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Konstruktivizam Aleksandra Venta četvrt veka nakon njegove „Društvene teorije međunarodne politike” **

Apstrakt

Cilj ovog rada je da kritički i problemski sagleda konstruktivistički pristup u međunarodnim odnosima i to sa posebnom pažnjom na „tanki” konstruktivizam ili „krnji” materijalizam, koji je u svojoj dobro poznatoj knjizi *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike* pre četvrt veka ponudio Aleksandar Vent i tako doveo u pitanje tradicionalne pristupe koji su se odražavali u značaju koji se pridavao strukturi međunarodnog poretka. Pored toga, sagledaće se i kritike i već date ocene o Ventovom konstruktivizmu, sa ciljem da sa ove vremenske distance pogledamo šta ostaje najveći doprinos konstruktivizma u proučavanju međunarodnih odnosa, posebno u kontekstu pojave novog konstruktivizma i otvorene debate teoretičara međunarodnih odnosa o stanju i budućnosti discipline. Tako će najveći deo rada biti posvećen onim aspektima pristupa koji su, prema našem sudu, ostavili najveći trag u disciplini – razumevanje promena i koncepta nacionalnog interesa i identiteta.

Ključne reči:

konstruktivizam, Aleksandar Vent, društvena teorija međunarodne politike, teorije, međunarodni odnosi, identitet, nacionalni interes

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UVOD

Iako su temelji konstruktivizma u društvenim naukama postavljeni sa sociološkom disciplinom još krajem 19. veka, sve do kasnih osamdesetih godina prošlog veka kultura i ideje nisu zauzimali značajnije mesto u političkim naukama. Sve do tada jasan je bio primat nekonstruktivista (pozitivista, bihejvioralista, teoretičara racionalnog izbora) koji su držali do toga da mi naseljavamo „realan” svet koji ima svoje karakteristike na koje ne možemo mnogo da utičemo (geografija, raspodela resursa i relativne moći), ali na koje smo primorani da reagujemo.¹ Osamdesetih godina 20. veka u teoriji međunarodnih odnosa uticajni su bili neorealizam i neoliberalni institucionalizam, oba pristupa usmerena na materijalizam i individualizam. Vrlo pojednostavljeno gledano, razlika između ova dva pristupa je u pogledu na ljudsku prirodu i prevazilaženje hobsovski ustrojenog sveta.² Kao reakcija na ove pristupe i značajnim delom neuspeh nekonstruktivista da objasne ono što se dešavalo u međunarodnim odnosima pred kraj Hladnog rata, iznikao je nov pristup koji se pod terminom konstruktivizam prvi put spominje 1989. godine u značajnoj knjizi Nikolasa Onufa (*Nicholas Onuf*),³ a čiji je jedan od utemeljivača u međunarodnim odnosima bez sumnje Aleksandar Vent (*Alexander Wendt*). Ovde bi valjalo napomenuti da konstruktivizam ne treba posmatrati kao jedinstven pristup u okviru kog nema nikakvih sporenja, ali ono što je zajedničko svim konstruktivistima je da stavljaju ključan naglasak na interpretaciju, jer tvrde da akteri neizbežno tumače svet kroz socijalne konstrukte, te da istraživači na prvom mestu moraju da nauče da tumače socijalne konstrukte kako bi razumeli delovanje.⁴

Cilj ovog rada je da kritički i problemski sagleda konstruktivistički pristup u međunarodnim odnosima i to sa posebnom pažnjom na „tanki” konstruktivizam ili „krnji” materijalizam, koji je u svojoj dobro poznatoj knjizi *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike* ponudio Aleksandar Vent.⁵ Ovo je posebno od značaja u kontekstu otvorene debate teoretičara međunarodnih

¹ Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh, and Gerry Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in political science*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018, p. 75.

² Ta razlika nije od značaja za potrebe ovog rada, te u nju nećemo detaljnije ulaziti.

³ Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Routledge, 1989.

⁴ Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh, and Gerry Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in political science*, p. 79.

⁵ Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Knjiga je prevedena i na srpski jezik. Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2014.

odnosa o stanju i budućnosti discipline, kao i potrebe da se objasne promene u međunarodnim odnosima, a koje nisu nužno izazvane promenama u materijalnim datostima.

Prvi deo teksta koji sledi bavi se Ventovom polemikom sa teorijama međunarodnih odnosa usmerenih na materijalizam, te njegovim nastojanjem da konstruktivizmom ponudi „srednji put”. Dalje, najveći deo rada biće posvećen onim aspektima pristupa koji su, prema našem sudu, ostavili najveći trag u disciplini međunarodnih odnosa – a to su razumevanje promena i koncepti nacionalnog interesa i identiteta. Premda ovo jesu centralno postavljeni koncepti u Ventovom radu, videćemo da ipak ostaju nedosledno i nedovoljno određeni. Imajući prethodno rečeno u vidu, kao i izazove za disciplinu i konstruktivizam u prethodnih četvrt veka, pokušaćemo na kraju da damo odgovor na pitanje da li je Ventov konstruktivizam uspeo da odgovori na zadatak koji je sam autor postavio.

ODGOVOR VOLCU I ŠTA JE DRUGAČIJE U VENTOVOM KONSTRUKTIVIZMU

Ako se o značaju nekog dela da suditi na osnovu dobijene pažnje, kritika i nastojanja da se na njega adekvatno ponudi odgovor, onda bi se „Društvena teorija međunarodne politike” Aleksandra Venta bez ikakve sumnje našla pri samom vrhu liste, inače vrlo obimne, literature o međunarodnim odnosima. To potvrđuje i Udruženje za međunarodne studije koje je Ventovu knjigu proglasilo za najbolju knjigu poslednje decenije 20. veka. Pisana u formi zamišljenog platonovskog dijaloga i polemike sa „grande” učiteljem međunarodnih odnosa Kenetom Volcom (*Kenneth Waltz*) i njegovom „Teorijom međunarodne politike”,⁶ koji je očigledno imao veliki uticaj na samog Venta, premda bi to teško priznao, Vent je ovom knjigom pokušao da zaokruži svoj konstruktivistički pristup u disciplini međunarodnih odnosa.⁷

Sudeći prema autoru, dva osnovna načela konstruktivizma ili strukturalnog idealizma koja iznosi u knjizi, a o kojima će više reći biti nešto kasnije, jesu da su strukture ljudskog udruživanja determinisane prvenstveno razme-

⁶ Kenet N. Volc, *Teorija međunarodne politike*, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Beograd, 2008.

⁷ Aleksandar Vent je o odnosu delatnika i strukture, odnosno nepostojanju anarhije kao takve, pisao i ranije. Alexander Wendt, „Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics”. *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), 391–425; Alexander Wendt, „The agent-structure problem in international relations theory”. *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (1987), 335–370.

njenim idejama, pa tek onda materijalnim činiocima i da su identiteti i interesi svrshodnih aktera konstruisani pre ovim razmenjenim idejama nego što su dati od prirode.⁸

Kako sam piše, predmet knjige jeste ontologija međunarodnog života, a može se slobodno reći i pokušaj da se pronađe srednji put koji miri realiste, liberale i marksiste, te pozitiviste i postpozitiviste.⁹ Namera je da njegova knjiga bude sinteza koja će realističke koncepcije podvesti pod njegovu teoriju i pomiriti ih sa kritičkim uvidima društvene nauke. Kovačević i Vujinović ocenjuju da Vent „konstruktivistički pristup smešta među holističke i idealističke, naspram npr. klasičnog realizma, koji je racionalistički, individualistički i materijalistički po svojim osobinama. To mu omogućava da pređe na raspravu o pitanjima drugog reda između postpozitivista i pozitivista – pri čemu se opredeljuje za idealističku ontologiju, ali ostaje privržen pozitivističkoj epistemologiji, što ga svrstava u sredinu Treće velike rasprave”.¹⁰ Takav „tanki” konstruktivizam, kao što je i autor sam predvideo, bio je česta meta kritika sa različitih strana, ne samo tradicionalnih pristupa, već je kritika došla i iz „sopstvene kuće”. Kao što je već napomenuto, konstruktivizam je daleko od jednoznačnog pristupa i važno je praviti razliku između dve dominantne struje – modernog (konvencionalnog ili „mekog”) i postmodernog (kritičkog ili „tvrđog”) konstruktivizma. Za postmoderne konstruktiviste svaki pokušaj da pristupimo „realnom” svetu unapred je osuđen na neuspeh zato što i sami istraživači neizbežno ono što posmatraju i istražuju interpretiraju kroz svoje filtere, što je poznato kao „dvostruka hermeneutika”.¹¹ Dakle, istraživače tumače već interpretiran društveni svet.¹² Zato oni kritikuju moderne konstru-

⁸ Ibidem, p. 1.

⁹ Božo Kovačević, „Šta je to novo u konstruktivizmu?”, u: Dejan Jović (ured.), *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), str. 67.

¹⁰ Marko Kovačević i Nikola Vujinović, „Socijalni konstruktivizam i međunarodni odnosi”, *Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka*, (jun 2014): 147–150. Više o tri velike debate pogledati u: Dragan R. Simić, *Svetska politika: međudržavni i međunarodni poredak, svetska politika, globalni odnosi*, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu i Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2009, str. 30–35.

¹¹ Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh, and Gerry Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in political science*, op. cit., p. 78. Charles Taylor, „Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”, in: Rodger Beehler and Alan R. Drengson (Eds.), *The Philosophy of Society*, Routledge, 2023, pp. 156–200; Stefano, Guzzini, *Power, realism and constructivism*, Routledge, 2013, pp. 201–202.

¹² Još je Entoni Gidens koristio koncept dvostruke hermeneutike kojim je problematizovao tumačenje drugog reda. Ne samo da se istraživači moraju osloniti na tumačenje iz prve ruke, već i njihovo tumačenje može imati povratni efekat na ovo

ktiviste, a među njima i Venta, što uopšte i ulaze u debatu sa nekonstruktivistima jer to znači prihvatanje da tamo postoji neki „realan” svet o kom bismo mogli diskutovati, što bi za njih bilo odbacivanje samih temelja konstruktivizma.¹³ A kao što se da naslutiti, Ventova cela knjiga je baš takva.

Uistinu, Vent kao „meki” konstruktivista nije odbacio baš sve temeljne postavke neorealizma, te nudi idejni dodatak materijalističkim pristupima u disciplini ili, kako sam kaže, „prijateljski amandman”,¹⁴ a teoriju racionalnog izbora vidi kao deo sopstvenog razumevanja delovanja.¹⁵ Njegov „krnji” materijalizam protivi se radikalnijem konstruktivističkom shvatanju da „grube” materijalne sile ne mogu imati samostalne učinke na međunarodnu politiku. Odnosno, Vent je, zapravo, pobornik naučnog realizma naspram postpozitivističkog relativizma.¹⁶ Dakle, društvena značenja nisu u potpunosti otporna na materijalne učinke, te materijalne sile mogu nesporno uticati na međunarodni život i to na tri načina: raspodela materijalnih sposobnosti aktera deluje na mogućnosti i verovatnoću određenih ishoda, kao i sastav materijalnih sposobnosti i karakter tehnologije, a tu su i geografija i prirodni resursi.¹⁷ Ipak, iako materijalna moć i interesi nisu nevažni, materijalne sile ne nastaju u vakuumu, te njihovo značenje i učinci zavise od društvene strukture sistema, a posebno od tipa anarhije koji preovlađuje, na šta ćemo se vratiti kasnije, te je karakter međunarodnog života određen uverenjima i očekivanjima koja države imaju jedna od druge, a ne čistim materijalnim datostima.¹⁸ Tako on moći, interesima i institucijama dodaje i ideje¹⁹ i priznaje da nije moguće sve u istom trenutku problematizovati, te zato i konstruktivisti moraju uzeti nešto kao dato.²⁰

Naravno, ovo nije prošlo bez kritike. Maja Cefus (*Maja Zehfuss*), koja brani poststrukturalističku perspektivu, videla je ovo kao pokušaj da se umiri savest jer, navodno, nije bilo mogućnosti izbora. Naime, za nju insistiranje na tome da postoji stvaran svet koji nije podložan bilo kakvom obliku konstruk-

prvo. Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration*, Berkeley, The University of California Press, 1984.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 79.

¹⁴ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 100.

¹⁵ Isto, str. 102.

¹⁶ Marko Kovačević i Nikola Vujinović, „Socijalni konstruktivizam i međunarodni odnosi”, *Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka*, (jun 2014): 147–150.

¹⁷ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 98.

¹⁸ Isto, str. 18.

¹⁹ Isto, str. 82.

²⁰ Isto, str. 32.

cije, ali koji određuje okvire delovanja, zapravo je pokušaj da se pronađe uporište za tvrdnju da nekim stvarima nema alternative, te da se mora delovati samo na jedan način.²¹ Ako pažljivo čitamo Venta videćemo da se on bori ne da umiri savest, već da ne zapadne u čist relativizam i besmisao. On i sam ističe da zbog toga što smo nešto prihvatili kao datost samo jer može biti analitički korisno ne daje nam za pravo da zaboravimo da je zapravo reč o procesu koji je u stvari samo dovoljno stabilizovan od strane unutrašnjih i spoljnih struktura da nam deluje *kao da je datost* (istakla N. J.), te da zato metodologija ne bi smela da postane prećutna ontologija.²² I baš zato što je relativno malo međunarodnog života posledica materijalnih sila po sebi, Vent savetuje da uzmemo moć i interes od materijalizma i pokažemo da su njihovi sadržaj i značenje utemeljeni zapravo na idejama i kulturi.²³

Ovo je u vezi sa u teoriji dobro poznatim problemom delatnika i strukture, za koji je Vent još u svom članku iz 1987. godine pokušao da ponudi rešenje u vidu strukturacione teorije.²⁴ Iako je putem ovog problema prvi prošao Ričard Ešli (*Richard Ashley*) tri godine ranije,²⁵ koliko je to bio ambiciozan zadatak pokazuju ocene onih koji tvrde da bi društvenoj teorijskoj aktivnosti došao kraj kada bi postojalo konačno rešenje ovog problema.²⁶ Ventova strukturaciona teorija vidi delatnika i strukturu kao ontološki različite, ali ravnopravne i neodvojive entitete koji su međusobno uslovljeni i zavisni, odnosno reč je o logici sauspostavljanja jer nema delatnika bez strukture, niti ima strukture bez delatnika.²⁷ Dakle, reč je o svojevrsnoj dijalektici – struktura

²¹ Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations. The politics of reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002; Božo Kovačević, „Šta je to novo u konstruktivizmu?“, u: Dejan Jović (ured.), *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), str. 63.

²² Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 292.

²³ Isto, str. 318.

²⁴ Alexander Wendt, „The agent-structure problem in international relations theory“. *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (1987), 335–370.

²⁵ Richard K. Ashley, „The Poverty of Neorealism“, *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1984), 225–286; Marina Ilić, „Problem agent-strukture: teorijski nalazi i implikacije za studije građanskih ratova“, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 157.

²⁶ Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 63.

²⁷ Marina Ilić, „Problem agent-strukture: teorijski nalazi i implikacije za studije građanskih ratova“, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 149; Alexander Wendt, „The agent-structure problem in international relations theory“. *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (1987), 335–370.

postoji i ima svoje učinke, ali delatnici u toj strukturi nisu sasvim nemoćni, ona se razvija samo uz pomoć delatnika i njihovih praksi. Odavde proizlazi i njegova ključna kritika neorealizma. Kako kaže, problem neorealizma nije u strukturalizmu već isključivom materijalizmu,²⁸ što se kod Keneta Volca manifestuje u tome da je anarhija konstanta, razlike međunarodnih aktera su irelevantne (države su poput „bilijarskih kugli”), te samo raspodela resursa i materijalnih moći koncentrisanih u sistemu stvara razlike u međunarodnoj strukturi i ishodima. U ovako postavljenom sistemu akteri su nemoćni – struktura posredno utiče na ponašanje delatnika preko takmičenja i socijalizacije, te će oni akteri čije je ponašanje prilagođeno podsticajima strukture napredovati, a drugi ne.²⁹ Kao što vidimo, ovde je reč samo o ponašanju aktera koje diktira struktura. Volc nam ništa ne govori o odlikama aktera, niti njihovim uverenjima i percepciji drugih aktera u okviru te strukture, jer je za njega to irelevantno. Posledično, ostaje nam nepoznato zašto se percepcije aktera menjaju čak i kada struktura ostaje ista i kako uopšte dolazi do promene strukture ako su akteri nemoćni.

PROMENA ILI PROCES KAO JEDINE KONSTANTE?

Da je jedina konstanta u životu promena bilo je poznato filozofu iz Efesa³⁰ još pre dve i po hiljade godina ali, na iznenađenje brojnih kritičara, kao što ćemo u nastavku videti kod Venta to baš nije tako jednostavno.

Ako u Volcovoј teoriji države tragaju za bezbednošću, te se prećutno pretpostavlja da su zadovoljne ili status kvo sile, kako onda objasniti promene? Kako objasniti zašto neke države od neprijatelja ili takmaka postaju saveznici? Uzmimo za primer uspon američke moći i mit o američkoј izuzetnosti. Iako bi bilo sasvim neutemeljeno pokušavati da se kroz istorijsku i uporednu perspektivu te izuzetne razlike između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i ostalih država izmere u nadi da ćemo pokazati da su SAD zaista kvalitativno drugačije od ostalih nacija, kako je verovao Sejmur Martin Lipset (*Seymour Martin Lipset*),³¹ određene odlike na kojoj se temelji američka izuzetnost zaista se ne mogu osporiti, uključujući tu ekonomsku, vojnu, ali i meku moć, kao i određene specifičnosti nastanka nacije. Američki predsednici neretko su pozivali

²⁸ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 160.

²⁹ Isto, str. 89.

³⁰ Naravno, misli se na Heraklita.

³¹ Kao te ključne razlike Lipset izdvaја: slobodu, egalitarnost, individualizam, populizam i slobodno tržište (engl. *laissez-faire*). Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, Norton & Company, New York and London, 1996.

u pomoć ovaj mit kako bi opravdali američku hegemoniju, odnosno obezbediti, sa jedne strane, podršku samih Amerikanaca za angažovaniju ulogu SAD u svetu, a, sa druge, pristanak ostalih međunarodnih aktera. Zašto su to radili ako je sve u strukturi, odnosno raspodeli moći? Setimo se Antonija Gramšija, nema hegemonije bez pristanka, pa makar ona bila i prećutna. Dakle, kako objasniti zašto je američka moć postala prihvaćena kao legitimna od strane većine međunarodnih aktera, a ne kao uzurpatorska sila u sistemu suverenih država? Ili možda još bolje, zašto je neki međunarodni akteri ipak percipiraju baš tako i osporavaju joj ulogu legitimnog hegemonu? Neorealizam teško da bi nam ovde bio od pomoći, ali možda se u Ventovom konstruktivizmu krije odgovor.

Naime, Vent nijednog trenutka nije osporio da moderne države mogu biti i status kvo „sebičnjaci“, ali, za razliku od Volca, on tvrdi da nema anarhije *kao takve* (istakla N. J.) – učinci anarhije i materijalna struktura zavise od toga šta države žele, od njihovih uverenja i politika koje vode.³² Dakle, raspodela moći je značajna, ali njeno značenje zavisiće isključivo od aktera. U takvoj raspodeli moći države mogu biti saveznice, takmaci ili neprijatelji, ali nema ništa u samoj anarhiji što bi nužno svaki put dovodilo do neprijateljskog odnosa među akterima.

Ako se u Ventovom konstruktivizmu sa pravom mogu uočiti izvesni nedostaci, njegova kritika Volca zbog materijalizma dobro je utemeljena.³³ Naime, kao što smo videli, Volc ističe značaj raspodele sposobnosti, ali bez uzimanja u obzir percepcije samih država, što podrazumeva vrlo statičan i jednosmeran odnos. Ključna stvar ovde je da Vent nije odbacio Volcovu anarhiju kao moguću. Čak naprotiv. Na pitanje da li su države realisti, odnosno da li su zainteresovane samo za sebe, iznenađujuće, ali Vent odgovara potvrdno. Međutim, to što je gotovo sve vreme tako nije opravdanje da zaboravimo da pitanje nije da li su države samozainteresovane ponekad ili većinu vremena, nego da li su one takve *po prirodi* (istakla N. J.).³⁴ A Vent to negira – nema ničeg u prirodi država ili anarhiji kao takvoj, jer anarhije kao takve i nema, što bi iznova podsticalo takvo ponašanje. Dakle, on odbacuje Volcovu anarhiju kao *jedino* moguću (istakla N. J.).

Ovde dolazimo do ključne odlike konstruktivizma, a to je denaturalizacija onoga što u međunarodnim odnosima prihvatamo kao dato i nepromenljivo. Bilo svojom kreativnošću, bilo slučajnošću, akteri kroz interakciju biraju jedan set od mnogih zamislivih setova značenja, gradeći tako određene

³² Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 95, 128.

³³ Marinko Raos, „Umjereni konstruktivizam Alexandera Wendta“, u: Dejan Jović (ured.), *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), str. 120.

³⁴ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 207.

interpretacije i konstituišući jedan svet od mnogih mogućih.³⁵ Naravno, taj set mogućnosti nije neograničen, jer akteri u interakciju neizbežno ulaze sa nekom pozadinom, ali bilo koja struktura biće naposljetku dostignuće prakse. Ništa od ovoga ne znači da je promena nužna, niti da je ona laka. Naprotiv, baš zato što kulture imaju konzervativne odlike strukturalna promena je teška, te će, kako zbog unutrašnjih tako i zbog spoljnih izvora stabilnosti koji se opiru promeni, ona pre biti izuzetak nego pravilo. Iako kultura jeste „samoispunjavajuće proročanstvo“, kako piše Vent,³⁶ ona to jeste jedino na leđima i u glavama delatnika koji je nose. Uverenja aktera su ta koja sačinjavaju znanje koje se deli, a njihove prakse potvrđuju ili falsifikuju to znanje tokom vremena. Tako je kultura u stalnom kretanju čak i dok reprodukuje samu sebe. Kao tekuće dostignuće, ona je ono što ljudi od nje načine, čak i dok ograničava šta oni mogu uraditi u bilo kom trenutku.³⁷ Uprkos sklonosti konzervativizmu, kulturu uvek odlikuju manja ili veća sporenja između njenih nosilaca, što je stalni izvor strukturalne promene.³⁸ Ovo je Ventu poslužilo kao argument za dobro poznatu tvrdnju da je anarhija ono što države naprave od nje.

Jednom kad se socijalni konstrukti u interakciji definišu oni uistinu mogu delovati konstitutivno koliko i neorealistički argumenti,³⁹ ali ključna razlika je u tome da se nijednog trenutka ne zaboravlja da su socijalni konstrukti društveni, da smo njihovi tvorci i autori mi sami, te da zavise od naše volje i zato se mogu i promeniti. Privilegovanje odomaćenog uzročnog pristupa društvenom životu utiče na to da ga doživljavamo konstitutivno, kao da se radi o prirodnim silama koje su nas pritisle, koje su pod našom kontrolom koliko i vetar i kiša.⁴⁰

Na osnovu prethodno iznetog možemo prihvatiti kao ispravnu ocenu da je temeljna razlika između Ventovog i Volcovog pristupa zapravo u svetonazoru, u filozofiji i politici, u temeljnom gledanju na čoveku narav, pa time

³⁵ Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh, and Gerry Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in political science*, p. 83.

³⁶ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 160.

³⁷ Da bi se ovo uopšte moglo primeniti na države, Vent je detaljno razradio antropomorfizaciju država („države su takođe ljudi“), pripisavši im antropomorfne kvalitete kao što su želje, uverenja i hotimičnost, premda svestan razlika koje postoje između pojedinačnog i korporativnog delovanja. Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, str. 170, 193.

³⁸ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 163.

³⁹ Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh, and Gerry Stoker (Eds.), *Theory and methods in political science*, p. 83.

⁴⁰ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 321.

posledično i na društvo u užem smislu i međunarodno društvo.⁴¹ Iz temeljnog prednaučnog uverenja da su čovek i društvo u suštini nepromenljivi, pa onda i nepopravljivi, proizlazi realistički pristup koji, kako je Vent dobro primetio, ne mora nužno biti materijalistički, pa ni pesimistički, ali je prosto takav kakav jeste i takvog ga moramo prihvatiti.⁴² Sa druge strane, za konstruktiviste, koliko god promene bile teške, one su zamislive i moguće, te ih nikada ne smemo isključiti. Dok realizam gleda pesimistički na ljudsku prirodu, konstruktivizam ne mora nužno biti optimističan, već je neodređen, odnosno neutralan. Dakle, ako prakse ne podržavaju određeni interes on će vremenom nestati. *Mogućnost* (istakla N. J.) strukturne promene rođena je iz te činjenice.⁴³ Ovo je jedna od značajnih novina koju konstruktivizam uvodi u disciplinu međunarodnih odnosa, a koja je, između ostalog, pre svega pomogla u razumevanju kraja Hladnog rata, s obzirom na to da iz neorealističke perspektive nije bilo lako objasniti slom bipolarne strukture sveta.

Ovde valja ukazati još i na to da se i neorealizam i konstruktivizam odlučno opiru tome da budu kvalifikovane kao normativne teorije. Vent primećuje da realistička teorija naturalizuje ili postvaruje određenu kulturu kao jedino moguću i čineći to pomaže njenom obnavljanju. Pošto je društveni proces način na koji dobijamo strukturu, što više države misle kao realisti time će sebičnost i njegova sistemska posledica, samopomoć, postajati samoispunjavajuće proročanstvo. Time realizam zastupa bar posredno stav ne samo o tome šta međunarodni život jeste već i šta treba da bude, dakle, postaje normativna kao i pozitivistička teorija.⁴⁴ Sličnu ocenu daje i Goldman (*Kjell Goldmann*), za kog je realizam „moćna teorija nepromene“, te ga vidi kao ideološko opravdanje blokovske podele.⁴⁵

Dok za Heraklita *panta rhei* (sve teče – prim. N. J.) neizbežno znači i promenu, kod Venta *panta rhei* izvesno znači samo to – *panta rhei* i ništa više. Stalan proces je neizbežan, a promene može biti, ali i ne mora. Ovakva neodređenost konstruktivista, pa i samog Venta, tumačena je kao izbegavanje rizika utvrđivanja moguće netačnosti i neuspaha njihovih teorija.⁴⁶ Iako,

⁴¹ Marinko Raos, „Umjereni konstruktivizam Alexandera Wendta“, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 140.

⁴² Isto, str. 141.

⁴³ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 315.

⁴⁴ Isto, str. 314.

⁴⁵ Kjell Goldmann, „International Relations. An Overview“, in: Goodin, R. E., Klingermann, H. D. (Eds.), *A New Handbook of Political Science*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 406.

⁴⁶ Božo Kovačević, „Šta je to novo u konstruktivizmu?“, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 77.

naravno, treba priznati da konstruktivizam ovde jeste načinio značajan korak u disciplini ka razumevanju promena u međunarodnim odnosima u odnosu na prethodne pristupe, ispravno se nameće kao pitanje šta nam uopšte takva teorija u kojoj ništa nije izvesno može i reći? Ili bi to od jedne (savremene) društvene teorije bilo neopravdano i očekivati?

Jedina izvesnost koju nam Vent nudi to je da isključuje nazadovanje.⁴⁷ U okviru njegove teorije ovo se čini sasvim neutemeljeno. Naime, tvrdeći da anarhije nema kao takve, Vent pravi razliku između hobsovske, lokovske i kantovske kulture anarhije u zavisnosti od toga koja uloga delatnika je dominantna u datom sistemu (neprijatelj, rival, prijatelj).⁴⁸ Na pitanje da li je neizbežno da kulture anarhije prelaze sa hobsovske, preko lokovske, do kantovske međunarodne strukture,⁴⁹ on nam odgovara da napredak ni u kom slučaju nije neizbežan. Iako ima podsticaja, nema istorijske neophodnosti, niti garancija da će podsticaji za progresivnu promenu prevazići ljudske slabosti i suprotstavljene podsticaje da se održi status quo.⁵⁰ Ali obrt je u tome da, iako nema garancije napretka, on isključuje nazadovanje, osim u slučaju velikog spoljnog šoka. Premda nam ne daje nikakve naznake šta bi taj spoljni šok mogao značiti, niti šta bi njegov inicijator moglo biti ako je spoljni u odnosu na međunarodnu strukturu koju čine države. Vent ovu prazninu sasvim zanemaruje i sa sigurnošću tvrdi da će istorija međunarodne politike ići samo u jednom pravcu – ako bude bilo kakvih strukturnih promena u budućnosti one će biti istorijski progresivne.⁵¹ Jedina garancija koju nudi – da se akteri teško odriču stečenih prava – ne čini nam se dovoljna. Ovo bi teoretičari racionalnog izbora rado prihvatili kao argument, premda nas istorija uči da države nisu uvek nastupale kao racionalni akteri sa ciljem da očuvaju ili prošire stečena prava. Takođe, u okviru samog konstruktivizma legitimno možemo postaviti pitanje kako unapred iz ove pozicije možemo znati šta će u budućnosti akteri percipirati kao stečena prava vredna očuvanja, pa čak i da znamo koja su to prava ništa nam ne garantuje da će ih podjednako vrednovati država A i država B.

⁴⁷ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 286.

⁴⁸ Isto, str. 215–223.

⁴⁹ Kao što je rečeno, u konstruktivizmu nema anarhije kao takve, već ona može imati različite oblike u zavisnosti od interakcije samih aktera. Oslanjajući se na Martina Vajta i englesku školu, Vent te različite oblike strukture naziva hobsovskom, lokovskom i kantovskom (stepen do kog su norme internalizovane utiče na razlike koje prave). To su idealni tipovi, premda veruje da su sve tri nastale u različitim vremenima i mestima međunarodne istorije.

⁵⁰ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 267.

⁵¹ Isto, str. 286.

Teško se ovde otrgnuti utisku da Vent na neki način jeste ostao nedorečen, te da se, ne plašeći se etikete normativizma (iako od nje ipak beži), gotovo otvoreno zauzima za prelaz iz sadašnjeg međunarodnog sistema, koji smatra pretežno lokovskim, u kantovski.⁵² U tom smislu, uistinu nije bez osnova za-pažanje Raosa da se Vent svrstao među normativiste i aktiviste koji svojim teoretisanjem žele ne samo da tumače, već i da menjaju svet.⁵³

JESU LI SAMO INTERESI VEČNI?

Ričard Lebow (*Richard Ned Lebow*) tvrdi da je, teorijski posmatrano, identitet od središnjeg značaja za konstruktivističku paradigmu kao što je moć za realizam, a bogatstvo za liberalizam.⁵⁴ Ovde je pitanje identiteta posebno značajno s obzirom na to da je reč o kategoriji koju konstruktivisti uvode u polje analize međunarodne politike povezujući je s pojmovima interesa i delovanja.⁵⁵ Ali šta uopšte identitet i interes predstavljaju za konstruktiviste?

Aleksandar Vent jednostavno definiše identitet kao ono što se odnosi na to ko ili šta akteri jesu, a interesi na ono što akteri žele.⁵⁶ Oni se i ne mogu posmatrati razdvojeno jer bez interesa identiteti nemaju motivacionu snagu, a bez identiteta interesi nemaju pravac. Priznajući da je definicija identiteta od koje kreće preširoka, Vent tvrdi da je dve vrste ideja potrebno uključiti u pojam identiteta – one koje održava Sopstvo i one koje održava Drugi. Dakle, identitete konstruišu i unutrašnje i spoljne strukture. Ključna distinkcija je u tome što racionalni model u interakciji država gleda na interese i identitete kao egzogeno date i stalne, dok se konstruktivistički model oslanja na simbolički interakcionizam koji gleda na identitete kao endogene i potencijalno promenljive.⁵⁷ Ako su identitet i interesi nepromenljivi, onda i nisu legitiman predmet istraživanja jer se posmatraju kao nezavisne varijable, te su zato dugo i bili skrajnuti u disciplini međunarodnih odnosa.

⁵² Marinko Raos, „Umjereni konstruktivizam Alexandera Wendta”, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 135.

⁵³ Isto, str. 116

⁵⁴ Richard Ned Lebow, „Identity and International Relations”, *International Relations*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, p. 474.

⁵⁵ Dejan Jović, „Uvodna studija”, u: Dejan Jović (ured.), *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), str. 16.

⁵⁶ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 200.

⁵⁷ Isto, str. 38.

Valja reći da Vent ne bi u potpunosti odbacio izjavu Lorda Palmerstona, nekadašnjeg britanskog premijera i sekretara za spoljne poslove, u kojoj kaže da Britanci nemaju večite saveznike i večite neprijatelje, večiti su jedino njihovi interesi.⁵⁸ On ne bi osporio činjenicu da se države vode svojim interesima, ali bi osporio njihovu statičnost, jer, kako kaže, interesi su promenljivi jer su granice sopstva promenljive.⁵⁹ Šta ovo znači? Pre svega, Vent oštro kritikuje realističku hipotezu koja kaže da nacionalni interesi imaju pre materijalnu nego društvenu osnovu i da su utemeljeni u nekakvom sklopu ljudske prirode, anarhije ili grubih materijalnih datosti. On čak tvrdi da kada se neko i poziva na interese da objasni postupke država u stvari ih objašnjava pozivajući se na određenu vrstu ideja.⁶⁰

Prema konstruktivističkom shvatanju, akcije neprestano proizvode i reprodukuju koncepcije Sopstva i Drugog, i kao takvi identiteti i interesi su uvek u procesu, pa čak i ako su nekad dovoljno postojani da ih možemo uzeti *kao date* (istakla N. J.). Dakle, identiteti se formiraju u interakciji država prilikom koje države preuzimaju određene uloge u okviru međunarodne strukture. Ovde je važno razumeti da ovo nije beskrajno slobodan proces, jer država nije „tabula rasa” na kojoj bi mogao bilo koji interes biti urezan.⁶¹ Takođe, postoji realna ograničenost od strane već postojećih zajedničkih shvatanja.⁶² Ovo znači da se identitet formira i kroz grupna uverenja koja su upisana u kolektivno pamćenje, mitove, narative i tradicije koje konstituišu ko je grupa i kako se odnosi prema drugima. To nisu samo deljena uverenja pojedinaca već inherentno istorijske pojave koje se prenose sa generacije na generaciju putem neprestanog procesa socijalizacije i ritualnog odigravanja. Dakle, Ego i Alter nisu prazne ploče već nešto unose u interakciju i na osnovu svojih predstava svaki za sebe konstruišu definiciju situacije. Zato Vent tvrdi da je društvo onakvo kakvim ga akteri čine.⁶³ U ovom procesu identiteti i njima odgovarajući interesi uče se i osnažuju kao odgovor na to kako aktere tretiraju značajni Drugi.⁶⁴ Dakle, konstruktivizam kaže da Egove ideje o Alteru, bilo tačne ili ne, nisu samo pasivni opažaji nečega što postoji nezavisno

⁵⁸ Dragan R. Simić i Dragan Živojinović, „Konstruktivistička teorija i koncept nacionalnog interesa”, u: Dejan Jović (ured.), *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, (Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti, 2016), str. 177.

⁵⁹ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 211.

⁶⁰ Isto, str. 100.

⁶¹ Isto, str. 203.

⁶² Isto, str. 283.

⁶³ Isto, str. 285.

⁶⁴ Isto, str. 281.

od Ega već aktivno i tokom interakcije konstituišu i Alterovu ulogu prema Egu. Tako i ko je Ego u interakciji nije nezavisno od onoga što Ego misli da Alter misli o njemu. Jedini način na koji ova samorazumevanja dobijaju smisao jeste ako ih Alter potvrdi, to jest potvrđuju se u interakciji. Dakle, na ovaj način Alter i Ego na svakom koraku zajedno definišu ko je svako od njih – zajednički konstituišu identitete.⁶⁵

Primenjeno na države i ranije dat primer, vidimo da dominantna država u sistemu (u našem slučaju SAD) može biti legitiman hegemon ili imperijalista/uzurpator u zavisnosti od toga kako je posmatraju Drugi. Država ne može da bude hegemon bez prihvatanja ostalih međunarodnih aktera jer u odsustvu relevantnog Drugog samo će se zavaravati svojom ulogom.⁶⁶ Dakle, sama raspodela moći u okviru sistema nije dovoljna. Ovo nam pomaže da razumemo kraj Hladnog rata i uspon američke moći u posthladnoratovskom svetu, kao i to zašto su američki predsednici neretko koristili mit o američkoj izuzetnosti kako bi obezbedili pristanak drugih međunarodnih aktera.

Koliko god u datom trenutku identiteti i interesi delovali stabilno kao kod neorealista, Vent tvrdi da smo, uprkos tome, i dalje u situaciji da su identiteti uvek u procesu, uvek osporavani, uvek dostignuće prakse. Nekada je obnavljanje relativno lako jer postoji malo osporavanja, i tada prihvatiti ih kao datost može biti analitički korisno. Ali, kao što je prethodno već spomenuto, metodologija ne bi smela da postane prećutna ontologija,⁶⁷ jer identitete i interese održava jedino interakcija.⁶⁸

Mora se na kraju reći da, iako identiteti i interesi ostaju primaran predmet Ventove analize, sama konceptualizacija ovih pojmova ostaje nepotpuna i nedovoljno razrađena, te ih on ostavlja bez jasnog terminološkog određenja. U svojoj knjizi on klasifikuje identitete na lične ili korporativne, tipske, identitet uloge i kolektivni identitet. Međutim, ovo se pre može posmatrati kao stepenovani identitet, a ne kao potpuno različite vrste. Svi polaze od ličnog/korporativnog kao osnove, a kolektivni, kao najviši stepen, u sebi nužno obuhvata, osim ličnog/korporativnog, i identitete tipa i uloga.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 287.

⁶⁶ Isto, str. 154.

⁶⁷ Isto, str. 292.

⁶⁸ Isto, str. 284.

⁶⁹ Nevena Stanković, „Konceptualna analiza identiteta i interesa u delu Aleksandra Venta”, *Politeia*, Vol. 9, No. 18 (2019): 137–154.

ZAKLJUČAK – ŠTA OSTAJE?

