Accessed 5 May 2019).

¹⁴⁶ Ingrid, Samset and Orrvar, Dalby, *Rwanda: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2003*, The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights(NORDEM), 2003, pp. 16, Available at: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1770-rwanda-presidential-and-parliamentary-elections.pdf> (Accessed on 5 May 2019).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

arrested together with Rwandan former president Pasteur Bizimungu. International observers qualified this case as shutting down the opposition. Amnesty International, described his arrest as “a part of a well-documented crackdown on political opposition by the ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), whose aim was to eliminate the space for any kind of debate.”¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, Amnesty International pointed out that the trial for Ntakirutinka “fell far short of international standards or fairness”¹⁵⁰ including the fact that “the trial took place over only 12 days spread out between 20 April and 19 May 2004. The defendants were only allowed to present a limited number of witnesses.”¹⁵¹ Charles Ntakirutinka was released in 2012 after serving a ten-year sentence.

2003 Parliamentary elections

In September 2003, one month after the presidential elections, parliamentary elections were held as well. In these elections, the coalition in front of the RPF won close to 74%, and the rest was split among other parties.

What is interesting about these elections is that the two of the independent candidates were forced to withdraw on the eve of the elections. Those two candidates were Célestin Kabanda, and Jean-Baptiste Sindikubwabo. The NEC accused them of pressuring people to sign up for them and therefore it found that the signatures they collected were not valid. As noted in the NORDEM’s report, ambiguity with this case concerns the time when the NEC disqualified the two candidates: only one night before the actual day of the election.¹⁵² The question that arose is whether the signatures were really forged since the NEC disqualified them that late.

2010 Presidential elections

In the next presidential elections held in 2010, Paul Kagame won 93,08 % of the votes. These elections were also marked by irregularities. Freedom of speech and freedom of

¹⁴⁹ Charles Ntakirutinka, *Prisoners of Conscience*, Amnesty International, Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20110429082855/http://www.amnestyusa.org/individuals-at-risk/priority-cases/rwanda-charles-ntakirutinka/page.do?id=1510032> (Accessed 6 May 2019).

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ingrid, Samset and Orrvar, Dalby, *Rwanda: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 2003*, The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights(NORDEM), 2003, pp. 22, Available at: <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/1770-rwanda-presidential-and-parliamentary-elections.pdf> (Accessed on 5 May 2019).

association were endangered. Opposition parties had difficulties in appointing their candidates, while leaders of opposition parties were being arrested. International movements and organisations that have been tracking the political situation in Rwanda have expressed concern about it in their reports. The 2011 Amnesty International Report stated that “restrictions on freedom of association prevented new opposition parties from contesting the elections.”¹⁵³ Two opposition parties, the Democratic Green Party and FDU- Inkingi, weren’t able to register as a party, while the third one, PS-Imberakuri, secured its registration. However, the PS-Imberakuri did not appoint its candidate, since its president Bernard Ntaganda was imprisoned. One of the requirements for the political parties to be registered is to organize congressional meetings. Regarding the Green Democratic Party, it had made multiple unsuccessful attempts to register. In September 2009, it had to cancel its meeting because the notary wasn’t available. The following month its attempt failed as well, since the police cancelled the meeting due to security issues, after an unidentified man disrupted this party’s assembly.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, the Green Democratic Party did not realize its plan to hold another assembly in November for it did not obtain police clearance for holding it.¹⁵⁵

Another case concerning the Green Democratic Party is the murder of its Vice president André Kagwa Rwisereka, Kagame’s critic who was found dead one month before the elections.¹⁵⁶ Rwisereka was a member of the RPF, but left the party in 2009 because he didn’t agree any more with the ideas of the party, and he had “decried the party’s archaic ideas and its inability to change, referring to its leadership as a dictatorship.”¹⁵⁷ He was arrested in June 2010 after protesting the disappearance of other officials. He had been found murdered soon after being released.¹⁵⁸

The second opposition party, FDU Inkingi (Union of Democratic Forces), also had difficulties to register as a political party. The 2nd of July 2010 was the deadline for submission of presidential candidacies to the NEC, and together with Democratic Green Party, the FDU Inkingi had been denied a permission to hold the meetings. Furthermore, its president Victoire

¹⁵³ *Annual Report: Rwanda 2011*, Amnesty International, Online, Available at:

<https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/annual-report-rwanda-2011/?page=show> (Accessed on 6 May 2019).

¹⁵⁴ The US Department of State, 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Available at: <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135971.htm> (Accessed on 5 May 2019).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Hill Report on Rwanda, 2012, Online, Available at: <https://www.hiil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Rule-of-Law-Quick-Scan-Rwanda.pdf> pp.60, (Accessed 5 May 2019).

¹⁵⁷ Zareen, Iqbal, “Rwandan Presidential Elections 2010: Rwanda’s new political victims”, *International Institute for Justice and Development*, Online, Available at: <http://ijid.org/news/entry/rwanda-presidential-election-2010-rwandas-new-political-victims> (Accessed 5 May 2019).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

Ingabire Umuhoza, has been arrested. Victoire Ingabire, an ethnic Hutu, has been in exile for 16 years, since end of the genocide in Rwanda. In January 2010 she came back to Rwanda and had planes to run for the Presidency. In April 2010, she was arrested on charges of “genocide ideology, divisionism, and collaboration with terrorist groups, including the FDLR.”¹⁵⁹ ¹⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch indicated that the accusations against her were related to the “statements she made at the genocide memorial in Kigali, in which she called for massacres of Hutus to be acknowledged - in addition to the genocide - and for justice for these crimes.”¹⁶¹ Her lawyer was arrested too, on accusations that includes denial and minimization of the genocide, as well as spreading rumors that could threaten national security.¹⁶² Furthermore, the members of the FDU- Inkongi were arrested in 2013 while protesting outside the trial of Victoire Ingabire. They were injured and charged with “contempt of public officials, illegal demonstration and inciting insurrection of public disorder.”¹⁶³ Victoire Ingabire was sentenced to 15 years prison and was released in 2018 together with 2,140 other prisoners.

The Ideal Social Party (PS Imberakuri) was an opposition party that also had intentions to appoint its candidate to run for the presidency. Unlike the two parties above mentioned, PS Imberakuri managed to register as a party, but it did not fill the candidacy because the president of the party Bernard Ntaganda got imprisoned. He was arrested on 24th of June, which was the first day for the presidential candidates to register for the elections. Ntaganda was accused on a number of charges including “organizing demonstrations without official permission, endangering national security, and inciting ethnic divisions - the latter two in relation to his public statements criticizing government policies.”¹⁶⁴ He was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment and “found guilty of breaching state security, of “divisionism” for holding public speeches criticizing government policies”¹⁶⁵, and of planing demonstrations.

¹⁵⁹Rwanda: *Silencing Dissent Ahead of Elections*, Human Rights Watch, Online, Available at:

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/02/rwanda-silencing-dissent-ahead-elections> (Accessed on 5 May 2019).

¹⁶⁰The FDLR is an armed group active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, consisting in part of individuals who carried out the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³United Nation’s Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mission to Rwanda*, pp.8, Online, Available at:

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/FAssociation/A-HRC-26-29_en.pdf (Accesed on 16 May 2019)

¹⁶⁴Rwanda: *Silencing Dissent Ahead of Elections*, Human Rights Watch, Online, Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/02/rwanda-silencing-dissent-ahead-elections> (Accessed on 5 May 2019).

¹⁶⁵Rwanda: *Opposition Politician Jailed for Exercising Rights*, Amnesty International, Online, Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2011/02/rwanda-opposition-politician-jailed-exercising-rights/> (Accessed 10 May 2019).

Regarding these arrests, the Amnesty International has remarked in its text “Safer to Stay Silent” that “the timing of these accusations against leading opposition politicians in the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections and the manner in which they were brought strongly suggest a political motivation.”¹⁶⁶

Additional concern in regards to the 2010 presidential election was if other candidates for the elections were real opposition for Paul Kagame. Two of the candidates were coming from coalition parties that supported Paul Kagame in 2003 presidential elections. These links with the president Paul Kagame and its party brought accusations whether the other candidates had been “placed into the election race by the government to provide a mere facade of multi-party politics.”¹⁶⁷

2015 Constitutional amendments

In 2015 important amendments on the Rwandan constitution, regarding the electoral process, were passed. These amendments kept a “two-term limit for the presidency and shortened the terms from seven to five years.”¹⁶⁸ The changes also stated that, “the current president—Paul Kagame—was eligible for one additional seven-year term, after which he may run for two of the new five-year terms.”¹⁶⁹ Considering that the rule will not take effect until 2024, this gave the possibility for Paul Kagame to rule until 2034. What preceded the constitutional amendments, was a petition signed by the Rwandan citizens to change the constitution so Paul Kagame could run his third term. The petition further initiated referendum on these changes in the electoral process. On the referendum for constitutional changes, 98 percent of the voters gave their approval.¹⁷⁰

These big changes in the Rwandan electoral process didn’t pass without flaws. Freedom House reported 3 problems regarding it. They include: the possibility that “some signatures on the petition were not given voluntarily”¹⁷¹, that the amendments weren’t discussed enough

¹⁶⁶ *Safer to Stay Silent, The chilling effect of Rwanda’s laws on “genocide ideology” and “sectarianism”*, Amnesty International, pp. 22, Online, Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/afr470052010en.pdf> (Accessed 7 May 2019).

¹⁶⁷ Zareen, Iqbal, “Rwandan Presidential Elections 2010: Rwanda’s new political victims”, *International Institute for Justice and Development*, Online, Available at: <http://ijid.org/news/entry/rwanda-presidential-election-2010-rwandas-new-political-victims> (Accessed 5 May 2019).

¹⁶⁸ Freedom House’s Report on Freedom in the World 2019: Rwanda, Online, Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/rwanda> (Accessed 5 May 2019).

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

before the referendum, and that no international independent group has been monitoring the referendum.¹⁷² Another assumption is that these constitutional changes weren't so spontaneously requested from the Rwandan people. Some call it a "government-orchestrated petition,"¹⁷³ referring to the calls of the political parties close to the Paul Kagame's RPF for a revision of the constitution to allow him to run for the presidency in 2017.¹⁷⁴

2017 Presidential elections

The last presidential elections up to now were held in 2017. According to various reports, the electoral process "was marred by numerous irregularities, including political intimidation, unfair registration practices, and alleged fraud during the balloting itself."¹⁷⁵ The case that brought the most attention, was the arresting of Diane Rwigara, a potential presidential candidate. Diane Rwigara is a Paul Kagame's critic who had planned to run for the presidency in 2017. She got arrested on charges of "inciting insurrection and forging documents"¹⁷⁶. Soon after she announced her candidacy in May 2017, nude photos of her appeared on the internet¹⁷⁷ and in July she was disqualified. Reasons for disqualification, according to the NEC, were because she did not submit enough signatures for her candidacy¹⁷⁸ and because "some of those she did submit belonged to dead people."¹⁷⁹ More precisely, the NEC said that she had submitted 572 valid signatures,¹⁸⁰ while Diane claimed that she had submitted even more than required: "985 signatures, and an additional 120 after many were disqualified."¹⁸¹ Furthermore, she claimed that her "followers were harassed and jailed as

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Clark, Phil, "Rwanda: Kagame Third Term- Popular Support but a Wary Ruling Party", *Huffington Post*, 2016, Online, Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-phil-clark/rwanda-kagame-third-term-b_8703166.html?guccounter=1 (Accessed 10 Jun 2019).

¹⁷⁴ The Economist, Available at : http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1702418954&Country=Rwanda&topic=Politics&subtopic=F_7 (Accessed on 6 May 2019).

¹⁷⁵ Freedom House's Report on Freedom in the World 2019: Rwanda, Online, Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/rwanda> (Accessed 5 May 2019).

¹⁷⁶ "Rwandan government critic acquitted of "baseless" insurrection charges" *The Guardian*, Online, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/06/critic-of-rwandan-president-cleared-of-insurrection-and-forgery> (Accessed 6 May 2019).

¹⁷⁷ "Rwanda is like a pretty girl with a lot of makeup, but the inside is dark and dirty", *The Guardian*, Online, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/aug/04/rwanda-pretty-girl-makeup-inside-dark-and-dirty-diane-rwigara-paul-kagame-election> (Accessed 6 May 2019).

¹⁷⁸ 600 signatures at least is required for a presidential candidacy in Rwanda.

¹⁷⁹ "Rwanda disqualifies only female presidential candidate", *Reuters*, Online, Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rwanda-election-idUSKBN19S2L6> (Accessed 6 May 2019).

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

they attempted to gather the signatures.”¹⁸² In September 2017 she was arrested on the charges mentioned above, and released from the prison in 2018, after the court dropped charges against her.

Next to the arresting of political opponents, Human Rights Watch(HRW) has released some cases of violations that happened in the days leading up to the election and also during the voting. According to the HRW, one voter complained that he was “forced to vote in the presence of a National Electoral Commission official.”¹⁸³ Furthermore, he added: “it was easy to see who I was voting for on the ballot, so it was impossible for me to vote for anyone besides Kagame.”¹⁸⁴ The HRW also stated that “a person monitoring the vote in Nyamagabe District, in the south, said he saw voting officials sign ballots for at least 200 people who did not show up to vote. All the votes went to the RPF.”¹⁸⁵

4.2. The success and failures of the Rwandan economy

Rwandan Civil War and genocide left Rwanda’s economy devastated. Displacement of a huge number of Rwandans led agricultural production, to decline around 15% in 1993.¹⁸⁶ Per capita income also declined from U.S.\$320 in 1989, to U.S.\$200 in 1993.¹⁸⁷ Regardless of the difficulties, Rwanda is today being recognized as one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. Rwanda developed its strategies for economic development, and is setting targets that it wants to reach. Its economic progress is higher than the average, on both, the African continent and the World level. To elaborate these points, the chapter will first give an overview of the most important Rwandan economic strategies,¹⁸⁸ and it will be concluded with the elaboration of the current economic progress, as well as challenges that Rwanda’s economy has yet to address.

¹⁸² Freedom House’s Report on Freedom in the World 2019: Rwanda, Online, Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/rwanda> (Accessed 5 May 2019).

¹⁸³ *Rwanda: Politically Closed Elections*, Human Rights Watch, Online, Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/18/rwanda-politically-closed-elections> (Accessed 5 May 2019).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp.159.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ We will give a broader overview of the strategies that were conducted and finished and strategies that are currently being conducted. As for the strategies that are yet to be conducted, we will give just a brief overview including their main objectives.

4.2.1. Economic strategies

Rwanda's most important strategies for economic development include long-term strategies: "Vision 2020", and "Vision 2050", as well as medium-term strategies: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy(EDPRS)1, EDPRS2, and National Strategy for Transformation(NST). We will elaborate them following the order in which they were developed.

In 2000 Rwanda has brought "Vision 2020" which was later revised in May 2012. According to the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning(MINECOFIN), the Vision 2020 "presents a framework and key priorities for Rwanda's development and a guiding tool for the future, and is ambitious to overcome poverty and foster unity and reconciliation."¹⁸⁹ The aim of this strategy is to transform the country from low income to lower middle income country¹⁹⁰ by 2020. In 2000 Rwanda's per capita income was US\$229, and according to the original Vision 2020, the aim was to reach an income of US\$ 900 per capita until 2020. This has been changed in 2012, because of the rise of income necessary for countries to be identified as the middle-income countries. In addition, the main aim of the strategy to achieve rapid growth and reduce poverty, inter alia, includes: 1)rapid economic growth to middle-income status until 2020, which includes GDP of US\$1240 per capita, average GDP growth of 11.5%; 2)poverty reduced to 20% and extreme poverty eliminated; 3)more urbanization and off-farm jobs; 4)reduced external dependency which includes: exports growth of 28% per annum; and 5)private sector as an engine of growth.¹⁹¹ In addition, the Vision 2020 is based on six pillars. Those are: "1)good governance and a capable state; 2)human resource development and a knowledge-based economy; 3)private sector-led economy; 4)infrastructure development; 5)productive and market-oriented agriculture; 6)regional and international

¹⁸⁹“Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)2”, MINECOFIN Rwanda, 2013, Online, Available at: http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/EDPRS_2.pdf (Accessed 23 July 2019).

¹⁹⁰The World Bank classifies world economies into four categories: low income country, lower- middle income country, upper- middle income country, and high income country. This classification is based on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (current US\$). The thresholds for income classification may change and, as of 1 July 2019, which represents the start of the World Bank's new fiscal year, they have been changed and will remain fixed for the next twelve months. For more information see: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-country-classifications-income-level-2019-2020> (Accessed 23 July 2019).

¹⁹¹ 'Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)2', MINECOFIN Rwanda, 2013, Online, Available at: http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/EDPRS_2.pdf (Accessed 23 July 2019), pp.2.

economic integration.’’¹⁹² Inter-woven among the pillars are gender equality, environmental protection, and the use of science and technology.¹⁹³

As it is stated in the Vision 2020, assuring good governance includes “accountability, transparency and efficiency in deploying scarce resources’’¹⁹⁴, and a state that is “respectful of democratic structures and processes, committed to the rule of law and the protection of human rights.’’¹⁹⁵ On behalf of the human resource development pillar, it implies the necessity for major emphasis to be on technical training in the area of technology and engineering, as well as small-scale entrepreneurs.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, it implies the necessity of reducing fertility rate and improving the health condition of citizens of the country, especially reducing the frequency of endemic diseases such as malaria.¹⁹⁷ The third pillar - private sector-led development, indicates the necessity of boosting locally based business class,¹⁹⁸ while infrastructure development highlights the necessity to attract “domestic and foreign investments.’’¹⁹⁹ Fifth, market oriented agriculture pillar implies the necessity of improving the agricultural sector, while the last pillar - regional and international integration, implies that the accent should be on the promotion of the enterprises, exports, and entrepreneurship,²⁰⁰ as well as “regional co-operation in the Great Lakes / Eastern African Region.’’²⁰¹

The realization of the “Vision 2020’’ is being conducted through the medium-term strategies. The main medium term strategies include Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy(EDPRS)1, Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy(EDPRS)2, and National Strategy for Transformation(NST)1. Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy(EDPRS)1 was being implemented from 2008 to 2012 by the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning(MINECOFIN). The main objective of the EDPRS1 was to “reduce the share of the population living in poverty from 56.9% in 2005/6 to 46% in 2012/13’’²⁰², and to reduce the extreme poverty from 37% in 2005/6 to 24% in 2012/13.²⁰³

¹⁹² 'Rwanda Vision 2020', Republic of Rwanda, Online, Available at: http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/Vision_2020_.pdf (Accessed 23 Jul 2019), pp.9.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. pp.10.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. pp. 11.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. pp.12.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. pp. 13.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. pp. 16.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² MINECOFIN, Rwanda, Report on EDPRS1, Online, Available at:

Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)² was being implemented in the period from 2013 to 2018. This strategy focused on 4 areas: 1) economic transformation, 2) rural development, 3) productivity and youth employment, and 4) accountable governance.²⁰⁴ Overreaching goal of EDPRS² was to speed up the “progress to middle-income status and better quality of life for all Rwandans through sustained average GDP growth of 11.5% and accelerated reduction of poverty to less than 30% of the population.”²⁰⁵

Another strategy Rwanda has developed is the National Strategy for Transformation. This is a seven-year strategy in charge from 2017 to 2024. According to the NST, its three pillars are: 1) economic transformation pillar, which is oriented on economic growth founded on the private sector and natural resources of the country, 2) social transformation pillar, which aims at developing Rwandans into skilled and capable people, and 3) transformational governance pillar, whose main objective is to establish good governance and sustainable development.²⁰⁶ This government’s program is “the implementation instrument for the remainder of Vision 2020 and for the first four years of Vision 2050.”²⁰⁷

Vision 2050 is a new strategy that is yet to be implemented. Its aim is to reach upper-middle-income status by 2035 and high-income status by 2050.²⁰⁸ Priorities for the new strategy will focus on: export diversification, energy distribution, consolidated land use to improve agricultural productivity and boosting the private savings.²⁰⁹ This strategy aims, inter alia, at ensuring high living standards for all Rwandans, food security, green/eco-friendly cities, as well as providing jobs for Rwandans, regional integration,²¹⁰ etc.

<file:///C:/Users/Win7/Downloads/MINECOFIN%20REPORT.pdf> (Accessed on 23 July 2019).

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ “Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)²”, MINECOFIN Rwanda, 2013, Online, Available at: http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/EDPRS_2.pdf (Accessed 23 July 2019), pp. 14.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. pp. 1.

²⁰⁶ “National Strategy for Transformation”, Republic of Rwanda, Online, Available at: http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/NST1_7YGP_Final.pdf (Accessed on 23 July 2019).

²⁰⁷ Ibid. (preface.)

²⁰⁸ “The Rwanda we want: towards Vision 2050” Claver Gatete, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning Rwanda, presentation, Online, Available at: http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/Hon_Gatete_Umushyikirano_Presentation_2016.pdf (Accessed 1 Aug. 2019).