Konstruktivizam Aleksandra Venta možda nije uspeo da se nametne kao nova sveobuhvatna „velika teorija” (engl. *Grand Theory*),⁷⁰ ali bez sumnje konstruktivizam ostaje značajan pristup i u ovom veku. Da ta ocena nije bez osnova govori nam podatak da su ga među tri vodeće teorije/paradigme međunarodnih odnosa na početku ovog veka svrstali i Stiven Volt (*Stephen M. Walt*),⁷¹ Džozef Naj (*Joseph Nye*)⁷² i Džek Snajder (*Jack Snyder*).⁷³

Polazeći od Ventovog pristupa, dalji rad istraživača doveo je do novog konstruktivizma i poziva Dejvida MekKorta (*David McCourt*) na „praktičko-relacioni obrt”, te on kao glavne iskorake predlaže razmatranje teorija praksi i odnosa i mogućnost prevazilaženja problematičnih dihotomija materijalno-ideaciono i delatnik-struktura. Ovaj obrt iz ugla novog konstruktivizma je potreban zato što konstruktivizam biva pretežno shvaćen pomoću ontologije koja uzima identitet, normu i kulturu kao predmet proučavanja.⁷⁴ Dakle, MekKort ide korak dalje od Venta, odnosno od statičnih modela tradicionalnog konstruktivizma, ka dinamičnijem, relacionom razumevanju društvene stvarnosti, u kojoj se strukture i identiteti stalno menjaju i ponovo pregovaraju kroz praksu.⁷⁵ Odavde vidimo da glavna linija razmimoilaženja sa Ventom jeste u njegovom ontološkom pogledu na materijalne strukture koje i dalje imaju uticaj na delatnike, kao i njegovom oprezu sa kojim pristupa mogućim promenama kao posledicom praksi.

Valja reći i da je, sa svojom usmerenošću na relacione odnose i prakse, novi konstruktivizam manje zainteresovan za davanje velike sveobuhvatne teorije međunarodnih odnosa, što je još jedna razlika u odnosu na Ventov pristup. Ovo je u vezi i sa novijim raspravama oko toga da li nam je potrebna jedna velika teorija međunarodnih odnosa ili treba težiti teorijskom plura-

⁷⁰ Marinko Raos, „Umjereni konstruktivizam Alexandera Wendta”, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 112, 139.

⁷¹ Stephen M. Walt, „International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998), pp. 29–46.

⁷² Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: an Introduction to Theory and History*, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 6.

⁷³ Jack Snyder, „One World, Rival Theories”, *Foreign Policy* (November/December, 2004), pp. 53–62.

⁷⁴ Marko Kovačević, „Međunarodni odnosi u doba teorijskog pluralizma: o stanju discipline i glavnim raspravama početkom 21. veka”, *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. 69, No. 2–3 (2017): 181–205.

⁷⁵ David M. McCourt, „Practice theory and relationalism as the new constructivism”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2016): 475–485.

lizmu. Na stanovištu pluralizma i dijaloga u teoriji međunarodnih odnosa, Kovačević tvrdi da je danas „literatura saglasna da se nalazimo u dobu teorij-skog pluralizma u kojem kohabitiraju različiti 'izmi', što je, ipak, u suprotnosti sa pojedinim mišljenjima da su međunarodni odnosi u krizi ili da se bliže kraju jer ne postoji jedna velika, 'saborna' teorija međunarodnih odnosa”.⁷⁶

Ako i sam priznaje da nijedan pristup nije bolji od onog drugog, već da se jednostavno razlikuju,⁷⁷ da li je onda uopšte moguće ponuditi sveobuhvatnu teoriju složenih međunarodnih odnosa? I da li je to uopšte bila namera Aleksandra Venta, što pojedini autori koriste u svrhu kritike? Zaista, centralno pitanje Ventove knjige bilo je – „uzevši u obzir interesovanja slična Volcovim, tj. teoriju sistema država i njihovo objašnjenje, ali različitu ontologiju, koja je onda rezultirajuća teorija međunarodne politike”?⁷⁸ Dakle, onda bi korektno bilo i dati ocenu na osnovu uspešnosti odgovora na pitanje koje je sam postavio. Ispravno se može postaviti pitanje da li je do takve teorije uopšte moguće doći, ili možda još bolje – da li nam je takva konačna rezultirajuća teorija uopšte potrebna? Behnke je Ventov pokušaj ocenio anahroničnim, jer su bogatstvo i snaga discipline međunarodnih odnosa zapravo u mnoštvu perspektiva i pristupa koji su odraz neprestano rastuće višestranosti predmeta nazvanog globalna politika.⁷⁹ Deluje kao da Vent na samom startu možda nije najsrećnije postavio istraživačko pitanje, ili ga je pak sam proces doveo do odgovora na neka važnija ili pak korisnija pitanja – razumevanje promene u međunarodnim odnosima, uvođenje pitanja (promenljivosti) identiteta u disciplinu, doveo je u pitanje tradicionalne pristupe u oblasti međunarodnih odnosa koji su se i revidirali nakon toga... A možda je i najveći doprinos konstruktivizma što je razobličio i denaturalizovao datosti koje su do tada u međunarodnim odnosima posmatrane kao prirodne i prihvaćene zdravo za gotovo, te su samim tim nakon toga postale legitiman predmet istraživanja. Tako i Naj, iako tvrdi da je konstruktivizam pre pristup nego teorija, svrstava ga rame uz rame sa glavnim teorijama realizma i liberalizma, jer nas konstruktivistički pristupi podsećaju na ono što dve glavne teorije često propuštaju.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ David M. McCourt. “Practice theory and relationalism as the new constructivism”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2016): 195.

⁷⁷ Aleksandar Vent, *Društvena teorija međunarodne politike*, nav. delo, str. 22.

⁷⁸ Isto, str. 6.

⁷⁹ Andreas Behnke, “Grand Theory in the age of its impossibility: contemplations on Alexander Wendt”, in: Guzzini, S., Leander, A. (Eds.), *Constructivism and International Relations*, (London i New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 56; Božo Kovačević, „Šta je to novo u konstruktivizmu”, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 67.

⁸⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: an Introduction to Theory and History*, op. cit., p. 8.

Iako neke zamerke možemo prihvatiti kao legitimne – da ne otkriva uzroke, sklonost preteranom teoretizovanju i retroaktivnost, odnosno loš za predviđanja, deluje nam kao suviše oštra ocena da od Ventovog konstruktivizma nakon ozbiljne kritike ne bi previše toga ostalo,⁸¹ te da konstruktivizam nije ništa više do razmatranje različitih teorija koje se bave proučavanjem društvenih pojava, uključujući i međunarodne odnose.⁸² Ako očekujemo da pronademo neku novu metateoriju koja će staviti tačku na, pre svega ontološke, polemike različitih pristupa u međunarodnim odnosima, čak i ako to i jeste bio cilj samog Venta, razočaraćemo se, i u tom slučaju konstruktivizam je uistinu pobudio znatno više očekivanja nego što je ponudio njihovih ispunjenja.⁸³ Ali ako konstruktivizam Aleksandra Venta oslobodimo tih sasvim nepotrebnih zahteva videćemo da on i te kako i dalje ima šta da nam ponudi kao vredna polazna osnova za dalja istraživanja (što u novom konstruktivizmu već jeste), i to posebno ona, uže ili šire posmatrano, usmerena na legitimna pitanja promene i identiteta u međunarodnoj politici, a to je i više nego dovoljno da se u doba teorijskog pluralizma ne odrekemo Ventovog konstruktivizma.

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⁸¹ Marinko Raos, „Umjereni konstruktivizam Alexandera Wendta”, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 141.

⁸² Božo Kovačević, „Šta je to novo u konstruktivizmu”, u: *Konstruktivističke teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, str. 77.

⁸³ Isto, str. 78

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THE ALEXANDER WENT'S CONSTRUCTIVISM
A QUARTER OF A CENTURY AFTER HIS BOOK
"SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS"

Abstract

This paper aims to critically and problematically look at the constructivist approach in international relations, with special attention to "thin" constructivism or "truncated" materialism, which was offered by Alexander Wendt in his well-known book *"Social Theory of International Politics"* a quarter of a century ago and thus questioned traditional approaches that were reflected in the importance attached to the structure of the international order. In addition, criticisms and already given evaluations of Wendt's constructivism will be reviewed, with the aim of seeing from this time distance what remains the greatest contribution of constructivism in the study of international relations. Thus, the largest part of the work will be devoted to those aspects of the approach that, in our opinion, have left the biggest mark on the discipline – understanding changes and concepts of national interest and identity.

Keywords:

constructivism, Alexander Wendt, social theory of international politics, theories, international relations, identity, national interest.

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Odnos Hindu nacionalizma i demokratskog nazadovanja u Indiji

Apstrakt

Nakon Drugog svetskog rata i povlačenja Britanske imperije iz regiona Južne Azije kroz proces dekolonizacije, nastali su Indija i Pakistan kao nezavisne države. Od svoje nezavisnosti, pa do početka 21. veka, Indiju je karakterisao demokratski politički poredak, po čemu je u kontinuitetu bila izuzetak u regionu Južne i Jugoistočne Azije, gde su države većinski u kontinuitetu pod vlašću različitih vrsti autoritarnih režima. Međutim, rapidan porast Hindu nacionalizma u ovoj državi javio se u prethodnim godinama u svojoj izrazito naglašenoj formi. U korelaciji sa ovim procesom, Indija je zabeležila i postepeno povlačenje demokratije i rast autoritarnih tendencija, što se može videti u izveštajima organizacije *Freedom House* iz godine u godinu. Ovaj rad će pokušati da utvrdi da li su ova dva procesa u uzročno posledičnoj vezi i da li uspon Hindu nacionalizma koji je počeo u prethodnoj deceniji ima uticaja i na sve vidljivije demokratsko nazadovanje u Indiji.

Ključne reči:

Hindu nacionalizam, Indija, demokratsko nazadovanje, autoritarizam, Narendra Modi

UVOD

Nakon sticanja nezavisnosti 1947. godine, Indija je izgradila reputaciju najstabilnije demokratije u Južnoj Aziji, zasnovane na sekularnim vrednostima i političkoj inkluzivnosti. U periodu kada su se mnoge susedne zemlje odlučno

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okretale autoritarnim režimima, Indija je održavala demokratski poredak, uprkos unutrašnjim etničkim i religijskim napetostima. Međutim, poslednjih godina dolazi do naglog porasta Hindu nacionalizma, najizraženijeg kroz političko delovanje stranke Indijske narodne partije (BJP) i njenog lidera Narendre Modija. Ovaj politički pokret snažno promoviše hinduističke vrednosti, često u suprotnosti sa originalnim sekularnim temeljem indijskog društva.

Osnovna hipoteza ovog rada je da Hindu nacionalizam ne samo da prati demokratsko nazadovanje ove države, već ima uzročno-posledičnu vezu s njim. Naime, dolazak BJP-a na vlast prate autokratske tendencije koje se ogledaju u ograničavanju medijskih sloboda, suzbijanju opozicionih glasova i marginalizaciji muslimanske manjine kroz diskriminatorne politike. Ove promene nisu slučajne, već reflektuju dugoročni cilj Hindu nacionalizma da redefiniše identitet indijske države kao pretežno hinduističke i kulturno homogene, a ne građanske i sekularne države kakva je bila njena inicijalna vizija. Autoritarne politike u ovom kontekstu postaju sredstvo za učvršćivanje ideološke dominacije i eliminaciju sekularnog nasleđa.

Kroz analizu institucionalnih i društvenih promena, rad će razmotriti u kojoj meri Hindu nacionalizam predstavlja ključni uzrok novijeg demokratskog nazadovanja u Indiji. Rad istražuje kako ideološka baza Hindu nacionalizma oblikuje savremenu indijsku državu i njene vrednosti, ali i kakve su posledice tog trenda za budućnost indijske demokratije i sekularizma.

POVLAČENJE BRITANIJE I UTICAJ NA DVE VIZIJE INDIJE

Britanska imperija nakon Drugog svetskog rata pretrpela je ogromne gubitke kao posledice višegodišnjih sukoba i postepenog relativnog slabljenja. Takva posledica ovih promenjenih okolnosti bilo je evidentno globalno slabljenje njene pozicije, koje se prvo manifestovalo u najdaljim regionima imperije, odnosno kolonijama. Ogromno interkontinentalno carstvo je krenulo u proces erozije i širom svetskih kolonizovanih regiona probuđena je antikolonijalna svest kod lokalnih elita domicilnog stanovništva.

Sličan sentiment javio se i u regionu Južne Azije, naročito na Indijskom supkontinentu, gde su se ispoljili različiti oblici otpora domicilnog stanovništva i želja za nezavisnošću od svog kolonijalnog centra.¹ Kroz pritisak nenasilnog otpora, prvenstveno u današnjoj Indiji, uz finansijski istrošeni imperijalni centar, pritisak je proizveo rezultate. Već početkom 1940-ih razmatrane su različite ideje povećanja autonomije Indije u različitim formama, jer je

¹ Mourya R. and Mittal J. P. (2020). *Partition of India – cause, and effect*, Universe International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Vol. 1, Issue 8, pp. 19–24.

nezadovoljstvo kolonijalnim statusom bilo veoma vidljivo i tokom Drugog svetskog rata od strane lokalnih elita.² Prvi posleratni premijer, laburista Klement Atli, zatražio je da se pronađe adekvatno rešenje za indijsko pitanje, koje ne bi obuhvatalo podelu. Pritisak za kolonijalni centar je bio visok i evidentno povlačenje u blažoj ili radikalnijoj formi je bio jasan i vidljiv ishod.

Ta tendencija se u ovom mnogoljudnom regionu brzo i ispunila, jer je već 1947. Britanska imperija napustila Indiju pod pritiskom lokalne populacije. Kroz svoj „Zakon o indijskoj nezavisnosti” od 18. jula 1947. određena je podela Indije na dve zasebne države u novim granicama, što je predstavljalo promenu u odnosu na originalnu ideju premijera Atlija.³ Britanska imperija ovaj region podelila je na Indiju, koja je po planu trebalo da zauzme većinske Hindu teritorije i koja je zauzimala centralni deo bivšeg kolonijalnog dominiona. Zapadni i istočni deo kolonijalnih teritorija, u kojima su većinu činili muslimani, pripali su novoj državi Pakistan, koja je obuhvatala etnički vrlo heterogene geografske oblasti.⁴

Podela bivše kolonijalne teritorije definisane kroz Zakon o indijskoj nezavisnosti iz 1947. gotovo je odmah stvorila izazove za novouspostavljene države.⁵ Neki od navedenih problema su svakako ogromne migracije koje su usledile odmah nakon proglašenja nezavisnosti novih država, religijski motivisano nasilje u različitim regionima, teritorijalni sporovi i konflikt koji se nastavio i u decenijama nakon dekolonizacije.⁶ Milioni stanovnika su menjali svoje mesto prebivališta u skladu sa religijskom pripadnošću, što je kao posledicu imalo kaos, lokalno nasilje i ogromne zločine, što je, po različitim procenama odnelo između nekoliko stotina hiljada do nekoliko miliona života.⁷ Tadašnja populacija celokupne kolonijalne Indije iznosila je nešto više od 300 miliona stanovnika, što ovaj udeo žrtvi čini dodatno relevantnim podatkom.⁸

² Mourya R. and Mittal J. P. (2020). *Partition of India – cause, and effect*, Universe International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Vol. 1, Issue 8, p. 21.

³ Ibidem, p. 22.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Philip B. Calkins and Frank Raymond Allchin, *India – Government and politics*, Britannica, London. Available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/India/Government-and-politics> (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

⁶ Mourya R. and Mittal J. P. (2020). *Partition of India – cause, and effect*, Universe International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Vol. 1, Issue 8, pp. 19–24.

⁷ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

⁸ Razib Khan, *Why the West lost India's culture wars*, Unherd, London, Available from: <https://unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

Takođe, važan faktor u daljim sukobima između različitih zajednica unutar navedenih država i između njih samih proizlazi iz prethodnog kolonijalnog načina upravljanja i kriterijuma po kojima su etničke zajednice zakonom deljene (najčešće po religijskim kriterijumima).⁹ Pre same podela Indije postojao je jasan sukob između prvenstveno muslimanske zajednice organizovane u Sveindijsku muslimansku ligu i, sa druge strane, različitih većinski Hindu organizacija, kao što su umereni i sekularni Indijski nacionalni kongres (najčešće poznat samo kao Kongres) i različite radikalne Hindu organizacije.¹⁰ Različite vizije o budućnosti hipotetičke države Indije su kroz prethodne dekade dovodile do različitih sukoba, pritisaka na kolonijalnu vlast i u potpunosti različitih formi organizovanja nove države. Podela Indije na dve države se iz tog razloga može opisati i kao proizvod, sa jedne strane, britanskog pragmatizma, a sa druge, pritisaka različitih lokalnih etničkih grupa i njihovih organizacija za takvim rešenjem.¹¹

Nove države, Indija i Pakistan, prvenstveno su ušle u međusobne sukobe zbog spornih teritorija, gde je stanovništvo bilo religijski heterogeno. Od samog početka, pitanje Kašmira ostaje kao sporno, odnosno opredeljivanje ove zasebne teritorije da postane deo Indije, iako je većinski naseljeno stanovništvom islamske veroispovesti.¹² Dve novouspostavljene države su u oktobru iste godine nastanka već stupile u oružani sukob oko oblasti Kašmira, odnosno bivše države Džamu i Kašmir, koji do današnjeg dana ostaje sporna teritorija i predmet zamrznutog konflikta. U međuvremenu, Istočni Pakistan postaje nova država, Bangladeš, 1971. u ratu za nezavisnost protiv centralne vlasti Pakistana u Islamabadu, u kom je i Indija učestvovala sa strane novoformirane države Bangladeš.¹³

U takvom neizvesnom i trusnom okruženju, razvijaju se različite vizije indijske države i njene budućnosti kao nezavisne države. Različite vizije indijske državnosti i ideje šta bi ona trebalo da predstavlja mogu se tumačiti i iz ugla praktičnosti zbog spoljašnjih izazovnih okolnosti i iz ugla različitih vrednosnih koncepata različitih delova indijske političke i kulturne elite. Kao demokratska država od svog začetka, Indija je u svojoj političkoj istoriji nezavisnosti imala izazov da balansira ove dve, najvećim delom međusobno isključive ide-

⁹ Mourya R. and Mittal J. P. (2020). *Partition of India – cause, and effect*, Universe International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Vol. 1, Issue 8, pp. 19–24.

¹⁰ Ibidem, pp. 20–21.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 24.

¹² Philip B. Calkins and Frank Raymond Allchin, *India – Government and politics*, Britannica, London. Available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/India/Government-and-politics> (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

¹³ Ibid. (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

je. Različite interpretacije indijske državnosti predstavljaju i najvećim delom različite koncepte društvenog uređenja, od statusa različitih etničkih zajednica do oblika političkog sistema.¹⁴

U poslednjim godinama primetan je rast Hindu nacionalizma utemeljenog na više religijsko-ekskluzivističkoj Hindu viziji ove države nego na sekularnom i inkluzivnom modelu nacije karakterističnom za prvi posleratni period.¹⁵ Ova ideja ima svoju tradiciju još iz perioda pre kolonizacije, ali nikada nije uspevala da dobije potrebnu političku predstavljenost da bude glavna vizija unutar indijske politike zbog velike institucionalne početne prednosti druge političke strane (Kongresa). Od dolaska novog lidera, Narendre Modija, na vlast u ovoj državi, primetno je da se paralelno sa dominacijom ove vizije države javlja i jasan autoritaran zaokret.¹⁶ Ono što se logično postavlja kao pitanje vredno analize je da li su autoritarne tendencije i povlačenje demokratije u ovoj državi dobrim delom povezani i sa dominacijom Hindu nacionalizma ili su u pitanju procesi koji nisu u potpunosti kauzalni.

RAZLIČITE VIZIJE INDIJSKE NACIJE I HINDU NACIONALIZAM

Od osnivanje Indije kao nezavisne države postojale su različite vizije kako bi ova država trebalo da bude organizovana i u kojoj vrednosnoj formi. Na samom početku, osnovano pitanje se postavilo oko religijskih razlika između različitih delova populacije i kako bi nova država trebalo da tretira ove grupe. Indija je još kao britanski kolonijalni posed imala većinsko Hindu stanovništvo, sa značajnom domicilnom manjinom muslimanske veroispovesti, uz prisustvo i drugih manjina poput Sika ili hrišćanske populacije.¹⁷ Međureligijske napetosti, koje su decenijama vladale između dve najveće grupe, hinduista i muslimana, predstavljale su ozbiljnu prepreku za harmoniju unutar hipoteti-

¹⁴ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

¹⁵ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

¹⁶ Nielsen G. A. (2021). *India's Trajectories of Change, 2004–2019*, in: Williams M. and Satgar V. (Eds.), *Destroying Democracy Neoliberal Capitalism and the Rise of Authoritarian Politics*. Wits University Press, pp. 131–139.

¹⁷ Philip B. Calkins and Frank Raymond Allchin, *India – Government and politics*, Britannica, London. Available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/India/Government-and-politics> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

čke jedinstvene države.¹⁸ Međutim, kao rešenje za ovo pitanje, većinska Hindu elita imala je dva različita pristupa. Jedan pristup je težio da pomiri ove razlike i da od Indije stvori inkluzivnu multietničku i multikonfesionalnu demokratsku državu, dok je drugi pristup više težio da naglasi etnički i religijski identitet Hindu većine i jedan vid kulturne majorizacije.

Prvi pristup karakterisao je lidere Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa, kao političku grupaciju koja je okupljala najveći deo vodećih lidera u borbi za nezavisnost protiv britanske vlasti. Kao najmoćnija politička grupacija, okupljala je političke vođe poput Mahatma Gandija ili Džavaharlala Nehrua, prvog premijera Indije kao nezavisne države.¹⁹ Od svojih početaka krajem 19. veka, ova politička grupacija je u kontinuitetu zastupala sekularnu i inkluzivniju viziju indijske države.²⁰ Ta vizija se oslanjala na svojevrсни građanski indijski nacionalni identitet, demokratski poredak, inkluzivan pristup prema ostalim zajednicama u odnosu na Hindu zajednicu, kao i generalno levičarski pristup ekonomiji.²¹ S obzirom na to da je Indijski nacionalni kongres bio vladajuća partija od proglašenja nezavisnosti Indije, pa sve do početka 1970-ih, kada tek prvi put gubi vlast, ova vizija indijske države bila je predominantna.²² Kroz svoje javne politike, lideri ove partije uspevali su da manje ili više prevaziđu velike razlike unutar stanovništva Indije i ponude modernizatorski građanski identitet kao alternativu politički prisutnom tvrdom religijski utemeljenom nacionalizmu.²³

Ovaj pokušaj izgradnje nacionalnog identiteta po ugledu na različita zapadna društva nije pojava koja nema uzročno-poslednične veze sa povezanošću partijskih lidera sa zapadnoevropskim državama. Iako su lideri ove stranke bili protiv britanske kolonijalne uprave i za nezavisnost Indije, značajan deo lidera iz ovih redova svoje visoko obrazovanje stekao je na vodećim evropskim univerzitetima, odakle mnogi tumače poreklo kosmopolitskih i reformskih stavova ove partije.²⁴ Primer za to je svakako Džavaharlala Nehru, sa svojim obrazovanjem sa Triniti koledža, Univerziteta Kembridž, koji je u

¹⁸ Mourya R. and Mittal J. P. (2020). *Partition of India – cause, and effect*, Universe International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Vol. 1, Issue 8, str. 19–24.

¹⁹ Bose S. (2013). *Transforming India – Challenges to the World's Largest Democracy*, Harvard University Press, pp. 11–23.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

²² Ibidem, pp. 2–3.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Razib Khan, *Why the West lost India's culture wars*, Unherd, London, Available from: <https://unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

tom periodu bio blisko povezan sa britanskim levičarskim Fabijanskim društvom.²⁵ Njegov vid levičarske i kosmopolitske politike dobrim delom se uklapa u ideološke koncepte tadašnje zapadne levičarske misli. Slične biografije imaju i mnogi naredni lideri ove partije, poput Indire Gandhi ili Radživa Gandija sa sličnim prestižnim obrazovanjem i političkim stavovima.²⁶

Indijski nacionalni kongres je kao takva partija dobrim delom i bio svojevrsni klub progresivne, školovane i kulturološki prozapadne društvene elite, koji je kroz svoju politiku težio da na sličan način modernizuje i Indiju nakon procesa dekolonizacije. Takođe, partija je bila i dobrim delom politički zastupnik interesa različitih etničkih manjina i njihov predstavnik u političkoj sferi.²⁷ Rezultat toga je da je premijer u ovoj državi postao i pripadnik manjine Sika, Manmohan Sing, i to u 10 godina dujoj vladavini.²⁸ Kao partija koja je simbol nezavisnosti Indije i odbrane ovog nasleđa, stranka je dugo uspevala da održava svoju dominaciju u političkom polju, koja tek od 1970-ih kreće da bude ozbiljnije izazivana i da periodično provodi periode u opoziciji.²⁹ Alternativna vizija Indije, koja sve vreme postoji u javnom prostoru još i pre povlačenja Britanije, tek je u poslednjih pola veka dobila i veoma jaku političku izbornu artikulaciju.

Na toj drugoj strani, unutar Indije sve vreme je postojao jak sentiment tvrdog Hindu nacionalizma koji je spajao etnički i religijski element ove većinske grupe na različite načine.³⁰ Zajedničko za različite političke grupacije koje su artikulisale ove pozicije je definisanje indijskog nacionalnog identiteta kroz dosta ekskluzivniji način, što je neretko imalo i svoja politički radikalna i polarizujuća izdanja. Najčešće manifestacije ovog radikalizma su se odlikovale u verskom fanatizmu koji se u više navrata izlivao u otvorene pogrome

²⁵ Razib Khan, *Why the West lost India's culture wars*, Unherd, London, Available from: <https://unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

²⁶ K. P. Sing, *Prime Ministers of India List From 1947 to 2022*, Sarkari List, New Delhi, Available from: <https://sarkarilist.in/prime-ministers-of-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

²⁷ Bose S. (2013). *Transforming India – Challenges to the World's Largest Democracy*, Harvard University Press, pp. 11–23.

²⁸ K. P. Sing, *Prime Ministers of India List From 1947 to 2022*, Sarkari List, New Delhi, Available from: <https://sarkarilist.in/prime-ministers-of-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

²⁹ Bose S. (2013). *Transforming India – Challenges to the World's Largest Democracy*, Harvard University Press, pp. 11–23.

³⁰ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

nad populacijom Sika ili češće nad islamskom manjinom.³¹ U svojoj blažoj formi, ovaj vid Hindu nacionalizma bio je artikulisan dosta umerenije kroz različite političke grupacije, koje su ciljale da promene sekularni i građanski republikanski *status quo* postavljen od strane Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa kroz više uzastopnih decenija vlasti ove stranke.

Najistaknutije političke grupacije koje su artikulisale ovaj alternativni vid ideologije su svakako stranka Indijska narodna partija (Bharatiya Janata Party), kao i velika krovna politička grupacija Nacionalna dobrovoljačka organizacija (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), koja ima svoje i političko, volontersko i paravojno krilo, kao i najširu terensku zastupljenost širom Indije.^{32,33} Unutar ovog vrednosnog bloka najšire zastupljena forma Hindu nacionalizma naziva se i Hindutva, nastala od strane ideologa ove grupacije, Vinajka Damodara Savarkara i jednog od ljudi optuženih za zaveru koja stoji iza ubistva Mahatma Gandija.³⁴ Hindutva ideologija predstavlja alternativnu interpretaciju indijske državnosti koja naglašava važnost i specifičnost Hindu kulture i religije u odnosu na druge, a koja se u različitim akademskim interpretacijama definiše i da predstavlja autentičnu hinduističku vrstu fašizma.³⁵

Iako Nacionalna dobrovoljačka organizacija, kao glavno organizaciono otelotvorenje Hindutva ideologije, nije uspela da dugo napravi političke uspehe, uspela je da stvori veliki društveni uticaj. Taj društveni uticaj u Indiji oslikavao se kroz veliku dobrovoljačku mrežu ljudi koji su bili aktivni u svojim zajednicama, a naročito tokom kriza.³⁶ Grupacija je od praktično zabranjene u vreme vlasti Džavaharlala Nehrua, zbog učešća jednog od bivših dobrovoljaca organizacije u ubistvu Mahatma Gandija, postala za samo nekoliko decenija ogromna politička parastruktura.³⁷ Različite krize, poput kriza u Kašmiru ili priliva Hindu izbeglica iz nestabilnih indijskih regiona, često su služile da kod

³¹ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, pp. 2–3.

³² Ibid.

³³ Nielsen B. K. and Nielsen G. A. (2021). *Hindu nationalist statecraft and Modi's authoritarian populism*, Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia, Routledge, pp. 92–98.

³⁴ Razib Khan, *Why the West lost India's culture wars*, Unherd, London, Available from: <https://unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

³⁵ Nielsen B. K. and Nielsen G. A. (2021). *Hindu nationalist statecraft and Modi's authoritarian populism*, Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia, Routledge, pp. 92–98.

³⁶ Ibidem, pp. 92–93.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 93.

širokih slojeva stanovništva ojačaju prihvaćenost ove tvrđe vrste Hindu nacionalizma koju su promovisali politički krugovi oko Nacionalne dobrovoljačke organizacije.³⁸ Ovi krugovi su počeli da ređaju prve pobede 1970-ih, povežu mandate na vlasti u drugoj polovini 1990-ih, ali svoj definitivni vrhunac, a možda i trajniju pobjedu, sa dolaskom na vlasti Narendre Modija i njegove Indijske narodne partije 2014.³⁹

Hindutva nacionalizam sa novim premijerom Indije dobija dosta bolju promociju, veću inkorporiranost u javnu politiku i postepeno počinje da bude kriterijum i za donošenje važnih političkih odluka.⁴⁰ Nova vlast donosi nove javne politike i promene naročito u sferi odnosa prema manjini islamske veroispovesti, odnosu prema Kašmiru i njenoj autonomiji, kao i ulozi vojske u društvu.⁴¹ U ovim oblastima Hindutva nacionalizam ima veliki uticaj i praktičnu primenu.⁴² Velike promene se dešavaju postepeno i u političkom uređenju u istom vremenskom okviru. Ovaj zaokret od 2014. predstavlja dosadašnji najveći otklon od nasleđa delovanja partije Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa i njenih lidera kroz period nezavisnosti.

INDIJSKI POLITIČKI SISTEM I STANJE DEMOKRATIJE

Jedno od nasleđa posleratne nezavisne Indije je demokratski politički poredak i sekularno uređenje, koje je predstavljalo svojevrsni izuzetak u ovom regionu. Nakon dekolonizacije u Južnoj i Jugoistočnoj Aziji, nove nezavisne države po pravilu su uspostavljale autoritarne poretke. Bilo da se radilo o vojnim režimima, socijalističkim diktaturama ili proameričkim autoritarnim liderima, zajednička karakteristika su bili sistemi koji su više cenili stabilnost od individualnih sloboda.⁴³ Čak i Pakistan, koji je pod vizijom Muhameda

³⁸ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

³⁹ Nielsen B. K. and Nielsen G. A. (2021). *Hindu nationalist statecraft and Modi's authoritarian populism*, Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia, Routledge, pp. 92–98.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, pp. 95–96.

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 96.

⁴² Nielsen G. A. (2021). *India's Trajectories of Change, 2004–2019*, in: Williams M. and Satgar V. (Eds.), *Destroying Democracy Neoliberal Capitalism and the Rise of Authoritarian Politics*. Wits University Press, pp. 131–139.

⁴³ Philip B. Calkins and Frank Raymond Allchin, *India – Government and politics*, Britannica, London. Available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/India/Government-and-politics> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

Ali Džina, osnivača Pakistana i lidera Sveindijske muslimanske lige, imao u početku cilj da postane sekularna republika slična Turskoj Mustafe Kemala Atatürku, relativno brzo je dobijala sve veće islamske uticaje.⁴⁴ Ta transformacija je veoma brzo tekla u godinama nakon sticanja nezavisnosti 1947, te je i dan-danas zakonski preduslov za predsedničku poziciju predstavlja islamska veroispovest.⁴⁵

Na drugoj strani, Indija je uspela da uspostavi demokratski poredak i državu načelno po ugledu na zapadnoevropske demokratije. Indija je neposredno nakon dobijanja nezavisnosti donela svoj ustav, koji je uz određene amandmane i dan-danas na snazi.⁴⁶ Indija je od svojih početaka definisana kao parlamentarna republika sa premijerom na čelu izvršne vlasti i predsednikom kao šefom države. Takođe, politička moć je podeljena između centralne vlasti i regionalnih vlasti saveznih država, koje predstavljaju različite istorijske i kulturne regione, a neretko i religijski specifične. Regioni su predstavljeni u gornjem domu parlamenta „Savetu država” (Rajya Sabha), dok donji dom, nazvan Narodna skupština (Lok Sabha), predstavlja direktno izabrane predstavnike građana. Indijski ustav takođe garantuje nezavisno pravosuđe i na čelu ove grane nalazi se Vrhovni sud koji se brine da ustav bude zaštićen i da rešava sporove između centralne vlasti i saveznih država.⁴⁷

Kroz ovakav vid društvenog uređenja, koje je uz sve manjkavosti nastavilo da postoji u kontinuitetu praktično sedam decenija, indijska demokratija se pokazala kao relativno otporna na brojne probleme. Kada je Indija postala nezavisna država njena populacija iznosila je 340 miliona ljudi, od čega je manje od 20% građana bilo pismeno, a, iako mnogoljudna, činila je tek par procenata globalnog BDP-a.⁴⁸ Uz pogranične konflikte, unutrašnje međureligijske sukobe i česte masovne gladi, postojali su rizici da ova država takođe skrene u neku formu autoritarizma zarad postizanja stabilnosti.⁴⁹ Međutim, indijska

⁴⁴ Akturk S. (2015). *Religion and Nationalism- Contradictions of Islamic Origins and Secular Nation-Building in Turkey, Algeria and Pakistan*, The Social Science Quarterly, Volume 96, pp. 778–806.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 781.

⁴⁶ Philip B. Calkins and Frank Raymond Allchin, *India – Government and politics*, Britannica, London. Available from: <https://www.britannica.com/place/India/Government-and-politics> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁴⁷ Ibid. (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁴⁸ Razib Khan, *Why the West lost India's culture wars*, Unherd, London, Available from: <https://unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁴⁹ Bose S. (2013). *Transforming India – Challenges to the World's Largest Democracy*, Harvard University Press, pp. 11–23.

elita oličena u stranci Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa, uspevala je da ovu državu održi kao jedan vid vestfalske nacionalne države, iako je njena demokratija od samog početka imala određene felere.⁵⁰

Jedna od konstantnih mana indijskog političkog sistema je bila apsolutna dominacija Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa, koja je trajala od ostvarivanja nezavisnosti do perioda uspona Narendre Modija i njegove Indijske narodne partije.⁵¹ Ovaj period apsolutne političke dominacije bio je privremeno prekidan u nekoliko navrata, kao što je bio slučaj u kratkom periodu od 1977. do 1980, krajem 1980-ih i drugoj polovini 1990-ih i početkom 2000-ih, kada je prvi premijer koji nije član Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa, Atal Bihari Vadžpaji, uspeo da odsluži ceo mandat i ostane na vlasti.^{52,53,54} Međutim, partija se brzo vratila na vlast pod partijskim liderstvom Sonje Gandhi, da bi izgubila svoje pozicije sa dosta većim političkim gubitkom pod vođstvom Raula Gandija u duelu sa Narendrom Modijem u usponu.⁵⁵

Jedan od velikih izazova za demokratiju u Indiji bio je i svojevrsni nepotizam glavne političke partije, gde je Indijski nacionalni kongres kao stranka konstantne vlasti dobrim delom bio i dinastijska partija. Naravno, radi se o tome da je čak šest lidera stranke dolazilo iz redova porodice Nehru i Gandhi, što je sa jedne strane, bila simbolika u odnosu na nasleđe dekolonizacije i nezavisnosti Indije.⁵⁶ Sa druge strane, ovo je predstavljalo svojevrsnu kartelizaciju politike, koja je stvarala populističkog potencijala među građanstvom.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Bose S. (2013). *Transforming India – Challenges to the World's Largest Democracy*, Harvard University Press, p. 19.

⁵¹ Ibidem, pp 11–23.

⁵² K. P. Sing, *Prime Ministers of India List From 1947 to 2022*, Sarkari List, New Delhi, Available from: <https://sarkarilist.in/prime-ministers-of-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁵³ India Votes, *Indian Election Data and Results*, India votes, New Delhi, Available from: <https://www.indiavotes.com/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁵⁴ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

⁵⁵ India Votes, *Indian Election Data and Results*, India votes, New Delhi, Available from: <https://www.indiavotes.com/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁵⁶ Sruthi Radhakrishnan, *Presidents of Congress past: A look at the party's presidency since 1947*, Hindu, New Delhi, Available from: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/presidents-of-congress-past-a-look-at-the-partys-presidency-since-1947/article21639174.ece> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁵⁷ Razib Khan, *Why the West lost India's culture wars*, Unherd, London, Available from: <https://unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

To je naročito bilo vidljivo pred kraj mandata premijera Manmohana Singa, kada se među glasačima postavilo pitanje efikasnosti ove vlasti i da li je političkom establišmentu potrebno poslati protestnu poruku.⁵⁸

Ipak, uprkos svim navedenim manjkavostima, po izveštajima organizacije Freedom House, Indija je dugo bila kategorizovana kao slobodna i demokratska država i po većini kriterijuma bila je veoma dobro rangirana, naročito u poređenju sa državama svog regiona.⁵⁹ Eroziya društvenih sloboda po izveštajima ove organizacije počinje 2014, sa dolaskom Narendre Modija i padom Indijskog kongresa sa vlasti, a značajno se ubrzava od 2019. do danas po pitanjima porasta nasilja i diskriminatorne politike koje pogađaju muslimansku populaciju, kao i sprovođenje represije nad izrazima neslaganja od strane medija, akademske zajednice, grupa civilnog društva i demonстраната.⁶⁰ Od 2021. ova država je kao posledicu navedenih tendencija kategorizovana 2021. od Freedom House (Freedom House) kao „delimično slobodna” od slobodne, kao i od strane V-dem instituta kao „izborna autokratija” u istom vremenskom periodu.⁶¹

Za dugo godina dominantnu partiju Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa uvek važio je da nije imala u potpunosti dubinsku i široku podršku građana, koliko je imala institucionalne i patronažne moći koja je uvek poboljšavala njen izborni doseg.⁶² Međutim, ukoliko se pogledaju izborni rezultati kroz decenije, vidljivo je da ova partija nikada nije uspevala da dobija natpolovičnu podršku samostalno.⁶³ Kao takva, može se pretpostaviti da je bila ranjiva na populistički opozicioni potencijal, koji bi u slučaju dostizanja sličnog nivoa resursa i institucionalne moći mogao da ima drastično veće uspehe. Ono što se, naravno, uvek postavljalo kao rizik je da li bi takva populistička smena bila destruktivna po indijsku demokratiju i odvela je u autoritarizam ili bi unela dodatne dinamike u demokratiju koja je imala određene probleme zbog

⁵⁸ Nielsen G. A. (2021). *India's Trajectories of Change, 2004–2019*, in: Williams M. and Satgar V. (Eds.), *Destroying Democracy Neoliberal Capitalism and the Rise of Authoritarian Politics*. Wits University Press, pp. 131–139.