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

4.2.2. Success and challenges of the Rwandan economy

Based on the reports from the Rwandan ministries and economic reviews of independent subjects, like the International Monetary Fund(IMF), World Bank, and the Heritage Foundation, Rwanda is showing many points of economic success. Those include: poverty rates drop and GDP growth, increased life expectancy, improved business environment, service sector growth and low level of corruption.

Rwandan economy is especially praised for successfully reducing the poverty rates and for its GDP growth. According to the MINECOFIN, from 60% in 2000, the poverty has been reduced to 38% in 2016/2017. According to the World Bank's latest updates, Rwanda's per capita income has grown from U.S.\$200 in 1993 to U.S.\$773 in 2018,²¹¹ including its economic growth of 8.6% in 2018.²¹²

Regarding the business environment, in the World Bank's Doing Business 2019 report, Rwanda is ranked 29th in the World, and as number 2 within Africa. Additional highlights of the Report include praise for: 1) being "the only Low-Income Country (LIC) in the Top 30, and the only one in the Top 100. Nearly 75% of the Top 30 are High-Income Countries (HICs) with annual per capita income above \$12,000;"²¹³ 2) remaining "#2 in the world for ease of registering property, and #3 in the world for quality of credit information systems and procedures;"²¹⁴ and 3) improving "its rank on ease of starting a business by replacing the electronic billing machine system with free software from the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) that allows taxpayers to issue VAT invoices from any computer."²¹⁵

One of the main aims of Rwandan economy is to boost the service sector. According to the latest updates in August 2019 from the Trading Economics database on international trade, "services is the largest sector of Rwanda's economy and accounts for 53 percent of total

²¹¹ The World Bank, Official site, Online, Available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=RW> (Assessed 2 July 2019).

²¹² Rwanda Economic Update, World Bank, 2019, Available online: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/593831561388957701/pdf/Rwanda-Economic-Update-Lighting-Rwanda.pdf> (Accessed 6 July 2019).

²¹³ World Bank Doing Business Report, Rwanda 2019, Online, Available at: <http://rdb.rw/rwanda-ranked-29th-globally-in-2019-world-bank-doing-business-report/> (Accessed 7 July 2019)

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

GDP,’’²¹⁶ while agriculture together with forestry and fishing counts for 29 percent of GDP.²¹⁷ Regarding the international trade, “exports of goods and services account for 19 percent of the GDP while imports account for 39 percent, subtracting 20 percent of total GDP.’’²¹⁸ In addition, the main source of foreign trade includes: coffee, tea, and minerals.²¹⁹

Rwanda has been making a great success in the Information Technology sector as well. Moreover, it is being called the “Singapore of Africa”, referring to following Singapore in its progress in information technologies, and in promoting green economy.²²⁰ Since 2006, Rwanda has banned the use of plastic bags and has established the National Cleanup day, Umuganda, which is held on the last Saturday of every month, when Rwandan citizens work together in cleaning the city of Kigali. Nonetheless, Rwanda is being praised for increasing the life expectancy of Rwandans. From only 49 years in 2000, life expectancy has, according to the latest updates, grown to 67 years in 2018.²²¹

Even though Rwanda is gradually achieving its economic development goals, there is still a number of challenges that it has to face on its path to the realisation of the Vision 2020. One of the places for improvement is its dependence on weather conditions. Rwandan economy is marked as stable, but the drought that lasted from September 2015 to December 2016 has caused the economic growth to decelerate. In the period between 2011 and 2015, “agriculture output grew by an annual average 5.2 percent,’’²²² however, due to the drought, “this growth slowed to 3.9 percent.’’²²³ According to the IMF’s Report from 2017, this drought “caused food supplies to drop and prices to skyrocket, leaving some 59,000 Rwandan households affected.’’²²⁴ The government had to react and use the “strategic food stocks to meet the most severe needs.’’²²⁵

²¹⁶ *Rwanda GDP Growth Rate*, Trading Economics, Online, Available at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/gdp-growth> (Accessed 7 July 2019).

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Simon, Shen, “Rwanda: From genocide to “Africa’s Singapore”, *Ejinsight*, Online, Available at: <http://www.ejinsight.com/20190411rwanda-from-genocide-to-africas-singapore/> (Accessed 7 July 2019).

²²¹ National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda, Official site, Available at: <http://www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/life-expectancy-birth> (Accessed 7 July 2019).

²²² International Monetary Fund’s Report on Rwanda, Online, Available at: [file:///C:/Users/Win7/Downloads/cr17217%20\(2\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Win7/Downloads/cr17217%20(2).pdf) (Accessed 7 July 2019).

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

Regarding the business environment, even though Rwanda is making a significant effort to become a good environment for doing business, and is ranked high on doing business lists, it still has to work on the education level of its workforce, according to the World Bank's 2017 Doing Business report. Furthermore, its unstable political situation is also one factor that negatively affects foreign investment, as it is highlighted in the Heritage Foundation index.²²⁶ Even though Rwanda took measures to improve the private sector, it is still not on a satisfying level. Rwanda's economy is still dependent on external financing and that is why the IMF's recommendation for Rwanda is to boost its private sector even more and "to balance tax incentives to bolster domestic production and domestic revenue objectives."²²⁷ Although its poverty rates have reduced from 60% in 2000 to 38% in 2016, extreme poverty is still present in Rwanda, "38.2 percent of the population continues to live below the poverty line"²²⁸ with less than \$1.25 a day. This implies that, while being present, economic progress is not equally distributed.

4.3. The process of reconciliation in Rwanda

The three authors, Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse, in *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*, find 4 instruments of reconciliation: healing, justice, truth-telling and reparation.²²⁹ In our analysis of the process of reconciliation in Rwanda, we are oriented towards the role of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in establishing justice. In the first part of the chapter, the mandate of the ICTR and its organizational elements are introduced. Afterward, the critiques of the ICTR are analysed, including the two crises of the ICTR's mandate. The chapter will be closed with a brief analysis of the Gacaca court in Rwanda and its impact on the prosecution of the perpetrators.

²²⁶2019 Index of Economic Freedom: Rwanda, The Heritage Foundation, Online, Available at: <https://www.heritage.org/index/country/rwanda> (Accessed 22 Jul 2019).

²²⁷International Monetary Fund's Report on Rwanda, pp.23, Online, Available at: [file:///C:/Users/Win7/Downloads/cr17217%20\(2\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Win7/Downloads/cr17217%20(2).pdf) (Accessed 7 July 2019).

²²⁸World Food Programme, Official site, Available at: <https://www.wfp.org/countries/rwanda> (Accessed 7 July 2019).

²²⁹Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T. and Huyse, L., *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*, 2003, 1st ed. Stockholm: International IDEA.

The ICTR's mandate

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established by the United Nations' Security Council Resolution 955, of 8th of November 1994 and it was closed on 31st of December 2015. The ICTR's mandate included "the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute."²³⁰ The ICTR's mandate was not limited only on the genocide, but it also included crimes against humanity. Regarding the territorial jurisdiction, the ICTR's mandate included Rwanda and neighboring states "in respect of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by Rwandan citizens."²³¹ *Inter alia*, this also means that the ICTR was supposed to prosecute crimes committed against both, Tutsis and Hutus.

Mandate of the ICTR was limited only on the year of 1994. Regarding the organization of the ICTR, it consisted of the following organs: 1) the Chambers, comprising two Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber; 2) the Prosecutor, and 3) registry, servicing both the Chambers and the Prosecutor.²³² The chambers were composed of 11 independent judges, while the Prosecutor was supposed to act independently of any Government. One point of dispute was that the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was also serving as the Prosecutor of the ICTR. The Chambers and Registry of the ICTR were located in Arusha, Tanzania, while the office of the Prosecutor was in Kigali, Rwanda and in The Hague, the Netherlands.

According to the United Nations, the ICTR had indicted 93 individuals, of whom "62 sentenced, 14 acquitted, 10 referred to national jurisdictions for trial, 3 fugitives referred to the MICT, 2 deceased prior judgement, 2 indictments withdrawn before trial."²³³ Those indicted included high-ranking military and government officials, politicians as well as media

²³⁰ "Resolution 955(1994)", Security Council of the United Nations, November 1994, pp.3, Online, Available at: https://www.irmct.org/specials/ictr-remembers/docs/res955-1994_en.pdf?q=ictr-remembers/docs/res955-1994_en.pdf (Accessed on 5 May 2019).

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² John, Jones, *The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunals*, Transnational Publishers, Inc. Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, 1997, pp.78.

²³³ United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Online, Available at: <https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal> (Accessed on 5 May 2019).

leaders.²³⁴ What is interesting about the ICTR is that it was the first international tribunal to find members of the media guilty for inciting hatred and people to commit genocide,²³⁵ it was “the first-ever international tribunal to deliver verdicts in relation to genocide, and the first to interpret the definition of genocide set forth in the 1948 Geneva Conventions. It is also the first international tribunal to define rape in international criminal law and to recognize rape as a means of perpetrating genocide.”²³⁶

The ICTR was officially closed in 2015. The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT), set up by the Security Council on December 2010, started to function. Its main task is to track individuals who remained fugitives.

The critiques of the ICTR

Critiques of the ICTR’s work can be split into two groups. The first group is in regards of its slowness and institutional incapacity. The second group refers to Tribunal-state relations. The critiques were coming from both the Rwandan government and the International Community.

Critiques regarding the ICTR’s slowness and institutional incapacity are related to its connection with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As stated in the Security Council 955 Resolution “the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shall also serve as the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. He or she shall have additional staff, including an additional Deputy Prosecutor, to assist with prosecutions before the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”²³⁷

The Rwandan government was worried that this would lead to less efficiency of the ICTR. It was concerned that the Prosecutor was spending more time in the Hague, where the ICTY was located, than in Rwanda, and that the trials of Rwanda were pending because of that. In regard to this accusation, it is important the so-called “Barayagwiza crisis” during the 1990-2000.

Jean Bosco Barayagwiza was “a top Hutu genocide suspect who had played a central role in

²³⁴Ibid.

²³⁵Ibid.

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷ “Resolution 955 (1994)”, Security Council of the United Nations, November 1994, pp.9, Online, Available at: https://www.irmct.org/specials/ict-r-remembers/docs/res955-1994_en.pdf?q=ict-r-remembers/docs/res955-1994_en.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2019).

the media campaign exhorting the Hutu population to massacre Tutsi.’²³⁸ He was a Rwandan diplomat and a chairman of the hate radio RTLM. As a consequence of the violation of his rights, “including the prosecution’s failure to charge him within the legally specified time period and his delayed arraignment,’’²³⁹ the Appeals Chamber ordered Barayagwiza to be released. The Rwandan government threatened to suspend the cooperation with the ICTR if Barayagwiza was not trialed. Being aware that that would possibly mean end of the ICTR,²⁴⁰ the new Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte has presented new facts, based on which the Appeals chamber reversed its decision and ordered Barayagwiza to stand trial.²⁴¹ He received a life sentence, which was reduced to 35 years, due to the violation of his rights.