⁵⁹ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2021*, Freedom House, Washington D.C. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2021> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁶⁰ Ibid. (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

⁶¹ The Wire Staff, *India Is No Longer a Democracy but an 'Electoral Autocracy': Swedish Institute*, The Wire, New York, Available from: <https://thewire.in/rights/india-no-longer-democracy-electoral-autocracy-v-dem-institute-report-bjp-narendra-modi> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁶² Bose S. (2013). *Transforming India – Challenges to the World's Largest Democracy*, Harvard University Press, pp. 11–23.

⁶³ Ibidem, pp. 11–12.

političke kartelizacije i nepotizma. Trenutne autoritarne tendencije, koje su se javile u prethodnih skoro deset godina, ukazuju da populistički uspon drugih snaga i erozija Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa možda i predstavljaju rizik za opstanje Indije kao demokratske, a možda i sekularne države. To govore sve aktuelniji spomenuti nalazi organizacija poput švedskog instituta V-dem ili američke organizacije Fridom Hausa.

DEMOKRATSKO NAZADOVANJE INDIJE I UTICAJ HINDU NACIONALIZMA

Dolazak na vlast Indijske narodne partije i njenog lidera Narendre Modija predstavlja novu eru politike u ovoj državi, bilo da se govori o istorijskoj smeni Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa, bilo da se radi o politički transformativnoj agendi ove nove vladajuće garniture. Prva primetna tendencija, koja dobija i međunarodnu pažnju, svakako je demokratsko nazadovanje koje primećuju i brojne međunarodne organizacije koje se bave merenjem stanja demokratije i ljudskih prava u različitim državama sveta, poput američke organizacije Fridom Hausa.⁶⁴ Na osnovu izveštaja ove organizacije iz prethodnih godina, primećeno je jasno demokratsko nazadovanje i danas se Indija kategorizuje ne više kao „slobodna”, već kao „delimično slobodna država”.⁶⁵ Razloga za to je nekoliko, a neki od glavnih uzroka koji ova organizacija identifikuju su: rastuće nasilje i diskriminatorna politika koja pogađa muslimansko stanovništvo, suzbijanje slobode izražavanja i neslaganja od strane medija, akademske zajednice, grupa civilnog društva i demonстранata.⁶⁶ Do sličnih zaključaka je došao i švedski institut V-Dem, koji danas zbog sličnih razloga Indiju kategorizuje kao „izbornu autokratiju”.⁶⁷

Na drugoj strani, primetni su i drugi vidovi rasta autoritarnih sentimenata i autoritarnih praksi vlasti, koji su povezani i sa dugoročnim ojačavanjem pozicije ove partije. Osim što se Indijska narodna partija oslanja na već veliku aktivističku mrežu prijateljske Nacionalne dobrovoljačke organizacije, brojne nove sistemske postavke će joj definitivno omogućiti dalju dominaciju u

⁶⁴ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2021*, Freedom House, Washington D.C. Available from: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2021> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁶⁵ Ibid. (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

⁶⁶ Ibid. (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

⁶⁷ The Wire Staff, *India Is No Longer a Democracy but an 'Electoral Autocracy': Swedish Institute*, The Wire, New York, Available from: <https://thewire.in/rights/india-no-longer-democracy-electoral-autocracy-v-dem-institute-report-bjp-narendra-modi> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

riziku daljeg demokratskog nazadovanja, kao što je apsolutna dominacija u medijima koji hvale vlast, a satanizuju opozicione glasove.⁶⁸ Ova stranka je, za razliku od Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa, vrlo lako došla do ubedljive vladajuće većine, sa 282 od 545 poslanika u Donjem domu 2014, da bi se ta većina uvećala 2019. na 303 od 545.⁶⁹

Ostvarivanju ovog vida političke suprematije, koja je u Indiji bila retkost, dobrim delom može se uzeti u obzir i korišćenje vojske od strane izvršne vlasti u političke svrhe. Tokom svog mandata, Modi je izvršio dva vojna napada u Kašmiru, čega su se prethodnici na čelu Indije mahom suzdržavali.⁷⁰ Takođe, tokom svoje vlasti ukinuo je autonomiju ovoj muslimanskoj većinskoj oblasti, uhapsio glavne političke lidere, što je naišlo na podršku opšte javnosti.⁷¹ Novim zakonima u sferi državljanstva, kroz brojne restrikcije i proceduralna ograničenja, više miliona ljudi islamske veroispovesti će ostati bez svog državljanstva.⁷² Kao lider koji je vodio region Gudžarat, u kom su se desili veliki religijski nemiri 2002, Narendra Modi je predstavljao lidera koji je dobro poznao političku dinamiku između ove dve zajednice postavljajući se kao zaštitnik Hindu zajednice.⁷³

Osim antimuslimanskih tendencija i autoritarnog zaokreta u sferi državne politike, najveći deo legitimiteta Narendra Modi i njegova Indijska narodna partija generisali su kroz obećanje o efikasnosti paralisane države i ekonomskom napretku. Njegova retorika bazirala se na predstavljanju sebe kao efikasnog tehnokrate koji će napraviti „ekonomsko čudo” na nivou Indije, kakvo je po svojim rečima napravio i u regionu Gudžarat, koji je vodio i koji jeste zabeležio visok ekonomski rast.^{74,75} U periodu prvog mandata Modija

⁶⁸ Abhimanyu Chandra, *Hindu Nationalism and Authoritarianism: Narendra Modi's Second – And Third – Term*, Blog London School of Economics. Available from: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionglobalsociety/2019/06/hindu-nationalism-and-authoritarianism-narendra-modis-second-and-third-term/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

⁶⁹ Ibid. (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

⁷⁰ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 2.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Razib Khan, *Why the West lost India's culture wars*, Unherd, London, Available from: <https://unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁷⁴ Nielsen B. K. and Nielsen G. A. (2021). *Hindu nationalist statecraft and Modi's authoritarian populism*, Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia, Routledge, pp. 92–98.

⁷⁵ Sud N. (2020). *The Actual Gujarat Model: Authoritarianism, Capitalism, Hindu Nationalism and Populism in the Time of Modi*, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Volume 52, pp. 125–126.

ekonomski rast i pad udela apsolutno siromašnih u Indiji su se desili, te se legitimizacija autoritarizma ekonomskim rezultatima i efikasnošću samo nastavila i produbila.⁷⁶ Međutim, postoje i kritike koje spore državne brojke po promjenjenoj metodologiji računanja rasta, ali perceptivno se održao utisak rasta u opštoj populaciji.⁷⁷ Ovaj ekonomski argument kao način legitimizacije vlasti, uz prethodno navedene antimuslimanske politike, autoritarni zaokret u načinu upravljanja državom, medijsku dominaciju i antiestablišment retorski pristup jesu faktori koji su zajedno omogućili demokratsko nazadovanje Indije u veoma kratkom roku. Međutim, ovi faktori predstavljaju samo simptome demokratskog nazadovanja i njegovu manifestaciju, ali ne predstavljaju nužno uzroke. Jedno od glavnih pitanja je da li ideološki element ove drugačije forme Hindu nacionalizma, koju promoviše Narendra Modi i njegova Indijska narodna partija, predstavlja glavni uzrok ovog demokratskog nazadovanja ili su u pitanju procesi koji se nalaze u korelaciji, ali između njih nema uzročno-posledične veze.

Kada se analiziraju ideologija i istorija Indijske narodne partije primetno je da je u pitanju kontinuirano ekskluzivistička ideologija i etnički i religijski partikularistička.⁷⁸ Samim tim, Hindutva koncept koji ova stranka zastupa, a čiji je Narendra Modi najuspešniji predstavnik, u samom startu nosi antidemokratsku ili barem antiliberalnu i antisekularnu osnovu. Iz tog razloga, restriktivne i čak otvoreno agresivne politike prema muslimanskoj manjini ne bi trebalo da budu iznenađenje. Iako je Indijska narodna partija oduvek svoju retoriku gradila na polarizaciji između Hindu zajednice i ostalih etničkih zajednica, na osnovu koraka ove partije na vlasti na saveznom nivou primetno je da je takva politika inkorporirana i u državnu politiku.⁷⁹ Ovi potezi mogu biti tumačeni kao politički izborni oportunizam, međutim, inkorporiranje ovih ideoloških Hindutva elemenata u državnu politiku svakako daju snage argumentu da je ideološka transformativna motivacija važna u donošenju ovakvih odluka.⁸⁰ Indijska narodna partija još od 1980-ih pokazuje svoje

⁷⁶ Bremmer I. (2018) – *Us vs them – The Failure of Globalism*, Penguin Random House, 86–87.

⁷⁷ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

⁷⁸ Britannica (2023) – *Bharatiya Janata Party*, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc, Edinburgh, Available from: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bharatiya-Janata-Party> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁷⁹ Nielsen B. K. and Nielsen G. A. (2021). *Hindu nationalist statecraft and Modi's authoritarian populism*, Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia, Routledge, pp. 92–98.

⁸⁰ Sinha S. (2021). 'Strong leaders', *authoritarian populism and Indian developmentalism: The Modi moment in historical context*, Geoforum, Volume 124, pp. 320–333.

autoritarne tendencije i kao opozicija, s obzirom na to da se u kontinuitetu služi vanzakonskim nasiljem, koje je dolaskom na vlast postepeno legalizovano ili abolidirano.⁸¹

Takođe, važno je utvrditi vezu da li Hindutva model na vlasti nužno dovodi do uspona autoritarizma, odnosno da li je on u osnovi baziran na antidemokratskim principima. Kada se pogleda delovanje Indijske narodne partije sa apsolutnom vlašću u parlamentu, primetno je da postoji želja da se ova država preustroji od sekularne građanske države po vestfalskom modelu u jedan tip „menadžovane demokratije“, odnosno režima u kom će Hindutva ideologija biti status quo i u kom ova vizija neće biti predmet preispitivanja. U retorici ove partije i njenog lidera Modija primetna je polarizacija koja insistira na „pravim Indijcima“ naspram „antinacionalnih elemenata“, te da je svaki vid prinude nad drugima opravdan zarad „očuvanja države“. ⁸² Ovaj način upravljanja na Hindu nacionalistički način i predstavlja vidljivu strategiju da se pravno zaključa Indija kao centralno hinduistička država na način da se oteža poništavanje ovakvog sistema u budućnosti. ⁸³ Ovom načinu upravljanja pomaže i kulturološka revolucija u Indiji i retradicionalizacija ovog društva pod naletom smene progresivnih i prozapadnih elita, sa dosta parohijalnim i globalno manje povezanim elitama, koje su bliže sentimentima prosečnog Hindu stanovnika (koji čine oko 80% populacije ove države). ⁸⁴ Navedeni sentiment je takođe povećala i sve veća vremenska distanca u odnosu na proces dekolonizacije, odnosno manjak važnosti ovog nasleđa borbe za nezavisnost za prosečnog birača, što je samim tim uticalo negativno i na položaj Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa kao partije koja ovo nasleđe brani, pa samim tim i na društveni položaj i snagu ove stranke. ⁸⁵

Jedna od već vidljivih posledica ovih promena je apsolutna promena percepcije o partijama u političkoj areni, kao i načina na koji se vodi politička utakmica. Kompletan politički spektar se u Indiji pomerio sa sekularizma koji se podrazumevao na dosta asertivniju Hindu politiku. ⁸⁶ To u praksi najčešće

⁸¹ Nielsen B. K. and Nielsen G. A. (2021). *Hindu nationalist statecraft and Modi's authoritarian populism*, Routledge Handbook of Autocratization in South Asia, Routledge, str. 92–98.

⁸² Ibid, p. 92.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Razib Khan, *Why the West lost India's culture wars*, Unherd, London, Available from: <https://unherd.com/2021/04/the-culture-wars-of-post-colonial-india/> (Accessed: August 5, 2024).

⁸⁵ Ibid. (Accessed: August 5, 2024)

⁸⁶ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, 1–20.

znači da promovisanje sekularne politike najčešće dovodi do percepcije da je određeni kandidat ili određena partija karakterisana kao „promuslimanska“, što u Hindu većini predstavlja nepopularnu percepciju.⁸⁷ Međutim, uprkos ovom autoritarnom talasu, Indijska narodna partija trpi otpor od različitih državnih regionalnih vlasti koje ne žele ili ne uspevaju da sprovedu politiku centralne vlasti, naročito u državama poput Delhija ili Harjani, s obzirom na to da druge partije imaju veliku moć kroz široka ovlašćenja država u brojnim oblastima.⁸⁸ To svakako nije garant da autoritarne tendencije neće biti nastavljene, ali jeste garant da Modijeva transformativna agenda ima i svoja ograničenja i da Hindu nacionalizam ne može ići u potpunosti po dubini.

Bez obzira na suprotnu argumentaciju, evidentno je da je u Indiji zabeležena jasna demokratska oseka od 2014. Takođe postoje jasni dokazi da je ova demokratska oseka dobrim delom povezana i sa željom da se država transformiše u autoritarnu Hindu državu i da se time izmene njeni sekularni koreni. Na kraju postoje i jasni dokazi da je ovakav autoritaran i transformativan pristup dobrim delom baziran na ideologiji Hindu nacionalizma, koja je kroz decenije bila opozicija i koja u svojoj osnovi podrazumeva antidemokratski i antisekularni sentiment. Faktori koji su uticali na ovakvu promenu su brojni i, kao što se može videti u prethodnim pasusima, utemeljeni su u oblastima od ekonomije, dnevne politike, religije, ali i delovanja konkretnih političkih aktera. Iako se primat nekog od ovih faktora može sporiti i uzroci se mogu različito interpretirati, jasno se može zaključiti da je uticaj Hindu nacionalizma na demokratsko nazadovanje Indije vrlo visok i uzročno-posledično povezan.

ZAKLJUČAK

Indija je od 1947, kada je nastala kao nezavisna država povlačenjem Velike Britanije iz regiona Južne Azije, postavljena kao suštinski država po zapadnom modelu. Njeni osnivači, poput prvog lidera Džavaharlala Nehrua, najvećim delom su novouspostavljenu državu konstruisali na osnovama demokratije, sekularne i etnički i verski inkluzivne države. Skoro 100 godina nakon osnivanja Indije kao nezavisne države, primetne su promene u svim navedenim tačkama od 2014. sa dolaskom na vlast Narendre Modija i Indijske narodne partije. Od dolaska na vlast navedenih političkih snaga primetno je jasno demokratsko nazadovanje u brojnim oblastima, od stanja medija, upotrebe vojske, do uticaja na nezavisne institucije. U sferi sekularizma, primetno je da se Hindu nacionalizam oslikava kroz sve veći uticaj navedene pojedinačne reli-

⁸⁷ Aiyar A. S. S. (2020). *Despite Modi, India Has Not Yet Become a Hindu Authoritarian State*, The Cato Institute, p. 15.

⁸⁸ Ibidem, 1–20.

gije na državnu politiku, koja se prelama kroz sve više diskriminatorne politike u odnosu na manjinske verske zajednice, poput brojčano velikog muslimanskog stanovništva. Kada se postavi pitanje da li povlačenje demokratije u Indiji i uspon autoritarizma u prethodnih 8 godina ima povezanosti sa ideologijom nove vlasti moguće je utvrditi brojne kauzalne veze. Osim što politika Indijske narodne partije i Narendre Modija predstavlja prvi veći diskontinuitet u odnosu na vlasti Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa i drugih stranaka, njen uticaj Hindu nacionalizma na transformaciju ove države je jasno merljiv. Najveći deo politika ove partije oslanja se na Hindutva ideologiju koja u svojoj suštini sadrži autoritarne vrednosne elemente koji se protive indijskom statusu quo, koji je postavljen nakon dobijanja nezavisnosti 1947. od strane Indijskog nacionalnog kongresa. Hindu nacionalizam interpretiran na način zastupanja politike od strane Indijske narodne partije ima zato veliki vrednosni i praktičan uticaj na povlačenje demokratije u Indiji od 2014. do danas, te je ova država zbog tog, po mišljenjima specijalizovanih organizacija poput Fridom Haus (Freedom House) ili instituta V-dem, okarakterisana kao „delimično slobodna država” ili „izborna autokratija”.

Za ovaj razvoj događaja i trijumf Hindu nacionalizma i autoritarizma naspram tradicionalnog indijskog sekularizma i demokratskog pristupa postoje brojni faktori koji su navedeni u prethodnim poglavljima. Ti faktori obuhvataju ekonomsku politiku, raširene antiestablišment sentimente birača, kulturne promene u ovoj državi, dnevnu politiku i druge faktore koji su omogućili da do ove promene na čelu Indije dođe 2014. i da ta politika postane permanentna. Ovi trendovi ne moraju biti trajni, jer se vladajućim snagama opiru druge partije koje su vlast u različitim regionalnim vladama saveznih država i autoritarne tendencije u Indiji ovu državu još nisu pretvorile u potpunosti u autoritarnu državu, te su promene u budućnosti moguće. Međutim, kao vrlo jasan zaključak se može uzeti da su aktuelne autoritarne tendencije i demokratsko nazadovanje u visokom stepenu kauzalnosti sa usponom Hindu nacionalizma i da je takav uspon jedan od glavnih uzroka navedenih tendencija.

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Dimitrije Milić

THE IMPACT OF HINDU NATIONALISM ON DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING IN INDIA

Abstract

After World War II and the withdrawal of the British Empire from the South Asia region through decolonization, India and Pakistan became independent countries. From the start of their independence movements until the beginning of the 21st century, India has had a uniquely democratic political order. This type of political order has continuously been the exception in South and Southeast Asia, where various forms of authoritarian regimes ruled permanently in different countries. However, the rapid growth of Hindu nationalism in this country has occurred in previous years in its most explicit form. In correlation with this process, India has also experienced gradual democratic backsliding and the rise of authoritarian tendencies. This trend is measurable in the Freedom House reports from year to year. This article will try to analyze the level of correlation between these two processes. The goal is to determine are these two processes directly related and whether the rise of Hindu nationalism, that began in the previous decade, impacts the increasingly rapid democratic backsliding in India.

Keywords:

Hindu nationalism, India, democratic decline, authoritarianism, Narendra Modi.

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Komunikacija o klimatskim promenama – katalizator ili inhibitor globalnih klimatskih politika

Apstrakt

Medijski polarizovana slika klimatskih promena u rasponu između *klimatske krize* kataklizmičnih razmera, sa jedne strane, i *naučne obmane*, sa druge, nedvosmisleno utiče na razumevanje i percepciju rizika od posledica ovog globalnog fenomena, pri čemu značajno određuje kurs klimatske debate u javnom diskursu. Ovakva dihotomizacija medijskog sadržaja između klimatskih alarmista i skeptika, osim što produbljuje već postojeću ideološku i političku polarizaciju u kontekstu dostizanja nulte neto emisije, odnosno energetske tranzicije sa fosilnih na obnovljive izvore energije, u značajnoj meri doprinosi i (de)motivisanju angažovanosti na polju klimatskih politika. Naime, u radu se razmatraju različiti mehanizmi komunikacije klimatskih promena u javnom diskursu sa fokusom na političku retoriku, odnosno dominantne frejmove i narativ i način na koji mogu doprineti ubrzavanju, odnosno usporavanju implementacije određenih mera, strategija, programa, kao i ciljeva iz klimatskih sporazuma o smanjenju emisija ili adaptivnih i mitigacionih mera.

Ključne reči:

klimatske promene, komunikacija klimatskih promena, medijski diskurs, politički diskurs, klimatske politike

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UVOD

Klimatske promene su se već godinama unazad pozicionirale na globalnoj agendi prioriternih pitanja kao univerzalno prihvaćen izazov sa kojim se suočavaju kako razvijena tako i tranziciona društva koja imaju različiti stepen ranjivosti, otpornosti i adaptacionih kapaciteta na mnogobrojne posledice. U svetlu prohujale epidemije virusa korona, ali i trenutnih ratova, klimatske promene su dodatno doprinele pogoršanju postojećih tenzija jer kao multiplikator rizika (engl. *risk multiplier*) imaju potencijal da prodube političke i geopolitičke konflikte i krize prvenstveno oko kontrole resursa, ali i da intenziviraju siromaštvo, kao i klimatske migracije usled ekstremnih vremenskih prilika.¹ Kao takve, odavno su izašle iz naučne zajednice, a sve više privlače pažnju kao društveno-politička, ekonomska, institucionalna, ali i bezbednosna pretnja usled kaskadnih efekata koji ugrožavaju normalno funkcionisanje ljudi, ali i planete.

KLIMATSKE PROMENE KAO KOMUNIKACIJSKI IZAZOV

Međuvladin panel za promenu klime (engl. *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*) definiše klimatske promene kao „promene stanja klime koje se mogu identifikovati (korišćenjem statističkih testova) usled promena u srednjoj vrednosti i/ili varijabilnosti njenih osobina koje traju duži period, obično decenijama ili duže. Klimatske promene mogu biti uzrokovane prirodnim unutrašnjim procesima ili spoljnim faktorima, kao što su modifikacije solarnih ciklusa, vulkanske erupcije i dugotrajne antropogene promene u sastavu atmosfere ili u korišćenju zemljišta”.² Neretko se u literaturi može naći

¹ Patrick Huntjens and Katharina Nachbar, “Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for Human Disaster and Conflict”, *Policy and Governance Recommendations for Advancing Climate Security*, Working Paper 9, 2015, Available from: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/61542ee0a87a394f7bc17b3a/t/61b8e67b32b0eb4c0fbb89a5/1639507580316/working-Paper-9-climate-change-threat-multiplier.pdf>, (Accessed June 22, 2024).

² IPCC: Annex I: Glossary. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock,

karakterizacija klimatskih promena kao super opakog fenomena³ (engl. *super-wicked phenomenon*), koji zbog svoje kompleksnosti, apstraktnosti i neupadljivosti (engl. *unobtrusiveness*) usled nevidljivog uzroka (emisija gasova sa efektom staklene bašte) predstavlja izazov za komunikaciju i interpretaciju široj javnosti.⁴ Iz tog razloga proizlazi tvrdnja da je „komunikacija klimatskih promena podjednako kompleksna koliko i sama nauka o klimatskim promenama”.⁵ Komunikacija klimatskih promena predstavlja kritični interfejs između naučnih istraživanja, razumevanja šire javnosti i političkih akcija. U ovom kontekstu, komunikacija se pre svega odnosi na način na koji su uzroci, posledice i rizici od klimatskih promena konceptualizovani u naučnom, političkom i medijskom diskursu. Prema tome, upotreba i kombinacija različitih jezičkih elemenata (leksičkih, gramatičkih, pragmatičkih) uglavnom je strateška, sa svrhom postizanja efekta apostrofiranja ili kamufliranja pojedinih aspekata, favorizovanja ili marginalizacije određenih stavova ili pak legitimizacije, odnosno diskreditovanja posebnih stanovišta i političkih predloga, a sve sa ciljem promovisanja ili negiranja pojedinih ideoloških aspiracija vladajućih elitističkih grupa. Shodno tome, odabir narativa, retorike ili frejma ni u kom pogledu nije slučajan, niti ideološki, jezički i vrednosno neutralan, i kao takav direktno utiče na razumevanje opasnosti od promena u klimatskom sistemu, a samim tim i na dinamiku donošenja odluka, odnosno kreiranja politika.

KOMUNIKACIJA KLIMATSKIH PROMENA NA RASKRŠĆU MEDIJA, POLITIKE I NAUKE

U evoluciji fenomena klimatskih promena u javnom diskursu dva su ključna događaja koja su uticala na njihov iskorak iz naučne zajednice. U tom pogledu, možemo govoriti o *medijatizaciji* i *politizaciji* klimatskih promena kao

M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (Eds.)). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, 2018, p. 544.

- ³ Richard J. Lazarus, “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future”, *Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works*, 159, 2009.
- ⁴ Mike S. Schäfer and Saffron O’Neill, “Frame Analysis in Climate Change Communication: Approaches for Assessing Journalists’ Minds, Online Communication and Media Portrayals”, in: Matthew Nisbet, Shirley Ho, Ezra Markowitz, Saffron O’Neill, Mike S. Schäfer, and Jagadish Thaker (Eds.), *Oxford Encyclopedia of Climate Change Communication*, Oxford University Press, 2017.
- ⁵ Caron Chess and Branden Johnson, “Information is Not Enough”, in: S. C. Moser and L. Dilling (Eds.), *Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change*, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

procesima koji su proširili domet interesovanja za ovaj globalni fenomen, ali i definisali druga dva poligona za njihovu komunikaciju i interpretaciju, čime su značajno doprineli nenaučnoj kontekstualizaciji samog fenomena.⁶ Prepoznavanje političkog konteksta kao potencijalnog oružja za manipulaciju mediji su vrlo brzo prepoznali i artikulisali svoje strategije komunikacije. U tom pogledu, godina 1988. označava prekretnicu jer je donela povećano interesovanje šire javnosti usled preplitanja uticaja tri događaja koja se smatraju okidačima za proces politizacije i medijatzacije klimatskih promena.⁷ Splet faktora koji je tome doprineo je *ekološko-meteorološki* (suše širom Severne Amerike), *politički* (svedočenje Džejmsa Hansena (Jamesa Hansena) pred američkim kongresom o postojanju globalnog zagrevanja, kao i upozorenje Margaret Tačer (Margaret Thatcher) na potencijalne efekte klimatskih promena), kao i *naučnog* karaktera (osnivanje Međuvladinog panela za promene klime – IPCC)⁸. Ili kao što je Ungar (Ungar) primetio, „ono što 1988. čini izuzetnom je niz fizičkih uticaja koje su osetili obični ljudi”.⁹

Medijski diskurs

„Sve što znamo o našem društvu, odnosno o svetu u kojem živimo, znamo zahvaljujući masovnim medijima.”¹⁰ Klimatske promene ne predstavljaju nikakav izuzetak. Nekolicina naučnih studija pokazala je da su mediji glavni izvor informacija o ekološkim problemima za širu javnost¹¹ budući da „mali broj ljudi započinje dan čitanjem najnovijih članaka iz naučnih, recenziranih publikacija uz prvu jutarnju kafu”.¹² Bez obzira da li se to naučnicima sviđa

⁶ Max T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, “Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the U.S. Prestige Press”, *Global Environmental Change*, 14, 2004.

⁷ Mike Hulme, *Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

⁸ Max T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, “Climate Change and Journalistic Norms: A Case Study of U.S. Mass-Media Coverage”, *Geoforum*, 38, No. 6, 2007, pp. 1190–1204.

⁹ Sheldon Ungar, “The Rise and (Relative) Decline of Global Warming as a Social Problem”, *Sociological Quarterly*, 33, 1992, p. 490.

¹⁰ Niklas Luhmann, *The Reality of the Mass Media*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000.

¹¹ Alison Anderson, “Sources, Media, and Modes of Climate Change Communication: The Role of Celebrities”, *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 2, 2011, pp. 535–546.

¹² Max. T. Boykoff and Tom Yulsman, “Political Economy, Media, and Climate Change: Sinews of Modern Life”, *WIREs Climate Change* 4, No. 5, 2013, p. 359.

ili ne,¹³ mediji imaju fundamentalnu ulogu u predstavljanju naučnih istraživanja široj javnosti, odnosno diseminaciji informacija. „Mediji predstavljaju važnu arenu, ali i važne agente koji vrše produkciju, reprodukciju i transformaciju značenja društvenih pitanja.”¹⁴ U tom pogledu, mediji imaju dvostruku ulogu, interpretativnu¹⁵, kao i ulogu validatora nauke¹⁶ i samim tim neposredno utiču na formiranje stavova, mišljenja i ponašanje javnosti. Međutim, medijska slika sveta nije refleksija stvarnosti već samo jedna njena verzija koju oni kreiraju.¹⁷ U tom kontekstu, medijska komunikacija klimatskih promena često može predstavljati distorziju stvarnosti jer je njihova konceptualizacija često u službi političkih, ideoloških ili finansijskih interesa određenih grupa.

Lažna ravnoteža

Lažna ravnoteža¹⁸ (engl. *false balance*) odnosi se na žurnalističku normu, odnosno medijsku praksu u kojoj se, kako bi se izbegla pristrasnost, suprotstavljenim stranama poklanja isti nivo vremena, prostora i pažnje u izveštavanju, iako su stavovi nesrazmerni u pogledu naučne utemeljenosti. U kontekstu klimatskih promena, mediji su dali isti legitimitet stavovima klimatskih alarmista i klimatskih skeptika uprkos postojanju naučnog konsenzusa od 99% o antropogenom poreklu klimatskih promena i time stvorili iluziju o postojanju klimatske debate po pitanju uzroka i posledica klimatskih promena raspirujući sumnju u verodostojnost naučnih dokaza i istraživanja. Takav vid komunikacije doprineo je da se klimatske promene profilisu kao kontroverzno pitanje, čime se produbila polarizacija u javnom i političkom diskursu, odnosno

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- ¹³ Max T. Boykoff and Ravi Rajan, “Signals and Noise: Mass-Media Coverage of Climate Change in the USA and the UK”, *EMBO Reports*, 8, No. 3, 2007, pp. 207–211.
 - ¹⁴ Anabela Carvalho, “Media(ted) Discourses and Climate Change: A Focus on Political Subjectivity and (Dis)Engagement”, *WIREs Climate Change*, 1, No. 2, 2010, p. 173.
 - ¹⁵ Andreas Schmidt, Ana Ivanova and Mike S. Schäfer, “Media Attention for Climate Change Around the World: A Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Coverage in 27 Countries”, *Global Environmental Change*, 23, No. 5, 2013, pp. 1233–1248.
 - ¹⁶ Ruxanda Petrescu-Mag et al., “How climate change science is reflected in people’s minds: A cross-country study on people’s perceptions of climate change”, *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 19(7), 4280.
 - ¹⁷ Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese, *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on MassMedia Content* Longman, New York, 1996.
 - ¹⁸ Michael Brüggemann and Sven Engesser, “Beyond False Balance: How Interpretive Journalism Shapes Media Coverage of Climate Change”, *Global Environmental Change*, 42, 2017, pp. 58–67.

ambivalentnost kod šire javnosti, što je dovelo do usporavanja, odnosno odlaganja zelene tranzicije. '

Politički diskurs

„Politička aktivnost ne postoji bez upotrebe jezika.”¹⁹ Međuodnos jezika i politike ima svoje korene u retoričkoj praksi starih Grka i Rimljana. O relevantnosti retorike, kao instrumenta za ubeđivanje sa uticajem na formiranje političkih stavova i mišljenja upućivali su još Aristotel i Ciceron. I upravo u tom pogledu, Džordž Orvel (George Orwell) je ukazao na potencijalnu zloupotrebu jezika u političke svrhe navodeći da su „politički govori odbrana neodbranljivog”.²⁰ Ričard Nojštad (Richard Neustadt), najuticajniји teoretičar američkog predsedništva, osnivač Harvard Kenedi škole za upravljanje (Harvard Kennedy School of Governance) i savetnik Harija Trumana (Harry Truman), Džona F. Kenedija (John F. Kennedy) i Bila Klintonu (Bil Clinton), u svojoj knjizi *Predsednička moć* primetio je: „moć predsednika je moć ubeđivanja”.²¹ Dakle, u kontekstu klimatskih promena, manipulativna i persuzivna funkcija jezika često služi kao sredstvo političke komunikacije sa ciljem uspostavljanja ili održavanja moći, dominacije i kontrole, a samim tim određuje tok i kurs klimatskih politika, uspostavljajući prioritete, programe i strategije koji će se preduzeti na nacionalnom i globalnom nivou.

Naučni diskurs

U kontekstu nauke o klimi, naučna zajednica ima hegemonijski status kojim se odražava potpuni autoritet, integritet i kredibilitet u pogledu „proizvodnje” naučnih činjenica i rezultata. U tom smislu, naučni diskurs ima primarnu ulogu u generisanju empirijskih podataka u vidu naučnih izveštaja, publikacija i analiza, čime legitimizuje svoj superiorni stav u javnom diskursu, a samim tim i opravdava upozorenja na zabrinjavajuće projekcije i scenarija o budućim efektima klimatskih promena. U tom kontekstu, naučna komunikacija se odvija primenom ekspertizacije kako bi se šira javnost uverila u verodostojnost i istinitost naučnih tvrdnji, a samim tim i dokazao suverenitet

¹⁹ Paul Chilton and Christina Schaffner, “Introduction: Themes and Principles in the Analysis of Political Discourse”, in: edited by Paul Chilton and Christina Schaffner, *Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 2002, p. 6.

²⁰ George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language”, in: George Orwell (Ed.), *George Orwell: A Collection of Essays*, Harcourt Publishing Company, 1946, p. 225.

²¹ Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1960, p. 55.

naučne zajednice. Međutim, takvu naučnu komunikaciju u velikoj meri remeti suficit tehničkih termina i akronima, što se odražava na samo sporazumevanje i razumevanje sa neekspertsom publikom, odnosno donosiocima odluka. Nedovoljno jasno prezentovani podaci na taj način mogu nepovoljno uticati na percepciju rizika od klimatskih promena i dovesti do (ne)namerne konfuzije u javnosti. Iz tog razloga, dekodiranje naučne komunikacije nameće se kao imperativ u javnoj sferi.

ANTAGONIZAM U KOMUNIKACIJI

Kao što je već rečeno, uprkos postojanju jasnog stava naučne zajednice o tome da ljudske aktivnosti i sagorevanje fosilnih goriva predstavljaju glavni uzrok porasta globalne temperature vazduha, medijski, politički i javni diskurs su izrazito polarizovani, pri čemu su u debati najizraženiji stavovi klimatskih alarmista i skeptika. Polarizacija se ogleda u njihovim suprotstavljenim političkim i ideološkim vrednostima, stavovima, verovanjima ili pak ekonomskim interesima čiju okosnicu čini dihotomija planeta ili profit. Samim tim, portret klimatskih promena razlikuje se zavisno od kreatora poruke, odnosno njegove namere, svrhe i cilja.

Sa jedne strane debate su naučnici, ali i klimatski aktivisti (pokreti: Petkom za budućnost (Fridays for Future) i Pobuna protiv izumiranja (Extinction Rebellion)) kao nepokolebljivi pobornici zelene ekonomije, a samim tim i neto-nulte budućnosti, snažnim zalaganjem za postizanje klimatske neutralnosti i negativnih emisija gasova sa efektom staklene bašte. Sa druge strane debate su, pak, naftne i gasne kompanije kao fanatični protivnici zelene tranzicije, odnosno tranzicije elektroenergetskog sistema sa fosilnih goriva (uglja, nafte, gasa) na obnovljive izvore energije (vetar, voda, sunce), koji na sve načine pokušavaju da uspore, odlože ili u potpunosti obustave globalni proces dekarbonizacije.

Iz tog razloga, komunikacija klimatskih promena oscilira između frejma u kojem je zagrevanje planete dramatizovano i predstavljeno kao *klimatska kriza* i frejma u kojem je antropogeni izvor klimatskih promena kompromitovan i prikazan kao *naučna zavera*. U oba slučaja jezik u kontekstu klimatskih promena strateški je upotrebljen, a zavisno od motiva i svrhe može imati funkciju katalizatora ili inhibitora progressa na polju donošenja klimatskih politika, adaptivnih i mitigacionih mera, klimatskih aktivnosti, kao i klimatskih sporazuma.

Kako bi se skrenula pažnja javnosti, u medijskom prostoru često postoji tendencija da se naučne projekcije i istraživanja o riziku i ranjivosti od klimatskih promena prikazuju kroz narativ krize sa fokusom na potencijalno nepovratne efekte i to u domenu između nadrealnog i naučno-fantastičnog. Takav narativ dovodi se u vezu sa klimatskim alarmizmom budući da se klimatske promene predstavljaju kao nadolazeća apokalipsa, pri čemu svako ignorisanje

upozorenja o neophodnom smanjenju emisija gasova sa efektom staklene bašte čini da distopijski scenario sudnjeg dana sa ekološkom kataklizmom, izumiranjem vrsta i potpunim nestankom civilizacije postane realnost. Ovakav prikaz često je praćen alarmističkom retorikom, a manipulacija percepcije javnosti vrši se upravo izazivanjem jakih emocionalnih reakcija (patosa), straha, panike i nemira kako bi se ukazalo na urgentnost rešavanja problema i donošenje hitnih mera za usporavanje zagrevanja. Naglašavanjem izrazito negativnih posledica porasta Zemljine temperature, mediji teže da postignu potpunu spektakularizaciju i senzacionalizaciju teme klimatskih promena, pri čemu katalizatorska uloga jezika dobija svoj puni smisao isticanjem neophodnosti ubrzavanja ispunjenja ciljeva iz postojećih klimatskih sporazuma, kao i donošenja novih sveobuhvatnijih. Danas se za frejm klimatske krize može reći da predstavlja medijsku normu budući da je postao dominantan i standardan modus predstavljanja informacija i činjenica u vezi sa klimatskim promenama u vestima, novinskim člancima, snimcima, reportažama, kao i na digitalnim platformama. Takav frejm klimatske promene problematizuje ne samo u kontekstu ekološke, već i sve prisutnije zdravstvene krize imajući u vidu zabrinjavajući globalni porast obolelih od kardiovaskularnih, respiratornih, vektorskih, ali i mentalnih bolesti pre svega izazvanih ekstremnim klimatskim uslovima, kao i lošijim kvalitetom vazduha.

Sa druge strane, određeni mediji oblikovali su frejm koji promenjene klimatske uslove tumači u kontekstu *naučne obmane*. Takav frejm dovodi se u vezu sa klimatskim poricanjem i klimatskim skepticizmom, a formiran je sa ciljem da se negiraju tvrdnje naučne zajednice o ljudskim aktivnostima (sagorevanju fosilnih goriva) kao glavnom uzroku povećanog zagrevanja, a pre svega da se onemoguće klimatski pregovori, zakoni, kao i programi niskokarboničnog razvoja. Iz tog razloga, njihov narativ je utemeljen na širenju retorike sumnje u naučne dokaze i rezultate, odnosno isticanje naučne nesigurnosti/nepouzdanosti, pri čemu se nastoji osporiti naučni integritet i kredibilitet, a samim tim i poljuljati poverenje u naučnu zajednicu, između ostalog, i izveštaje Međuvladinog panela za promenu klime kao najautoritativnijeg izvora informacija.