Another complaint from the Rwandan government, referred to the ICTR not having enough courtrooms to trial all the cases. What the UN Security Council did was to allow “for the possibility that additional trial chambers could be added as needed by both tribunals.’’²⁴² A third chamber was approved in late 1990s, for both the ICTR and ICTY, and then in 2005 fourth trial chamber was set up. Furthermore, as Alison Des Forges appoints in her report *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, administrative problems also included “assuring the attendance of witnesses and counsel for the defense, in part because of extended vacations taken by the judges.’’²⁴³

The state-tribunal conflict related to the ICTR’s dependence on the Rwandan government, and to the prosecutions of the RPF atrocities. The previously mentioned case of Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, showed us not only the problem of the ICTR’s slowness, but the ICTR’s dependence on Rwandan government’s cooperation as well. The ICTR had to answer to the Government’s demand because otherwise the Government would suspend the cooperation and not allow Tutsis to attend the trials. Another example is the case of Froduald Karamira, a genocide suspect, who escaped to India. After Rwandan officials found him and secured its return to Rwanda, Kigali, he managed to escape to Ethiopia. The ICTR Prosecutor Richard Goldstone requested Ethiopian officials to send Karamira to Arusha, Tanzania. The Rwandan government, as soon as it heard about this, “threatened to suspend all cooperation with the

²³⁸ Victor, Peskin, *International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and Fight for State Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2008, pp. 177.

²³⁹ Ibid. pp.178.

²⁴⁰ Ibid. pp. 179.

²⁴¹ Victor, Peskin, *International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and Fight for State Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2008, pp. 177.

²⁴² Ibid. pp. 164.

²⁴³ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999, pp. 1128.

tribunal if Goldstone went ahead with his efforts to obtain custody of Karamira and bring him to trial in Arusha.’’²⁴⁴ Faced with this ultimatum, the Prosecutor Richard Goldstone let Rwandan government have Karamira and trial him.

The most criticized aspect of the ICTR’s practice concerns the absence of the prosecution for the RPF atrocities. According to the Security Council 955 Resolution, the ICTR was not limited to prosecuting only the crimes that were committed against the Tutsis. The ICTR had “the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighboring States.’’²⁴⁵ The ICTR’s mandate also included the crimes committed by the RPF against Hutus.

The first ICTR Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, did not investigate RPF atrocities. In a 2003 interview to V. Peckin, he told that “the magnitude of genocidal crimes wrought by the Hutu extremists so outweighed the RPF’s massacres that the prosecutorial choice was clear.’’²⁴⁶ In addition, he added that the ICTR “didn’t have enough resources to investigate all the nines and the tens.’’²⁴⁷ Goldstone’s successor was Louise Arbour. She was aware of the atrocities done by the RPF, but was silent because of the fear that if the RPF atrocities would be investigated, the government would do what it takes to close the Tribunal.²⁴⁸ Anyway, before leaving the prosecutor’s position, she had started some investigations and opened the door for the next prosecutor,²⁴⁹ Carla Del Ponte. When the ICTR started to investigate RPF crimes, and the Prosecutor Carla del Ponte announced the investigation against the RPF officers, the government initially promised to cooperate. Soon afterward, the confrontation was so high that not only tribunal’s autonomy was in question but its whole work.²⁵⁰

In April 2002, Del Ponte for the first time publicly criticized Rwandan government’s non-cooperation, and that is when the open confrontation has started between the Rwandan government and the ICTR. In her intention to make the Rwandan government cooperate, the

²⁴⁴ Victor, Peskin, *International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and Fight for State Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, United Kindgdom, 2008, pp. 174.

²⁴⁵ “Resolution 955 (1994)”, Security Council of the United Nations, November 1994, pp.3, Online, Available at: https://www.irmct.org/specials/ictr-remembers/docs/res955-1994_en.pdf?q=ictr-remembers/docs/res955-1994_en.pdf (Accessed 5 May 2019).

²⁴⁶ Victor, Peskin, *International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and Fight for State Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, United Kindgdom, 2008, pp. 189.

²⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 189.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. pp. 190.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Alison, Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.

Prosecutor did not have support from the West. Western countries did not push Paul Kagame to cooperate with the court. This confrontation led to the “witness crisis” in 2002. Tutsi witnesses were prevented from traveling to Arusha, Tanzania, to testify in front of the Court. “The Rwandan authorities at the airport in Kigali blocked a group of Tutsi genocide survivors scheduled to testify on behalf of the prosecution from boarding the UN plane that regularly ferries witnesses to and from the courtrooms in Arusha.”²⁵¹ The Rwandan government did not tell the restriction of traveling to Arusha was made because of the investigations on the RPF atrocities, but because the Government wanted better conditions and more security for the witnesses.²⁵² As a consequence of the crisis, the Tribunal had to postpone two trials, for it could not function without the witnesses. In July 2002, Prosecutor Del Ponte issued a complaint against the Rwandan government at the UN Security Council for its non-cooperation. The Council acted by only reminding Rwanda about its obligation to cooperate with the ICTR. Later in 2002, Rwandan government allowed the witnesses to travel again, after the judges from Arusha had issued an order for the Rwandan government to do so.²⁵³ Even though the government stated that the restriction of the witnesses to travel to Arusha was because it wanted better conditions and more security for the witnesses, it is commonly believed that “the government blocked witnesses from traveling to Arusha to warn the tribunal of what could happen if and when Del Ponte fulfilled her promise to indict RPF officers.”²⁵⁴ Del Ponte temporarily suspended investigations on the RPF atrocities, and in 2003 she was dismissed from her responsibilities.²⁵⁵

Gacaca court

Gacaca was a “traditional Rwandan community-based conflict resolution mechanism.”²⁵⁶ It was mainly dealing with the cases that include: marriage, land use, property, livestock, and other conflicts in the society.²⁵⁷

²⁵¹ Victor, Peskin, *International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and Fight for State Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2008, pp. 212.

²⁵² Ibid. pp. 213.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid. pp. 221.

²⁵⁶ Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T. and Huyse, L. (2003), *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*, 1st ed. Stockholm: International IDEA, pp.116.

Having in mind the slowness of the ICTR and the number of cases awaiting trial, the Rwandan government transformed Gacaca to trial people for the genocide.²⁵⁸ The government designed Gacaca “to work in combination with the national criminal courts by enabling Gacaca to handle crimes committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994.”²⁵⁹ The Gacaca’s objectives were to: “1) reveal the truth about what has happened; 2) speed up the genocide trials; 3) eradicate the culture of impunity; 4) reconcile the Rwandans and reinforce their unity; and 5) prove that Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its own problems through a system of justice based on the Rwandan custom.”²⁶⁰ The trials were held in public, gathering the entire community, “giving survivors the chance to confront alleged perpetrators in full view of their families and neighbors.”²⁶¹ Each prisoner would be brought to the courts in a community where he supposedly committed the crime.²⁶² People would listen, discuss, provide testimony, as well as arguments and contra arguments.²⁶³ Judges were elected from the “persons of integrity”²⁶⁴ and they were not supposed to be related to the accused.²⁶⁵ The two main aims of the Gacaca, were “to speed up the trials and empty the prisons; and to involve the community in establishing the truth and, through that, promoting reconciliation,”²⁶⁶ Even so, human rights groups were worried about the fairness of the Gacaca, including concerns about the suspects representing themselves,²⁶⁷ or because of the “less protection for defendants than in conventional courts.”²⁶⁸ During the period of ten years, from 2002 to 2012, according to the Government of Rwanda, Gacaca trialed 1,958,634 genocide-related cases, of whom it convicted around 160 000.²⁶⁹

²⁵⁷ Nevena, Mancic, *The Role Of Gacaca Court System in Restoring Relations between Hutu and Tutsi in the Post-war Rwanda*, Master Thesis, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Online, Available at: <http://docplayer.net/92807386-University-of-belgrade-faculty-of-political-sciences-regional-master-s-program-of-peace-studies.html> pp. 19, (Accessed 10 May 2019).

²⁵⁸ Maya, Sosnov, “The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to Reconciliation in Rwanda”, *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, 2008, vol. 36, no. 2, pp.131.

²⁵⁹ Ibid. pp.135.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. pp.136.

²⁶¹ “Grassroots justice”, *The Guardian*, Online, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/17/worlddispatch.rwanda> (Accessed on 20 July 2019).

²⁶² Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T. and Huyse, L. (2003), *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*, 1st ed. Stockholm: International IDEA, pp.116.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid. pp. 117.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid. pp. 118.

²⁶⁷ “Grassroots justice”, *The Guardian*, Online, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/17/worlddispatch.rwanda> (Accessed on 20 July 2019).

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Government of Rwanda, Official site, Available at: <http://gov.rw/about-the-government/governance-home-grown-solutions/> (Accessed 20 July 2019).

5. International actors' response to the political, economic and social situation in the post-genocide Rwanda

5.1. International actors' response to the critiques of Rwandan politics and Paul Kagame's rule

International actors in the scope of our research are the USA, France, Belgium and the UN. In this chapter, we will be discussing how the USA and the UN responded to the critiques on Paul Kagame's rule, since the responses of the other two states haven't been detected.

The answer of the USA upon the existing critiques included: acknowledging some of the deficiencies of Rwandan politics including the use of laws in political purposes, through various reports on Rwanda, as well as public condemnations and official statements. In its 2009 Report on Human Rights Practises, the US Department of State (Bureau of Democracy, Human rights and Labour) has highlighted the flaws of the 2003 Presidential elections. It stressed that the law against genocide ideology was misused,²⁷⁰ and that, as it further stated, "discouraged debate or criticism of the government and resulted in brief detentions and the holding of one political prisoner, former minister Ntakirutinka."²⁷¹ In the same report, the US has condemned the situation regarding the 2010 presidential elections. It highlighted the obstacles for the opposition political parties to register. More specifically, it acknowledged that the government, in the case of parties PS- Imberakuri and Green Democratic Party did not respect freedom of assembly even though this right is provided by the constitution and law.

Regarding the 2015 referendum about the constitutional changes in the Rwandan political process, the US expressed concern over it. As the US ambassador to Rwanda stated, the referendum was organized quickly and without a serious debate about the proposed amendments.²⁷²

²⁷⁰US Department of State, 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135971.htm> (Accessed 16 July 2019).

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² "Rwandan president Paul Kagame could rule until 2034 after voters lift limits", *The Guardian*, 2015, Online, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/19/rwandan-president-paul-kagame-could-rule-until-2034-after-voters-lift-limits> (Accessed 16 July 2019).

The US expressed its disappointment when Paul Kagame announced his intention to run for the third time, in presidential elections in 2017. As it was stated on January 2nd, 2016 on the site of the US embassy in Rwanda: “The United States believes constitutional transitions of power are essential for strong democracies and that efforts by incumbents to change rules to stay in power weaken democratic institutions.”²⁷³ In addition, the USA called the Rwandan government to „ensure and respect the rights of its citizens to exercise their freedom of expression, conscience, and peaceful assembly — the hallmarks of true democracies.”²⁷⁴

A significant step, oriented towards assessing the deficiencies of Rwandan politics, taken by the UN, happened in January 2014. The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association of United Nation’s Human Rights Council, has conducted a visit to Rwanda in January 2014. The aim of the visit was “to assess the situation of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in the country.”²⁷⁵ The Special Rapporteur found that “peaceful protests voicing dissent and criticizing government policies are reportedly not allowed.”²⁷⁶ Here he was referring to 2013 arresting of members of the opposition political party, FDU- Inkingi, while they were protesting outside the trial of Victoire Ingabire, the chair of the party.

5.2. The role of the International actors in rebuilding Rwanda’s economy

This chapter is dedicated to analyzing the International actors’ contribution to the Rwandan economy after 1994. We will be analyzing the contribution of the USA, France, Belgium and the UN in the spheres of bilateral economic relations and economic assistance, including different programs aimed at boosting Rwandan agriculture, entrepreneurship, and investment.

5.2.1. The USA contribution to the Rwandan economy

²⁷³Press Statement of John Kirby, the US Bureau of Public Affairs, 2 January 2016, Online, Available at: <https://rw.usembassy.gov/reaction-rwandan-presidents-decision-run-third-term/> (Accessed 17 July 2019).

²⁷⁴Ibid.

²⁷⁵United Nation’s Human Rights Council, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Mission to Rwanda*, pp. 1, Online, Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/FAssociation/A-HRC-26-29_en.pdf (Accessed on 16 May 2019).

²⁷⁶Ibid. pp. 8.

The USA and Rwanda established diplomatic relations in 1962 following Rwanda's independence from a Belgium-administered trusteeship. Economic relations between Rwanda and the USA include both bilateral economic relations and economic assistance to Rwanda. Regarding the bilateral economic relations, in 2006 the USA and Rwanda signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)²⁷⁷ and in 2008 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which was ratified later in 2011. We will be also analyzing the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), signed under the regional cooperation.

The USA and Rwanda signed TIFA in order to improve investment and trade in products and services.²⁷⁸ According to TIFA, the two countries obliged to take measures to secure "long-term development and diversification of trade."²⁷⁹ The agreement also predicted the establishment of the US-Rwanda Council on Trade and Investment, composed of representatives from both parties. The Council's objectives include: controlling the trade and investment relation; holding consultations on trade and investment issues; identification of the impediments and opportunities to trade.²⁸⁰ Last Council meeting was held in December 2011,²⁸¹ even though the TIFA predicted that "the Parties shall endeavor to meet no less than once every two years."²⁸²

The BIT was signed in 2006 and ratified in 2011. This agreement is concentrated on investment relations between the USA and Rwanda. It regulates them by providing investors with legal protection policies, which include "non-discriminatory treatment of investors and investments; the right to freely transfer investment-related funds; prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event of an expropriation; freedom from specified performance

²⁷⁷Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), provides 'strategic frameworks and principles for dialogue on trade and investment issues between the United States and the other parties to the TIFA', Retrieved from: <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements> (Accessed 14 May 2019).

²⁷⁸"Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States and the government of Rwanda", USA, 2016, Available online: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US-Rwanda%20TIFA.pdf> (Accessed 14 May 2019).

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹Office of the United States Trade Representative, Official site, Available at: <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/east-africa/rwanda> (Accessed 20 Jun 2019).

²⁸² "Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States and the government of Rwanda", USA, 2016, pp.2, Available online: <https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US-Rwanda%20TIFA.pdf> (Accessed 14 May 2019).

requirements, such as domestic content or technology transfer requirements; and provisions to ensure transparency in governance.’’²⁸³

Economic relations between the USA and Rwanda also include cooperation through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). AGOA is the United States Trade Act, enacted in 2000 by president Bill Clinton as a public law. The Act increases market access for the qualified²⁸⁴ Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, including Rwanda,²⁸⁵ by providing them duty-free U.S. market access. The latest happenings in the USA-Rwanda trade relations include suspension of Rwanda from the AGOA, for the apparel sector. In July 2018, the USA President Donald Trump issued a “Proclamation to take certain actions under the African growth and opportunity act and for other purposes”. This proclamation suspended “the application of duty-free treatment for all AGOA-eligible goods in the apparel sector from Rwanda,’’²⁸⁶ for 60 days. The reason for this suspension was, according to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, because Rwanda did not fulfill the AGOA eligibility requirements, which, inter alia, include the elimination of barriers to the USA trade and investments.²⁸⁷

In 2016, the East African Community (EAC)²⁸⁸, whose member is Rwanda, agreed to ban imports on used clothes by 2019, since those items were holding back development and endangering their local textile industries, according to the EAC.²⁸⁹ Unlike the other two AGOA EAC beneficiaries,²⁹⁰ who revised their policies, Rwanda refused to lower trade

²⁸³ *United States, Rwanda Ratify Bilateral Investment Treaty*, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Online, Available at: <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2011/december/usa-rwanda-ratify-bilateral-investment> (Accessed 14 Aug. 2019).

²⁸⁴ In order for countries to qualify for the AGOA, some conditions must be met. They include: respect for core labour standards, rule of law, human rights. For more on this see: <https://agoa.info/about-agoa/country-eligibility.html> (Accessed 14 May 2019).

²⁸⁵ <https://agoa.info/about-agoa.html> (Accessed 14 May 2019).

²⁸⁶ 'Proclamation to take certain actions under the African growth and opportunity act and for other purposes', USA, 2018, pp.1, Available online: <https://agoa.info/images/documents/15496/pred-proclamation-rwanda-agoa-eligibility-apparel.pdf> (Accessed 14 May 2019).

²⁸⁷ *President Donald J. Trump Upholds Agoa Trade Preference Eligibility Criteria with Rwanda*, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Official site, Available at: <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/july/president-donald-j-trump-upholds-agoa> (Accessed 15 May 2019).

²⁸⁸ Rwanda became a member of the EAC in 2007.

²⁸⁹ Franck, Kuwunu, “Protectionist ban on imported used clothing, US threatens East Africa with AGOA expulsion”, *Africa Renewal Magazine*, Online: <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2017-march-2018/protectionist-ban-imported-used-clothing> (Accessed 15 May 2019).

²⁹⁰ These two African nations are Tanzania and Uganda. AGOA benefits weren't suspended for them because as it was stated, they eliminated prohibitive tariff rates on imports of used clothing and shoes. For more information see: <https://www.enlightenmentafrica.com/defiant-rwanda-faces-u-s-trade-sanctions-over-ban-on-used-clothes-imports/> (Accessed 15 May 2019).

barriers for American import of used shoes and clothing.²⁹¹ As Rwandan officials explained, secondhand clothes were undermining their own local textile industries.

Regarding the economic assistance to Rwanda, the USA is mostly oriented on agriculture and improving food security, as well as on small entrepreneurs. The US assistance is being provided through initiatives like Feed the Future, US African Development Foundation, Power Africa, Trade Africa, Dairy competitiveness program and Food for Peace program.

Feed the Future (FTF) is the USA global food security strategy. It is developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and its points of interest include solving global hunger and food insecurity. FTF was launched in Rwanda in 2013, and since then, USAID has been promoting agricultural growth in the country through it. The latest activities launched in Rwanda under the Feed the Future program include: Feed the Future Nguriza Nshore and Feed the Future Rwanda Hinga Weze. Feed the Future Hinga Weze activity was launched in April 2018. This is a five-year, U.S.\$32.6 million project that aims to increase smallholder farmers' income and to make Rwanda's agricultural and food systems more resilient to a changing climate.²⁹² The plan is to reach 200,000 farmers and help them “grow at least 50 percent more crops on the same amount of land by promoting sustainable use of fertilizers, improved seeds, watering practices and more.”²⁹³ Hinga Weze also provides pest management and spraying equipment to help farmers to combat Fall Armyworm. It is also predicted that by the end of the program “over 600 new hectares of farmland will be fitted with new irrigation infrastructure.”²⁹⁴

Feed the Future Nguriza Nshore initiative was launched in September 2018. This is a five years program whose aim is to increase access to financing to small and medium enterprises in agribusiness sector. The idea is to support Rwandan banks with 39.5 billion Rwandan

²⁹¹ Office of the United States Trade Representative, Official site, Available at: <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/july/president-donald-j-trump-upholds-agoa> (Accessed 15 May 2019)

²⁹² *Feed the Future Rwanda Hinga Weze*, Aspen Network of Development Entrepreneurs, 2018, Online, Available at: <https://ecosystems.andeglobal.org/dir/cultivating-new-frontiers-in-agriculture-cnfa/feed-the-future-rwanda-hinga-weze/> (Accessed 3 July 2019).

²⁹³ US embassy in Rwanda, Official site, Available at: <https://rw.usembassy.gov/usaid-hinga-weze/> (Accessed 3 July 2019).

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

francs, to adapt their strategies for giving credit loans to small and medium entrepreneurs.²⁹⁵ This project will also introduce investors with the investment opportunities in Rwanda, on one side, and will work with Rwanda's ministries in order to "support the development and refinement of policies, regulations, and strategies that foster broad-based firm growth in the agribusiness sector"²⁹⁶, on the other side. The plan is to facilitate conditions for growing business within the period of five years, starting from its establishment.²⁹⁷

The US African Development Foundation(USADF),²⁹⁸ was established in Rwanda in 1986 and resumed after a pause in 2005. It has implemented 24 projects in Rwanda. The program focuses on smallholder farmer organizations in the country.²⁹⁹ For example, "from 2005-2007, U.S Government support helped establish the Rwanda Smallholder Specialty Coffee Company and enabled it to improve drying and roasting techniques."³⁰⁰

Deriving from regulative bilateral agreements and the benefits that tax-free goods bring, Rwanda and the USA have improved their trade relations. According to the latest reports from the US Trade Representative office, Rwanda is in trade surplus with the USA. Rwanda's goods export to the USA in 2018 totaled \$67 million, while its import from the USA totaled \$25 million.³⁰¹ Also according to the US Trade Representative office, goods that the USA exported to Rwanda in 2018 include: aircraft, machinery, vehicles, and optical and medical instruments, while top goods that Rwanda exported to the USA include: coffee, tea and spices, leather products, vegetables, etc.³⁰²

²⁹⁵ Ambassador Vrooman Remarks at the Launch of USAID's Feed the Future "Nguriza Nshore" Activity, September 2018, U.S. Embassy in Rwanda, Available at: <https://rw.usembassy.gov/ambassador-usaid-feed-the-future/> (Accessed 3 July 2019).