Dakle, u slučajevima kada je jezik u ulozi katalizatora, klimatske promene predstavljaju se kao egzistencijalni rizik ili neposredna pretnja u političkim govorima ili medijskim reportažama, pri čemu se teži naglasiti kompleksnost situacije, a pre svega istaknuti neophodnost hitnog reagovanja globalne zajednice i samim tim opravdati argumente za što skoriju zelenu tranziciju. Sa druge strane, kada se klimatske promene predstavljaju u svetlu ekonomskih gubitaka, odnosno kao teret za privredu, postoji težnja da se opstruira svaki pokušaj napuštanja, odnosno smanjenja zavisnosti industrije od fosilnih goriva. U tom pogledu, treba imati u vidu da je svaka medijska ili politička poruka kreirana u svrhu postizanja ideoloških ciljeva određenih interesnih grupa, organizacija ili pojedinaca, pa je samim tim i jezik u službi ubrzavanja ili usporavanja donošenja klimatskih politika i mera.

KAKO KOMUNIKACIJA OBLIKUJE GLOBALNU KLIMATSKU POLITIKU

Na koji način globalni naponi u zauzdavanju emisija sa efektom staklene bašte mogu biti osujećeni, a samim tim i poremetiti globalni momentum za klimatsku akciju najbolje ilustruju dva slučaja „bojkota” klimatskih sporazuma iz istorije SAD. Prvi slučaj se odnosi na povlačenje SAD iz Kjoto protokola 2001. godine. Sporazum koji je potpisan u japanskom Kjotu, 11. decembra 1997. godine, predstavlja prvi pravno obavezujući globalni protokol u borbi protiv klimatskih promena. Međutim, obaveze u pogledu ispunjenja ciljeva iz protokola o smanjenju emisija gasova sa efektom staklene bašte bile su diferencirane, pri čemu su razvijene zemlje imale obavezujući cilj da u periodu od 2008. do 2012. smanje emisije za otprilike 5 procenata u odnosu na 1990, dok su ostale potpisnice, odnosno najsiromašnije i zemlje u razvoju bile izuzete od istih obaveza, sa mnogo fleksibilnijim pristupom kako bi se omogućio njihov dalji ekonomski razvoj. Zbog ovakve neravnomerne alokacije odgovornosti, Sjedinjene Američke Države, pod predsedništvom Džordža Buša (George Bush), formalno su odbacile Kjoto protokol marta 2001. godine s obzirom na to da Senat nije ratifikovao potpis Bila Klintona (Bill Clinton). Ključni motiv za izlazak SAD iz sporazuma su nepravedno olakšavajuće okolnosti i tretiranje zemalja u razvoju Kine i Indije koje nisu bile obavezane na smanjenje emisija uprkos činjenici što su veliki emiteri. Kako bi legitimizovali svoju odluku za povlačenje, američki lideri su prikazali sporazum u svetlu negativnih posledica po američku privredu, gubitak radnih mesta u energetskom sektoru, kao i smanjenje konkurentnosti u odnosu na zemlje koje su bile isključene od obaveze smanjenja emisija. U tom smislu, ceo diskurs predstavljanja SAD kao žrtve nepravednog sistema Kjoto protokola, kroz frejm pretnje za ekonomske interese i privrednu stabilnost, služi kao mehanizam legitimizacije političkog povlačenja utemeljen na ideologiji pravičnosti.

Drugi blatanтни primer opstruiranja sprovođenja efikasne klimatske politike sa odjekom globalnih razmera predstavlja odluka tadašnjeg američkog predsednika Donalda Trampa (Donald Trump) o povlačenju SAD iz Pariskog klimatskog sporazuma.²² U trenutku kada je sporazum usvojilo više od 190 država članica Okvirne konvencije UN o promeni klime, u obraćanju u Beloj kući, 1. juna 2017. godine, on je ozvaničio izlazak iz sporazuma sa gotovo identičnom negativnom retorikom prema određenim ciljevima iz dogo-

²² Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, “On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement”, press statement, November 4, 2019, U.S. Department of State, Available from: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/> (Accessed August 10, 2024).

vora²³. Kako bi opravdao svoju političku odluku o povlačenju, Pariski klimatski sporazum je prikazao u izrazito negativnom svetlu, stavljajući ga u frejm neprijatelja američkog naroda i fokusirajući se na ekonomske gubitke koje bi mogao prouzrokovati. Svoju retoriku je utemeljio na persuazivnim pragmatičkim elementima implicirajući da sporazum „nije fer” jer „predstavlja ogromnu redistribuciju bogatstva SAD drugim zemljama” time što ide u korist samo Kini i Indiji.²⁴ „Pariski sporazum je sporazum koji nema veze sa borbom protiv klimatskih promena, nego sa sticanjem ekonomskih prednosti u odnosu na SAD”.²⁵ Osim toga, svoju odluku je pokušao da legitimizuje time što je apostrofirao narativ „tereta za američku privredu” argumentujući da se zbog njega „gube poslovi i smanjuju plate, mnogi rudari u rudnicima uglja bi izgubili posao”. „Povlačimo se. Kako bih ispunio uzvišenu dužnost zaštite Amerike i njenih građana, SAD će se povući iz Pariskog sporazuma o borbi protiv klimatskih promena.”²⁶ Stavljajući nacionalne interese iznad globalnih obaveza, uz korišćenje emocionalno markiranih reči „zaštita” i „uzvišena dužnost”, povlačenje je predstavio kao patriotski čin, odnosno moralnu i etičku odgovornost, kako bi ubedio građane u ispravnost svoje odluke i time manipulisao percepcijom samog sporazuma u kontekstu pretnje za američku privredu. Osim što je povlačenje SAD iz Pariskog dogovora imalo ozbiljne implikacije na polju globalnih klimatskih pregovora i donošenja odluka, koliki je zemljotres izazvao svedoči i trag koji je ostavio na leksičkom planu u vidu neologizma *clexit*²⁷ (analogno sa slivenicom *Brexit*), koji označava izlazak država iz međunarodnih klimatskih sporazuma uglavnom usled nepoverenja prema naučnim istraživanjima i naučnom konsenzusu, a sa ciljem odlaganja donošenja klimatskih politika o ukidanju fosilnih goriva (*delayism*).

Koliko je uloga jezika, odnosno komunikacija, relevantna za tok međunarodnih klimatskih pregovora i koliko može uticati na njihov ishod svedoče klimatski sporazumi iz Kopenhagena i Pariza. Najavljivan kao najvažnija kon-

²³ Donald J. Trump, “President Trump Announces U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord”, White House Archives, June 1, 2017, Available from: <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/president-trump-announces-u-s-withdrawal-paris-climate-accord/> (Accessed August 2, 2024).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Julian Petley, “From Brexit to Clexit? Delaying Climate Action is the Right’s Next Big Political Culture War”, *Byline Times*, September 29, 2023, Available from: <https://bylinetimes.com/2023/09/29/from-brexit-to-clexit-delaying-climate-action-is-the-rights-next-big-political-culture-war/> (Accessed on August 1, 2024).

ferencija posle Drugog svetskog rata²⁸, sporazum iz Kopenhagena postignut 2009. godine, smatra se jednim velikim fijaskom na globalnom planu, između ostalog usled odsustva ambicioznih, odnosno pravno obavezujućih okvira za smanjenje emisije sa efektom staklene bašte²⁹. Raskol koji je nastao između razvijenih i zemalja u razvoju uglavnom se odnosio na pitanja smanjenja budućih emisija, odnosno prošlih obaveza, što je dovelo do toga da se medijski diskurs usaglasi u predstavljanju pregovora kao debakla, a pre svega „samita u krizi”. Džon Sauven (John Sauven), izvršni direktor britanskog Grinpisa (Greenpeace), istakao je tom prilikom „kako je Kopenhagen mesto zločina iz kojeg krivci beže u pravcu aerodroma”.³⁰ S obzirom na to da je pregovore obeležio frejm neravnopravnosti i nejednakosti u pogledu emitovanja emisija, adaptacije kao i troškova među industrijalizovanim i zemljama u razvoju, neprecizna komunikacija klimatskih ciljeva pokazala se kao neefikasna u pogledu angažovanja u borbi protiv klimatskih promena.

Sa druge strane, koliko adekvatna komunikacija može biti podsticajna na globalnom planu u pogledu postizanja konkretnih mera i strategija, odnosno klimatskih politika, svedoči Pariski klimatski sporazum. Za razliku od Kopenhagena, koji je obeležila paradigma klimatskih skeptika, dvonedeljni klimatski pregovori političkog establišmenta predstavljaju trijumfalni poduhvat u okviru međunarodne zajednice iz više razloga. Pariski klimatski sporazum donesen je 12. decembra 2015. godine na 21. zasedanju Konferencije strana (COP21) u Parizu, odnosno godišnjem klimatskom samitu Ujedinjenih nacija, a usvojilo ga je 196 zemalja potpisnica Okvirne konvencije UN o promeni klime, čime je stupio na snagu 4. novembra 2016. godine.³¹ Distinktivno obeležje ovog međunarodnog okvira za borbu protiv klimatskih promena jeste mehanizam donošenja odluka, tačnije odsustvo rigidnih rokova, perioda važenja i pravno obavezujućih smanjenja emisija, imajući u vidu da je usvojen

²⁸ David Carlin, “Why Copenhagen Fell Apart and the Lessons It Offers for COP 27”, *Forbes*, November 17, 2022, Available from: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidcarlin/2022/11/17/why-copenhagen-fell-apart-and-the-lessons-it-offers-for-cop-27/> (Accessed August 1, 2024).

²⁹ Adam Vaughan and David Adam, “Copenhagen Climate Deal: Spectacular Failure—or a Few Important Steps?” *The Guardian*, December 22, 2009, Available from: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-deal-expert-view> (Accessed August 2, 2024).

³⁰ Reuters, “Reaction to Copenhagen Climate Deal”, December 19, 2009, Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/business/environment/-reaction-to-copenhagen-climate-deal-idUSTRE5BH4VN/> (Accessed August 5, 2024).

³¹ United Nations Climate Change, “The Paris Agreement”, Available from: <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement> (Accessed on August 5, 2024).

na potpuno dobrovoljnoj osnovi. Takav princip može se protumačiti kao retorička strategija koja je doprinela da se konstruiše narativ fleksibilnosti i egalitarizma u pogledu rešavanja posledica klimatskih promena. Bez nametanja pritiska određenim zemljama učesnicama došlo je do smanjenja otpora prema sporazumu, čime se podstakla globalna odgovornost i saradnja u ispunjenju cilja ograničenja porasta globalne prosečne temperature na 2 stepena celzijusova, odnosno 1.5 stepen u odnosu na predindustrijski nivo. Taj ekološki prag ubrzo je postao refren, tj. integralni deo globalne klimatske retorike, što je rezultiralo opštom mobilizacijom gotovo svih zemalja sveta u pogledu obavezivanja na ispunjenje ciljeva iz sporazuma stvarajući jednu globalnu koaliciju u borbi protiv klimatskih promena.

AMERIČKI PREDSEDNIČKI IZBORI 2024. – KATALIZATOR ILI INHIBITOR KLIMATSKIH POLITIKA?

Koliko medijska komunikacija klimatskih promena, odnosno odabir frejmova „po meri” u medijskom izveštavanju mogu biti podsticajni, odnosno sputavajući u donošenju političkih odluka u pogledu smanjenja emisija ili jačanja otpornosti na klimatske promene najranjivijih grupa svedoče i predstojeći američki izbori. Prema pisanju Žurnalističkog pregleda Kolumbijskog univerziteta (Columbian Journalistic Review), predizborno odmeravanje snaga predsedničkih kandidata Demokrata i Republikanaca, Kamale Haris (Kamala Harris) i Donalda Trampa predstavljeno je u medijima pre svega kao klimatski duel, pri čemu su kontrastirani njihovi klimatski dosijei sa fokusom na aktivnosti i implementaciju.³² Za razliku od prethodnih izbornih ciklusa kada su se u medijima uglavnom apostrofirale razlike među kandidatima na polju političkih/geopolitičkih, ekonomskih i bezbednosnih pitanja, 2024. godine medijsko klatno počinje da naginje ka energentskim i klimatskim izazovima zumirajući postojeće ideološke kontraste među političkim rivalima.

Prema Klimatskoj konekciji Jejl univerziteta (Yale Climate Connection), polarizacija koja postoji prema pitanju klimatskih promena je evidentna. Dok Kamala Haris smatra da je „hitnost momenta jasna”, Tramp se i dalje pridržava retorike klimatskog kontraša (engl. *climate change denier*), i mejnstrim naučna istraživanja vrlo često predstavlja konstruisanjem diskursa „zavere”.³³

³² Columbia Journalism Review, “Sane-Washing and the Harris-Trump Debate”, *Columbia Journalism Review*, September 12, 2024, Available from: <https://covering-climatenow.org/from-us-story/sane-washing-and-the-harris-trump-debate/> (Accessed September 12, 2024).

³³ Samantha Harrington, Sara Peach, and Pearl Marvell, “How Kamala Harris and Donald Trump Compare on Climate Change”, *Yale Climate Connections*, July 22,

U nedavnom intervjuu sa najbogatijim čovekom sveta i tehnološkim magnatom, Ilonom Maskom, održanom na platformi X (bivši Twitter), Tramp je na pitanje o porastu nivoa mora kao jednoj od posledica klimatskih promena ushićeno odgovorio, „Bićemo vlasnici više imovine uz obalu okeana”.³⁴ Time je nastavio tradiciju upotrebe ironizacije kao retoričkog sredstva manipulacije kako bi podrugljivo ismejao scenarija i projekcije o budućim efektima klimatskih promena, minimizovao rizik i opasnost od sagorevanja fosilnih goriva i porasta temperature, i time delegitimizovao nauku o klimi sa ciljem što dužeg odlaganja procesa dekarbonizacije.

Međutim, upotreba persuazivne moći jezika radi reprodukovanja kontrole može dovesti do smanjenja antagonizma među predsedničkim kandidatima. Naime, neočekivano blaga klimatska retorika predsedničke kandidatkinje Haris na Konvenciji Demokrata tumači se kao komunikacijska strategija ubeđivanja (persuazije) glasača u državama koje mogu presuditi ishod izbora (engl. *swing states*), budući da su upravo te države značajno uključene u proizvodnju fosilnih goriva, i to pre svega Pensilvanija kao vodeći proizvođač prirodnog gasa zahvaljujući eksploataciji škriljaca (fracking). Tom prilikom Haris je istakla, „imali smo najveći porast domaće proizvodnje nafte u istoriji zbog pristupa koji prepoznaje da ne možemo previše zavisiti od uvozne nafte”.³⁵

Tako kreiran konfrontacioni diskurs u medijima može biti značajan faktor za oblikovanje javnog mnjenja, čime se može povećati svest i zainteresovanost birača za klimatske promene, a samim tim i uticati na izborni proces. U tom pogledu, prioritizacija klimatske politike kandidata može biti odlučujuć faktor na vagi na predstojećim izborima i tako odlučiti progresivnu ili regresivnu putanju kojom će se Sjedinjene Američke Države kretati u borbi protiv klimatskih promena.

2024, Available from: <https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2024/07/how-kamala-harris-and-donald-trump-compare-on-climate-change/> (Accessed 20 August, 2024).

³⁴ Philip Bump, “Does Donald Trump Understand How the Ocean Works?” *The Washington Post*, August 13, 2024, Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/08/13/does-donald-trump-understand-how-ocean-works/> (Accessed September 12, 2024).

³⁵ Ari Natter and Jennifer A. Dlouhy, “Harris Touts Record Oil Boom in Rare Embrace of Fossil Fuels”, *Bloomberg*, September 11, 2024, Available from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-11/harris-touts-record-us-oil-boom-in-pitch-as-climate-pragmatist> (Accessed on September 12, 2024).

ZAKLJUČAK

Politička opredeljenost, a samim tim i uključenost na polju donošenja klimatskih politika u velikoj meri zavisi od jezika, odnosno načina komunikacije klimatskih promena široj javnosti, a pre svega donosiocima odluka. U tom smislu, klimatske promene je nužno posmatrati u jukstapoziciji medijskog i političkog diskursa kao najuticajnijih domena u pogledu definisanja dominantne paradigme kroz interpretaciju rizika i opasnosti od budućih promena klime. Međutim, vrlo često medijska i politička slika uzroka, posledica i potencijalnih rešenja klimatskih promena ne predstavlja nužno ogledalo stvarnosti već distorziju naučnih rezultata i činjenica. U tom pogledu, gotovo uvek, poruka koja se šalje je kreirana (tehnički, politički i ideološki) u skladu sa interesima vladajuće elite, određenih interesnih grupa ili organizacija i ima za cilj da afirmiše ili kritikuje određene stavove, mere ili vrednosti. Iz toga proističe da odabir frejma nužno služi da osvetli poželjne, odnosno zamrači nepoželjne aspekte određenog pitanja klimatskih promena. Komunikaciju u tom pogledu gotovo uvek karakteriše binarna kategorija, odnosno pozitivni ili negativni frejm koji dalje ima za cilj da ubrza, odnosno uspori određene aktivnosti na polju klimatskih promena. U tom smislu, retorička sredstva mogu biti zloupotrebljena u manipulativne i persuazivne svrhe kako bi se konstruisao diskurs kojim se napadaju ili opravdavaju određene mere, aktivnosti, programi, odnosno strategije klimatskih promena. Predstojeći američki izbori takođe predstavljaju primer kako komunikacija klimatskih promena može biti važan tas na vagi u predizornoj kampanji, a samim tim i uticati na krajnji ishod dvoboja za mesto u Beloj kući. Istovremeno je utvrđeno kako različiti narativi oblikovani putem kombinovanja mnoštva jezičkih sredstava mogu uticati na dinamiku i tok globalne klimatske politike time što se nekim glasovima daje legitimitet, a nekima oduzima, čime se favorizuju, odnosno demonizuju određeni programi. Naučna nepouzdanost i sumnja se uvek javljaju kao kontrapunkt naučnom konsenzusu i tako usporavaju, opstruiraju ili onemogućavaju dekarbonizaciju, odnosno neto nultu budućnost bez sagorevanja fosilnih goriva. Obnovljivi izvori energije kao glavni energent u tom slučaju mogu biti predstavljeni kao glavni izvor troškova i nezaposlenosti ili novi profitabilni i održivi način snabdevanja energijom. Prema tome, sama komunikacija može biti ključna determinanta u donošenju klimatskih politika u onoj meri u kojoj uspe da mobiliše javnost i donosiocima odluka.

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Jovana Vurdelja

CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION – CATALYST OR INHIBITOR OF GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICIES

Abstract

Understanding and perception of climate change risks are greatly influenced by the polarized mediated portrayal of this global phenomenon, oscillating between the narrative of *climate crisis* of cataclysmic proportions on one hand and the notion of a *manufactured scientific hoax*, thereby shaping the course of climate debate in the public discourse. Apart from deepening

existing ideological and political polarization in the context of achieving net-zero emissions, specifically, the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources, this dichotomization of media content between climate alarmists and sceptics significantly contributes to the (de)motivation of engagement in climate policy-making. In this paper, different mechanisms of communicating climate change in the public discourse are examined, with a focus on political rhetoric, specifically dominant frames and narratives, and how they may contribute to accelerating or slowing down the implementation of specific measures, strategies, programs, as well as goals from climate agreements on emissions reduction or adaptive and mitigation measures.

Keywords:

Climate change, climate change communication, media discourse, political discourse, climate policies.

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Društvene nejednakosti i kriza: potreba za rodno-odgovornim strategijama**

Apstrakt

Tokom poslednjih dvadeset godina savremeno društvo se suočilo sa brojnim krizama koje su pogodile sve zemlje na globalnom nivou – počevši od globalne ekonomske krize iz 2008. godine, preko pandemije COVID-19 i rata u Ukrajini, pa sve do aktuelnog izraelsko-palestinskog sukoba. Krize čine kritični događaji koji pojedinačne zemlje ili društvo u celini dovode u izuzetno stanje koje odstupa od norme¹, a koje za posledicu ima eskaliranje društvenih sukoba i intenziviranje društvenih nejednakosti usled disfunkcionalnosti različitih društvenih sistema.² Društvene nejednakosti mogu oblikovati, pokretati i produbiti krize, a istovremeno i biti posledica kriza. Efekti kriza nikada nisu rodno neutralni. Zdravstvena kriza izazvana pandemijom COVID-19 je ponovo potvrdila da su, u kontekstu kriza, društveni i

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¹ Robert J. Holton, „The idea of crisis in modern society“, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1987), pp. 502–520.

² Tao Liu, „Social policy reform driven by crises: Promoting and reshaping social policy during the SARS and COVID-19 pandemics in China“, *Social Policy & Administration*, Vol. 56, No. 6 (2022), pp. 910–924.

ekonomski problemi rodno determinisani. Kriza koja je pratila pandemiju COVID-19 istakla je izraziti rodni disparitet u pogledu očekivanih ishoda i efekata preduzetih mera i strategija, što je dodatno otkrilo i intenziviralo već postojeće rodne nejednakosti u mnogim aspektima života – od tržišta rada i obrazovnih mogućnosti, pa sve do sistema zdravstvene i socijalne zaštite. Cilj ovog rada je da, primenom komparativnog metoda, sagleda uticaj pandemije na rodnu ravnopravnost i analizira na koji način i sa kojim efektom je *gender-mainstreaming* implementiran u nacionalne mere i strategije oporavka kao odgovora na pandemiju. Rezultati upućuju na neophodnost integracije rodne perspektive u proces upravljanja krizama, te da je za postizanje „rodno-odgovornog oporavka“ ključno usvajanje inkluzivnih i pravičnih ekonomskih i socijalnih mera i programa, koje promovišu socijalnu inkluziju, jednakost i rodnu ravnopravnost.

Ključne reči:

društvene nejednakosti, kriza, COVID-19, rodna ravnopravnost, rodno-odgovorne/rodno-transformativne strategije

UVOD

Unazad par decenija svedoci smo da su globalni sistemi – počev od finansijskog, preko bezbednosnog, energetskog, do zdravstvenog – naročito osetljivi na sistemske rizike i krize. Izrazita isprepletanost i međuzavisnost ovih različitih sistema doprinosi da se relativno mali problem u jednom delu sistema vrlo brzo proširi i dovede u pitanje opstanak celokupnog sistema. Počevši od globalne ekonomske krize iz 2008. godine, preko migrantske krize 2015, pandemije COVID-19 i rata u Ukrajini, pa sve do aktuelnog izraelsko-palestinskog sukoba, evidentno je da sistemski rizici ne ostaju ograničeni na globalne sisteme u kojima nastaju. Globalne krize se sve ređe dešavaju izolovano. Naprotiv, one međusobno deluju tako da kriza u jednom globalnom sistemu ima negativne efekte koji se prelivaju u druge globalne sisteme, čineći druge krize izvesnijim i produbljujući njihov ukupan devastirajući efekat.³

Krize čine kritični događaji koji pojedinačne zemlje ili društvo u celini dovode u izuzetno stanje koje odstupa od norme⁴, a koje za posledicu ima eskaliranje društvenih sukoba i intenziviranje društvenih nejednakosti usled

³ Michael Lawrence, Scott Janzwood and Thomas Homer-Dixon, *What Is a Global Polycrisis?*, Version 2.0. Discussion Paper 2022-4, Cascade Institute. Available from: <https://cascadeinstitute.org/technical-paper/what-is-a-globalpolycrisis/> (Accessed July 10, 2024).

⁴ Robert J. Holton, *The idea of crisis in modern society*, op. cit.

disfunkcionalnosti različitih društvenih sistema.⁵ Različite vrste kriza – od ekonomske krize, preko finansijske, društvene, političke, do krize izazvane ratnim stanjem – zahtevaju različite mehanizme odgovora i strategije delovanja. Krize se najčešće razumeju kao sistemski rizici koji ugrožavaju način života i socijalnu sigurnost ljudi, stvarajući pritisak na individualne i/ili kolektivne mehanizme reagovanja, što neretko dovodi u pitanje dosadašnja dostignuća i ostvareni stepen društvenog napretka, sa naročito pogubnim posledicama po ranjive i marginalizovane društvene grupe.⁶ Neosporno je da negativni efekti društvenih kriza kompromituju aktuelni društveni poredak, čineći implicitne socijalne probleme u „normalnim” vremenima eksplicitnim.

Društvene nejednakosti i krize su blisko povezane, formirajući zajedno jednu eskalirajuću spiralu u kojoj svaka pojačava i učvršćuje onu drugu do tačke ekstremne ranjivosti i neodrživosti.⁷ Kroz istoriju, društvene nejednakosti su neretko oblikovale, pokretale i produbljivale krize, dok su istovremeno bile i posledica višestrukih kriza, stvarajući začarani krug nestabilnosti i rastućih dispariteta, kao i globalno društvo naročito ranjivo na šokove.

Jedna od poslednjih u nizu kriza izazvanih pandemijom COVID-19 ne samo da je otkrila postojanje nejednakih struktura u našim društvima, već je delovala i kao „lupa za postojeće društvene nejednakosti”⁸, dovodeći do daljeg nepovoljnog položaja i marginalizacije onih koji su već bili ranjivi i marginalizovani. Kako Strid i saradnici navode (Strid, Schrodi and Cibin, 2022)⁹,

⁵ Tao Liu, *Social policy reform driven by crises: Promoting and reshaping social policy during the SARS and COVID-19 pandemics in China*, op. cit.

⁶ “Improving pandemic preparedness and management – Lessons learned and ways forward – Independent expert report”, European Commission (EC), Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, Group of Chief Scientific Advisors, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020. Available from: <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/370440> (Accessed March 4, 2024).

⁷ “Crises of Inequality: Shifting Power for a New Eco-Social Contract”, UNRISD FLAGSHIP REPORT 2022, UNRISD, Switzerland, 2022, p. 6. Available from: <https://cdn.unrisd.org/assets/library/reports/2022/full-report-crises-of-inequality-2022.pdf> (Accessed May 23, 2024).

⁸ Dragana Stöckel, Marina Pantelić, „Socijalna (is)uključenost marginalizovanih grupa u vreme covid-19 krize: novi izazovi i lekcije”, u: Vladimir Ilić (ur.), *Međunarodna naučna konferencija Aktuelnosti u logopediji, okupacionoj terapiji, psihologiji i socijalnom radu – ALOPS21: Nova realnost: kontinuitet i promene*, Beograd: Visoka škola socijalnog rada, 2022, str. 273–290.

⁹ Sofia Strid, Colette Schrodi and Roberto Cibin, “Better stories for a gender equal and fairer social recovery from outbreaks: learnings from the RESISTIRÉ project”, *Gender & Development*, Vol. 30, No. 1–2 (2022), pp. 265–281.

pandemija je promenila društvene strukture i organizaciju, a efekti toga su bili rodno determinisani i manifestovali su se duž različitih socioekonomskih i sociokulturnih osa – od pola, preko starosti, invaliditeta, etničke pripadnosti/rase, migracionog statusa, religije, društvene klase. Kriza koja je pratila pandemiju COVID-19 istakla je izraziti rodni disparitet u pogledu očekivanih ishoda i efekata preduzetih mera i strategija, što je dodatno učvrstilo, proširilo i intenziviralo već postojeće rodne i interseksionalne nejednakosti u mnogim aspektima života – od tržišta rada i obrazovnih mogućnosti, pa sve do sistema zdravstvene i socijalne zaštite, neplaćenog rada u kući i sektora brige.¹⁰

Međutim, krize jednako mogu predstavljati i priliku za promovisanje transformativnih politika, gde se posredstvom integrisanih rodno odgovornih mera i strategija ublažavaju, a ne pogoršavaju postojeće nejednakosti, čime se prevazilazi kratkoročno upravljanje krizom i osigurava pravedan i održiv oporavak. Pandemija COVID-19 ogolila je sveprisutne rodne nejednakosti u društvu, dok je u isto vreme ukazala na izazove i mogućnosti za unapređenje rodne ravnopravnosti u svetu nakon pandemije.¹¹ S tim u vezi, cilj ovog rada je da, primenom komparativnog metoda, sagleda uticaj pandemije na rodnu ravnopravnost i analizira na koji način i sa kojim efektom je *gender-mainstreaming* implementiran u nacionalne mere i strategije oporavka kao odgovora na pandemiju. Analiza koja sledi u nastavku nastojaće da ukaže da je za smanjenje nejednakosti i izgradnju otpornosti u suočavanju sa budućim rizicima i krizama ključno usvajanje inkluzivnih i pravičnih ekonomskih i socijalnih mera i programa, koje promovišu socijalnu inkluziju, jednakost i rodnu ravnopravnost.

PANDEMIJA COVID-19 I RODNE NEJEDNAKOSTI

Učinak kriza nikada nije rodno neutralan, a kriza izazvana pandemijom COVID-19 je svakako to i potvrdila. Kao rezultat već postojećih rodnih nejednakosti i preovlađujućih sociokulturnih normi, neosporno je da su žene neporocionalno više bile pogođene socijalnim i ekonomskim posledicama pan-

¹⁰ Tobias Axelsson, Anne-Charlott Callerstig, Lina Sandström and Sofia Strid, *RESISTIRÉ D4.1 Qualitative Indications of Inequalities Produced by COVID-19 and its Policy Responses. 1st Cycle Summary Report*, Zenodo, 2021. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5595815> (Accessed May 23, 2024).

¹¹ Maria López Belloso and Sofia Strid, "Navigating the pandemic: Gendered perspectives on vulnerability, resilience and institutional change in times of crisis", *Papers*, Vol. 108, No. 3 (2023), e3243, pp. 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.5565/rev/papers.3243>

demije. Kriza izazvana pandemijom ugrozila je decenijski napredak u pogledu ostvarenog stepena rodne ravnopravnosti u zemljama širom sveta. Dok su se rodne razlike decenijama unazad smanjivale u zdravstvenom i obrazovnom sektoru, značajne razlike i pre pandemije su ostale u oblasti zapošljavanja i na tržištu rada.¹² Kritični domeni u kojima su se rodne nejednakosti dodatno produbile tokom pandemije kretali su se u rasponu od ekonomske (ne)sigurnosti, preko sektora brige i neplaćenog rada u kući, do kršenja ljudskih prava i lične (ne)sigurnosti u kući, o čemu će detaljnije biti reči u analizi u nastavku.

Premda su prve procene UN-a pokazale da su širom sveta muškarci činili neznatnu većinu potvrđenih slučajeva (53%) zaraženih koronavirusom (SARS-CoV-2), u gotovo svim starosnim grupama osim među najstarijima (85+), u kojima su žene činile 63% prijavljenih slučajeva¹³, žene su ipak bile izloženije riziku od zaražavanja usled profesionalne rodne segregacije. Budući da na globalnom nivou one čine skoro 70% radne snage u zdravstvenom sektoru, našle su se na čelu borbe protiv pandemije, izlažući se na taj način većem riziku od infekcije.¹⁴

Istovremeno, pandemija je zaposlenost žena i njihovu ekonomsku aktivnost pogodila neproporcionalno više i drugačije u odnosu na muškarce. Engleski termini *She-cession* i *Mom-cession* se sve češće koriste kako bi se ukazalo na negativne posledice koje je zdravstvena kriza imala na ekonomsku aktivnost žena i njihovu poziciju na tržištu rada.¹⁵ I pre pandemije došlo je do zaustavljanja napretka u eliminisanju globalnog rodnog jaza u učešću u radnoj snazi i stopama zaposlenosti, dok su profesionalna segregacija i rodne razlike u platama ostale sveprisutne, što je uslovalo da se većina zaposlenih žena u svetu u trenutku izbijanja pandemije nađe na neformalnim i nesigurnim poslovima sa vrlo malo prava i zaštite. U 2020. godini žene su izgubile 46,6 miliona poslova širom sveta, što je gubitak od 3,6% u poređenju sa 2,9% koliko je to bio slučaj kod muškaraca.¹⁶ Gubitak poslova bio je posebno izražen

¹² "From Insights to Action: Gender Equality in the Wake of Covid-19", UN Women – Headquarters, 2020. Available from: <https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2020/Gender-equality-in-the-wake-of-COVID-19-en.pdf> (Accessed May 15, 2024).

¹³ Ibidem, p. 2.

¹⁴ "Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Women", UN, 2020, p. 10. Available from: <https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/Policy-Brief-on-COVID-Impact-on-Women.pdf> (Accessed May 24, 2024).

¹⁵ Dragana Stöckel, Marina Pantelić, „Socijalna (is)uključenost marginalizovanih grupa u vreme covid-19 krize: novi izazovi i lekcije“, nav. delo.

¹⁶ "Government responses to COVID-19: lessons on gender equality for a world in turmoil", UN Women, UNDP, 2022. Available from: <https://www.unwomen.org/>

u sektoru usluga, naročito u maloprodaji, ugostiteljstvu, turizmu i sektoru brige, gde su žene, posebno mlade žene, tradicionalno više angažovane. Nalazi istraživanja o socio-ekonomskom uticaju COVID-19 u 45 zemalja (Rapid Gender Assessment surveys -RGAs¹⁷) pokazali su da je jedna od četiri žene izgubila posao tokom pandemije. Takođe, žene u braku i sa decom su se češće odlučivale za rad sa skraćenim radnim vremenom, dok je sa razvojem krize veliki broj žena napustio posao, navodeći nedostatak brige o deci kao glavni razlog za to.¹⁸ Prve projekcije su ukazivale da je pandemija doprinela povećanju ekstremnog siromaštva kod žena i devojčica, beležeći porast stope siromaštva sa 11,7% u 2019. na 12,5% u 2021. godini (dok se kod muškaraca i dečaka taj rast kretao od 11,3% na 12,1%).¹⁹ Podaci iz 2022. godine pokazuju da na svakih 100 muškaraca starosti 25–34 godine dolaze 124 žene istog uzrasta koje žive u ekstremnom siromaštvu, sa izgledima da se ovaj odnos do 2030. godine neće vratiti na nivo pre pandemije.²⁰

Pored izrazitih negativnih posledica koje je zdravstvena kriza imala na ekonomsku aktivnost žena, tokom pandemije je, takođe, postalo evidentno u kojoj meri se sektor brige oslanja na neplaćeni i nedovoljno plaćeni rad žena. I pre krize, žene širom OECD-a su u proseku dnevno provodile dva sata više vremena u obavezama brige o domaćinstvu i članovima porodice u odnosu na muškarce.²¹ Kućni poslovi su se povećali tokom perioda izolacije za većinu domaćinstava, a posebno za ona sa decom ili drugim izdržavanim članovima, koji nisu bili u mogućnosti da dobiju adekvatnu institucionalnu podršku. Generalno, a naročito tokom trajanja pandemije, žene su imale tendenciju da

sites/default/files/2022-06/Government-responses-to-COVID-19-Lessons-on-gender-equality-for-a-world-in-turmoil-en_0.pdf (Accessed July 5, 2024).

¹⁷ "Women and Girls Left Behind: Glaring Gaps in Pandemic Responses", UN Women, 2021. Available from: <https://data.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/documents/Publications/glaring-gaps-response-RGA.pdf>

¹⁸ "Government responses to COVID-19: lessons on gender equality for a world in turmoil", op. cit.

¹⁹ "Gender Equality and COVID-19: Policies and Institutions for Mitigating the Crisis", IMF, UN Women, UNDP, 2021. Available from: <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/en-special-series-on-covid-19-gender-equality-and-covid-19.ashx> (Accessed July 4, 2024).

²⁰ "Government responses to COVID-19: lessons on gender equality for a world in turmoil", op. cit.

²¹ "Towards gender-inclusive recovery", OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), OECD Publishing, Paris, 2021. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1787/ab597807-en> (Accessed May 20, 2024).

preuzmu veći deo ovih povećanih zahteva za brigom u odnosu na muškarce, što se pokazalo kao jedan od vodećih izvora stresa kod žena.²²

Na kraju, pandemija je dovela do porasta rodno zasnovanog nasilja. Mere socijalnog distanciranja i ograničenja kretanja, u kombinaciji sa ograničenim pristupom uslugama podrške, učinile su da žene neretko budu „zatvorene” u kući sa svojim nasilnicima, što je dodatno predstavljalo pretnju po njihov telesni integritet, zdravlje i opstanak. Studija UN Women, kojom je obuhvaćeno 13 zemalja, ukazala je na intenziviranje nasilja nad ženama za vreme trajanja pandemije. Gotovo polovina ispitanica izjavila je da su one ili žena koju poznaju doživele neki oblik nasilja tokom pandemije, sa stopama koje su se kretale do čak 80% u Keniji, odnosno 69% u Maroku²³, a kao najčešći vidovi nasilja isticani su verbalno i ekonomsko nasilje.

Dakle, nesumnjivo je da je pandemija dodatno produbila tri međusobno povezane krize koje sistematski potkopavaju dostignuti nivo rodne ravnopravnosti u savremenom svetu. Kriza zaposlenja i egzistencijalna kriza, uz krizu u sektoru brige i „pandemiju u senci” rodno zasnovanog nasilja, dovele su u pitanje ionako krhki napredak u položaju žena na tržištu rada i u društvu, doprinoseći da ova zdravstvena kriza vrlo rano bude problematizovana kao ekonomska i društvena kriza.

POLITIČKI I DRUŠTVENI ODGOVOR NA PANDEMIJU COVID-19 – KA „RODNO-ODGOVORNOM” OPORAVKU

Premda je prethodna analiza ukazala na izraziti rodni disparitet efekata krize, ipak, stepen do kog teret krize pada na žene, odnosno muškarce, zavisi kako od njihovih različitih pozicija koje su zauzimali u društvu i ekonomiji pre krize tako i od toga kako mere i politike preduzete za rešavanje krize ublažavaju ili pogoršavaju ove efekte.

Naime, izazovi koje je pandemija COVID-19 stavila pred vlade i države širom sveta zahtevali su hitne i koordinisane političke i društvene odgovore na različitim nivoima, u rasponu od mera javnog zdravlja do strategija ekonomskog oporavka. I u slučaju krize izazvane pandemijom COVID-19 virusa pokazalo se da nacionalni sistemi socijalne zaštite predstavljaju značajan politički mehanizam u kriznim kontekstima, odnosno da programi i mere soci-

²² Ivana Bulog, Sandra Pepur and Ana Rimac Smiljanić, “Women’s overload during the pandemic: Unpaid care work, financial well-being, and stress”, *Management: Journal of Contemporary Management Issues*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2022), pp. 123–150.

²³ “Government responses to COVID-19: lessons on gender equality for a world in turmoil”, op. cit.

jalne politike predstavljaju ključni politički odgovor za ublažavanje društvenih i ekonomskih efekata krize.²⁴ Pandemija je još jednom reafirmisala ideju o neophodnosti uspostavljanja univerzalnih, sveobuhvatnih i adekvatnih nacionalnih sistema socijalne zaštite, u skladu sa Ciljevima održivog razvoja UN (Cilj 1.3), kako bi se pravovremeno odgovorilo na potrebe vulnerabilnih grupa u društvu, sa posebnim fokusom na žene i devojčice, čime bi se u krajnjoj liniji doprinelo izgradnji inkluzivnijih i rezilijentnijih društava.

Međutim, brojna istraživanja su pokazala da je integrisanje rodne perspektive u strategije odgovora na krizu bilo neadekvatno, te da vlade širom sveta nisu u dovoljnoj meri odgovorile na rodne nejednakosti koje su eskalirale kao posledica pandemije²⁵, što je dodatno istaklo da postojeći sistemi socijalne zaštite zanemaruju pitanje roda u svojim programima i politikama oporavka.²⁶ Nalazi pokazuju da je samo jedna od pet globalnih mera socijalne zaštite tokom pandemije COVID-19 bila rodno osetljiva, obuhvatajući podršku ženama u neformalnom zapošljavanju, ublažavanje rizika od nasilja i suočavanje sa nejednakom distribucijom obaveza brige oko dece i drugih članova

²⁴ Maja Gavrilovic, Monica Rubio, Francesca Bastagli, Roopa Hinton, Silke Staab, Ruth Graham Goulder, Charlotte Bilo, Ruby Khan, Amber Peterman, Bobo Diallo, Laura Alfes, Aroa Santiago, Zehra Rizvi, Rebecca Holmes, Juan Gonzalo Jaramillo Mejia, Constanza Tabbush, "Gender-responsive social protection post-COVID-19", *Science*, Vol. 375, No. 6585 (2022), pp. 1111–1113.

²⁵ Tobias Axelsson, Anne-Charlott Callerstig, Lina Sandström and Sofia Strid, *RESISTIRÉ D4.1 Qualitative Indications of Inequalities Produced by COVID-19 and its Policy Responses. 1st Cycle Summary Report*, op. cit.

Linda Sandström, Tobias Axelsson, Anne-Charlotte Callerstig, Sofia Strid and Alicja Bobek, *RESISTIRÉ D4.2 Building Back Better? Qualitative Indications of Inequalities Produced by COVID-19 and its Policy and Societal Responses. Second Cycle Summary Report*, Zenodo, 2022.

Clare Stovell, Federica Rossetti, Lorenzo Lionello, Alexis Still, Rana Charafeddine, Anne Laure Humbert and Charikleia Tzanakou, *RESISTIRÉ D3.1 Summary Report on Mapping of Quantitative Indicators – Cycle 1*, Zenodo, 2021.

²⁶ „Kontinuum rodne integracije” je okvir razvijen da objasni da sistemi (programi i mere) socijalne zaštite ne promovišu automatski rodnu ravnopravnost. Sistemi socijalne zaštite mogu varirati od rodno diskriminatornih i rodno slepih, preko rodno osetljivih, rodno responsivnih do rodno transformativnih, u skladu sa njihovim osnovnim ciljem i namenom (za detaljnije informacije pogledati: Paola Pereznieto and Rebecca Holmes, *Gender-transformative social protection in crisis contexts: guidance note*, Social Protection Technical Assistance, Advice and Resource Facility (STAAR), DAI Global UK Ltd. United Kingdom, 2023. Available from: https://socialprotection.org/sites/default/files/publications_files/Gender%20transformative%20SP%20guidance%20note_03.10.23.pdf (Accessed July 7, 2024), p. 5).

porodice.²⁷ Oslanjajući se u velikoj meri na nalaze UNDP-a i UN Women-a, tj. podatke Globalne baze za praćenje rodni odgovora na COVID-19 (Global Gender Response Tracker), analiza u nastavku će pokušati da prikaže kakvi su bili odgovori država na pandemiju iz rodne perspektive, odnosno koje i kakve su mere države preduzele da bi ublažile negativne efekte pandemije na žene i devojčice, te da li su i na koji način omogućile učešće žena u proces donošenja odluka u vezi sa pandemijom.

Program Ujedinjenih nacija za razvoj (UNDP) i UN Women pokrenuli su u septembru 2020. godine Globalnu bazu za praćenje rodni odgovora na COVID-19 (Global Gender Response Tracker), kako bi pratili mere vlada kao odgovor na krizu u tri ključna domena (ekonomska sigurnost žena, ekonomija brige i nasilje nad ženama) i procenili ih iz rodne perspektive. Analiza je pokazala da je do novembra 2022. godine u 226 zemalja usvojeno ukupno 4.968 mera kao odgovor na pandemiju COVID-19 (za više informacija posetiti: <https://data.undp.org/insights/covid-19-global-gender-response-tracker>). Od tog broja, ukupno 1.605 mera u 196 zemalja identifikovane su kao rodno osetljive. Nešto više od polovine ovih mera (853) usmereno je na rešavanje „pandemije u senci” rodno zasnovanog nasilja, dok su mere usmerene na jačanje ekonomske sigurnosti žena (526) i podršku neplaćenom radu u sektoru brige (226) bile manje zastupljene, čineći deo šireg paketa mera socijalne zaštite i mera zapošljavanja kao odgovora na COVID-19.²⁸ Od ukupno 3.099 mera socijalne zaštite i mera na tržištu rada, usvojenih kao odgovor na pandemiju, samo 12% je bilo usmereno na podsticanje ekonomske sigurnosti žena, dok je samo 7% predstavljalo odgovor na rastuće zahteve za neplaćenim radom žena u sektoru brige.²⁹

Podaci pokazuju da je najveći deo rodno osetljivih mera usvojen tokom prvog talasa pandemije, tačnije između marta i maja 2020. godine, dok je dalji tok pandemije pratilo usvajanje daleko manjeg broja rodno osetljivih mera kao odgovora na krizu.³⁰ Premda se može zaključiti da su rodno osetljive strategije počele da se usvajaju relativno brzo nakon izbijanja pandemije, njihovi dometi su bili ograničeni kao posledica neizvesnosti u implementaciji istih. Rodni odgovor na krizu je, takođe, varirao u odnosu na zemlju/region, odra-

²⁷ Maja Gavrilovic, Monica Rubio, Francesca Bastagli, Roopa Hinton, Silke Staab, Ruth Graham Goulder, Charlotte Bilo, Ruby Khan, Amber Peterman, Bobo Diallo, Laura Alfes, Aroa Santiago, Zehra Rizvi, Rebecca Holmes, Juan Gonzalo Jaramillo Mejia, Constanza Tabbush, *Gender-responsive social protection post-COVID-19*, op. cit.

²⁸ “Government responses to COVID-19: lessons on gender equality for a world in turmoil”, op. cit., p. 19.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 19.

³⁰ Ibid.

žavajući razlike u postojećoj političkoj i institucionalnoj infrastrukturi, razvijenosti feminističkih pokreta, političkoj posvećenosti i fiskalnim i administrativnim kapacitetima. Regioni sa usvojenim najvećim ukupnim brojem rodno osjetljivih mera su Evropa, Severna Amerika, Australija i Novi Zeland (494 mere u 56 zemalja), a zatim slede Latinska Amerika i Karibi (414 mera u 46 zemalja). Podsaharska Afrika je region sa trećim najvećim brojem rodno osjetljivih mera, dok je istovremeno region sa najmanjim prosečnim brojem mera po zemlji (221 mera u 50 zemalja).³¹ Na kraju, samo 64 zemlje je imalo holistički rodni odgovor na krizu (sa merama koje su donesene u sva tri analizirana domena), dok u čak 30 zemalja uopšte nije registrovano postojanje rodno osjetljivih mera. Donekle očekivano, skoro polovinu onih sa holističkim rodnim odgovorom čine visokodohodovane zemlje (28 od 64), zatim slede zemlje sa srednje visokim dohotkom (23 od 64) i na kraju one sa srednje niskim dohotkom (njih 13). Nijedna od 26 niskodohodovanih zemalja obuhvaćena analizom nije imala holistički rodni odgovor na krizu, što može uputiti na zaključak da su nacionalni dohodak i fiskalna ograničenja imala glavni uticaj na odgovor zemalja na rodnu nejednakost u kontekstu pandemije.³²

Pandemija ne samo da je uticala na način na koji su vlade reagovala i prilagođavale svoje politike i mere novonastalom kriznom kontekstu, ona je, takođe, dovela u pitanje i sam proces u kom su se donosile odluke o merama i načinu odgovora na krizu. Kada je reč o participaciji žena u radnim grupama za COVID-19, koje su u većini država predstavljale ključni politički i institucionalni mehanizam za upravljanje krizom, treba napomenuti da su one u velikoj meri bile isključene iz ovih tela. Naime, budući da se u kriznim kontekstima države najčešće oslanjaju na izvršne strukture vlasti, u kojima su mahom zastupljeni muškarci, bez adekvatnih i pravovremenih konsultacija sa organizacijama civilnog sektora i drugim zainteresovanim stranama, ne iznenađuje da su žene u samom procesu odlučivanja tokom pandemije uglavnom bile po strani ili je njihov glas često bio prigušen. Kako pokazuju dostupni podaci, od ukupno 262 radne grupe za koje postoje podaci o članstvu, žene su činile samo 24% njihovih članova, dok su bile potpuno isključene u 10% svih radnih grupa.³³ Takođe, žene su gotovo uglavnom bile isključene iz rukovođenja ovim grupama, što dokumentuje podatak da se samo 18% žena našlo na čelu svih radnih grupa za COVID-19.³⁴

³¹ "Government responses to COVID-19: lessons on gender equality for a world in turmoil", op. cit., pp. 20–21.

³² Ibidem, pp. 21–22.

³³ Ibidem, p. 23.

³⁴ Ibid.

Budući da je za vreme trajanja pandemije prostor za konsultacije u pogledu odgovora na krizu između predstavnika vlasti i ostalih zainteresovanih strana bio izuzetno ograničen, odluke vlada su neretko bile oblikovane u već uspostavljenim institucionalnim i administrativnim strukturama konkretnih država i društava. Premda su bili prisutni konstantni naponi zagovornika i aktivista rodne ravnopravnosti da se uključe u proces donošenja odluka i formulisanje odgovora na pandemiju, u onim kontekstima u kojima su predstavljali deo dugogodišnjih zagovaračkih grupa i mreža bili su u boljoj poziciji da to i učine.

FORMULISANJE RODNO-OSETLJIVIH STRATEGIJA KAO ODGOVORA NA COVID-19 – PRIMERI DOBRE PRAKSE

Uprkos izazovima sa kojima su se zemlje suočavale u integrisanju rodno-osetljivog pristupa u svoje mere i programe odgovora na krizu, izdvojili su se i neki primeri dobre prakse među zemljama koje su pokušale da obezbede da upravljanje krizom i politike oporavka jednako uzimaju u obzir potrebe žena i muškaraca. Sa stanovišta upravljanja krizom, dobra međusektorska praksa podrazumevala je sprovođenje rodne analize kako bi se razumele rodno zasnovane potrebe, rizici i mogućnosti, uključivanje i koordinacija svih zainteresovanih strana u procesu donošenja odluka i formulisanju politika i, na kraju, zauzimanje inkluzivnog pristupa u formulisanju politika koji vodi sveobuhvatnoj (ili univerzalnoj) pokrivenosti stanovništva, bez rigoroznih uslova za ostvarivanje prava i uz uvažavanje dostojanstva i promovisanje izbora. Sa druge strane, na nivou konkretnih političkih odgovora, dobra praksa se kretala u smeru proširenja postojećih i formulisanja novih mera i programa socijalne politike kako bi se odgovorilo na rastuće nejednakosti izazvane krizom u tri ključna domena (ekonomska sigurnost žena, ekonomija brige i nasilje nad ženama). Na kraju, važno je napomenuti da, iako je fokus na ženama i devojčicama, rodno-osetljiv pristup zahteva adresiranje potreba i rad sa muškarcima i dečacima, posebno na promeni diskriminatornih rodni normi u kući/domaćinstvu i društvu.

Kada je aspekt upravljanja krizom u pitanju, u onim kontekstima u kojima je i pre pandemije *gender-mainstreaming* bio dobro uspostavljen, vlade su koristile rodnu analizu kao značajan resurs u procesu donošenja odluka u vezi sa pitanjima rodne ravnopravnosti na samom početku pandemije. Naime, prema podacima OECD-a, čak 42% zemalja je koristilo rodnu analizu za formulisanje odgovora na pandemiju, kako bi adekvatno procenile uticaj politika na žene i muškarce.³⁵ Takođe, važnost institucionalne koordinacije i mehanizama za razmenu informacija u adresiranju različitih efekata pandemije

³⁵ "Towards gender-inclusive recovery", op. cit., p. 8.

na žene i muškarce, uključujući uvođenje rodno inkluzivnih razmatranja u hitne mere pomoći i oporavka, pokazao se kao značajan uslov za formulisane uspešnih strategija. Kao primeri dobre prakse u tom segmentu ističu se Kanada, Švajcarska, Italija i Meksiko. Naime, u ovim zemljama su nacionalne radne grupe za COVID-19, u saradnji sa drugim vladinim telima, radile na stvaranju međuresornog foruma za razmenu informacija, usklađivanje strategija i inicijativa kako bi se uvele politike koje promovišu rodno-inkluzivna razmatranja u mere odgovora vlada.³⁶ Konsultacije sa svim zainteresovanim stranama pokazale su se kao još jedan značajan mehanizam vlada u formulisanoj rodno-osetljivog političkog odgovora na krizu. S obzirom na neophodnost hitnog donošenja odluka, postojanje dobro razvijenih mehanizama za konsultacije i koordinaciju u procesu donošenja odluka može predstavljati značajan resurs i uštedeti dosta vremena. Naime, različita stručna savetodavna tela o rodnoj ravnopravnosti pokazala su se od naročite koristi prilikom identifikovanja potencijalnih prepreka za rodnu ravnopravnost i potencijalnog rodnog uticaja hitnih mera, dok su digitalne platforme za konsultacije omogućile fleksibilan i efikasan način za okupljanje i uključivanje svih zainteresovanih strana u proces kreiranja politika. Kao primeri dobre prakse navode se SAD i Kanada, koje su dale prioritet konsultacijama sa svim zainteresovanim stranama kako bi unapredile razumevanje različitih uticaja COVID-19 na muškarce i žene, dok su istovremeno mobilisale specifične forume kako bi koordinisale komunikaciju između mnogobrojnih aktera na svojoj teritoriji.³⁷

Kada su u pitanju konkretne mere i programi socijalne politike, ipak nisu sve države propustile da integrišu pitanje roda u svoje mere i programe oporavka od krize. Kako bi ublažile rizike u vezi sa rodnom nejednakostima u tri ključna domena, pojedini nacionalni sistemi socijalne sigurnosti su povećali svoju obuhvatnost i pristupačnost, usvajajući inkluzivne rodno-senzitivne strategije oporavka. Tokom pandemije COVID-19 pojedine zemlje (Argentina, Brazil, Kolumbija, Kenija i Togo) proširile su obuhvatnost svojih nacionalnih sistema socijalne zaštite, dajući poseban prioritet ženama sa niskim prihodima i nesigurnim zaposlenjem. Novčani transferi su se pokazali kao vitalni izvor podrške za nezaposlene, kao i za radnike zaposlene u neformalnom sektoru. Na primer, u Brazilu je vlada uvela program hitne novčane pomoći kojim je bila obuhvaćena gotovo trećina stanovništva, a koji se obezbeđivao u dvostruko većem iznosu jednoroditeljskim porodicama na čijem su čelu bile žene. Slično je bilo i u Egiptu, gde je vlada proširila programe novčane socijalne pomoći, tzv. Takaful i Karam, kako bi obuhvatila oko 3,8 miliona domaćinstava, uglavnom targetirajući domaćinstva na čijem čelu

³⁶ "Towards gender-inclusive recovery", op. cit., p. 9.

³⁷ Ibid.

se nalaze žene.³⁸ Budući da su nalazi brojnih istraživanja dokumentovali da su ekonomska nesigurnost i stres povezan sa siromaštvom tokom COVID-19 bili ključni okidači nasilja unutar porodice – Irska, Malta i Urugvaj su uvele mere koje su omogućile pristup dodacima za stanarinu i bezbednom stanovanju, što je ženama i deci olakšalo izlazak iz nasilnih situacija. Slično tome, Argentina i neke brazilske države uspostavile su gotovinske transfere koji su isključivo bili namenjeni onima koji su preživeli nasilje.³⁹ Na kraju, tokom pandemije COVID-19 najizraženiji rodni disparitet bio je u domenu ekonomije brige – povećana briga o deci, zatvaranje škola i školovanje od kuće, kao i briga o bolesnim i nemoćnim članovima porodice je teret koji su nesrazмерно više podnele žene. Kako bi omogućile zaposlenima da brinu o izdržavanjem licima u svojim domaćinstvima, pojedine zemlje (uključujući Austriju, Kanadu, Republiku Koreju, Sejše, Trinidad i Tobago i Uzbekistan) proširile su postojeće ili uspostavile nove politike odsustva. Takođe, budući da su u novonastalim okolnostima rad na daljinu i fleksibilni radni aranžmani postali uobičajeni načini organizacije posla, neke zemlje, poput Belgije, Čilea i Mađarske, obezbedile su isplatu gotovinskih naknada za negu roditeljima kao kompenzaciju usled zatvaranja vrtića i škola.⁴⁰

Iako se neretko o nacionalnim strategijama oporavka govori kao o propuštenoj prilici za rekonstruisanje društva i njegovo unapređenje, u svetlu navedenih primera dobre prakse može se zaključiti da je kriza u pojedinim kontekstima predstavljala priliku za promovisanje transformativnih politika oporavka i inkluzivnog upravljanja krizom. Za izgradnju pravednijih i rezilijentnijih društava nakon krize politike oporavka treba da budu zasnovane na rodnim i društvenim analizama, prilagođene potrebama žena i muškaraca iz različitih društvenih grupa i proaktivno usmerene na rešavanje nejednakosti.

ZAKLJUČAK

U svetlu pogoršanja rodni nejednakosti i nesrazmernog uticaja koji je pandemija COVID-19 imala na mnoge aspekte rodne ravnopravnosti, analiza odgovora vlada na pandemiju predstavlja značajan potencijal za promene,

³⁸ *Gender Equality and COVID-19: Policies and Institutions for Mitigating the Crisis* op. cit., pp. 3–4.

³⁹ Maja Gavrilovic, Monica Rubio, Francesca Bastagli, Roopa Hinton, Silke Staab, Ruth Graham Goulder, Charlotte Bilo, Ruby Khan, Amber Peterman, Bobo Diallo, Laura Alfes, Aroa Santiago, Zehra Rizvi, Rebecca Holmes, Juan Gonzalo Jaramillo Mejia, Constanza Tabbush, *Gender-responsive social protection post-COVID-19*, op. cit.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

budući da integriše važne lekcije za oporavak i izgradnju otpornosti i spremnosti savremenih društava u suočavanju sa budućim krizama i šokovima. Premda je nesumnjivo da odgovori vlada širom sveta na ekonomske i socijalne posledice pandemije nisu u dovoljnoj meri posvetili pažnju pitanjima roda i rodnoj dinamici, ipak, analiza je ukazala i na neke značajne međuregionalne i međudržavne razlike koje pružaju uvid u to da su rodno odgovorne strategije u vremenima krize ne samo moguće, već i uspešne.

Odgovori na pandemiju COVID-19 su u velikoj meri bili opredeljeni postojećim institucionalnim i administrativnim strukturama u konkretnim državama i društvima. Nacionalne socijalne politike imale su ključnu ulogu u rešavanju pitanja nejednakosti kroz bolje upravljanje socijalnom potrošnjom, ulaganje u ljudski kapital i povećanje produktivnosti, što je bilo od suštinskog značaja za održavanje društvene kohezije. Da li i kako su adresirani specifični rodni rizici i ranjivosti takođe je u velikoj meri bilo uslovljeno stepenom u kom je *gender-mainstreaming* integrisan u prethodno postojeće politike i institucije. Zaključak je jasan: ne samo kako bi se predupredili negativni efekti krize, već i zato što podsticanje rodne ravnopravnosti pruža snažnu osnovu za bolju izgradnju društva, značaj *gender-mainstreaming-a* u procesu donošenja odluka i kreiranju politika ne sme biti potcenjen kako bi se osigurao pravedan i održiv oporavak u vremenima krize.

Implementacija rodno odgovornih strategija oporavka, počevši od mera o hitnoj brizi o deci, preko podrške zaposlenima u neformalnom sektoru, do mera za rešavanje rodno zasnovanog nasilja, pokazala se od suštinskog značaja za ublažavanje rodno uslovljenih posledica pandemije. Rodno odgovorni i inkluzivni paketi ekonomskih podsticaja uz sveobuhvatne kompenzacione mehanizme socijalne politike, koji odražavaju temeljno razumevanje rodno specifičnih ranjivosti i potreba, mogu dovesti do transformativnih promena i pravednijih ishoda.

Konačno, u vremenima krize, institucionalizovani, dugoročni, univerzalni programi i mere socijalne politike zasnovani na ljudskim pravima ključni su za smanjenje nejednakosti i izgradnju otpornosti u suočavanju sa budućim šokovima. Nacionalne vlade trebalo bi da se fokusiraju na implementaciju inkluzivnih mera i strategija kako bi se maksimizirao uticaj socijalnih politika i poboljšala njihova održivost, te obezbedila sigurnosna mreža za ugrožene grupe stanovništva. Usvajanjem inkluzivnih i pravičnih politika za ekonomski i društveni oporavak nakon krize društva mogu ponovo da se izgrade na način koji se bavi sistemskim preprekama sa kojima se suočavaju žene i druge vulnerabilne društvene grupe, promoviše rodna ravnopravnost i postavljaju temelji za inkluzivniju i održiviju budućnost.

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Marina Pantelić

SOCIAL INEQUALITIES AND CRISIS: THE NEED FOR GENDER-RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES

Abstract

During the previous twenty years, the world has experienced numerous crises that have affected all countries globally – from the global economic crisis in 2008, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Crises represent critical events that bring individual countries or whole societies into an exceptional state deviating from the norm⁴¹, resulting in the escalation of social conflicts and the intensification of social inequalities due to the dysfunctionality of various social systems⁴². Social inequalities can shape, drive and intensify crises, while at the same time they can be the consequences of the crises. The effects of crises are never gender-blind. The health crisis caused by the COVID-19 has once again confirmed that, in the context of the crisis, social and economic problems are gendered. The crisis that followed the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted gender disparity in terms of the expected outcomes and the effects of undertaken measures and strategies, which additionally revealed and intensified already existing gender inequalities in many aspects of life – from the labor market and educational opportunities to the healthcare and social protection system. By applying a comparative method, the aim of this paper is to look at the impact of the pandemic on gender equality and to analyze how and with what effect gender-mainstreaming was implemented in the national recovery measures and strategies as a response to the pandemic. The results suggest the necessity of integrating a gender perspective into the crisis management, and that the adoption of inclusive and fair economic and social measures and programs, that promote social inclusion, justice and gender equality, is crucial in achieving "gender-responsive recovery".

Keywords:

social inequalities, crisis, COVID-19, gender equality, gender-responsive/gender-transformative strategies.

⁴¹ Robert J. Holton, *The idea of crisis in modern society*, op. cit.

⁴² Tao Lui, *Social policy reform driven by crises: Promoting and reshaping social policy during the SARS and COVID-19 pandemics in China*, op. cit.

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Tito – Harriman: History of a Special Friendship**

Abstract

In this text, the author discusses Yugoslav-American relations through the prism of the personal relationship between Josip Broz Tito and Averell Harriman. The mentioned indicates that the acquaintance of Tito and Harriman dates back to the time of the Second World War when they met in Moscow in 1944. In the decades that followed, it turned into friendly relations that lasted until the death of Josip Broz in 1980. Ever since the split between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1948, Harriman became one of the most vocal supporters of Tito's Yugoslavia among members of the so-called Washington establishment. That is why the United States of America, when the Democratic Party was in power in this country, used to send him for talks with Tito when certain delicate bilateral or international problems had to be resolved, and the Yugoslavs often used Harriman as an intermediary for communication with the top of the administration in Washington. The paper is based on unpublished and published historical sources and relevant literature.

Keywords:

Josip Broz Tito, Averell Harriman, friendship, United States of America, Yugoslavia, cooperation

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The delegation from the United States of America was among the 209 official delegations from 127 countries that attended the funeral of Josip Broz Tito in Belgrade in May 1980. As a result of the Cold War issues, the delegatio[n] was not led by the President of this country, Jimmy Carter, but by Vice President Walter Mondale, and Carter had sent his mother, Lillian, to Belgrade, in order to make up for his absence.¹ Out of all the other members of the otherwise large delegation, Averell Harriman was certainly the most well-known figure to the Yugoslavs. Harriman was not acting in the capacity of a state or party official at this grand gathering, the “summit of humanity”, as the Yugoslavs called it, but was presented as a veteran of American diplomacy and a former governor of New York.² The reason why the Americans had included him in their delegation was certainly that he was considered to be an old friend of Tito’s, with whom he met in one way or another, socialized and negotiated on behalf of his country in a three-decade long period of time from the beginning of the 50s until the Yugoslav president’s death.

Averell Harriman, a multimillionaire and member of one of the richest aristocratic New York families, belonged to the circle of the most influential figures of what some authors call the Washington establishment.³ Owing to the fact that, as a successful businessman, since the mid-1920s, he had been the most famous American investor in the Soviet economy between the two world wars, and then Roosevelt’s wartime ambassador in Moscow, he established close relations with Stalin, so the door of the Kremlin was almost always open to him.⁴ Regardless of the Cold War tensions after 1945, and the fact that he was a Cold War warrior as an anti-communist, Harriman remained a *persona grata* in Moscow for the rest of his life and was a welcome interlocutor of both Stalin and his successors.⁵ Moreover, his role of one of

¹ Tvrtko Jakovina, *Budimir Lončar: Od Preka do vrha svijeta*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2020, str. 349.

² *Svet o Titu 1980*, Tanjug, Beograd, 1981, str. 409.

³ Volter Ajsakson i Evan Tomas, *Mudri ljudi, Šest prijatelja i svet koji su napravili*, BMG plus, Beograd, 2006. On the life of Averell Harriman, see also the following extensive study: Rudy Abramson, *Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman 1891–1986*, William Morrow and Co, New York, 1992.

⁴ In addition to the above-mentioned literature, on Harriman’s connections with the USSR in the interwar period and during the Second World War, see also: V. O Pecatnov, *Avrell Harriman’s Mission to Moscow*, <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/d8-0cms-yx56/download> (accessed on 12th November 2023)

⁵ Harriman’s last visit to Moscow was in 1983 when, albeit in his old age, he spoke with then Soviet leader Yuri Andropov in an effort to ease Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. (See Harriman’s report on the

the most important and influential American diplomats during the Second World War, and then during the years of the Cold War, enabled him to establish contact with the leader of the Yugoslav communists and the lifelong president of socialist Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito.

The acquaintance between Tito and Harriman dates back to the war days when Harriman served as ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Tito was the head of the Yugoslav partisans. During his stay in Moscow in September 1944, in addition to meeting with the Soviet leaders, Tito also spoke with the American ambassador.⁶ Furthermore, Harriman stated that he had already advocated for Yugoslavia to be provided with the necessary military assistance during the liberation of the country.⁷ Harriman's daughter Kathleen, who had spent the war years in London and Moscow with her father, had also met the Yugoslav partisan leader in Italy in August 1944.⁸

conversation with Andropov at: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/17311-document-11-memorandum-conversation-between> (accessed on 17th November 2023). In recognition of his role in the Soviet-American relations, in 1985, on the fortieth anniversary of Victory Day, Moscow awarded him the Patriotic War decoration of the first order. V. Ajsakson i E. Tomas, *Mudri ljudi, Šest prijatelja i svet koji su napravili*, op. cit., p. 833.

⁶ The Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Political Archive (hereinafter: DAMSP, Pa), 1978, United States of America, box 129, document number 444857, Note on the Conversation of the President of the Assembly of the SFRY, Dragoslav Marković, with Governor Averell W. Harriman on 29th July 1978). It is interesting that Harriman does not mention the meeting with Tito anywhere in his extensive memoirs, in which he described his own role in the Second World War. W. A. Harriman, Elie Abel, *Specijalni poslanik kod Churchila i Staljina 1941–1946*, Globus, Zagreb, 1978.

⁷ Harriman spoke of this to the vice-president of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Vidoje Žarković, during his visit to Yugoslavia in September 1976. In the conversation with Žarković, he even mentioned how he became friends with Tito then. The Archives of Yugoslavia, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (Fund 837), I-3-a/107-221, stenographic notes from the conversation between the Vice-President of the Presidency of the SFRY, Vidoje Žarković, and Averell Harriman, the governor, Special Adviser to the American Democratic Presidential Candidate, held on 24th September 1976.

⁸ Kathleen left an interesting note about this meeting in a letter. She described Tito as a straightforward and witty man with piercing steely blue eyes and unusually manicured hands for a guerrilla leader, a person who was easy to talk to. Geoffrey Roberts, “Do the crows still roost in the Spasopeskovskaya trees’. *The Wartime Correspondence of Kathleen Harriman*”, Harriman Magazine, Winter 2015, p. 22. Available at the following address: <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/creative/epub/>

Averell Harriman's role in Yugoslav-American relations was even more significant in the tumultuous days after the split between Belgrade and Moscow in 1948. At that time, Harriman, a close associate of President Harry Truman, was in Europe in the capacity of United States' Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. Even after the first news about the split between Tito and Stalin, he strongly advocated for help to the Yugoslavs. Although an anti-communist, he believed that ideological differences should be put aside and that relations with Belgrade should be approached pragmatically, keeping in mind the common American-Yugoslav interests. For this reason, he advocated unreserved support for Yugoslav positions, thus strengthening Tito's resistance to Kremlin's dominance. Together with other members of the American government, such as William Draper, the Undersecretary of Defense, he was ready to personally travel to meet Tito in Belgrade in order to show his support for the Yugoslav side in this manner. As Draper described in a telegram addressed to the Ministry of Defense in Washington, sent from Vienna, where he was at that time: "Harriman's presence would in my mind have an electrifying effect not only in Yugoslavia, but in other satellite nations which are thought to be restive and perhaps are seeking relief from the oppression inherent in satellites positioned within Soviet orbit".⁹ Harriman believed that it was very useful to provide economic aid to Yugoslavia for the purpose of "stiffening Tito's resistance to the Kremlin pressures" in such a way.¹⁰ He feared that a lack of US interest in the events in Yugoslavia could "adversely affect Tito's current actions".¹¹ However, Harriman's trip to Yugoslavia and his meeting with Tito did not occur. Namely, a more cautious policy prevailed in the ruling circles of the USA to approach cooperation with Yugoslavia gradually and without fanfare.¹²

Harriman continued to strongly support Yugoslavia and Tito, which could be seen at the meeting of the main American ambassadors, held in Paris in October 1949. He then emphasized that Tito schism was undoubtedly the most important event outside the Western bloc countries, adding once more that the Atlantic Powers had to do everything in their power to help

[harriman/2015/winter/harriman_winter_2015.pdf](#) (accessed on 25th January 2024)

⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV, p. 1086.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 1088.

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² Lorejn M. Lis, *Održavanje Tita na površini. Sjedinjene Države, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, BMG, Beograd, 2003, str. 88–89.

Tito's regime, as he emphasized, "so that this sore on the Soviet security and ideological structure might continue to fester and spread".¹³ Harriman underscored that the victory or defeat of Tito could also be the victory or defeat of the USA in the Cold War and added: "If Tito is the number 1 job for Stalin, it should be the number 1 job for us."¹⁴

Harriman's mentioned attitude towards Yugoslavia and Tito was also present in the following years. It can be said that he was one of the most responsible people for the establishment of Yugoslav-American military cooperation during the 50s. Namely, according to the testimony of diplomat Vladimir Velebit, who met with him during his stay in Washington in 1950, Harriman and an influential group of people from Washington establishment close to him promised that they would advocate in the State Department and the Pentagon that the United States of America deliver American weapons to the Yugoslav army.¹⁵ He advocated the same policy during the meeting with the Yugoslav delegation led by the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army, Konstantin – Koča Popović, in June 1951 in Washington.¹⁶ At Yugoslavia's request, the Truman administration sent Harriman to Yugoslavia at the end of August of the same year for further discussions on this issue.¹⁷ It was then that he had his first official meeting with Tito. Harriman thus became the highest US government official to visit Yugoslavia after its break with the Soviet Union.¹⁸

During their several-hour conversation held at Tito's residence in Bled at the time, cooperation between the two countries was discussed on the military, economic and political levels.¹⁹ The most important topic was related to

¹³ FRUS, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV, p. 478.

¹⁴ Ibid, 479; Darko Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu. Odnos sa velikim silama 1949–1955*, Globus, Zagreb, 1988, p. 104.

¹⁵ Mira Šuvar, *Vladimir Velebit, Svjedok historije*, Razlog d.o.o., Zagreb, 2001, p. 374.

¹⁶ During this meeting, Harriman underlined that he was the first who, after the conflict in 1948, "resolutely advocated the opinion that the conflict between Yugoslavia and the USSR is true and insurmountable". DA MSP, Str. Pov., SAD, k. 39, f. 2, Notes on a Conversation with Averell W. Harriman and R. B. Joyce, Planning Staff Member at the State Department, 10th June 1951.

¹⁷ D. Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu. Odnos sa velikim silama 1949–1955*, op. cit., p. 301.

¹⁸ "Harriman Confers with Tito on Aid", *The New York Times*, 26th August 1951, p. 20.

¹⁹ FRUS, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2, 1842–1843; AJ, Cabinet of the Marshal of Yugoslavia (AJ, KMJ), I-2-a/95, Reception of the US President's Personal Adviser, Averell Harriman, at Marshal Tito's (Brdo near Kranj, 25. VII 1951; Historiography has given its exhaustive

military issues. Yugoslavia asked the US for armaments, such as jet planes and new tanks, as well as raw materials and industrial equipment to increase its own military production. Economic aid to Belgrade was also discussed, as well as the international situation, especially Soviet policy and Stalin's intentions towards Yugoslavia. As part of international topics, the issues of Yugoslavia's relations with Greece, Turkey and Italy were discussed.²⁰ The press conference that Harriman held in Bled the day after the meeting with Tito also attracted attention. This was especially true of the question of *The New York Times* correspondent M. S. Handler to comment on Tito's statement that "aggression against Yugoslavia could not be localized". Harriman replied that he "did not object" to such a statement, which was obviously a confirmation of Tito's position.²¹ In a later recollection of this meeting, Harriman stated that Tito was in great trouble at the time, owing to the Soviet threat, and that the USA helped him overcome the difficulties.²²

In addition to the far-reaching consequences for the relations between the two countries that this meeting had, as stated by historian Tvrtko Jakovina, the fact remains that Tito and Harriman liked each other as personalities, that Tito clearly managed to charm the American diplomat and that they

answer to this encounter. D. Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu. Odnos sa velikim silama 1949–1955*, op. cit., pp. 302–303; Tvrtko Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik. Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države 1945–1955*, Srednja Evropa, Zagreb, 2003, pp. 334–337; Ivan Laković, *Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958*, Istorijski institut Crne Gore, Podgorica, 2006, p. 50; L. Lis, *Održavanje Tita na površini. Sjedinjene Države, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, op. cit., pp. 153–154.

²⁰ Ibidim. Attention was also attracted by the mention of the current Trieste issue. Although Harriman did not comment on the issue at the press conference, news emerged in the Italian public that he had agreed to settle the matter with Tito. Such news, which was later reported by the newspaper *Europeo*, had to be denied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. "Rome Scouts Report of Accords on Trieste", *The New York Times*, 3rd October 1951, p. 22

²¹ "Accord of Defence with Tito is Seen in Harriman Talks", *The New York Times*, August 27. 1951, p.1; D. Bekić, *Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu. Odnos sa velikim silama 1949–1955*, op. cit., p. 304. Harriman's stay in Yugoslavia and his conversation with Tito led the journalist Hedler to emphasize in his report from Bled that their conversation: "widened the area of understandings between the United States and Yugoslavia to a point where it is permissible to speak of an unwritten United State-Yugoslav alliance to defend the peace in Europe against possible Soviet aggression".

²² Oral history transcript, W. Averell Harriman, interview 1 (I), 6/16/1969, by Paige E. Mulhollan, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, Available at: <https://www.discoverlbj.org/item/oh-harrimanw-19690616-1-74-123> (19th February 2024).

then definitely established friendly relations.²³ It is not known to what extent Harriman charmed Tito on that occasion, but judging by the statements of Tito's biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, out of all the Americans who had visited Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav president was "particularly impressed by Harriman".²⁴

However, their relationship during the 50s should perhaps not be exaggerated. This is evidenced by an attempt by the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (DSIP) to organize the arrival of the then governor of New York, Harriman, to Belgrade for a talk with Tito in the mid-1950s. DSIP justified this proposal by the reputation enjoyed by Harriman and the attitude he had towards Yugoslavia. Tito, however, overwhelmed by other obligations, was not enthusiastic about the idea of organizing this meeting, complaining that his protocol did not sufficiently take care of his obligations, so this visit was not organized in the end.²⁵ It was also a time of altered foreign policy circumstances, so this visit would certainly not have had the significance of the one in 1951. Be that as it may, the fact remains that his mission from 1951 also resulted in the establishment of closer ties between the two countries, for which Harriman would credit himself, showing a certain amount of self-flattery, over the next three decades.