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ USADF is an independent US government agency whose objective is to support African -owned enterprises. USADF is investing directly in community enterprises by providing seed capital and technical support to agriculture, youth- led enterprises and off-grid energy. Retrieved from: <https://www.usadf.gov/> (Accessed 15 July 2019).

²⁹⁹ Rwanda USADF Country Portfolio, Available online: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/564bee8de4b05dd815f0baa0/t/5a302f419140b7cecd7d1/1513107266394/Rwanda+Briefing+Sheet+10-1-2017.pdf> (Accessed 3 July 2019).

³⁰⁰ *Coffee Farming Offers Hope to Rwandan Farmers with a Troubled History*, Feed the Future, Official site, Available on: <https://www.feedthefuture.gov/article/coffee-farming-offers-hope-to-rwandan-farmers-with-a-troubled-history/> (Accessed 3 July 2019).

³⁰¹ Office of the United States Trade Representative, Official site, Available at: <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/east-africa/rwanda> (Accessed 3 July 2019).

³⁰² Ibid.

5.2.2. Belgian contribution to the Rwandan economy

Since its independence in 1962, Rwanda has been one of the 14 partner countries of Belgium. The Belgian partner countries are selected on “the basis of their degree of poverty, aspects of good governance and Belgium’s potential for providing meaningful support.”³⁰³ The Belgian Development Cooperation in Rwanda is implemented through the Belgium Development Agency (Enabel). According to the Belgium embassy in Rwanda, Rwanda is the second biggest receiver of the Belgian Cooperation Programme budget.³⁰⁴ Belgian Development Cooperation politics has been mainly in accordance with Rwanda’s economic strategies. In the period from 2004 to 2019, four cooperation program agreements have been signed.

In 2004, Indicative Cooperation Programme was signed, for a period from 2004 to 2006. It was oriented on three sectors: rural development, health and good governance, and covered by the amount of 75 million €. ³⁰⁵ Next Cooperation Programme was signed for period from 2007 to 2010, and it was focused on “health, justice, education, agriculture and rural development.”³⁰⁶ In 2011, the third Indicative Cooperation Programme was signed, covering the period from 2011 to 2014 for the amount of 160 million euros. Based on Rwandan Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy(EDPRS)2, the Cooperation Programme was oriented on three sectors: health, energy, and decentralization.³⁰⁷ The last one was signed in April 2019, and it covers the period from 2019 to 2024. It is worth EUR120 million, and it focuses on health, agriculture and sustainable urbanization.³⁰⁸ Regarding the health, focus will be on sexual and reproductive health, while within the agriculture sector, attention will be on the commercialization of agriculture.³⁰⁹

³⁰³ Kingdom of Belgium Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Official site, Available at: https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/development_cooperation/where_we_work/partner_countries (Accessed 6 July 2019).

³⁰⁴ Embassy of Belgium in Rwanda, Official site, Available at: <https://rwanda.diplomatie.belgium.be/en/development-cooperation/cooperation-programme> (Accessed 6 July 2019).

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Embassy of Belgium in Rwanda, Official site, Available at: <https://rwanda.diplomatie.belgium.be/en/development-cooperation/cooperation-programme> (Accessed 1 Aug. 2019).

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of Rwanda, Official site, Available at: http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/index.php?id=12&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=714&cHash=a16d5a1a86bfc5fed79ec711654b8e7d (Accessed 6 July 2019).

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

In September 2018, Belgian officials signed general cooperation agreements with Rwanda and Senegal. Among other things, Belgium committed to “waive the tax exemptions on imports and local purchases of goods and services, which donor countries usually enjoy.”³¹⁰ According to the Belgian Foreign Trade Agency, in the first months of 2019, Rwanda was ranked as 113th country for Belgium goods exports, while regarding the Belgian imports from other countries, Rwanda is ranked as 143th.³¹¹

Major sectors of Belgium exports to Rwanda include: chemicals, machinery and equipment, and textiles, while the main goods that Belgium is importing from Rwanda include vegetable products, foodstuffs, machinery, and equipment.³¹²

According to the latest reports from 2018, Rwanda was in trade deficit with Belgium. In 2018 Belgium exports to Rwanda amounted to EUR 51.5 million, while Belgium import from Rwanda amounted to EUR 3.9 million. The trade balance was EUR 47.6 million in 2018.³¹³

5.2.3. French contribution to the Rwandan economy

Due to unstable diplomatic relations between France and Rwanda,³¹⁴ economic relations weren't steady neither. After diplomatic relations being restored in 2009, France's export to Rwanda has increased.

French contribution to the Rwandan economy is mostly reflected in its support for the private sector, by enhancing entrepreneurial activities in Rwanda. Through the cooperation between French Development Agency (ADF) and Bank of Kigali, France is supporting entrepreneurial activities in Rwanda. ADF is giving credit lines to the Bank of Kigali, in order to widen the Bank's possibilities to finance small and medium entrepreneurs. Rwanda is also benefiting

³¹⁰ *No more tax exemptions for Belgium in partner countries Guinea and Rwanda*, Kingdom of Belgium Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Official site, Available at: https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/development_cooperation/where_we_work/partner_countries (Accessed 6 July 2019).

³¹¹ *Belgium and Rwanda Trade*, Belgian Foreign Trade Agency, Online, Available at: https://www.abh-ace.be/sites/default/files/BILATERAL_TRADE_SHEETS/rwanda.pdf (Accessed 6 July 2019)

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ *Belgium and Rwanda Trade*, Belgian Foreign Trade Agency, Online: https://www.abh-ace.be/sites/default/files/BILATERAL_TRADE_SHEETS/rwanda.pdf (Accessed 6 July 2019).

³¹⁴ In 2006 diplomatic relations were severed from the Rwandan side, after Judge Bruguière issued “nine arrest warrants against Rwandan officials in the case of the attack on the aircraft of President Juvénal Habyarimana in April 1994.” In 2009 diplomatic relations were restored. Retrieved from: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/rwanda/> (Accessed 1 July 2019).

from the “Choose Africa” French initiative. Here the cooperation is being developed through the cooperation with the Banque Populaire du Rwanda.

In 2011, the French Development Agency(ADF) granted a credit line of €16 million to the Bank of Kigali and a guarantee fund of €6 million to support small and medium enterprises.³¹⁵

In 2017, as a part of the French initiative “Choose Africa”, privately-owned commercial bank, Banque Populaire du Rwanda(BPR) benefited from €30 million. The ADF invested €30 million in the Bank. The aim of this funding is to “strengthen the private sector by financing Rwandan SMEs mainly operating in the trade and building sectors.”³¹⁶ This plan will be accomplished through the cooperation with the BPR, whose plan is to finance companies in Rwanda.³¹⁷

In June 2019, AFD signed a financing agreement of \$20 million with the Bank of Kigali, to “finance small and medium enterprises in agro business, ICT and renewable energy.”³¹⁸ This credit line was complemented by technical assistance agreement of Rwf306 million, which will help to increase the Bank of Kigali’s capacities to review “risks of projects as well as conduct appraisals for projects.”³¹⁹ The aim of this credit line is to advance the possibilities of Bank of Kigali to answer on small and medium enterprises’ loan requests. According to Diane Karusisi, Bank of Kigali CEO, predictions are that “around 50 SMES will benefit from the credit.”³²⁰ There is also a number of conditions that one enterprise must meet in order to get the credit. Those conditions include a good business plan and a number of employees.

According to France’s Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, France’s exports to Rwanda have increased since 2010. In 2010, France was ranked 18th country that exports to Rwanda, while in 2017 France was 11th.³²¹ On the other side, Rwanda is in trade deficit with France because in 2017, Rwanda’s import from France was EUR 48 million, while export was EUR

³¹⁵ France Diplomatie, Official site, Available at: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/rwanda> (Accessed 1 July 2019).

³¹⁶ Choose Africa, Official site, Available at: <https://choose-africa.com/en/projects/banque-populaire-du-rwanda-a-loan-to-support-the-countrys-private-sector/> (Accessed 1 July 2019).

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Daniel, Sabiiti, “BK Group, French Dev’t Agency Ink \$20M Deal To Fund SMEs In Rwanda”, *KT Press Rwanda*, Online, Jun 2019, Available at: <https://ktpress.rw/2019/06/bk-group-french-devt-agency-ink-20m-deal-to-fund-smes-in-rwanda/> (Accessed 8 Aug.2019).

³¹⁹ Collins, Mwai, “SMEs to benefit from Bank of Kigali’s Rwf18bn credit line”, *The New Times*, 21st June 2019, Available at: [://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/smes-benefit-bk-credit-line](http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/smes-benefit-bk-credit-line) (Accessed 18 July 2019).

³²⁰ Daniel, Sabiiti, “BK Group, French Dev’t Agency Ink \$20M Deal To Fund SMEs In Rwanda”, *KT Press Rwanda*, Online, 21st Jun 2019, Available at: <https://ktpress.rw/2019/06/bk-group-french-devt-agency-ink-20m-deal-to-fund-smes-in-rwanda/> (Accessed 8 Aug.2019).

³²¹ France Diplomatie, Official site, Available at: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/rwanda> (Accessed 1 July 2019).

3 million. Most of France's imports from Rwanda comprise of agricultural products, while Rwanda's export to France comprises mostly of vegetables, machinery and boilers, electrical equipment, articles of iron and steel, as well as coffee, tea, and spices.³²²

5.2.4. Contribution of the United Nations to the Rwandan economy

The UN has a wide range of programs initiated to support the economic development of Rwanda. Its engagement is conducted within the scope of "Delivering as One" UN initiative,³²³ and United Nations Development Assistance Programs: UNDAP1 and UNDAP2. The first part of the chapter will introduce the 2 above-mentioned plans and emphasize their contribution in achieving the Vision 2020. The second part of the chapter will contain a brief overview of one part of the UN agencies in Rwanda that support its economic development.