Tito and Harriman met again in October 1963 in Washington. As a staunch member of the Democratic Party, Harriman was given a place in the White House when President John F. Kennedy came to the White House from the mentioned party. When the Yugoslav president came on an official visit to the USA, Harriman served as undersecretary for political affairs in the State Department and participated in the talks between Tito and Kennedy. On that occasion, Harriman recalled his meeting with Tito in the early 50s. He stated that Yugoslavia had preserved its independence in the meantime and supported the further course of the relations between the countries.²⁶

Harriman played a more significant role in Yugoslav-American relations in the period from 1965 to 1967, when he stayed in Belgrade on three occasions as a personal envoy of the new president Lyndon Johnson

²³ T. Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik. Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države 1945–1955*, op. cit., pp. 334, 337.

²⁴ Dedier states that, in addition to Harriman, the judge of the Constitutional Court, William Douglas, also left the same impression on Tito. Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita*, IKOR "Mladost", Zagreb, 1980, p. 651.

²⁵ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-33, New York State Governor Averell Harriman's Reception, July 1955.

²⁶ Miladin Milošević i Dragan Bogetić. prir., *Jugoslavija – Sjedinjene Američke Države: susreti i razgovori najviših zvaničnika Jugoslavije i SAD, 1955–1980*, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2017, p. 167.

with the task of negotiating with Tito on the issue of achieving peace in Vietnam. During these meetings, Yugoslavia was one of the stops in a series of diplomatic visits that Harriman made in his capacity as ambassador at large in an effort to help Johnson solve this complicated and painful issue for the US. The first of Harriman's mentioned visits was at the end of July 1965 and was presented to the public as a private visit to Yugoslav President Tito. While the Americans had Vietnam as the main topic on the agenda, the Yugoslavs saw Harriman's visit as a good opportunity to improve bilateral relations, which were going through a period of crisis at the time.²⁷ Harriman and Tito spoke on two occasions. The first meeting was held in Belgrade on 29th July, and the second was held on the island of Vanga three days later. Although there were no concrete results in terms of the Yugoslav mediating role in resolving the Vietnam issue, the aforementioned meeting led to an improvement between Belgrade and Washington.²⁸ This particularly referred to the US's economic support.²⁹ The meeting on Vanga also left an interesting episode that was later fondly recounted in American diplomatic circles. The several hour long conversation was tense at times until the moment, as witnessed by Walter Roberts, one of the American diplomats present, when Tito asked Harriman how old he was. As it turned out that both were seventy-three years old (although Harriman had actually been born at the end of 1891 and was six months older), Tito brought out a dusty bottle of wine produced in 1892 from the cellar. It helped to alleviate the tension and bring the interlocutors closer to each other. This episode certainly contributed to establishing an even closer contact between Tito and Harriman.³⁰

At the end of the year, President Johnson still hoped that Harriman, in a conversation with whom he emphasized to be his "old friend" Tito, could find a way to persuade the North Vietnamese to sit down at the negotiating table.³¹ The new meeting was arranged in a hurry, on the first day of the New Year in

²⁷ Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961–1971*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2012, p. 193; Milan Stevanović, "Averel Hariman u poseti Beogradu 1965. i poboljšanje jugoslovensko-američkih odnosa", *Arhiv*, godina XVII (2016), br. 1–2, pp. 158–169.

²⁸ D. Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961–1971*, op. cit., p. 198.

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ *In Vino Veritas*, <https://adst.org/2014/12/in-vino-veritas/>, (accessed on 1st March 2024).

³¹ FRUS, 1964–1968, volume III, Vietnam, June – December 1965, p.720; Jonathan Colman, "The 'Most Distinguished Envoy of Peace': Averell Harriman and the Vietnam War in the Johnson Years", *The International History Review*, (2016), 38:1, p. 74.

1966, at Brdo Castle near Kranj.³² This time, the talks were entirely devoted to Vietnam, while bilateral relations were not discussed. However, like the previous meeting, this one did not produce results either.³³ The next meeting between Harriman and Tito took place in November 1967 in Karađorđevo.³⁴ In addition to Vietnam, the situation in the Middle East was also discussed, as well as some other international topics. Although all of the mentioned Harriman's talks with Broz, as well as with other leaders, did not lead to peace in Vietnam, Harriman's visits and several hour long talks with Tito improved Yugoslav-American bilateral relations and additionally strengthened their personal friendship. Attempting to resolve the Vietnam issue was one of Harriman's last official diplomatic missions, as he retired in 1969.

After almost a full decade of absence, which coincided with the Republican administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald P. Ford, Harriman came to Yugoslavia again at the end of September 1976. It was in the final phase of the presidential election campaign, and he was sent to Belgrade by politicians gathered around the Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter. In fact, Yugoslavia was part of a larger route, in which the main stop, as was always the case when it came to Harriman, was Moscow. As stated by Harriman, the goal of his visit to Yugoslavia was twofold: "to express Carter's deep respect for the President as the most eminent figure of our time, and secondly, to discuss with Tito a number of the most important international problems, because Carter would very much like to hear Tito's opinion and assessment regarding the most sensitive problems of international relations".³⁵

Harriman presented the trip to Yugoslavia to the public as a private visit to an old acquaintance, Fitzroy McLean, who had a house on the Adriatic.³⁶ In this way, he wanted to avoid participating in the talks with the US ambassador to Yugoslavia, Lawrence Silberman, who was a *persona non grata* in Belgrade

³² AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-140, Reception of US Special Envoy Averell Harriman, 1st January 1966; D. Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961–1971*, op. cit., pp. 199–201; Milan Stevanović, „Američka 'mirovna ofanziva', druga poseta Averela Harimana i Jugoslavija krajem 1965. i početkom 1966. godine", *Arhiv*, godina XVII (2017), br. 1–2, pp. 227–240.

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ M. Milošević i D. Bogetić. prir., *Jugoslavija – Sjedinjene Američke Države*, op. cit., pp. 197–213.

³⁵ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-221, Reception of Former Governor Averell Harriman, September 1976.

³⁶ Ibidem.

at that moment.³⁷ He also had a personal motive. He wanted to introduce his new, third wife, Pamela, ex-wife of Randolph Churchill, to Tito, as well as to spend their fifth wedding anniversary on the Brijuni islands. Tito, however, was seriously ill at the time, so – despite Harriman's persistent insistence – the meeting did not take place. Still, the Harriman couple was showered with special attention and gifts from Yugoslav state officials. As a special token of appreciation, Tito also allowed them to visit Vanga in his absence.³⁸ Unable to speak with the Yugoslav president, Harriman conveyed the key message he came with to Edvard Kardelj. And the message was that Carter would pursue the same policy towards Yugoslavia as the Truman administration did after 1948.³⁹

After Carter's victory in the November 1976 elections, Harriman's role in Yugoslav-American relations gained importance. At the start of its term, the new Democratic administration seemed to have presented Harriman as the embodiment of their views on Yugoslavia. During the first meetings, members of the Carter administration emphasized the importance of Harriman. Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Assistant Undersecretary for Yugoslavia at the State Department John Armitage passed on Harriman's letters, verbal messages, and greetings to Tito whenever they met with Yugoslav government officials.⁴⁰ The reference to Harriman and his friendship with Tito seemed to have been intended to mean that the new administration would pursue a policy of friendship and understanding toward Yugoslavia, a policy best embodied by Harriman.⁴¹ Thus, the relationship between Harriman and Tito seemed to have grown

³⁷ AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-21, State Secret, Information on the US Ambassador to Belgrade, L.H. Silberman.

³⁸ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-221, Reception of former Governor Averell Harriman, September 1976.

³⁹ Ibidem, A note on the conversation of the member of the presidency of the SFRY, Edward Kardelj, with Averell Harriman, the special adviser of the democratic candidate for the President of the USA J. Carter, 25th September 1976.

⁴⁰ AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-22, From a note on a conversation between Comrade Edward Kardelj, a member of the Presidency of the SFRY, with Charles N. York, Chargé D'affaires of the US Embassy in Belgrade, and John Armitage, Assistant Undersecretary in the State Department, in charge of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, on 25th February, 1977 in Belgrade.

⁴¹ During his visit to Yugoslavia in May 1977, Walter Mondale met Tito and handed him Harriman's letter. The Vice President of the USA said on that occasion: "this is a letter from your old friend Harriman, who is well and informed of everything." M. Milošević i D. Bogetić. prir., *Jugoslavija – Sjedinjene Američke Države (Yugoslavia – United States of America)*, op. cit., p. 378.

beyond the relationship of two old friends, and represented the friendship of the two states on a symbolic level. Harriman, who did not become part of the Carter administration, both because of his advanced age and because of his cold relations with national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, was the first to outline the basis of the policy that the Carter administration should have pursued towards Tito's Yugoslavia in early 1977 to the American public, who often used him as a reliable interpreter of Yugoslav politics and relations between Belgrade and Washington. He succinctly summarized them in four key words: non-alignment, independence, integrity and unity of Yugoslavia.⁴² Carter would indeed hold on to these for the rest of his term.

In Belgrade, they also believed that Harriman had an influence on improving the general atmosphere in bilateral relations. They believed that the platform on which Carter had based his positive policy towards Belgrade was created, among other things, based on the report that Harriman had submitted after his September stay in Yugoslavia.⁴³ At the basis of this policy was the understanding that any pressure on Belgrade was "counterproductive", and that it was most useful for the United States of America to accept Yugoslavia "as an independent and equal factor".⁴⁴ In accordance with the above, there was also the estimate that Harriman was one of the most worthy people, which led to the White House considering Yugoslavia and its future with more trust.⁴⁵ The President of the Assembly of the SFRY, Dragoslav Draža Marković, expressed himself most succinctly about his importance for the formulation of this kind of American policy towards Yugoslavia during their meeting in Belgrade at the end of July in 1978. Marković stated that it could be said that Harriman's visit to Yugoslavia in 1976, at a time when Yugoslavia's relations with the USA were not good, "was the initial step that led to further improvement and the current development of relations".⁴⁶

⁴² AJ, KPR, I-5-b/104-22, Ambassador Belovski's Conversation with Harriman, 25th June 1977.

⁴³ DA MSP, Pa, 1977, SAD, b. 125, dos. 4, no. 452373, Letter from the Embassy in Washington to the SSIP, 6th September 1977; Archives of Yugoslavia, Presidency of the SFRY (803), 1978, Folder Number 54, State Secret, Information on the Occasion of the Visit of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, to the United States, 1st February 1978.

⁴⁴ AJ, 803, 1979, b. 64, Strictly Confidential, Reported titled "Long-term relations between the SFRY and the USA", 20th October 1978.

⁴⁵ AJ, KPR, I-2/73-1, Ambassador Belovski's Telegram on the Eve of Comrade President's visit to America, 25th February 1978.

⁴⁶ DA MSP, Pa, 1978, SAD, b. 129, dos. 18, no. 444857, Note on the Conversation between the President of the Assembly of the SFRY, Dragoslav Marković, and Governor Averell W. Harriman on 29th July 1978.

Even though they had not seen each other in the fall of 1976, Tito and Harriman would meet often in the following few years, both in Yugoslavia and in the USA. The first of these meetings was held in Washington in March 1978 during Tito's official visit to Washington. At that time, the Yugoslav president hosted an intimate dinner for Harriman at Blair House, where he was staying.⁴⁷ The next meeting took place at the end of July of the same year. This time, Harriman was visiting Tito on Vanga. In the conversation, which was also attended by the American ambassador in Belgrade, Lawrence Eagleburger, most of the talk was about the non-aligned politics, relations between the Soviet Union and the USA, China, as well as bilateral Yugoslav-American relations.⁴⁸ During his stay in Yugoslavia, Harriman was not only Tito's guest on Vanga, but also met with the new Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Josip Vrhovec, and the President of the SFRY Assembly, Marković.

Harriman was also often in the role of mediator whenever it was necessary to directly convey an important message from the White House to the Yugoslavs or, conversely, to examine and convey to Washington Tito's political views on important international topics, such as the policy of non-alignment. He continued to explain and defend Yugoslav positions in the American media. On the other hand, Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Washington often used Harriman when they wanted to communicate with Carter and his closest circle.⁴⁹ Harriman's luxury house in the Washington suburb of Georgetown was the place where the most important Yugoslav state officials met with the most influential representatives of the establishment during their visits to the USA. That is why it is not surprising that Harriman was at the head of the American delegation that, in February 1979, attended the funeral of the number two man in Yugoslavia at the time, Edvard Kardelj.⁵⁰ Finally, as already stated at the beginning, he was a member of the official American delegation that attended Tito's funeral. Harriman outlived Tito by a full six years. He died in July 1986 at the family estate in Arden.⁵¹

⁴⁷ AJ, KPR, I-2/73-1, J. B. Tito's Trip to the USA, 6th to 9th March 1978

⁴⁸ FRUS, 1977-1980, Eastern Europe, Volume XX, pp. 841-846.

⁴⁹ Harriman was a frequent interlocutor with the Yugoslav ambassador to the USA, Dimče Belovski, and since the fall of 1979, with his successor, Budimir Lončar. Belovski and Lončar used Harriman's influence to solve certain current bilateral problems or to gain insight into the positions of the Carter administration regarding numerous international topics. Diplomatic documents in the Yugoslav archives bear witness to their meetings.

⁵⁰ Harriman used his stay in Yugoslavia to discuss current international issues with Tito and other government officials, such as the conflict in Kampuchea.

⁵¹ V. Ajsakson i E. Tomas, *Mudri ljudi, Šest prijatelja i svet koji su napravili*, op. cit., p. 833.

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Yugoslav-American Relations in 1941: Yugoslav Delegation's Presentation of Peace Aims to the Council on Foreign Relations

Abstract

The paper analyzes the bilateral meeting of Yugoslav delegates and representatives of the New York *Council on Foreign Relations* held after the “April War” in 1941 with regard to collecting political information for the requirements of the presidential administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Yugoslav minister in Washington, Konstantin Fotić, led intensive diplomatic activities on the territory of the United States with the aim of securing American aid for the reconstruction of Yugoslav statehood in the ensuing international order upon the completion of the World War. In addition to Fotić, Jozo Tomašević participated in the conversation with the American academic elite from the New York *Council on Foreign Relations*, and presented the economic goals for the development of Yugoslavia. On behalf of the State Department, the Council gained insight into the Yugoslav political and economic situation and prepared several memorandums on Balkan relations for the needs of the American government in the implementation of the post-war arrangement of world politics.

Keywords:

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Council on Foreign Relations, The Inquiry, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Konstantin Fotić, Jozo Tomašević, Hamilton Fish Armstrong

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SERBIA'S WORLD WAR ONE MISSION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE INSTITUTIONAL NEXUS OF THE NEW YORK COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT

The study of International Relations emerged after the Great War with the first independent research institutes, which have had a great influence on the development of theoretical frameworks concerning international relations and practical international politics to this day. In 1920, the British Royal Institute for International Affairs was formed in London (*Chatham House*); a year later, the *Council on Foreign Relations* (hereinafter: CFR) formally began its work in New York.¹ The very next year, in 1922, another think tank was created in America, the *Chicago Council on Foreign Relations* (today: *Council on Global Affairs*). Irrespective of the fact that the CFR from New York commenced work in 1921, it had been preceded by the establishment of President Woodrow Wilson's advisory body, called *The Inquiry*, as well as the work of the American delegation involved in the Paris Peace Conference.² *The Inquiry* was created by order of the President a few months before the American declaration of war on Germany in 1917, and was comprised of the academic elite whose task was to prepare the US government's plan for a comprehensive peace process and reaching an end to the military conflict. The preparatory committee for the participation in the Paris conference acted according to the instructions of "Colonel" Edward M. House, the leader of the mentioned political body and the proto-national security adviser of the American president. The committee conducted studies for the purpose of resolving the problematic relations in almost all areas of the world and formally proposed solutions for the territorial problems on the basis of such studies to Wilson, which he proclaimed in the "Fourteen Points". A large number of *The Inquiry's* proposals, including solutions for Western Europe, the Balkans, Poland, the Middle East and a system of mandated territories, were incorporated into the final peace decisions of the Paris Peace Conference.³ The Council's flagship magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, began its work in 1922, and leading International Relations authorities and Social sciences intellectuals have been publishing their works and papers to date.

The Serbian political elite contributed to the work of *The Inquiry* by gathering the necessary information during the visit of the "*Serbian War*

¹ Dragan R. Simić, *Svetska politika*, Fakultet političkih nauka, Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2009, p. 16.

² Laurence H. Shoup, William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust*, MR, New York, 1977, p. 13.

³ Lawrence E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry, American Preparations for Peace, 1917–1919*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1963, pp. x–xi.

Mission" to Washington in late 1917 and early 1918. Members of the Serbian mission presented the Serbian national goals to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Chief of Staff Tasker Bliss and Edward House. On that occasion, *The Inquiry* prepared a part of the memorandum dedicated to Balkan relations, which was to be discussed at the upcoming Peace conference, and which referred to the solution of the Serbian question. At Wilson's request, Edward House held a meeting on January 5th with the head of the Serbian mission, Milenko Vesnić, at which time they discussed Serbia's post-war plans. The Serbian delegate emphasized the vision of "the end of German-Hungarian domination".⁴ Once Vesnić had delivered a speech at the Senate on January 5th, 1918, his address was also attended by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, a young lieutenant in the US Army who was assigned by the State Department to accompany the Serbian delegation.⁵ Thus, one of the CFR's key figures and long time *spiritus movens* would be historically destined to devote a considerable amount of academic work and foreign policy analysis to the two state forms of Yugoslavia and the development of the geopolitical situation in the Balkans.

The end of World War One put the USA in the position of the leading country in world politics. President Wilson intended to use the newly formed position of America to create the international institution of the League of Nations, which would work on the creation of a system for collective security and the preservation of peace. Since the US Senate had not ratified the Paris Peace Conference treaties, nor had it accepted US participation in the League of Nations, America distanced itself from European politics. However, certain political, business and intellectual circles in America believed that a situation like the one on the eve of the First World War, when Washington had been insufficiently informed about global events and was outside the loop when it came to world politics, must not occur, which is why President Wilson initially created *The Inquiry*. One of the ways for interested circles in America to follow the course of international and world politics was through the CFR organization in New York. A crucial feature of the Council was "continuous conference" on international affairs. In the first years, general meetings were organized for prominent statesmen. For instance, the Council sponsored a

⁴ Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *U potrazi za zaštitnikom*, Albatros plus, Beograd, 2011, pp. 144–145. About „Serbian War Mission“ see: Dr Ubavka Ostojić-Fejić, *Sjedinjene Američke Države i Srbija 1914–1918*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 1994, pp. 146–152; Bogdan Krizman, *Srpska ratna misija u SAD* (decembar 1917–februar 1918), *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 1–2, Beograd, 1968, pp. 43–73.

⁵ Mabel Grujić, *Kratak pregled o ulozi Amerike u svetskom ratu u vezi sa našom zemljom*, 1934, p. 11. Cited according to: Bogdan Krizman, *Srpska ratna misija u SAD* (decembar 1917–februar 1918), op. cit., p. 61.

November 1922 appearance in New York by former Prime Minister George Clemenceau of France. After 1929, the meetings brought foreign statesmen, as well as American officials. Occasionally, such meetings were to be used for the delivery of an important statement. From 1921 to 1938, every Secretary of State made an important foreign policy address at one Council session at least. From 1927, the CFR paid more systematic attention to the study and research program, and this aspect of the Council's work became its most important activity as years went by. The Council invited prominent diplomats and politicians to address its members on a monthly basis in order to keep its members informed of the latest developments and opinions in world affairs. It also organized specialist study groups to focus on particular aspects of foreign affairs, such as Soviet Russia (1923), the Far East (1924), Anglo-American relations (1928) etc.⁶ Until the outbreak of World War II, the CFR held working meetings, discussing key world problems and processes, such as the problems of economic reconstruction in Europe, the World Economic Crisis, the French quest for security and militarization on a global scale.⁷

INTERWAR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA

As a consequence of the dramatic world changes occurring at the onset of the Second World War in 1939, the political bilateral relations of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the United States gained importance.⁸ Prior to that, for

⁶ Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 108.

⁷ Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs, The History of the Council on Foreign Relations*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1984.

⁸ The subject of research related to Yugoslav-American relations in the period at the beginning of the Second World War (1939–1941) refers us to some of the important works in domestic and foreign literature. Regardless of the relatively small number of existing works, their importance is reflected on the interpretation of mixed historical sources and documentary material. Linda Kilen's monograph *Testing the Peripheries, US–Yugoslav Economic Relations in the Interwar Years*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994, is an essential and indispensable study of the relations between the two countries, predominantly of an economic nature in the period between the two world wars. Among the works of Serbian authors, the best known is Vojislav Pavlović's, *Od monarhije do republike – SAD i Jugoslavija (1941–1945)*, Clio, Beograd, 1998, as well as Nataša Miličević's, *Jugoslovensko–američki odnosi u predvečerje Drugog svetskog rata*, *Institut za stratezijska istraživanja*, n. 2/2008, Beograd, 2008. An essential work on the interwar Yugoslav emigration in the US is the study by Vesna Đikanović,

the duration of the entire period between the world wars, both countries insufficiently exploited the potential of bilateral relations, which is why there was an intention of deepening mutual ties. With the exception of the problem related to the negotiations regarding the formal regulation of war debts from the First World War, there were no significant open issues. Considering the isolationistic impulses, the interwar diplomacy of the State Department perceived Yugoslavia as an actor of minor importance, considering that it held the place of a distant peripheral state in the economic sense. Therefore, in the global economic vision that the US advocated in the 1920s, Yugoslavia did not possess the strategic importance for achieving international economic and political stability. During the 1930s, the Americans did not view Yugoslavia as necessary market for the placement of American goods. Beyond its own vision, grounded on regional relations, the young and underdeveloped Yugoslav state had difficulty incorporating the American factor into the process of its own development. Similarly to the American administration, the Yugoslav government viewed the United States as a distant country of little importance for Yugoslav interests and rarely relied on in political calculations, so it mostly depended on France instead. To the Yugoslavs, the gigantic economic power of America represented a synthesis of contradictory qualities, which is why the role of the US was only occasionally in the focus of the Yugoslav understanding of world politics. While the Kingdom's foreign trade was indeed of marginal importance to the United States, a different situation unfolded in the opposite direction. The Yugoslav government considered the US one of the key sources of financial capital from abroad, although they did not provide as much money as was necessary to meet all needs. What is more, the competition in the sale of agricultural products, which is what the two nations considered each other, did not favor the economic and internal processes for the development of Yugoslavia.⁹

Economic and political bilateral relations during the 1920s involved the issue of regulating war debts and realizing the "Blair loan" through the sale of royal government bonds on the American stock exchange. At a later date, during the next decade, until the beginning of the world war, negotiations conducted

Iseļjavanje u Sjedinjene Američke Države, jugoslovensko iskustvo 1918–1941, Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd, 2012. while the prominent works by Croatian authors are the English-language monograph *American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939–1941*, Texas College Station, 1999. by the American Croat Ivo Tasovac and Mario Jareb's, *Američka diplomacija i Kraljevina Jugoslavija uoči i nakon Travanjskoga rata*, as part of the thematic collection of works "Srbi i rat u Jugoslaviji 1941. godine", Beograd, 2014.

⁹ Linda Killen *Testing the Peripheries*, op. cit., pp. 208–211.

regarding the signing of a trade agreement were unsuccessful.¹⁰ According to Linda Killen, the lack of hard currency in mutual trade presented a permanent problem for Yugoslavia, although the US was one of its leading partners only when countries that did not use clearing accounts and the compensation trade system were taken into account. The difference in understanding the concept of free trade between Belgrade and Washington influenced the fact that Yugoslavia did not want to abandon the clearing method and practice in foreign trade with the largest partners for the sake of uncertain economic concessions from the United States.¹¹ During the World Economic Crisis of 1930, the permanent impotence of Yugoslavia culminated in an attempt to be competitive with cheap American grain on the world market. For the entire decade after the First World War, Yugoslav agricultural producers were severely affected by the mass distribution of agricultural products to Europe from overseas countries, mostly from the US, whose prices were so low that if Yugoslav producers were to sell these products at the prices set by the exporters from America, they could not even cover the basic production costs.¹²

The real danger of the outbreak of the Second World War in world politics in the second half of the thirties gradually began to influence the intensification of bilateral political ties between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the United States. With the aim of bolstering military strength, the Yugoslav government tried to purchase weapons from the US. In attempts to secure American military and political assistance for the purposes of waging war, Minister and Ambassador in Washington, Konstantin Fotić, was convinced in 1940 “that the USA would not stop until they achieved the goal that political relations in Europe should be determined and dominated by the Anglo-Saxon powers and not the Axis”.¹³ In view of Fotić’s unsuccessful efforts, Prince Regent Pavle Karađorđević sent a top-secret military mission to procure weapons from America under the leadership of Dr. David Albala, a trusted diplomat and soldier who had gained negotiation experience among influential circles from the United States during World War I.¹⁴

¹⁰ Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918–1945, Zbornik dokumenata*, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 2015, pp. 198–199, 205–207.

¹¹ Linda Killen, *Testing the Peripheries*, op. cit., p. 174.

¹² Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts Archives (hereinafter: SASA Archives), document n. 14439/489, O teškoj agrarnoj krizi u Jugoslaviji, Rumuniji, Bugarskoj i Mađarskoj u godini 1930.

¹³ Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918–1945*, op. cit., pp. 243–244, 248–249, 290.

¹⁴ Dr David Albala, *Specijalni delegat pri Jugoslovenskom kraljevskom poslanstvu u Vašingtonu 1939–1942*, dr Đorđe N. Lopičić (Ed.), Beograd, 2010; Milan Koljanin,

The US did not view Yugoslavia's possible entry into the Triple Pact with favor and approval. In fact, they tried to distance it from the Axis powers and bring it closer to the Anglo-Saxon bloc, whereby they first signaled encouraging intentions of providing material aid to countries that would fight against the Axis alliance.¹⁵ The German advance rapidly created changes in international politics, owing to which the American administration began sending harsher, sometimes even threatening diplomatic notes and messages to the Yugoslav authorities, which culminated during Colonel William Donovan's mission in Belgrade in January 1941. By the middle of March, a diplomatic dilemma hung over the head of Prince Pavle, not alleviated by the fact that not a single world power wanted a neutral Yugoslavia.¹⁶ The difficult position in which Pavle found himself is well illustrated by his statement in a conversation with the American minister in Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane, that "he would rather be dead than wait for this moment", considering that he had "sacrificed personal feelings" because of what he had had to do with regard to the issue of entering the Tripartite Pact.¹⁷ After the March coup in Belgrade, Under secretary Sumner Wells expressed his understanding for neutrality expressed by the royal government with the aim of preserving sovereignty, since that act was in line with the American policy of preventing allied ties between neutral countries and the Axis. After the German attack on Yugoslavia on April 6th, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had no choice but to strongly condemn the German invasion and promise military aid. Two days later, the president himself sent a consoling message to King Peter II, assuring him that he would send material aid from America as soon as possible in accordance with the existing formal United States' statutes.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the quick Yugoslav defeat made American military aid unnecessary. The absence of a practical reaction from the American administration regarding the German invasion and the lack of military aid in the "April War", enabled German propaganda to directly blame President Roosevelt for the "ruin of Yugoslavia", accusing him of "working" through Arthur B. Lane and William

Druga misija dr Davida Albale u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama 1939–1942, *zbornik Jevrejske studije*, br. 8, 2003, Beograd, pp. 7–76.

- 15 Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918–1945*, op. cit., p. 303.
- 16 Jacob B. Hoptner, *Jugoslavija u krizi 1934–1941*, Otokar Keršovani, Rijeka, 1972, p. 211, 217.
- 17 SASA Archives, doc. n. 14387/8663.
- 18 Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918–1945*, op. cit., pp. 305–308.

Donovan on Yugoslavia's entry into the war.¹⁹ After the defeat of Yugoslavia and its occupation, the US continued to officially recognize the Yugoslav Government in exile and its minister in Washington, longtime Serbian and Yugoslav diplomat, Konstantin Fotić.

WORLD WAR II, THE NEW YORK COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND YUGOSLAV FORUM PREPARATION

Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor and entry into the war on December 7th, 1941, the United States had initiated a grandiose political project to determine America's role in the future architecture of the international order after World War II. The American administration received strategic and academic assistance from the New York *Council on Foreign Relations* and its intellectual force. Given that its members held bilateral talks with the representatives of various countries, as well as the representatives of Yugoslavia in 1941 for the requirements of the American administration, it is, therefore, important to explain the structure and nature of the organization's connection with the executive authorities and the presidential administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. When Hamilton F. Armstrong, the Vice President of the CFR Board of Directors at the time, held the first in a series of meetings with US government officials on September 12th, 1939, this signified the beginning of a specific cooperation between the White House and the CFR intellectual elite, with the aim of formulating American foreign policy for the purpose of participation in World War II.²⁰ Their joint work made sense if one were to take into account the lack of professional staff in the American administration for studying different parts of the world and relations with them. Experts were divided into groups according to their professional orientations for the formulation of security, political, economic and territorial goals after the World War.²¹ With the increased responsibility of the United States in international affairs, it was crucial to intensify the participation of the intellectual elite in the articulation of American foreign policy. The special relationship between the Roosevelt administration and the CFR intelligentsia produced the adequate

¹⁹ SASA Archives, doc. n. 14387/8648. On December 21st, 1941, a lengthy text was printed on the front page of the pro-Nazi daily paper "Novo vreme" under the title "Roosevelt is to Blame for the Collapse of Yugoslavia".

²⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations 1939–1945*, The Harold Pratt House, New York, 1945, p. 2.

²¹ George Gavriliš, *Council on Foreign Relations – A Short History*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 2021, p. 25.

institutional synergy for the enterprise of creating a postwar international system, in which the United States would occupy a prominent place.

The emergence of new American foreign policy goals upon the fall of France in June 1940 and the German geopolitical advancement in Europe led to the formation of a new CFR work group in May 1941, called "*Peace Aims of European States*". This group functioned independently of other CFR groups; its chief task was to formulate the postwar intentions of European states, and it was supposed to conceptualize the vision of foreign governments in shaping the international system. During the talks with the CFR, every European country was represented by a political expert, as well as an expert in economic sciences who would present the economic conditions of their country. Along with reports and discussions, they were tasked with presenting the basic national aspirations of their countries for a peace period after the war conflicts.²²

Before the American declaration of war on Germany, Japan and Italy, Konstantin Fotić had informed the CFR about the situation in Yugoslavia on two separate occasions. The first meeting, held in 1939, was not formally documented in Yugoslav sources, nor did Fotić mention it in his memoirs. He only briefly commented in his official report that he had spoken before the CFR about the international position of Yugoslavia in Southeast Europe and the beginning of the world war.²³ The second meeting took place on August 5th, 1941 and it brought the Yugoslav political-economic situation after the "April War" much closer to the American political elite.

THE FIRST INQUIRY REGARDING WORLD WAR II: KONSTANTIN FOTIĆ'S MEETING AT THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The prelude to the main Yugoslav-American panel organized by the CFR from New York in 1941 was a bilateral meeting of the Yugoslav minister with the planners of the Council on Foreign Relations from Chicago (now the *Council on Global Affairs*) held on May 1st, 1941. Konstantin Fotić presented the details of the political and economic situation in Yugoslavia to the Chicago organization in the presence of the Consuls General of Czechoslovakia and Poland. In his address to the Council, he referred to the fact that, during the war, Yugoslavia defended not only the universal right to freedom and justice

²² Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations 1939–1945*, op. cit., p. 5.

²³ Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918–1945*, op. cit., p. 342.

that both the US and Yugoslavia had inherited, but also the principles of democracy. In accordance with the basic principles on which the free world rested, Yugoslavia and the United States were on the same side of history.²⁴ The meeting discussed the causes of the war in the Balkans and the possibilities for its end from the Yugoslav perspective. Fotić did not miss the opportunity to accuse Hungary and Bulgaria not only of the downfall of Yugoslavia, but also that of Greece, and expressed his satisfaction that President Roosevelt himself had mentioned those countries in a negative context and condemned them in public.²⁵ From the very beginning, Yugoslavia's war against Germany was under the burden of unresolved diplomatic conflicts with the two countries, and in a hypothetical alternate distribution of forces, the Yugoslav contribution to the allied effort against Germany would have been more effective.²⁶ He explained in detail the conspiracy that had led to the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles in 1934.²⁷

The most important impression from the meeting was related to Fotić's observation that the Second World War was unlike any other previous war. According to his observation, the war represented an aggressively imposing project of a totalitarian ideological concept and way of life against the common values shared by Yugoslavia and the United States.²⁸ The European conflict did not occur solely owing to territorial conflicts or national intolerances, but due to different ideological conceptions of totalitarian and democratic systems, leading to the collapse of civilization. A considerable number of small states used the conflict of great powers as an opportunity to promote their non-democratic principles arising from distorted philosophical interpretations of statehood and an insufficient level of cultural development. Fotić concluded that such states were enemies of democracy and that they would always represent a danger to the foundations of civilization.²⁹ In order to resolve conflicts between small states, the prerequisite was that democratic and totalitarian contradictions should be resolved between great powers on a global, systemic level. Fotić justified his unequivocal position by expressing his opinion that small states did not fall under the influence of Germany because of their weakness, but because their ideology and culture were on the

²⁴ Archives of Yugoslavia, Records of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the United States of America – Washington D.C (hereinafter: AY), doc. n. 371-82-55

²⁵ AY, doc. n. 371-82-56

²⁶ AY, doc. n. 371-82-58

²⁷ AY, doc. n. 371-82-62

²⁸ AY, doc. n. 371-82-56

²⁹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-57

same level as those of the Axis powers. He saw the dominance of Germany and its satellites as the responsibility of the Western allies, primarily because they had not established and maintained a new order in Europe after the First World War, which would have solved the problem of national minorities with the levers of democracy. Accordingly, Hitler would not have been able to use the problems of minorities in order to undermine universal human principles.³⁰ The moment Yugoslavia had decided to oppose the aggressor, Hungary and Bulgaria accused the government in Belgrade of endangering the rights of the members of their nations in Yugoslavia. Until that time, the issue of the rights of the Hungarian and Bulgarian minorities had not been actualized as problematic for the interests of those national groups. Fotić used the Yugoslav example to show Hitler's policy of manipulating the problems of national minorities in international politics, given that the Hungarian-Bulgarian attack on Yugoslavia was not of existential importance to those minorities.³¹

During the meeting, the Chicago Council members gained insight into several topics: why Yugoslavia entered the war, how the events of the war had occurred and how it contributed to the war efforts of the Allies. The first topic stirred the most emotions, given that Yugoslavia had paid for the military neutrality with human sacrifices and by losing the country. With the German troops in Romania, maintaining neutrality had become increasingly difficult, which is why the government had signed the Tripartite Pact. Most of its officials did not believe in Hitler's promises that he would not send the army through Yugoslavia, and many of them had welcomed the state coup in Belgrade with approval. According to Fotić, Simović's government enjoyed the support of all parties in Yugoslavia, including the Croatian and Slovenian parties, some of whose members had become ministers. The new government immediately confirmed access to the Triple Pact, but this was not enough to deter the German attack.³² The Council was informed of the destruction of Belgrade irrespective of the fact that the city had declared a free city status. It was important to know that Hitler was waging a special media war against Yugoslavia. The CFR from New York elaborated on a lot more about the special warfare against Yugoslavia in a special report on the measures for warfare using psychological methods.³³ The characteristic of the psychological pressure on Yugoslavia was that there were no reports in the media about the

³⁰ AY, doc. n. 371-82-59

³¹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-60

³² AY, doc. n. 371-82-68

³³ Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations 1939-1945*, op. cit., p. 27.

destructions. The reason the news was withheld was that both the German and the puppet regimes viewed Yugoslavia as an artificial creation whose collapse was the natural conclusion of the Versailles process.³⁴

Konstantin Fotić's report to the representatives of the Chicago Council on the political situation in Yugoslavia, with remarks on the Serbian-Bulgarian relations, displayed the Yugoslav minister's resentment due to the abolition of international law and the non-implementation of international agreements on non-aggression. As an already experienced diplomat in Washington, Fotić understood the potential of American power, which could bring a decisive advantage in world politics. That is why he asked for the support of the American people to participate in the shaping of Yugoslavia's future and for help to repair the destruction of Yugoslavia.³⁵

GRAND CONVENTION: PRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL AIMS OF YUGOSLAVIA TOWARDS THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS IN NEW YORK

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, President of the CFR *Peace Aims of European States* group, contacted Fotić to participate in a conference on Yugoslavia's peace goals, organized by the Council in June. The invitation came at a time when the German and Italian press had intensified articles in which the policy of President Roosevelt, Under secretary Sumner Wells and Colonel William Donovan were directly blamed for the disaster of Yugoslavia.³⁶ In addition, in accordance with the program of the Council, where the foreign delegation was represented by a political economy expert, Dr. Josip Tomašević's arrival was awaited. He had written an essay on Yugoslav economic policy and its goals in international relations.³⁷ An alumnus of the Rockefeller Institute, Tomašević was known as a financial expert, since he was the author of several scientific works and had an insight into how the Yugoslav National Bank from Belgrade functioned, as he was a former employee.³⁸ The fact that the Council intended to cover the travel expenses of Jozo Tomašević from California

³⁴ AY, doc. n. 371-82-69

³⁵ AY, doc. n. 371-82-64

³⁶ Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918-1945*, op. cit., p. 318.

³⁷ AY, doc. n. 371-82-73

³⁸ J. Tomašević published a number of economic studies, most prominently the following: *Financijska politika Jugoslavije: 1929-1934*, *Novac i kredit* and *Die Staatsschulden Jugoslawiens*.

to New York shows how important it was to present the Yugoslav political and economic peace goals equally.³⁹ Philip Moseley, secretary of the "Peace Group" and Professor at Cornell University, had informed the Yugoslav delegates before the meeting that all recorded excerpts from the talks would be strictly confidential and that the group would study their reports from a scientific point of view. A written minutes of the meeting was to be kept strictly confidential.⁴⁰ The Council's consideration of the interests of foreign actors was based on the coordination of the presentation of political and economic content, and in this sense, the report of only one delegate would not be satisfactory.⁴¹

In addition to President Hamilton F. Armstrong and the group's secretary Philip Moseley, the "*Peace Group*" intended for discussion with Yugoslav delegates was comprised of experts from the American universities of Harvard, Princeton and Columbia. The representatives, who would later become known to the general public, included influential historian William Langer, Colonel William Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the CIA and Allen Dulles, the future Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.⁴² Donovan was familiar with the Yugoslav diplomatic and foreign policy dilemma as he had previously visited Belgrade on a special mission.⁴³ Conversely, Fotić knew that the "Peace Group" was an unofficial institution of experts with an advisory role in the American administration dealing with foreign affairs. Scientific papers and lectures were strictly kept secret and confidential reports were drafted on the basis of bilateral meetings with foreign actors.⁴⁴ He was correct to think that the victors would set up a new architecture of the international order after the war; he believed that the peoples of Yugoslavia should be united and should participate in the process of the world's political transformation.⁴⁵ The documented correspondence between the Yugoslav delegates provides information that Tomašević had prepared a special paper of the postwar reconstruction of Yugoslavia, its need for international loans and access to the markets of raw materials. It was essential to indicate to the CFR the consequences of German-Italian

³⁹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-80

⁴⁰ AY, doc. n. 371-82-76

⁴¹ Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918–1945*. op. cit., pp. 342–343.

⁴² AY, doc. n. 371-82-78

⁴³ Vojislav Pavlović, *Od monarhije do republike*, op. cit., pp. 9–13.

⁴⁴ AY, doc. n. 371-82-86

⁴⁵ AY, doc. n. 371-82-88

occupation on the economic system and the problems of Yugoslav adaptation to the new economic reality. One of the topics was the possible reception of German reparations, given that Yugoslavia had had exceedingly bad experiences with the reparation issue from the defeated powers after the First World War, although it had pursued an active policy based on the decisions of international institutions.⁴⁶ All these issues were potentially important topics for discussion at a hypothetical international conference in the future, just like the issues discussed at the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920).

The agenda for the meeting of August 5th, 1941, covered areas of prime importance to the American understanding of Yugoslavia's position in the war, as well as its position in world politics in general. The presentation of the delegation was formally recorded in a special document entitled "*Studies of the Peace Aims of European Nations; Yugoslav Peace Aims*". The structure of the discussion was composed of issues concerning Yugoslavia, such as territorial borders, relations with neighboring countries, issues regarding the position of national minorities, the problem of internal reconstruction of the state – including political and economic aspects, as well as Yugoslavia's position in international relations. American representatives wanted to find a place of Yugoslav interests within the framework of the future European order with regard to security, economic and political arrangements. They were interested in whether Yugoslavia would be better suited to a universal system of implementing a peace settlement or relying on a regional concept of peace cooperation in Europe. A special aspect that was unequivocally felt as the shadow topic of the meeting was how the Yugoslav delegates viewed the potential role of the United States in postwar events and how Yugoslav decision makers would understand the role of the Anglo-American bloc in arranging the peace process.⁴⁷

Based on its knowledge and information about the previous Yugoslav foreign and internal policy, the "*Peace Group*" of the *Council on Foreign Relations* presented its views on the preconditions for a sustainable Yugoslav system once the war ended. Hence, the discussion with the delegates had been directed toward the concepts of its future statehood. For the Yugoslav border arrangement, primarily with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria, relative factors were to be considered, such as the strategic lines of communication, ethnic population by area, economic potential and borders based on historical principles. The question of the internal political composition of Yugoslavia was at the top of the agenda. The CFR carefully directed the course of the panel to clarify the internal state structure and prepare an acceptable model of internal governance. According to the Council, the structure of

⁴⁶ AY, doc. n. 371-82-81

⁴⁷ AY, doc. n. 371-82-99

the Yugoslav state was to be sought in some form of federalism, regional autonomy or regional autonomy based on national characteristics. The possibility of a centralized state was also not ruled out *a priori*.⁴⁸ Therefore, it was unsurprising that the "Peace Group" had frequently been asking about the situation in the Independent State of Croatia and the Croatian-Serbian dispute.⁴⁹ What was not fully clarified at the meeting was the role of the unified national parliament, local assemblies and political parties in internal processes.

The discussion panel included the topic of the international position of Yugoslavia in Southeast Europe. The CFR representatives studied the development of economic cooperation of the Danube basin countries and were interested in the possibility of the creation of a political-economic "Danube Federation". However, there were genuine problems in grouping Balkan states and realizing wider cooperation between them. Nonetheless, the Council considered the economic consolidation of smaller economic systems into one broader regional form. Finally, the Council examined the development in which Yugoslavia would not be part of a certain confederation or a regional economic entity, which is why it was necessary to analyze, in greater detail, its future relations with the United States, Great Britain, France, the USSR, Germany and Italy after the war. The CFR perceived the mentioned countries as likely centers of power in postwar world politics.⁵⁰

The first point on the agenda of the meeting was related to the *Neohabsburg* program and the political agitation of Archduke Otto von Habsburg on the territory of the United States. Fotić believed that his actions were not centered directly towards American South Slavs or Croatian organizations in America, but towards Austrians and Hungarians. At the same time, Armstrong agreed that the possibilities of the Danube Monarchy's restoration to its former structure were unlikely. The question of Austria-Hungary's restoration was raised by historian Langer, especially for the reason that, on the eve of the meeting with the Yugoslav delegates, news circulated among the American public that the CFR maintained informal contact with Otto von Habsburg.⁵¹ This proved to be true, as Otto had published a paper entitled "Danubian Reconstruction" in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine in January 1942, where he called for a public debate in America regarding the "federalization of the Danubian nations".⁵²

⁴⁸ AY, doc. n. 371-82-100

⁴⁹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-90

⁵⁰ AY, doc. n. 371-82-100

⁵¹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-90

⁵² Otto of Austria, "Danubian Reconstruction", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1942. Council on Foreign Relations, New York, pp. 243–252.

Nevertheless, during the creation of the CFR strategic study, the process of gathering information on the proposals for Yugoslav internal organization was still ongoing, regardless of the fact that Roosevelt was skeptical about the reconstruction of Yugoslavia, especially upon learning about the Croatian Ustaša crimes against Roma, Jews and Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in late 1941.⁵³

One of the main topics on the panel was Serbian–Croatian relations. The situation in Croatia particularly intrigued Langer because he had a dilemma regarding the political legitimacy of the Independent State of Croatia, for the following reason: “if the Croatian Peasant Party, as the party that enjoyed the majority support of the people, was not in favor of Pavelić’s⁵⁴ regime, who was it that supported his government then?” To the best of his knowledge, Vladimir Maček, the former vice president of the Yugoslav government and the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, was under house arrest in Croatia.⁵⁵ Fotić then explained in more detail the characteristics of the extremist Ustaša movement, as the main pillar of Pavelić’s political and state power in the Independent State of Croatia. The Ustaša had adopted the theoretical assumptions about races from Nazi theories, emphasizing the “Aryan” characteristics of the Croats and their closeness to the German people. Racial intolerance towards the Serbs was enforced by the Croatian authorities with a strict regime, comparable only to the treatment of the Jews by the German authorities. Allegations that Croatian officers in the Yugoslav army had been exposed to discrimination during their career advancement were considered. Fotić confirmed that there were cases in which the supremacy of Serbian military personnel did occur, leading to desertion, but that this referred to Croatian reserve officers of the former Austro–Hungarian army.⁵⁶ Speaking about the Ustaša Croatian state, Allen Dulles inquired about its borders. The “Peace Group” was informed that Bosnia and Herzegovina had become part of it and that, even though Croatia’s border with Italy was not definitively determined, the border with Serbia was established unilaterally. The Council wanted to know whether Yugoslavia would seek a correction of the border with Italy after the war, to which Fotić clearly emphasized that it would be natural for the Slovenes and Croats who had been under Italian rule since 1918 to be integrated. From the American perspective, it was important to

⁵³ Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918–1945*. op. cit., p. 395.

⁵⁴ Poglavnik and the Prime Minister of the Independent State of Croatia.

⁵⁵ At that moment, V. Maček was not the vice president of the Yugoslav government since he resigned on 10th April 1941 and handed over the position to his deputy, J. Krnjević, who was in exile with the government.

⁵⁶ AY, doc. n. 371-82-102

determine the statuses of the cities of Rijeka, Trieste and Zadar. Although Fotić believed that the position of these cities should be determined after the formation of the international security system, Dulles insisted that the delegate explicitly determine Yugoslav aspirations. The only answer that Fotić could offer was that relations with Italy would not be friendly if it kept Zadar, because that city had been a stronghold of Italian subversive activities in the interwar period. Armstrong brought the conversation about the Italian border to an end, realizing that it was complicated to determine the position of not only Zadar, but also Trieste and Rijeka at that moment, owing to the disconnection of the interior from the cities on the Adriatic.⁵⁷

The problem of the eastern Yugoslav border was burdened by the slow process of Serbian-Bulgarian rapprochement. The main obstacles to closer ties with Bulgaria were the opposition to the unresolved "Macedonian question" and the Bulgarian policy regarding Thrace. At the Paris Peace Conference, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia received two areas from Bulgaria, but this was done for strategic reasons, and not based on ethnic principles. Upon hearing Langer's thesis that Macedonians are pro-Bulgarian, Fotić admitted that they were more integrated into the political life in Bulgaria, but as a different national entity⁵⁸, while Macedonians who lived in Serbia were not treated as a foreign entity.⁵⁹ Langer recalled that Nikola Pašić⁶⁰ had often emphasized the need for the union of Serbia and Bulgaria, which Dulles used to expand on the topic and raise the question of how realistic an alliance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would be. Since the rapprochement of the two countries by the Balkan Entente of 1934 did not yield results, the alliance was unattainable as long as there was the open issue of Macedonia.⁶¹ From the point of view of the State Department, the rapprochement of the two countries was desirable since an alliance in the Balkans would represent an obstacle to German penetration, as was noted by minister Arthur Bliss Lane in the report from Belgrade.⁶² The discussion concerning Albania hardly lasted, considering the fact that Fotić did not question Albanian independence, but proposed a wider regional cooperation between Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania instead. Furthermore,

⁵⁷ AY, doc. n. 371-82-103/104

⁵⁸ This refers to the Slavic population inhabited in the part of Macedonia that was part of Yugoslavia, which is the sovereign state of North Macedonia the present day.

⁵⁹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-104

⁶⁰ Long time Prime Minister of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

⁶¹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-105

⁶² Vojislav Pavlović, *Od monarhije do republike*, op. cit., p. 13; Ivo Tasovac, *American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941*, op. cit., p. 84.

he rejected the proposal made by Professor Hopper from Harvard University to divide Albania between Yugoslavia and Greece.⁶³

At the end of Fotić's presentation, the Council expressed the opinion that the neighboring nations would still be dissatisfied with the territorial aspirations of Yugoslavia. The representatives of the Council were interested in joint broad collaboration, which is what Fotić based his hopes on for the postwar reconstruction of Europe. The delegate believed that security had to be attained not in the alliances that existed in history, but in closer cooperation between the states. The task of achieving international cooperation would be undertaken by large democratic states, because they would have a starting point in the common body of democratic ideas. Yugoslavia could not cooperate with Bulgaria and Hungary precisely because these two countries had based their own ideology on *lebensraum*, political thinking opposite to the ideology of Yugoslavia.⁶⁴ Langer concluded by stating that, over time, Yugoslavia had not taken notice of the historical reasons on the basis of which it was created following the First World War by "combining" the parts of former states. The CFR criticized the structure of interwar Yugoslavia, standing behind the observation that the country had failed to resolve its internal problems in terms of the tensions in Macedonia or the Croatian aspirations for autonomy over twenty years. A hypothetical question emerged: "could these problems be solved in the next twenty years?" Langer expressed his belief that, after World War II, the conflicts that had lasted until the "Agreement" of 1939, when Banovina Croatia was created, would be repeated. Fotić ended his presentation with the thesis that the key thing for the internal stability of Yugoslavia is the attitude of Croatia, taking into account that too little time had passed since the act that gave Croatia broad administrative powers and the state formally ceased to be centralized.⁶⁵

JOSIP "JOZO" TOMAŠEVIĆ'S PRESENTATION ON POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL AND YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

One of the chief economic issues was the postwar regulation of international trade. In order to find a place for future Yugoslav foreign trade, the CFR wanted to find ways to free it from political restrictions and fit it into the free trade model. Before the beginning of World War II, Yugoslav commercial exports naturally found the largest markets for the placement of goods in

⁶³ AY, doc. n. 371-82-105

⁶⁴ AY, doc. n. 371-82-105

⁶⁵ AY, doc. n. 371-82-106

Italy, Germany and Czechoslovakia. Later exports were intensified to Great Britain for political reasons. The CFR raised the issue of Yugoslav barter trade (especially with Germany⁶⁶), since the United States advocated the principles of free trade and the most favored nation clause. The US government did not approve of the system of international compensation treaties and clearing exchanges.⁶⁷ In fact, the mechanism Yugoslav foreign trade used was openly criticized by the American ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy, who believed that Washington would understand and support the Yugoslav reorientation towards trade with countries that did not use clearing accounts.⁶⁸ In addition to the existing Yugoslav trade practice, the main obstacles in signing a comprehensive trade agreement with the US, which would replace the one from 1881, signed with the Kingdom of Serbia, were the opposed approaches regarding the implementation of the most favored nation clause.⁶⁹

Tomašević's strategic analysis predicted that Great Britain and the US would create a multilateral system of world trade and force Germany to abandon compensatory treaties. Thus, it would be encouraged to buy food and raw materials from Yugoslavia, whereas it would sell manufactured goods on large world markets. The main prerequisite of the strategy was securing loans from the financial centers of the United States. On the remark of Mr. Stine⁷⁰, stating that Yugoslav imports and exports are small in proportion to the world's volume, Tomašević stated that, for this reason "it was important to ensure the export of agricultural surpluses. Otherwise, prices at home would decrease, and producers would be threatened". Germany skillfully exploited the situation in Yugoslav agriculture since it could not find buyers for agricultural goods; producers could not sell surpluses. For this reason, under pressure to get rid of the surpluses, the Yugoslav government had no choice but to accept the German offers despite the political implications.⁷¹ Observing the global situation in the sale of agricultural products, Yugoslavia

⁶⁶ On the political and economic ties between the Third Reich and Yugoslavia, see: Perica Hadži-Jovančić, *The Third Reich and Yugoslavia, An Economy of Fear 1933–1941*, Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2020; Milena Kocić, *Economic Relations Between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Germany from 1929 to 1941*, PhD thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš, 2019.

⁶⁷ AY, doc. n. 371-7-141

⁶⁸ Predrag Krejić, Mitar Todorović, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1918–1945*. op. cit., p. 243.

⁶⁹ AY, doc. n. 371-11-263/264

⁷⁰ Oscar Clemen Stine (1884–1974), an expert in agricultural economics.

⁷¹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-106

also competed with the United States for access to markets for the sale of grain and food.⁷²

The “*Danube Federation*” project was a striking topic at the meeting. After the end of the Paris Peace Conference, the US was interested in the economic prosperity of the Danube states and followed the political situation in the basin region.⁷³ Professor Hopper was interested in why Southeastern European countries had not formed an agrarian federation, since it would be easier to negotiate with Germany and other large countries in that way. Tomašević’s belief was that such a federation would not achieve any gains owing to the similarity of the economic structures of the members, and that the different goals of the states within would be an obstacle to tighter integration. The creation of an agrarian block in Southeastern Europe, of which Yugoslavia could be a member, would not solve the problem of agricultural overpopulation. Additionally, the tactical advantage of the federation would soon disappear as Germany would very quickly turn to importing cheaper grain from Argentina or Australia. Professor Hopper believed that, regardless of the economic similarity between them, the Danubian states might be forced to join some form of association in order to withstand the German pressure. Tomašević replied that, if he viewed the union “as a Yugoslav, a Croat and a supporter of the Croatian Peasant Party, it was possible to imagine the creation of such a federation. However, as an economist, he believed that it would not solve the problems of the Danube region”.⁷⁴

With a massive influx of cheap overseas grains, primarily from the United States to the European markets before the Second World War, the countries of Southeast Europe, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, i.e. precisely those that were envisaged to form the Danube agrarian bloc, had two possibilities to counter the competition: reducing agricultural production to the level of their own needs or obtaining preferences on European markets for the placement of their agricultural goods. The first solution was difficult to implement, since the transition from agricultural to industrial production would require a lot of time and resources, which is why the Yugoslav government had tried to ensure preferences.⁷⁵ Realizing the industrial underdevelopment of Yugoslavia, Mr. Stine emphasized the advantages of Czechoslovakia and Poland, because they possessed significant industrial centers. He believed

⁷² Linda Killen, *Testing the Peripheries*, op. cit., p. 35.

⁷³ See: Walker D. Hines, *Report on Danube Navigation*, League of Nations, Geneva, 1925.

⁷⁴ AY, doc. n. 371-82-107

⁷⁵ SASA Archives, doc. n. 14439/489, O teškoj agrarnoj krizi u Jugoslaviji, Rumuniji, Bugarskoj i Mađarskoj u godini 1930.

that, for the economic progress of Yugoslavia, it was important to develop nonagricultural production by expanding industry and mines, whose products would be export-oriented. Professor Hopper added to this proposal "that the process of industrialization in Yugoslavia would be easier if it were an integral part of a larger Balkan regional federation". The Yugoslav delegate then started lamenting the bitter experience of economic relationship of the Austro-Hungarian authorities towards the Yugoslav peoples who were part of the larger territorial administration. Unlike the Czechs, Austria and Hungary, where investments floated because of the political pressure for industrial development, the Yugoslav areas were exploited by the Austrian-Hungarian fiscal, railway and industrial policy, dictated by the political and strategic interests of these two nations. Moreover, they built the railway network in Bosnia and Herzegovina impractically, which prevented the political and economic unification of the Yugoslav regions.⁷⁶

Bilateral relations in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia within the wider European relations were observed at the meeting mainly in relation to Germany and the threat it represented. The rare situation in which Yugoslav ties with France were discussed was reflected in the policy of economic sanctions imposed on Italy. Speaking on that topic, Fotić emphasized the advantages that Italy had gained by the assassination of King Alexander, such as the weakening of Belgrade's rival position, which Armstrong agreed with, believing "that the king would remain loyal to the French military system in Europe". His death had marked a critical blow to the Little Entente and reduced the political authority of the League of Nations towards the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Referring to the Yugoslav-French cooperation, Tomašević considered that one weakness in their relations "was the difficulty of persuading France to take into account Yugoslavia's needs in formulating her commercial policies. France's neglect of Yugoslavia's foreign trade vulnerability had not been offset by granting loans in 1923, 1931, and 1933".⁷⁷

Professor Langer's general conclusion regarding Germany's dominant role referred to the fact that Yugoslav exports were needed exclusively by Germany, considering that Yugoslavia could not compete for other markets. Tomašević saw the trade exchange based on free trade, as well as limiting Germany's use of "dangerous" trade techniques, such as centralized purchasing or fixed price policies, as a possible way out of the "tight embrace" of Germany. In response to the CFR planner's remark that the industrialization of Yugoslavia was necessary in order to make it less dependent on exports of agricultural products on foreign markets, Tomašević stressed that, for this process, "the first prerequisite was the absence of enemy invasions, because

⁷⁶ AY, doc. n. 371-82-107/108

⁷⁷ AY, doc. n. 371-82-109

the construction of factories for war material and strategic communications would not solve the country's economic problems". Yugoslavia needed a longer period of continuous peace in order to consolidate its economic potential and internal political development. The primary element in maintaining its security after the war was the containment of Germany, given its central geopolitical position in Europe. The German danger arose from a specific political philosophy, based on the leading Prussian social stratum inclined to conquest and powerful industry. Tomašević noticed that, out of all these factors, it was only possible to eliminate German industrial superiority. For this reason, it was necessary for the US and Great Britain to control the German industry in order not to repeat the mistakes after the Paris Peace Conference. He recalled the cessation of reparation payments and that it was the US that had financially helped the German industry.⁷⁸ With regard to economic solutions, the CFR members concluded that the Yugoslav delegate did not advocate regional integration and economic nationalism, but solving problems through a general economic construction at the global level.⁷⁹

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS TOWARD THE YUGOSLAV PEACE AIMS

Konstantin Fotić submitted to the Council a Yugoslav study on the influence of small states in international politics. In order to stabilize small nations and their development, several factors necessary for the leadership of the Anglo-Saxon bloc in world processes are proposed in the study. The first step for securing international cooperation and a federal form of world society based on the principles of universal justice was the most important, as this would gradually lead to the development of democratic institutions.⁸⁰ From the political economy point of view, Tomašević believed that the problems of small states would be resolved if the great powers created a righteous world order.⁸¹ Shortly after the meeting, the *Council on Foreign Relations* drew up a final document in which it presented conclusions and submitted it to the Yugoslav minister in Washington. The Council considered that the basis of Yugoslav aspirations was not reliance on regional political and economic arrangements. In relations with Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, the Yugoslav

⁷⁸ AY, doc. n. 371-82-109/110

⁷⁹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-107

⁸⁰ AY, doc. n. 371-82-108

⁸¹ AY, doc. n. 371-82-109

goal was democratic cooperation with the neighbors and minor corrections toward the Italian border, which would entail the annexation of Zadar and the Italian areas where Croats and Slovenes are compactly populated. The possibility of a potential alliance with Bulgaria was left open, while Albania's independence was unquestionable. The main conclusion of the document stated that it was necessary to pacify the German power so that Yugoslavia would be able to obtain more direct and free trade relations with Berlin.

The CFR's consideration of internal relations in Yugoslavia led to the federalization of the political system. The internal reconstruction of the country implied the continuation of the process of establishing Croatian autonomy according to the principles of the "Agreement" of 1939. Slovenia was to get autonomy, while a separate status for Southern Serbia⁸² was not foreseen. National economic development would be based on agricultural production and exploitation of mineral resources, as well as on the promotion of economically achievable industry. In terms of the general European order, the primary condition for Yugoslavia's very existence and suitable internal development was the creation of an efficient system of collective security, universal in scope, created and supported by Great Britain and the US. That order was supposed to enable markets for Yugoslav goods, allow the inflow of foreign capital for internal development and provide a chance for the surplus of the Yugoslav population to emigrate abroad.⁸³

Regardless of the fact that the meeting took place a few months after the Yugoslav capitulation, In its project of creating the postwar order of world politics, the CFR had the opportunity to learn more about the conditions in Yugoslavia and to implement the details in its work. Unlike 1918, when Serbian political actors had the opportunity to influence the final decisions of E. House's *The Inquiry*, the geopolitical situation in August 1941 was drastically different. The Council's members unequivocally criticized the interwar arrangement of Yugoslavia, created just after the Paris Peace Conference, during whose peace agreements some proposals made by the American delegation and President Wilson were implemented. The criticism was based on the observation that, for twenty years, the country had failed to resolve internal problems and calm tensions. One year after the panel with Yugoslav delegates, for the purpose of the State Department activity, the *Council on Foreign Relations* drafted three strategic memoranda on the issue of Yugoslav peace goals and postwar arrangements. All of these were partly based on the presentations of the Yugoslav delegates. Memorandum marked T-B 58, entitled "*Current Yugoslav Quarrels: The American Interest*" was written by Hamilton F. Armstrong in December 1942. It elaborates on the interests of the

⁸² Council on Foreign Relations planners considered South Serbia as Macedonia.

⁸³ AY, doc. n. 371-82-98

United States in Yugoslavia due to the emergence of the political influence of the Soviet Union. Armstrong saw the possibility that the Yugoslav government in exile would agree to “harmonize” its policy with the Soviet Union, provided it had guarantees from Moscow for the preservation of territorial integrity. The document emphasized stability in Eastern Europe as a crucial interest of the US, and in order to achieve this, American policy towards Yugoslavia would have to include the preservation of a unified state. Fragmentation into small states, which could easily gravitate towards the spheres of influence of Germany, Italy or Russia, was not to be allowed. Therefore, H. F. Armstrong advised the US Government to prevent the penetration of the Soviet influence. From the American perspective, the disintegration of Yugoslavia into small states would create a favorable situation for the expansion of Russian control.⁸⁴

CONCLUSION

The Inquiry from the First World War was intended to be a limited-term political body, tasked with proposing terms for ending the war and establishing peace. After the Paris Peace Conference, in addition to the State Department, one of the leading institutions in America that monitored world politics and enabled foreign actors to present their views on international relations was the CFR. This organization was a specific substitute for American state institutions involved in the analysis of world politics, considering the official interwar political discourse of isolationism and neutrality. As an unofficial and non-governmental body, the Council did not make binding decisions, but it definitely influenced the formation of political attitudes among interested circles both in America and abroad. Its members felt that the US must not allow a new world war to begin with insufficient knowledge of world politics, which had been the case during World War I, when *The Inquiry* had had to act quickly.

The New York *Council on Foreign Relations* was the only influential think tank where American experts communicated with foreign actors and at whose meetings strategic opinions could be exchanged. The Council made it possible for discussions to take place on all world problems, even though it did not make formal political decisions, but solely analytical and advisory ones. The address of the Yugoslav delegates in August 1941 was the only way for the opinion about the Yugoslav goals and aspirations after the war to somehow reach the American statesmen. The inevitability of World War II led the State Department to create a national project for postwar planning

⁸⁴ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Memorandum on: *Current Yugoslav Quarrels: The American Interest*, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial Series, New York, 1942, pp. 1–9.

of world relations under the leadership of Under secretary Sumner Welles in early 1939, considering the confusion that existed in the previous generation of American decision makers regarding World War I. With President Roosevelt still fearful of public opinion and with an administration divided over America's involvement in the war, Welles looked outside the State Department for assistance. A few weeks after the start of the war, he asked the director of the *Council on Foreign Relations*, Hamilton F. Armstrong, with whom he maintained close cooperation, for the Council to prepare more detailed studies on postwar planning. For guidance, Welles looked to the Wilsonian precedent of the "*Inquiry*".⁸⁵ He had a mandate to go forward with postwar planning and to appoint members of the Postwar Planning Committee. He sent several invitations to people outside the administration, including Norman Davis, who was the president of the *Council on Foreign Relations* until his death in 1944, Isaiah Bowman, who was president of the CFR for a brief period and Hamilton F. Armstrong himself.⁸⁶

On the subject of Yugoslav-American relations, the name of Hamilton F. Armstrong is very well known, but his activity is not connected with the analytical work of the *Council on Foreign Relations*. Yet, it is analyzed through the prism of his engagement in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*. The role of the CFR in the creation of American foreign policy in the First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, and even in the Post-Cold War period, is unknown in Serbian science and represents a missing component for a broader scientific approach, considering the fact that many of the most significant political actors engaged in the State Department were members of the Council.

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⁸⁵ Christopher D. O'Sullivan, *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order 1937–1943*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 33–34.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 64.

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The Scope and the Relevance of the US Economic and Military Aid to SFR Yugoslavia

Abstract

The paper draws a sketch of bilateral relations between socialist Yugoslavia and the United States of America in 1945-1992 period. It argues that the logic of economic and military aid of the US towards Yugoslavia was the main feature of that relationship, as it followed both countries' own assessments of their respective roles and interest in a wider Cold War framework. The paper will show variations in these policies as they reflected deeper foreign policy changes, most radically in 1948 and with a number of softer turns over the given period but will also show that until the late 1980s there were core mutual understandings of benefits for both countries. These understanding subsided with the end of the Cold War in Europe as different agendas emerged on both sides. The paper uses historical method, through combination of published and unpublished archival sources from the US (what is digitally available) and Belgrade (Archive of Yugoslavia and Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and relevant literature of both Serbian/Yugoslav and US provenance.

Keywords:

Yugoslavia, United States of America, Cold War, economy, military, foreign aid.

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INTRODUCTION

The end of the World War II brought to Yugoslavia a position of a country in broad victorious coalition, with a government dominated by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, as it was the leading force of the liberation movement(s) during the war. Its immediate tasks were to repair as much of the war damage as possible and to perform a communist makeover of the social and state order. The United States came out of the war without any damage to its own soil, civilian life, and economy (bar the Pearl Harbor attacks) and were undoubtedly the world's foremost economic power. Its focus was on the fate of the occupied Germany, organizing European economic and security architecture, and wielding its considerable influence to shape global processes.

Yugoslavia was one of the founding members of the United Nations, whose relief agency, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), was the major foreign aid donor to many countries, including Yugoslavia. UNRRA's major funder were the United States. Crop shortages in 1945 and the drought in 1946 were overcome through the UNRRA food aid, while the donated makeshift hospitals and pharmaceuticals helped to ease the early crises in public health in the wake of the war. Total UNRRA aid value until the early 1947 was some 415 million dollars, almost three quarters of which was supplied by the USA.¹

The two countries soon came at the loggerheads over a range of issues. The new communist government wanted to make a revolutionary discontinuity with the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia in international relations by claiming no sovereign financial obligations for the period up to 1941 but had relented under US pressure in early 1946, after it received the formal recognition from Washington. In May 1945 Yugoslav troops had entered Trieste, some time before the British troops did, thus opening the "Trieste issue" with Italy for the next decade. In August 1946 on two separate occasions the Yugoslav anti-air defence shot down two US military transport airplanes on route from Italy to Austria, with casualties in one of the shootings. With neighbouring communist governments in Bulgaria and Albania Yugoslavia had supported the Greek communists' efforts in the Greek civil war (March 1946 – October 1949). The degree to which the US President Harry Truman saw Yugoslavia with utter distrust and attributed it with power and agency is perhaps best described in a September 1947 letter to his wife: "[...] But here is a situation fraught with terrible consequences. Suppose, for instance, that Italy should fold up and that Tito then would march into the Po Valley. All the Mediterranean coast of France then is open to Russian occupation and the iron curtain comes

¹ Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, Vol. III, Nolit, Beograd, 1988, pp. 80–82.

to Bordeaux, Calais, Antwerp, and The Hague. We withdraw from Greece and Turkey and prepare for war. It just must not happen.”²

Through 1947 the USA got increasingly involved in post-war stabilization of Western/capitalist Europe. Early in the year, the United Kingdom officials informed Washington that they could not maintain the security umbrella over Greece and Turkey, which was a call for the USA to step in. Regional issues aside, economic picture in Western Europe was far from stable, and the US diplomacy increasingly worried that this was conducive to communist efforts to win over large popular support and topple the established governments. “Containing” the reach of Soviet communists was now an imperative drive of US policy in Europe. Washington crafted the European Recovery Plan – the so-called Marshall plan – by June 1947 to streamline economic aid to partner European countries and to help them to ease the flow of capital and goods across their borders. Yugoslavia refused to participate, as all other communist countries did, partly because no communist country was truly wanted by the US as a part of the program, partly as the Soviets insisted on that, and partly as the Yugoslav communists distrusted the Americans and saw this mostly as potentially subversive intrusion into domestic economic affairs.³

In Autumn 1947 the European communists established their first post-war international forum, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, or the Cominform. In a way, it was a response to the US gathering of most of the capitalist states in Europe, to coordinate future policies of communist parties across the continent, with the early headquarters set in Belgrade, a sign of recognition of Yugoslav importance. But this setting was not to last.

1948 – SCRAMBLE FOR NEW POLICIES

From the early 1948 fracture points emerged in Yugoslav – Soviet relations, not visible to the wider public though, as they were tightly confined to the tops of two leaderships. Soviets were delaying trade negotiations as they were dissatisfied with Yugoslav five-year planning and the huge requests for aid that were put in front of them. They scolded the Yugoslav leadership for their talks with Bulgaria on the possible state union without consulting and seeking Moscow’s approval, for flirting with similar ambitions with Albania, for further aiding Greek communists when Moscow decided to end its support in

² Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2006, p. 162.

³ Đoko Tripković, „Jugoslavija i Maršalov plan”, *Istorija 20. veka*, 1–2/1990, pp. 59–76.

fear of possible US military intervention there, for being too aggressive on the Trieste issue while the Italian communists were trying to win the April 1948 parliamentary elections (which they lost). The exchange of letters between Tito and Stalin did not resolve the disputes. It was a barrage of accusations that Belgrade was pursuing overly ambitious policies beyond the perimeter of what Moscow as the “center of global communism” saw fit.

By the summer, Moscow decided to ostracize the Yugoslav communist party from the Cominform and introduce de facto economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. The expulsion was announced on 28 June through the official Cominform statements, at which moment the whole issue became public. For Yugoslavia internally, the party leadership saw this move as an existential threat to its own grip on power. It meant a start of the pressure on real or perceived pro-Soviet elements (mostly) within the party and a wave of extrajudicial arrests over next several years. It also led to ideological differentiation from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whose normative framework in the USSR was a clear role-model for the Yugoslav communists from 1945.⁴ The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (later the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) established a form of workers self-management of the enterprises, thus devolving the formal power of decision-making for a specific firm from the federal and republic ministries, but it has retained planning competencies and most of the price controls. The policy was implemented starting in 1950 and by the early 1960s it became a staple of LCY approach to the overall economic management. The party also abolished compulsory collectivization of farming in 1952, another major difference from the CPSU norm and practice.

Externally, at first, Yugoslavia had to seek some relaxation with the Western countries. Already in June 1948 Belgrade and Washington made an agreement on releasing 60 million dollars of Yugoslav gold reserves in the USA in exchange for keeping the 17 million dollars of deposits in the USA to cover the majority of the value of nationalised property of US legal and private persons in Yugoslavia up to that point.⁵ The deal was signed in mid-July, after the split with the Soviets. In early 1949 Truman relaxed the export controls for Yugoslavia in exchange for the Yugoslavs to drop the support they gave to the Greek communists. The request for the steel mill equipment

⁴ Miroslav Jovanović, „Preslikana ili samobitna društvena izgradnja: komparativna analiza Ustava SFRJ (1946) i 'staljinskog' Ustava SSSR (1936)”, *Tokovi istorije*, 1–2/2008, pp. 280–289.

⁵ Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), 130, 640, *Sporazum između vlada Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i FNRJ o novčanim potraživanjima SAD i njihovih državljana od 19. jula 1948.*

was soon granted and by August that year, the Exim Bank issued a 20 million dollars loan for mining equipment.⁶

Some support from the international financial institution also came forth in 1949. The chairman of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("The World Bank"), Eugene Black, came to meet Tito and, while sceptical of the bank's position when issuing credit lines to communist states with poor track record, eventually agreed to a small, 3 million dollars loan in 1949. That would be followed by two loans in 1951 (28 million) and 1953 (30 million), but the bank would be a difficult partner for Yugoslavia for the next decade as it conditioned new loans with Yugoslavia reaching deals on its outstanding pre-World War II sovereign debts with a number of Western countries.⁷

The evolving US position on Yugoslavia after the Tito-Stalin split could be seen from the National Security Council's documents: its NSC 18/2 and 18/4 ("United States Policy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia") and NSC 58 ("United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe), which remarked that Yugoslavia was not a Soviet satellite "because, although it is a Communist state, it is not at present subservient to the Kremlin nor an integral part of the Soviet system".⁸ This perception will be fundamental to further Washington's approach in dealings with Yugoslavia for next several decades. When tight export controls against the communist bloc were enacted in 1949, Yugoslavia was not one of the targets, and for the most part it would remain so during the Cold War. The 1948 split opened a way for political and economic reproachment between the two countries, and in the immediate period led to considerable economic and military aid as Yugoslavia's security vis-à-vis the Soviets was a first-rate concern.

The "chipping away" of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, and then using it as a "wedge" against that bloc became an integral part of larger containment policy against the Soviet Union. While in 1949 the NATO was formed, formalising America's standing involvement in European security affairs, Moscow mostly looked inwards, in stabilising its own international system, acquiring the atom bomb (the first test was in August 1949) and global communism got the boost as the Communist Party of China took over the

⁶ Ljubiša S. Adamović, Džon R. Lempi i Rasel O. Priket, *Američko-jugoslovenski ekonomski odnosi posle Drugog svetskog rata*, Radnička štampa, Beograd, 1990, p. 35.

⁷ Devesh Kapur, John Lewis and Richard Webb, *The World Bank: Its First Half Century, Vol. 1 History*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1997, p. 103.

⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 5, Eastern Europe; *The Soviet Union, Report to the President by the National Security Council*, Washington, December 8, 1949, pp. 42–54.

mainland China territory and proclaimed the People's Republic in October. Yugoslavia's position was thus one piece of a larger, global puzzle.

1950s – HEYDAY OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID

While the normalisation of economic relations between Yugoslavia and USA slowly picked up steam, the events across the globe effectively sparked the topic of military aid. The army of communist North Korea, a state formed over a Soviet-held part of Korean Peninsula, attacked the South Korea (under the US control) on 25 June 1950, which prompted Washington not only to engage in a direct war with one communist country, North Korea, which was aided by China, and to a lesser degree by the Soviet Union, but to reassess other possible hotspots of seeming Soviet-sponsored aggression. And in that sense Yugoslavia was an obvious choice.⁹ It was a communist country so any meaningful help from the West would be hard to come; the full authority of the CPY over the society was in doubt; it was economically squeezed by the collapse of trade with the communist bloc and the standard of living was, by the US assessment in the second half of 1950, lower than at the pre-World War Two level.¹⁰ Thus, US concerns over possible Soviet attack on Yugoslavia were growing right after the start of the war in Korea. On a mission delegated by the State Department, John Foster Dulles had a long talk with Yugoslavia's ambassador to the UN, Aleš Bebler, in July, on wider prospects of Soviet's possible attacks in Europe and Yugoslavia's position on the matter. Dulles elaborated how the Washington thought that the Soviets would go for military action on their wider periphery, while Bebler stated that Yugoslavia was more in danger than the Greece was, and that the shortage of ammunition and aircraft was of a particular concern for the defence.¹¹

The following months proved to be crucial in establishing the military and economic aid policies of the USA in global, and for Yugoslavia in particular. Yugoslav deputy foreign minister Vladimir Velebit went to visit the US to seek the IBRD aid, but has also ventured into meetings with State Department, CIA and Department of Defence officials to discuss military aid. He had no

⁹ Coleman Mehta, "The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948–1951", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 101–145.

¹⁰ Thomasingar (Ed.), *Yugoslavia From 'National Communism' to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948–1990*, Central Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council, Washington, 2006, pp. 59–60.

¹¹ AJ, 507, IX, 109/VI-184, *Pismo Aleša Beblera Edvardu Kardelju*, 14. 7. 1950.

formal authority to do so and he returned to Belgrade to brief Tito and other relevant state officials. In early December he got the clearance to seek military aid on his return trip to America. At the time he only got promises for surplus artillery ammunition, as the Washington was preparing the legal framework that would become the Mutual Security Act (MSA) in 1951. Washington also wanted formal agreements and staff to staff meetings between the military officials to understand the needs and determine its possibilities in sending weaponry and supplies.¹²

In May and June 1951 Yugoslav chief of the General Staff, Konstantin Koča Popović, visited the United States and held detailed talks in the Pentagon, including with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, George Marshall. The first agreement was signed on June 13 and Yugoslavia was to receive military equipment worth some 30 million dollars in the first batch although Belgrade was asking for some 80 million dollars' worth. Belgrade was also keen on keeping out of the formal aid programs as it feared possible political repercussions for aligning with the US and wanted to reduce any US military involvement on the Yugoslav soil. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia joined the MSA program in 1951, and the American Mission Assistance Staff mission of some 30 officers initially came to Yugoslavia by the end of the year.¹³ Jet aviation – F-86 fighters, F-84 fighter bombers and T-33 trainers, helicopters (S-55), modern armour (M47 Patton tank) and artillery (M114 howitzers) dragged the Yugoslav army in the 1950s out of the World War II technological level.