The United Nations Development Assistance Plan(UNDAP)1 and United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP)2 are the United Nations' programs for its agencies in Rwanda, designed to help Rwanda in achieving the Vision 2020 and Vision 2050. The United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP)1 is a five years plan for the United Nations agencies in Rwanda. It was signed between the government of Rwanda and the UN, covering the period from 2013 to 2018. It was designed to help Rwanda achieve its Vision 2020, by aligning with its economic strategy. The focus of the UNDAP1 was on: 1)inclusive economic transformation; 2)accountable governance; and 3)human development.³²⁴ These three areas directly corresponded to the priorities in EDPRSII.³²⁵

According to the UN report on UNDAP1, the main results in the area of inclusive economic transformation, include: 1)implementation of an online platform (e-Regulations platform), that provides basic information and training content for small and medium enterprises; 2) training of twelve farmer cooperatives on gender concepts in agriculture and on postharvest

³²²Rwanda Exports to France, Trading Economics, Available at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/rwanda/exports/france> (Accessed 1 July 2019).

³²³"Delivering as One" is a UN reform initiative, launched in 2006, when six countries including Rwanda, decided to be a pilot countries for the Initiative. The purpose of the initiative is the UN agencies to act as one, 'with one leader, one programme, one budget and, where appropriate, one office.' The initiative should support coherence on the UN development system in one country.

Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/> (Accessed 4 July 2019).

³²⁴ *United Nations Development Assistance Plan- Key Achievements*, United Nations In Rwanda, 2018, Online, Available at: <https://rwanda.un.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/UNDAP%20I%202013-2018%20Key%20Achievements%20Booklet%20%28A5%29-compressed.pdf> (Accessed 4 July 2019).

³²⁵ Ibid.

handling techniques; 3) covering the costs of cooperative membership fees for 342 women farmers that were identified as the most vulnerable; 4) support for women involved in cross-border trade in Western Rwanda to strengthen their activities in the fish and tomato value chains; 5) improving entrepreneurship skills for youth and women by 90 young people having been trained on how to improve their business, and by 8 girls being trained in entrepreneurship for the ICT related projects; 6) funding more than 8 000 jobs created by youth business projects and much more.³²⁶

UNDAP2 is the second five years program for the UN agencies in Rwanda. It is covering the period from 2018 to 2023. UNDAP2 is also in accordance with the national priorities of Rwanda. It is supporting the NST1(2017-2024) and Vision 2050. The UNDAP2 focuses on the same three areas that NST1 is based on. Those are: 1) economic transformation, 2) social transformation, 3) transformational governance.³²⁷ Within the field of the economic transformation, the main aims of the UNDAP2 include: 1) creation of 1.5 million jobs, 2) establishing knowledge-based economy, 3) increasing domestic saving and promoting investments in Rwanda, and 3) modernization of the agricultural sector.³²⁸ Regarding the area of social transformation, the plan is oriented towards enabling access to quality education, nutrition, water, and sanitation,³²⁹ while transformative governance includes “enhanced gender equality, justice, human rights, peace and security.”³³⁰

The United Nations system in Rwanda consists of 22 agencies, programs, and funds³³¹ that are helping Rwanda to reach the Sustainable Development Goals.³³² The UN Agencies that are aimed at supporting Rwanda’s economic development include: 1) Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 2) IFAD Investing in rural people, 3) International Trade Center, 4) Economic Commission for Africa, 5) UNCTAD, 6) United Nation Development Program,

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ *United Nations Development Assistance Plan UNDAP II summary*, United Nations in Rwanda, Available online: https://rwanda.un.org/sites/default/files/201905/UNDAP_II_2018_2023_Summary_Trifold_%20flat_compressed.pdf (Accessed 4 July 2019).

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ United Nations in Rwanda, Official site, Available at: <https://rwanda.un.org/en/about/about-the-un> (Accessed 4 July 2019).

³³² Sustainable Development Goals were adopted by the UN in 2015. Seventeen sustainable development goals address the global challenges the world is facing, including poverty, inequality, environmental degradation, peace, justice, gender equality, quality education and much more. The aim is achieving these goals until 2030. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/> (Accessed 4 July 2019).

7)UNESCO, 8)UNIDO, 9)World Food Programme. Here we will give a brief overview of some of the programs that FAO, IFAD, UNIDO, WFP and UNDP are implementing.

Food and Agriculture Organisation(FAO) of the United Nations opened its country office in Rwanda in 1985.³³³ FAO is helping Rwanda achieve its goals towards food security and agricultural development. Its program in Rwanda is closely aligned with the Vision 2020 and EDPRSII. Four priority areas that FAO is supporting in Rwanda are: 1)improved food security among the Rwandan population, 2)agriculture and livestock productivity through sustainable resource natural management, 3)private sector investment and 4)knowledge sharing in addressing agricultural development and food security.³³⁴ FAO is supporting local projects in Rwanda that are aligned with its objectives, and it also works in close collaboration with Rwandan ministries in identifying the areas where FAO's support would be desired.

The International Fund for Agricultural Development(IFAD)³³⁵ is both a specialized United Nations' agency and international financial institution. IFAD's strategic program for Rwanda (2013-2018) has been aligned with country's EDPRS II. In addition, IFAD is implementing projects related to rural and agricultural development. Speaking of rural development, IFAD is implementing the so called "Project for Rural Income through Exports". The aim of this project is to raise the income of smallholder farmers by strengthening "producer cooperatives as full-fledged economic partners of the private sector"³³⁶ and by increasing the quality of the production. The duration of the program is from 2011 until 2020.

Another ongoing project, is the Rwanda Dairy Development Project, which is intended to "raise rural income by intensifying dairy production."³³⁷ This will be achieved by dairy

³³³ Cooperation between FAO and Rwanda began in 1963.

³³⁴ Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations In Rwanda, Official site, Available at: <http://www.fao.org/rwanda/fao-in-rwanda/en/> (Accessed 25 Jun 2019).

³³⁵ IFAD is partnering with other UN's agencies, in particular with UN agencies based in Rome: FAO and World Food Programme (WFP). IFAD is oriented on empowering rural people to increase their food security, their incomes and improve nutrition of their family. Retrieved from: <https://www.ifad.org/en/about> (Accessed 2 July 2019).

³³⁶ IFAD Investing in Rural People, Official site, Available at: <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/project/id/1100001550/country/rwanda> (Accessed 2 Jun 2019).

³³⁷ "Rwanda Dairy Development Project", IFAD Investing in Rural People, Available at: <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/project/id/2000001195/country/rwanda> (Accessed 2 Jun 2019).

farmers learning to achieve higher amounts of milk through “climate-smart dairy production.”³³⁸ The duration of the project is from 2016 until 2022.

IFAD has also conducted a project intended to strengthen rural microenterprises. The project was conducted in two phases: from 1996 until 2004 and from 2004 until 2013. It has been working on providing “entrepreneurs with access to sustainable financial services, non-financial services and markets”³³⁹ and on developing “linkages between the Government and private-sector producers.”³⁴⁰ According to the IFAD, the project contributed to 4,000 rural small and microenterprises.

United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) is, inter alia, implementing projects on advancing economic competitiveness. UNIDO is currently working on the implementation of “Capacity-building for industrial research and development” projects in Rwanda. UNIDO’s role reflects in giving institutional support to Rwanda’s National Industrial Research and Development Agency (NIRDA). UNIDO’s backing for NIRDA include providing developing strategy and action plan for NIRDA, defining new organizational structure, capacity building training as well as investment in pilot projects.³⁴¹ This program will be finished in October 2019. Another project oriented on advancing economic competitiveness was “Technical assistance for strengthening SEZs and industrial parks” in Rwanda. It was being implemented in the period from 2015 until 2018. UNIDO’s support has been requested by the Ministry of Trade and Industry to „improve the effectiveness of Rwanda’s special economic zones and industrial parks.”³⁴²

World Food Programme (WFP) is a humanitarian organization that is “delivering food assistance in emergencies and working with communities to improve nutrition and build resilience.”³⁴³ One of the areas in which WFP is assisting Rwanda is in its support for smallholder farmers. WFP is helping “members of farmers cooperatives by enhancing their governance, enabling them to reduce their post-harvest losses, facilitating their access to

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ IFAD Investing in Rural People, Official site, Available at: <https://www.ifad.org/en/web/operations/project/id/1100001276/country/rwanda> (Accessed on 2.06.2019).

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, Available at: <https://open.unido.org/projects/RW/projects/> (Accessed on 2.06.2019).

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ World Food Programme, Available at: <https://www.wfp.org/overview> (Accessed on 2.06.2019).

financial services.’’³⁴⁴ Furthermore, WFP is helping farmers in their intentions to reach their commercial buyers. In 2016, in accordance with its goals of reducing post-harvest losses and improving food security, WFP “distributed 834 storage facilities (plastic and metallic silos, and improved crop storage bags) to men and women in farming regions across Rwanda.’’³⁴⁵

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provides development support in three main areas in Rwanda: poverty reduction and environment, democratic governance and peace consolidation, as well as aid coordination.³⁴⁶ One of the UNDP’s projects in Rwanda was Building Inclusive Financial Sector, implemented in the period from 2010 until 2015. The aim of this project was to reduce poverty by promoting inclusive finance and entrepreneurship programs.³⁴⁷ Within, the United Nations Development Programme was giving technical and financial assistance to the Central Bank of Rwanda and the Rwandan Ministry of Finance in order to establish 416 Umurenge SACCOs (Savings & Credit Cooperatives) in the country.³⁴⁸ Nonetheless, through this project, microfinance institutions were supported in offering credit lines to entrepreneurs, what led to “20,998 MSEs accessed credit through refinancing’’,³⁴⁹ This project has also supported mobile banking, which resulted in extending financial services to the poor communities accross Rwanda.³⁵⁰

5.3. International actors’ contribution to the process of reconciliation in Rwanda

In this part of the thesis, the role of the International actors in the process of reconciliation in Rwanda is explored, including their contribution to the ICTR and support for the national Rwandan reconciliation initiatives, as well as their own initiatives for reconciliation.

³⁴⁴ World Food Programme Rwanda, Available at: <https://www.wfp.org/countries/rwanda> (Accessed on 2.06.2019).

³⁴⁵ *Ensuring farmers have something to harvest in Rwanda*, World Food Programme Insight, Online, Available at: <https://insight.wfp.org/ensuring-farmers-have-something-to-harvest-in-rwanda-260c2daee21e> (Accessed 2 Jun 2019).

³⁴⁶ United Nations Development Programme Rwanda, Available at: <http://www.rw.undp.org/content/rwanda/en/home/ourwork/overview.html> (Accessed 28 July 2019).

³⁴⁷ *Building Inclusive Financial Sector in Rwanda*, UNDP, Online, Available at: http://www.rw.undp.org/content/rwanda/en/home/operations/projects/poverty_reduction/building-inclusive-financial-sector-in-rwanda---bifsir-.html (Accessed 2 Aug.2019).

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

The United Nations' role in the process of reconciliation in Rwanda is particularly reflected through the establishment of the ICTR in 1994. In that sense, we will show here whether the UN answered on the deficiencies of the Tribunal. Major problems that the ICTR was facing were its institutional incapacity and the impossibility to trial the RPF atrocities. The UN answered to the ICTR's slowness by increasing the number of chambers, after the Rwandan government expressed its concerns about it. In 1998, the UN Security Council established a third trial chamber for the ICTR with three additional judges.³⁵¹ In 2000, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1329, adding two more judges to the appeals chamber. In 2003, in order to "expedite cases before the Tribunal"³⁵² the UN adopted the Resolution 1503, in which it urges the ICTR to complete the "investigations by the end of 2004, all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, and all of its work in 2010."³⁵³ In addition, the Security Council has again increased the number of judges of the ICTR, and in 2005 established the fourth trial chamber.

Regarding the problems in prosecuting the RPF atrocities, the UN did not make any visible pressure on the Rwandan government to cooperate with the ICTR. After the Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte made a complaint to the Security Council, the UN only reminded the government about its obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal.

The UN is supporting reconciliation within Rwanda through its agencies in Rwanda and through various initiatives launched to promote reconciliation. One of the initiatives is the Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations. The Programme was established by the UN General Assembly in 2005, and it is run by the UN Department of Global Communications. Its aim is to "mobilize civil society for Rwanda genocide victim remembrance and education in order to help prevent future acts of genocide."³⁵⁴ It provides information materials and organizes events to educate Rwandans about the Genocide and its impact on the survivors. It is especially focused on victims of sexual violence, widows, and orphans. For example, in 2007, the Programme organized an event called "Visions of

³⁵¹ *Security Council establishes third Trial Chamber For ICTR*, United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 1998, Online, Available at: <https://unictr.irmct.org/en/tribunal> (Accessed 5 Aug.2019).

³⁵² Audio Visual Library for International Law, Online, Available at: <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ict/ict.html> (Accessed 5 Aug. 2019).

³⁵³ "Resolution 1503,(2003)",United Nations Security Council, August 2003, Online, Available at: [https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1503\(2003\)](https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1503(2003)) pp.2, (Accessed 5 Aug 2019).

³⁵⁴ Outreach Programme on the Rwanda genocide and the United Nations, Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about.shtml> (Accessed 5 Aug. 2019).

Rwanda.” It was a photo project in which genocide survivors and perpetrators, including orphans and rape survivors, gathered and documented “their day-to-day life, hopes, dreams and memories.”³⁵⁵ They were able to document something that is very important for them and share it with the participants.³⁵⁶

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is supporting Rwandan national initiative for reconciliation- the Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, in its sessions to gather genocide survivors and perpetrators, and other organizations that promote social cohesion.³⁵⁷ Other UN agencies also involved in Rwanda, are helping the process of reconciliation, whether through direct initiatives or through the funding. In 2013 UN agencies, including the UNDP, UNICEF, UN WOMEN, OHCHR, on one side, and Rwandan government representatives, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and other Rwandan representatives on other side, signed a Joint Programme Document on Promoting Access to Justice, Human and Peace Consolidation in Rwanda, for a period from 2013 to 2018. Its main focus included: access to justice for the most vulnerable groups, promotion of human rights, crime reduction and prevention, and promoting peace, unity and reconciliation.³⁵⁸

According to the statute of the ICTR, all UN member states are required to “cooperate with the Tribunal's investigations and prosecutions of accused persons by complying with the Tribunal's orders or requests to identify, arrest, detain and surrender them to the Tribunal.”³⁵⁹ Also, even the ICTR has the primacy over national courts, “foreign courts in third countries in

³⁵⁵ *Visions of Rwanda*, Outreach Programme on the Rwanda genocide and the United Nations, Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/visions-of-rwanda.shtml> (Accessed 10 July).

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ *Highlights of UNDP's work in 2017*, United Nations Development Programme, 2017, Online, Available at: <https://www.undp.org/content/dam/rwanda/docs/Research%20and%20publications/2017%20UNDP%20Highlights.pdf> (Accessed 22 Aug 2019).

³⁵⁸ “Promoting access to justice, human and peace consolidation in Rwanda”, UNDP, pp-3-7, Online, Available at: https://www.undp.org/content/dam/rwanda/docs/demgov/UNDP_RW_ACCESS_TO_JUSTICE_HR_PEACE%20CONSOLIDATION_PRODUC.pdf pp-3-7 (Accessed 10 Aug. 2019).

³⁵⁹ *Cooperation and assistance of states key to success of ICTR*, United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 1999, Online, Available at: <https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/cooperation-and-assistance-states-key-success-ictr> (Accessed 20 Aug. 2019).

which genocide suspects are residing after their flight from Rwanda after the violence,³⁶⁰ are also eligible for prosecuting the suspects.

Belgium's contribution to the process of reconciliation in Rwanda, includes conducting a few trials for the genocide in its national courts, and supporting the Rwandan national initiatives for reconciliation, like the Gacaca courts, by having provided training for the judges of Gacaca. According to the UN Residual Mechanism, Belgium is together with the USA among the countries that "adopted domestic laws to facilitate their cooperation with the ICTR."³⁶¹

The USA was the first country to publicly declare its support for the establishment of the ICTR.³⁶² It has contributed to the work of the ICTR by financing the establishment of additional two chambers, together with the Netherlands. Regarding the RPF prosecutions, it did not make a visible pressure on the Rwandan government to cooperate with the Tribunal. It has adopted laws in order to facilitate cooperation with the ICTR.³⁶³

In 2003, France signed an agreement with the UN on the enforcement of sentences imposed by the ICTR, complying to receive the ICTR convicts. According to the report from the Collective of Civil Parties for Rwanda(CPCR) from 2018, there were a number of cases in which France did not fully cooperate with the Tribunal. In 2007, the ICTR transferred the jurisdiction over Wenceslas Munyeshyaka to France. In 2015, the French court dismissed the case due to the lack of evidence. On the other side, the CPCR, in its report to the Human rights council stated that "France has not taken sufficient steps either to prosecute or to

³⁶⁰ Patrick, Rowanda and Susanne, Buckley, *Changing Patterns of Acceptance. International Criminal Justice After the Rwandan Genocide*, International Nuremberg Principles Academy, 2017, Online, Available at: https://www.nurembergacademy.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Rwanda.pdf (Accessed 22 Aug. 2019).

³⁶¹ *Cooperation and assistance of states key to success of ICTR*, United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 1999, Online, Available at: <https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/cooperation-and-assistance-states-key-success-ictr> (Accessed 20 Aug. 2019).

³⁶² Zachary D.Kaufman, *After Genocide: Traditional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond*, Columbia University Press, 2009, Available online: <file:///C:/Users/Win7/Desktop/Jasmina/Nova%20fascikla/Ruanda%20DELOVI/ict/SSRN-id1916775.pdf> pp.231 (Accessed 20 Aug. 2019).

³⁶³ *Cooperation and assistance of states key to success of ICTR*, United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 1999, Online, Available at: <https://unictr.irmct.org/en/news/cooperation-and-assistance-states-key-success-ictr> (Accessed 20 Aug. 2019).

extradite these suspects.’’³⁶⁴ Furthermore, France showed “lack of will to trial the suspected génocidaires.’’³⁶⁵ France justified this by accusing the ICTR of lack of cooperation in transferring the evidence.³⁶⁶

Besides this, France has a high number of rejections of the extradition requests from Rwanda. In 2016 Rwanda submitted a Mutual Legal Request to the government of France requesting the information about 20 French nationalists, suspected to be involved in the genocide.³⁶⁷ According to the CPCR, France did not give an answer to the Rwandan government on this matter.

³⁶⁴Collective of Civil Parties for Rwanda, Official site, Available at: <http://www.collectifpartiescivilesrwanda.fr/en/cpcrs-submission-to-the-un-human-rights-council/> (Accessed 20 Aug. 2019).

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

Conclusion

The leading objective of the study was to establish whether the International actors were actively present in the peacebuilding process in Rwanda, from the end of the genocide in 1994 until 2019.

Following the theoretical framework of the peacebuilding, introduced in the first part of the thesis, the study followed on, presenting the political, economic and social situation in Rwanda after the genocide. Based on that, the study elaborated the contribution of the International actors to each one of these sectors.

Based on the results from the three sectors we have analyzed and the research in the form of a case study about the work of the ICTR, we have come across several specific conclusions and one overall conclusion of the study.

First, it is possible to notice that the accusations against Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, are found justified and that the International actors are not taking significant steps upon the existing critiques on Paul Kagame's politics. Reactions of the International actors were reduced on the USA's acknowledging some of the deficiencies of Rwandan politics through various reports, and on the UN's report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. Therefore, the study found that International actors are not contributing to the Rwandan political development.

Secondly, the study found that International actors do give a significant contribution to the Rwandan economy development, especially by supporting Rwanda's economic development strategies. Still, the place for improvement exists, considering the differences in the trade balance between Rwanda and the International actors, and the unevenly distributed economic progress of the country.

Regarding the process of reconciliation in Rwanda, we found that the International actors did not invest enough effort to enhance the work of the ICTR, and that they especially showed inactivity regarding the prosecution of the RPF atrocities. The International actors should have done more in order to bring all the perpetrators to justice.

These specific conclusions led us to the overall conclusion of the study. Since the main objective of the thesis was to show the role of the International actors in the peacebuilding process in Rwanda, the study concluded that the International actors were not actively and equally present in all the segments of the peacebuilding process in Rwanda. The International actors did contribute to the economic progress of Rwanda, but did not make an effort to enhance and democratize the political situation in Rwanda, neither did they contribute significantly to the process of reconciliation in Rwanda. In addition, a situation like this one in Rwanda could raise further discussion about the possibility for another conflict in Rwanda to escalate, while having in mind that according to the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, social injustice and political oppression are among the deepest causes of conflict. The findings of this research could serve as the basis of the research on the subject of possible consequences of Paul Kagame's withdrawal from the politics. Furthermore, the results of the research could also raise discussion concerning the motives that drive the International actors and shape their attitude towards Rwanda.

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