In parallel, the USA, the UK, and France had established the so-called tri-party aid program for Yugoslavia (where the USA will provide for 2/3 of the value). For 1951/52 that aid amounted to 120 million dollars. By the end of 1955 when the program was closed, just over 600 million dollars of aid, mostly food, was implemented through this format.

In January 1952 Yugoslavia and the USA signed a trade agreement that had established the counterpart funding for Yugoslavia. In essence, Yugoslavia would receive goods of agreed value from the USA and the proceeds from its sales in Yugoslavia would be accumulated in dinars in special accounts, so the Yugoslav side would keep 90% of the dinars and the US (through its embassy) would keep 10%. These accounts would be used to fund development projects agreed by both sides, and they would essentially run for decades. In 1952 severe drought has hit Yugoslavia, with agriculture falling short of the 1951 output at only 57%. Yugoslavia asked for additional aid, which was granted to

¹² Ivan Laković, *Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji, 1951–1958*, Istorijski institut Crne Gore, Podgorica, 2006, pp. 35–36, 207.

¹³ Aleksandar Životić, „Vašingtonski pregovori (maj – jun 1951) – prelomna tačka jugoslovensko-američkih odnosa?“, *Tokovi istorije*, 2/2015, pp. 165–177.

the tune of 20 million dollar, plus the said IBRD credit of 30 million dollars for purchasing agricultural mechanisation was granted in 1953.¹⁴

In 1952-1954 Yugoslavia held high-level talks with the US on the common strategic view on the situation in the Balkans, scope and limits of joint military planning and the best use of military hardware that started flowing into Yugoslavia. Tito was fairly clear that he was not interested in joining NATO, and in talks with the US military he never agreed to formal commitment to adjust military planning in such a way to prioritise defending the "Ljubljana gate", or the shortest route for Soviet army from Hungary to northern Italy. He jockeyed through various forms of Western military initiatives and formal deals, in order to show some closeness to the concepts of defence against the Soviet Union and to get the best possible deal on Trieste where the armed standoff with Italy was in place since October 1953.¹⁵ The pinnacle of that dynamics was the (new) Balkan Pact on mutual defence with Greece and Turkey in 1954. Since these two countries became NATO members just two years prior, formal arrangements were made to distance their NATO commitments (through Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty) from their commitment to Yugoslavia's defence.

The 1954-55 period was the one of fast developing and intertwined processes. Besides the Balkan Pact, in the summer of 1954 Tito made interim deal with Italy on the Trieste issue and had started correspondence with the new Soviet leadership (Stalin had died in March 1953). Thus, his attention now turned to the East in order to normalize relations with the Eastern bloc on the grounds favourable for Belgrade. When Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation visited Belgrade in May 1955, they came with a soft *mea culpa* message, and signed a Belgrade Declaration on mutual relations that very much pleased Yugoslav officials. It marked the formal end of the critically hostile relations but did not mean the return to the pre-1948 state of affairs. The future relationship will fluctuate but will be managed and kept in check.

In 1954 the US established a so-called Food for Peace program, or the Public Law 480. The program allowed the US government to purchase domestic agricultural surplus and to offer it, on very favourable terms, to foreign governments. The allocated surpluses would be paid for either in dollars or local currency, and the sum would be treated similarly as a counterpart fund – for local development projects in agreement with the US government.¹⁶ The

¹⁴ Momčilo Pavlović, „Pomoć Jugoslaviji u hrani od strane zapadnih zemalja, 1950-1951”, *Istorija 20. veka*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1994, pp. 119–138.

¹⁵ Milan Igrutinović, „Život i smrt Evropske odbrambene zajednice – pogled iz Beograda”, *Vojno-istorijski glasnik*, 2011, No. 2, pp. 101–124.

¹⁶ George M. Guess, *The Politics of United States Foreign Aid*, Routledge, London and New York, 2011, p. 15.

details of specific aid for each country were negotiated on a year-to-year basis, which was not optimal from the Yugoslav point of view as it had to constantly navigate State Department, White House and the Congress interests to reach the best possible deals. In terms of sheer volume and the way the money was used, the PL480 was a largest program of aid from the USA to Yugoslavia over the next decade and a half, while Yugoslavia was a formal party to the program. Over 8.8 million tons of wheat and some 930 million dollars of total aid came through this program to Yugoslavia by the end of the 1960s.¹⁷

In September 1954, Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the State Department visited Tito to finalize the deal on Trieste and to determine the scope of the food aid under the PL480 program. He brought with him the letter from President Eisenhower in which he made a friendly plea to Tito to “personally intervene” to make a final gesture on the border issue with Italy, while stating that he had instructed Murphy to “take a sympathetic look at any economic predicaments” that Yugoslavs relay to him.¹⁸ Tito played ball and the deal with Italians was finalised in October. Still, the Yugoslav delegation had a hard time negotiating on food aid in Washington in November, but the deal was made on 425,000 tons of wheat, 10 million dollars’ worth of cotton and the use of counterpart funds on the Adriatic motorway, a program that had both military and commercial importance.¹⁹ Yugoslavs were gloomier about the whole affair. They found it difficult to negotiate on numbers and projects they saw as priority, and they thought that after the Trieste deal was made the Washington would be more forthcoming.²⁰

Tito also took the time, at the end of 1954, for a long trip across oceans, to Burma and India. A voyage of several months, easily his longest absence from Yugoslavia to date, was a sign of improved security and a wish not the feel being squeezed between two blocs in Europe while playing only a defensive role. It was a steppingstone for global approach to Yugoslav’s international position by developing the policy of non-alignment over the next several years.

By the logic of bloc relations, the thaw with Soviets inevitably meant the cooling off the relations with the United States. James Riddleberger, the US ambassador (1953-58) made complaints in early 1955 that Yugoslavia

¹⁷ Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova (DA MSP), PA, 1966, 178, 43046, *Problemi u vezi s uvozom poljoprivrednih viškova iz SAD*, 31. 1. 1966.

¹⁸ AJ, 837, I-1/1083.

¹⁹ Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS), 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, No. 715, *The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia*, Washington, November 18, 1954, pp. 1423–1424.

²⁰ DA MSP, PA, 1955, 60, 14, 18223, *Ekonomska pomoć triju vlada*, 17. 6. 1955.

was not forthcoming about the use of military aid, its defence planning, and was hampering the AMAS mission. Yugoslav diplomats were adamant that Yugoslavia would not cooperate on military planning and that it was providing enough information already on the use of military equipment. Belgrade was willingly and slowly letting go of the MSA program (but was eager to squeeze out of it as much as it still could) and was shifting its interest towards the long-term economic aid (ie long-term and favourable credit lines).²¹ By late summer, the US military fully understood that the end of the line for tying Yugoslavia to Western military structures was reached and it saw no point in continuing the rhythm of sending military aid, which would only trickle for the next two years.²²

USA wanted to make sense of the Yugoslav-Soviet reproachment directly, so Murphy came for another visit in September 1955. Tito assured him that the reproachment should not be considered as directed against the US and US-Yugoslav ties, that it was too early to say that the relations with other communist countries were also improving, and that Yugoslavia was firm on its declared position that it would not join Soviet-led bloc.²³ That was reassuring enough for Murphy, so he arranged for the John Foster Dulles (as a Secretary of State) visit to Tito and went on to discuss the new annual economic aid package for Yugoslavia and the state of MSA program with Belgrade interlocutors. Murphy got satisfactory answers from Secretary of Defence Ivan Gošnjak to unclog some lesser amounts of military aid and got a clearer sense of direction of Yugoslavia at that sensitive moment. Tito was visited by Dulles on November 6, and they talked about topics of wider international situation in Europe. His takeaway was like Murphy's, that Tito had no plans to return to the Soviet fold.²⁴ Shortly after, the US approved the release of 300,000 tons of wheat and by January 1956 the total aid under PL480 for fiscal 1955/56 was agreed at the level of just over 101 million dollars.²⁵

The interest of both sides for the existing form of MSA military aid was waning rapidly in 1955-57. Relaxation of the relations with USSR made Yugoslavia more secure and thus long-term military and economic planning

²¹ Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952–1955: jugoslovensko približavanje NATO-u*, Službeni list SRJ, Beograd, 2000, pp. 213–223.

²² Lorejn M. Lis, *Održavanje Tita na površini: Sjedinjene Države, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, BMG, Beograd, 2003, p. 168.

²³ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, No. 258, *Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State*, Belgrade, September 27, 1955, pp. 672–674.

²⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, No. 264. *Message From the Secretary of State to the President, at Denver*, Washington, November 7, 1955, p. 698.

²⁵ DA MSP, PA, 1956, 83, 8, 424128, *Ekonomski odnosi sa SAD*, 17. 2. 1956.

became more important than filling some current gaps in the military hardware. Also, a pushback on the oversight of AMAS mission over the use of US weapons in Yugoslav army was widespread by that time, and the logic of tighter security of armed forces (in this sense – against the US inspections and queries) took precedence over prospects of receiving surplus weaponry after ever more longer and difficult negotiating process. Furthermore, visible courtship from the Soviet Union military towards the Yugoslav military and embassy in Moscow in 1956–57 opened the prospects of getting new Soviet hardware (jets, helicopters and anti-aircraft missiles) on favourable terms.²⁶ Yugoslav Foreign Minister Konstantin Koča Popović and the US ambassador Riddleberger held several talks on the MSA issue. In December 1956 Popović was pretty clear that Yugoslavs felt increasingly secure and held the position that there was no immediate threat of war in Europe, that they would like to focus on security of supply (implying that the MSA aid was not good enough in changed international circumstances when the limits of alignment with the US have been reached), and that with the US manufacturers there were always issues with high prices and difficult licencing even for spare parts. He emphasized that the best option for all was to exit the MSA program and concentrate on long-term economic relations “which was the best way to solve our security needs anyway”.²⁷ In December 1957 Yugoslavia officially ended its participation in the MSA program. This move came two months after Yugoslavia issued a recognition of independence and sovereignty of German Democratic Republic, which once again raised eyebrows in Washington to the question how closely Yugoslavia is following the Soviet foreign policy footsteps. Eventually, from the early 1960s, Yugoslavs will switch to the USSR as the main source of modern weaponry. For Soviets, luring Yugoslavia as close as it was possible was a part of consolidation of communist bloc, as in 1955 they formed the Warsaw treaty military bloc in the wake of failed negotiations with the US on the fate of Germany, when Western Germany was incorporated into NATO and its army was slowly being built from scratch.

To strengthen the ties with the US administration and to explain Yugoslav economic interests, a large delegation of Yugoslav officials led by Avdo Humo, Federal Minister for Finance, had visited the United States in October 1957, a largest such visit to a Western country since 1945. They met Dulles, C. Douglas Dillon (Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs), Eugene Black of the IBRD and Per Jacobson of the IMF. In talks with Dulles and Dillon, Humo explained main lines of Yugoslav economic development, highlighting the fast rates of growth (in 1950s they were among the highest in the world) but

²⁶ Aleksandar Životić, „Uspom i pad jugoslovensko-sovjetskih vojnih odnosa 1957”, *Tokovi istorije*, 1/2014, pp. 105–134.

²⁷ AJ, 837, I-5-b/104-4, Str. pov. 328, *Beleška o razgovoru*, 24. 12. 1956.

also continuous issues with balance of payments, poor agricultural output, and price disparities (a fairly common issue with non-market economies). He asserted a wish for long-term credit lines on which Yugoslav industry should rely on and made a point that the regime of economic aid through food and other programs was good because it was necessary, but that Yugoslavia wanted a way out through its economic development, for which it needed cheap industrial credits and technology import. He was also trying to find partners for the development of electric grid and Majdanpek copper mine and smelter, an expensive project on which the US interlocutors were fairly cool, citing low global prices of copper. Humo was also trying to get across the message that Yugoslavia was not fundamentally aligning with the Soviet Union, that it has its own red lines and that it seeks only friendly and productive relations, not a place in the Soviet's bloc. Dillon was clear that Washington had a positive overall view of Yugoslav needs but that it certainly could not cover all of them, explaining the perennial issues with Congressional approval of annual aid and cost-benefit analysis of each and every project that Yugoslavia and many other countries wanted to finance through ongoing US programs. Dillon brought the question of Yugoslav pre-war debt, on which there were ongoing talks between Yugoslavia and a number of foreign countries (USA, France, Switzerland etc) and urged Yugoslavia to settle the debts so it could raise its commercial appeal to US private lending as well. Dillon was also explaining the coming changes in aid policy and establishing new modes that would be beneficial to Yugoslav expectations of long-term funding.²⁸

In 1958 the USA established a Development Loan Fund, to supplement the MSA and PL480 and in close connection with the Exim Bank and the IBRD, with tailored credit facilities. Eligibility criteria required countries to be outside the global communist domination, to be undeveloped, to respect terms of export controls of the US goods it uses, and to submit for financing feasible project that would help its development.²⁹ In March 1958 Yugoslavia submitted its list of proposed projects worth 130 million dollars. However, new problems with the USSR on ideological grounds led to Soviet backing off from previously announced credit lines so Belgrade created an updated list for DLF by July, of some 200 million dollars. Priority projects were Azotara Pančevo (nitro fertilizer plant), Thermal Plant Kosovo, Hydro Plant Trebišnjica, fertilizer plants in Lukavac and Sisak, diesel locomotives and a cellulose factory.³⁰ Thermal and hydro plant got the early provisional

²⁸ DA MSP, PA, 1957, 92, 10, 28396, *Rad delegacije A. Huma*, 8. 10. 1957.

²⁹ DA MSP, PA, 1957, 92, 12, 426883, *Organizacija i poslovanje Fonda za ekonomski razvoj*, 6. 12. 1957.

³⁰ DA MSP, PA, 1958, 108, 21, 31694, *Podsetnik za razgovor druga Kardelja sa ambasadorom SAD K. Renkinom*, 15. 7. 1958.

approval for financing, and by 1961 the DLF allocated 117 million dollars for Yugoslav needs,³¹ and in that year the DLF was incorporated into the newly formed USAID.

PURSUING REFORMS AT HOME AND NONALIGNMENT ABROAD

During 1960 Yugoslav officials were preparing a major economic reform in the sector of monetary policy and foreign trade. Some international preparation was done through an associate membership in Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor of the World Trade Organization) in 1959 and already in 1956 Yugoslavia got an observer status in Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, a predecessor of the OECD). In 1958-59 it concluded several agreements on servicing its pre-war and early post-war sovereign debt and thus has opened the door to IBRD financing and has gained some reputation in international private finance circles. In the context of Cold War, it has to be noted that a communist country was putting so much energy into being a part of the global capitalist mainstream.

The reform was rolled out in January 1961. Its goals were to end the decade-long policy of multiple foreign currency exchange rates, to devalue the dinar (from 300 to 750 dinars for 1 dollar), to abolish rigid state-approved export and import quotas, deregulate the imports, create a policy of export subsidies, all with hopes of expanding the foreign trade overall and easing the disparities of domestic and foreign prices of goods, with the long-term aim of reaching dinar international convertibility. Important part of the approach to the reform was to gather as much international support as possible. Dillon came to visit Yugoslavia in mid-July and toured the ongoing projects financed by the United States (such as fertilizer plant in Pančevo by the DLF). His Yugoslav interlocutors told him that they were seeking 340 million dollars of short- and mid-term loans to enter the reform from the USA (150 million was requested), Western European countries, the IMF and the EBRD. Federal secretary of economy, Mijalko Todorović, was claiming that after the successful rollout of the reform the Yugoslav exports to the USA would triple by 1965 and that in that year Yugoslav standard of living would be equal to the current Italian (1960).³² Those words and numbers had no grounds in reality but Yugoslavs were looking to make an impression. Dillon met Tito as well, but they mostly discussed global issues, where Dillon talked about US

³¹ DA MSP, PA, 1961, 127, 439308, *Ekonomski odnosi sa SAD*, 27. 2. 1961.

³² FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, Part II, No. 163, *Memorandum of Conversation*, Belgrade, July 18, 1960, pp. 437-444.

policies towards Cuba and Tito gave his views on several crisis points of the day (Algeria, Congo, China...).³³

This reform was well-received in Washington, as they saw it as a pro-market reform that will tie Yugoslavia more tightly to the Western camp. By the end of 1960 the USA pledged 100 million dollars (25 from the MSA program, 25 from the DLF and 50 million from the Exim Bank). The IMF provided a loan of 75 million dollars for foreign exchange reform and IBRD issued a loan of 30 million for energy sector development.³⁴ Yugoslavia gathered some 270 million dollars in aid from Western countries and organizations, so, not all what it wanted but still nearly 10% of its GDP at the time.

In September 1960 Tito went to the UN General Assembly session, and his trip to New York was highlighted with the meeting with Dwight Eisenhower in Waldorf Astoria Hotel, where both stayed during the UN GA session. It was the first ever meeting between presidents of two countries. Their conversation was light in content and courteous. They both gave their views on current issues in their own countries, with focus on economy (Tito on rapid but uneven growth, Eisenhower on military spending) and just quick notes on the meetings they had with foreign leaders. Eisenhower relayed that that he understood the neutral position of Yugoslavia, but “expressed the hope that as the old saying went, it would be neutral on our side” as “there was no neutrality in moral questions of right or wrong.”³⁵ This was a mainstream view of Yugoslav endeavours on non-aligned foreign policy in the early 1960s – a combination of suspicion and benevolence. This UN GA meeting served Yugoslavia to strengthen its non-aligned approach, by organizing a meeting between leaders interested in pursuing principles of non-aligning with bloc logic and politics and of principles of peaceful coexistence. On September 29 in Yugoslav Mission to the UN, Tito met with J. Nehru (Prime Minister of India), G. A. Nasser (President of Egypt), K. Nkrumah (President of Ghana) and Sukarno (President of Indonesia). They showed mutual support in their statements for the rest of the UN GA meetings, and paved a way for future meetings that would be formalised next year with the First non-aligned conference in Belgrade.

³³ FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. X, Part II, No. 164, *Memorandum of Conversation*, Vanga, July 19, 1960, pp. 444–447; No. 165, *Memorandum of Conversation*, Vanga, July 19, 1960, p. 448; No. 166, *Memorandum of Conversation*, Vanga, July 19, 1960, pp. 449–451; No. 167, *Memorandum of Conversation*, Vanga, July 19, 1960, pp. 452–453; No. 168, *Memorandum of Conversation*, Vanga, July 19, 1960, pp. 453–454.

³⁴ AJ, 112, 1166, 2/1, *Saopštenje Stejt departmenta i MMF o zajmovima odobrenim Jugoslaviji*, 3. 1. 1961.

³⁵ FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. X, Part II, No. 170, *Memorandum of Conversation*, New York, September 22, 1960, pp. 455–461.

As Yugoslavia was gearing up for its biggest global role in hosting the foundational conference of the emerging Non-aligned Movement, it threaded carefully between the USA and USSR, but in effect it got closer to the USSR, despite somewhat tense relations of two ruling communist parties. In August 1961 the Berlin wall crisis was at its height and Yugoslavia was cautious not to blame the Soviets publicly, and in talks with new US ambassador, one George F. Kennan, and Chester Bowles (Under Secretary of State) Tito urged the US to be "more constructive" in dealing with the Soviets.³⁶ Prior to the Non-aligned conference (1–6 September), Soviets conducted a nuclear test which Tito failed to condemn, instead firing off tirades against the USA and global capitalism. This sent a bit of a shockwave to Washington, as the State Department expected a more neutral tone, banking on the assurances of Yugoslav officials over the previous months.³⁷

The new, Democratic administration under John F. Kennedy was generally continuing a soft approach towards Yugoslavia inherited from Republicans. But it felt it had to stop and reappraise such a policy. Kennedy issued a internal ban on aid to Yugoslavia in late September but it lasted only for several weeks.³⁸ By January 1962 the overall policy of extending the economic aid was continued in a reduced format. For example, wheat sent through PL480 was to be nominally paid for only in dollars; IMF and IBRD would drag their feet on disbursing allocated funds for Yugoslavia; Exim Bank credits were capped at 10 million dollars for the moment, and the US Government allocated 10 million dollars of direct aid, less than expected.³⁹ But there was additional damage. The Congress stopped the process of training of Yugoslav military pilots on US soil and banned the commercial sale of surplus jets, of the types that Yugoslavia already had in an inventory from the 1950s.⁴⁰ Secretary of State Dean Rusk elaborated in Congress in early February 1962 the restrictive measures in place against Soviet Union and Cuba and in that light of perceived Yugoslav closeness to USSR he had to defend the policy of aid towards Yugoslavia. He described the bilateral relationship as "friendly and honest" and painted it in terms receptive to Congress: that Yugoslavia mostly complied with US sanctions against the reexport of military and dual use goods, that it was not a part of communist global conquest, that its foreign

³⁶ Đoko Tripković, *Jugoslavija i SSSR 1956–1971*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2013, pp. 112–117.

³⁷ DA MSP, PA, 1961, 124, 39960, *Beogradska konferencija i odnosi Jugoslavija – SAD*, 16. 9. 1961.

³⁸ FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, No. 103, *Editorial Note*, p. 217.

³⁹ DA MSP, PA, 1962, 120, 41033, *Razgovor Marka Nikezić i Dina Raska*, 9. 1. 1962.

⁴⁰ Ljubiša S. Adamović, Džon R. Lempi i Rasel O. Priket, op. cit., p. 63.

trade is predominantly tied to the West and that it would be “sterile and defensive” to treat it as just another country of the Soviet bloc.⁴¹ On the other hand, the Yugoslavs did not appreciate being painted as just serving the US interests, although they did understand the politics in Washington and the relationship between the administration and Congress.⁴² By June, the various amendments in the House of Representatives coalesced around Wilbur Mills’ (D-Ar) proposal to remove the Most Favourable Nation status for Yugoslavia (and Poland, which was granted that status only in 1960). The amendment found its way into the final form of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The room for manoeuvre for Kennedy’s administration that lobbied against Congressional restriction in this matter was that the formal application of such measure, that would introduce a number of high customs for Yugoslav exports to the US and reduce overall economic relations, was delayed for one year. With strong Yugoslav protests over the summer and autumn, and an offensive in explaining to Washington that the improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations was not a zero-sum game against the US, Kennedy included this issue into his legislative agenda for 1963.

Kennedy invited Tito to visit the US during Tito’s previously planned tour in Latin America in October 1963, and it was extended shortly before this trip. The invitation was partly a logical step for better bilateral understanding in time of growing suspicions and the “hits” that Yugoslavia took in Washington but was also partly a wish to be cooperative while Tito was giving speeches in UN GA session and during his Latin American meetings.⁴³ Tito met Kennedy in the White House on 17 October for several round of talks. Bilateral relations were centred on two key issues: the boundaries of dynamic Yugoslav-Soviet relations and views on Soviet foreign policy towards the West. Tito was arguing that Yugoslavia was seeking to expand its overall foreign policy connections in beneficial ways and that closer ties with the Soviet Union were part of that, but that that should not be interpreted as spoiling the relationship with the US. He made a point that most of the Yugoslav trade was oriented towards the West and that Yugoslavia did not want any confrontation. He was boasting that he made Khrushchev state publicly that the Soviet Union was supporting the principles of peaceful coexistence. Kennedy reminded him of the Cuban missile crisis the year before and that such Soviet words were not followed by their actions. But in essence he was not displeased with Tito’s explanation

⁴¹ Congressional Digest, 1962, *Department of State Bulletin*, February 26, 1962, pp. 346-348.

⁴² FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, No. 120, *Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State*, Belgrade, February 14, 1962, pp. 257-258.

⁴³ Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961-1971*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2012, p. 143.

about Yugoslav global outlooks and of placement of its own foreign policy. On the issue of economic relations, Tito was clear that Yugoslavia was ready to stop receiving classic economic aid, and that it was interested in commercial cooperation based on mutual economic interest. He painted the aid policy as an obstacle for more productive relations overall. All this suited Kennedy. The wind down of aid programs meant one less hassle in relations with Congress, at least, and allowed for new and positive trend in relations.⁴⁴ As we know, Kennedy was shot one month later in Dallas. His legislative agenda regarding the return of MFN status for Yugoslavia was voted on in December, when the status was restored through the amendments to the Trade Expansion Act.

The 1965 economic reform in Yugoslavia was meant to deal with the slowdown of economic growth since the end of the 1950s, to strengthen the principles of self-management in enterprises and to give them more autonomy, and to further devolve power from the federal level. For League of Communists of Yugoslavia, it was an essential exercise in ideological maturity and holding the reins of power, internally and as an element of legitimacy towards international actors, possibly most of all within the context of constant ideological tension with the CPSU. Economically, it had its early contradictions: as a way of combating price distortions and as an element of stability during the major economic reform, most of the prices of industrial goods (up to 60% of the items) have been put under administrative control, which became a feature of the economic policy until the late 1980s, despite all the talk of more freedom to the enterprises.⁴⁵

In July 1965 the IMF supported the reform with 80 million dollars. Yugoslavia's appeals for international aid were focused mostly on the deferment of payments for the existing loans. The USA approved two such steps, through the PL480 program (for the payment of 8.2 million, in December 1965) and the Exim Bank (for 3.5 million, in March 1966), which was considerably less than the support for the reform in 1961, and less than several other countries (USSR agreed to deferments for loans of 30 million, Italy for 45, Canada for 8.2 – just like the PL480, West Germany for 26.2 etc).⁴⁶ In October 1966, the Congress accepted limitations on the PL480 that included, among other things, the ban on dollar purchases of US agricultural products for Yugoslavia and Poland, a measure introduced by Rep. Paul Findley (R-IL), due to their ongoing trade with Cuba and North Vietnam.⁴⁷ Political

⁴⁴ Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961–1971*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2012, pp. 144–151.

⁴⁵ György Simon, Jr, *An Economic History of Socialist Yugoslavia*, Rochester, 2012, p. 91.

⁴⁶ DAMSP, PA, 1966, 176, 432010, *Foreign assistance to the economic reform as of July 31, 1966*.

⁴⁷ AJ, 837, I-5-b/104-14, *Stanje i perspektive ekonomskih odnosa sa SAD*, 29. 10. 1966.

divergence on these issues, where the US war in Vietnam met widespread condemnation, including in Yugoslavia with formal and vocal opposition, caught up with the aid programs and economic relations. The administration of Lyndon Johnson did not put much of a fight in Congress and Yugoslavia showed mostly token interest in the matter. It was a time to close the specific Yugoslav participation in formal aid programs and to move to “cleaner”, commercial form. Future agricultural purchases would be centred on the Commodity Credit Corporation as the US Government agency, and on a free market to a lesser degree.

In the 1960s, the official Belgrade was watching the two main economic integration processes in Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (CMEA). In both it saw a specific danger to its foreign trade, a “closing-in” of the bloc economies and leaving out the neutral and independent countries in unfavourable positions. Add to those the specific trade problems with the USA, the MFN issue, Yugoslav trade with Cuba that made it cross the line with many US policies, so the Yugoslav perception of growing issues with trade relations with the West became an important element of foreign policy in the early 1960s. Once we factor in the full embrace of the non-alignment as a main pillar of foreign policy, with the spread of decolonisation the Yugoslavs saw growing economic potential that was in line with their foreign policy preferences. With the thaw in ideological relations with Moscow and growing military purchases, Belgrade sought to relax the foreign trade with the CMEA. In September 1964, Yugoslavia signed an agreement of cooperation with the CMEA. It was a *sui generis* agreement, not of a membership or observer status, per Yugoslav wishes, and it helped make multi-year arrangements on trade in goods and specific barter arrangements.⁴⁸ In 1967 Yugoslavia passed a Law on Foreign Investments, opening up selected sectors (most of the industry and some agriculture) to foreign investment through joint ventures, for property stakes of up to 49% and the rights for a return on investment but no management rights. In 1970, Yugoslavia signed the first of many trade agreement with the EEC, also a pioneer as a communist country.

A DECADE OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as the expression of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, where the intervention of communist bloc under Soviet lead was a legitimate action to protect the survival of communism in a

⁴⁸ Momir N. Ninković, “Establishment of Cooperation Between the SFRY and the COMECON in 1964”, *Tokovi istorije*, 3/2020, 139–163.

communist country, led to renewed question over the exposure of Yugoslavia to Soviet pressure, both within Yugoslavia and in the West. Tito preferred to deal with Soviets directly and personally and to maintain enough interest in the West to ensure additional level of security.⁴⁹

It was also a transition period in the US with the incoming Republican administration under Richard Nixon. Washington was already slowly expanding its economic relations with the Eastern Europe, and Romania rose as a new possible "wedge" in Soviet bloc as its troops took no part in invasion of Czechoslovakia. So, when Nixon planned its Europe trip for the 1969, Romania was the first and only communist destination, not Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a "known known" for the US in a period when no major policy changes were expected or sought, but Romania was an interesting new prospect for the US influence. Yugoslavs were disappointed with this, as it signalled a declining US interest which would reduce the country's overall international standing.⁵⁰ The State Department eventually proposed a visit right after the Lusaka conference of the Non-aligned Movement (September 1970) where Tito was successful in helping formalising the movement and keeping the Soviet influence at bay, and Nixon gave very positive comments on the conference. Tito understood that "Lusaka brought Nixon to Yugoslavia".⁵¹

Nixon's welcome to Belgrade on 1 October 1970 was "relatively cordial but very dignified" as Yugoslav Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mirko Tepavac put it.⁵² They exchanged views on global issues while avoiding deeper arguments over Vietnam. Regarding economic relations, Tito was looking for the expansion of trade possibilities for Yugoslavia, and Nixon agreed. He also promised that Yugoslavia would get a status of a developing country which opened up new credit possibilities, and that the US government will issue guarantees on US investments in Yugoslavia which could spur more interest in joint ventures in Yugoslavia. These would come mostly through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Nixon made a short visit to Zagreb and Tito's birthplace, nearby Kumrovec, and extended a call for a return visit. Ultimately, the visit had huge symbolic value for Yugoslavia as it sent a signal of some importance in a period of Soviet assertiveness and of rising instability in the Mediterranean.

In 1971 Yugoslavia was rocked by the feud between Tito and federal center and the Croatian communist party, together with a series of mass protests in

⁴⁹ Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961–1971*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2012, pp. 247–284.

⁵⁰ Ibidem, pp. 287–290.

⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 291.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 292.

Croatia in support of the republic's party leadership, that was ousted by the end of the year. Constitutional reform towards further decentralisation was in full swing and the perception of internal instability was widely shared by the international audience. Soviet overt and covert signals that Yugoslavia was under threat from imperialist powers and internal counter-revolution which all might lead to the need of communist – that is, Soviet – intervention, were received from many quarters.⁵³

Tito went to official state visit to the USA on 27 October 1971, and was received at the White House with full military honours the next day. He and Nixon discussed global developments since their last meeting, sharing insights on Soviet foreign policy. Tito relayed Brezhnev's message, which he gave to Tito during their meeting in Belgrade in September, that "the USSR wishes for best possible relations with the USA". In light of his forthcoming visit to the USSR, Nixon assured Tito that the US-Soviet relations would not develop over the back of any small country. Bilateral relations were mostly discussed by Tepavac and Secretary of State William Rogers.⁵⁴ But the most relevant part of discussions during this visit came through Tepavac's dinner-time and secret verbal notes to both Rogers and Nixon that the September meeting with Brezhnev "did not went well" and that "President Tito is a very old man and when he dies, when he goes, I mean when he retires, then we may be confronted with the attempts of some of our neighbors to capitalize on that". Rogers and Nixon discussed it later and they saw that Yugoslavs were "scared to death" of Soviets but were officially putting a brave face.⁵⁵ The visit resulted in the Washington Declaration, a communique in which the US expressed "interest for independent and non-aligned position and policy of Yugoslavia", with a number of references to sovereignty, respect for interests, full support to the state rights under the UN Charter etc. Two presidents also agreed to increased level of mutual communication in order to avoid volatility in bilateral relations and to increase the top-level consultation of standing international issues.⁵⁶

For Yugoslavia, the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s were marked by the high growth of material product (some 8% per annum in 1969-71) with the slow emergence of high inflationary pressure. The industrial production was rising some 10% per annum but the agriculture had high

⁵³ Ibidem, pp. 308–320.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, pp. 324–328.

⁵⁵ FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, No. 233. *Editorial Note*, pp. 586–589.

⁵⁶ Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi 1961–1971*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2012, p. 334.

volatility (explained mostly by the weather patterns) as it fell by 5% in 1970 and rose by 9% in 1971. From the second half of the 1970 more restrictive monetary policy was in place, coupled with the stand-by arrangements with the IMF on short-term and long-term debt policy and the devaluation of dinar in January 1971 by 16.4% and by further 19% in December.⁵⁷

The first oil shock in 1973 hit Yugoslavia as well but due to the ability to import oil under favourable terms from friendly countries at the time (Libya e.g.) the government did not venture into any meaningful structural reforms of the economy.⁵⁸ Anti-inflation program was introduced at the beginning of 1974 by tightening the dinar supply, a systemic start of the struggle that will be essentially futile until the end of the SFRY existence. Also, Yugoslavia had to change its own monetary policy in lieu of the US departure from the gold standard in 1971. It left the nominal hard peg of dinar to dollar in 1973 and by 1981 held a so-called basis rate, essentially a floating rate tied to the dollar but with flexibility defined by the National Bank of Yugoslavia. At the same time, the internal market among domestic banks for the foreign currency exchange was legally allowed.⁵⁹ We can essentially view this period, until the time of stronger state intervention during the early 1980s, as the most 'open' for foreign trade and dealings with the foreign capital in the whole socialist period.

Chairman of the Federal Executive Council (FEC) Džemal Bijedić met with Henry Kissinger in November 1974 in Belgrade. He repeated a familiar refrain that Yugoslavia was "socialist and non-aligned [...] our policy is based on principles we won't give up. But we are prepared to have friendship" and argued for continued financial support and stronger military support.⁶⁰

Bijedić had visited the USA in March 1975 to consolidate the bilateral relations based on the 1971 declaration and to expand the scope of economic cooperation. Yugoslav government saw the global US position as under threat of declining in strategic terms, and that Washington was "opposing the positive changes in the struggles of peoples and states for political and

⁵⁷ AJ, 803, 607, *Izveštaj ekonomske misije Međunarodne banke za obnovu i razvoj, Vašington o sadašnjem /1971./ stanju privrede Jugoslavije i izgledima za razvoj u budućnosti*, Savezni sekretarijat za finansije, 4-321/1, 17. 8. 1972.

⁵⁸ György Simon, Jr, *An Economic History of Socialist Yugoslavia*, Rochester, 2012, pp. 93–94.

⁵⁹ Bukvić, Rajko, „Devizna politika Jugoslavije 1945–1990: iskustva i pouke”, in *13th International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference Eurobrand*, November 18–20, 2016, Kragujevac, Serbia (2016): pp. 53–54.

⁶⁰ Robert Niebuhr, "In the Shadow of Transition: U.S.-Yugoslav Relations, 1966 to 1980", in Martin Previšić (Ed.), *Breaking Down Bipolarity Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations during the Cold War*, De Gruyter, Berlin, 2021, p. 115.

economic independence" (Vietnam as the main example) and thus being the "main source of tensions on the international stage".⁶¹ Beside President Ford and Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll, Bijedić met with heads of Exim Bank and OPIC, with Robert McNamara who was a head of the World Bank, and with a number of senators and congressmen. They left with an impression that the positive political attitude towards Yugoslavia was good enough frame for the unhindered economic cooperation and "an encouragement to American companies to venture into doing business with Yugoslav commercial organizations, and in for us especially important areas of agriculture, chemical industry, transport and black metallurgy". EXIM bank, for which Yugoslavia was the single largest customer in 1974, was still in principle willing to provide credits without hard limits (but usually to the tune of up to 200 million dollars per annum) but due to the bad press on Yugoslav balance of payments it wanted more detailed clarifications on that matter, which it received from the Bijedić and Yugoslav delegation. Bijedić was very satisfied with the talk with McNamara, as "this is the first time that the Bank, through its most responsible functionary, has clearly stated its long-term willingness to finance our development plans", which was in line with Bank's policy of expanding credits to the developing countries in general.⁶² It is also worth mentioning that when the USA introduced the Generalised Scheme of Preferentials (GSP) through its Trade Act in 1974, Yugoslavia and Romania were the only communist countries that were granted these benefits, through the MFN status.

When Gerald Ford visited Yugoslavia in August 1975, Yugoslavs were pretty straightforward about wanting more American capital in Yugoslavia, both through credit but more-so through JV investments. They believed that this would (continue to) show the abilities to work across the ideological divide and give credence to the peaceful active coexistence. On the other hand, the US side was interested in Yugoslav's role in a number of issues – not only as an outside-of-Soviet-bloc communist country in European theatre, but also in the Middle East, and within its complex policy towards the Non-aligned world and the growing North-South divide.⁶³ It brought additional complexity into bilateral relations, that would subside after Tito's death in 1980 and a slowly diminishing importance of the NAM and Yugoslavia within it.

⁶¹ AJ, 803, 625, SSIP, str. pov. 57, *Izveštaj o poseti predsednika SIV Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama*, 29. 3. 1975.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Robert Niebuhr, "In the Shadow of Transition...", pp. 116–118; Dragan Bogetić, „Poseta Džeralda Forda Jugoslaviji avgusta 1975. i jugoslovensko-američke nesuglasice oko aktuelnih žarišta svetske krize", *Istorija 20. veka*, 1/2013, pp. 157–180.

While the bilateral relations seemed stable enough, Yugoslavia became a subject of the presidential campaign in 1976. In the electoral debate in late October between President Ford and then Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter (and the future president), Carter stated that he “would not go to war in Yugoslavia even if the Soviet Union sent in troops.”. That was in line with the prevailing post-Vietnam sentiment and in line with overall US strategic posture towards this issue. But the open statement such as this caused some stir in Washington. Henry Kissinger went on a popular TV show (a rare TV appearance for him at the time) to criticise Carter’s statement, generally suggesting that the Democratic candidate did not yet understand the art of foreign policy, and that, if elected, would surely reconsider his “dangerous” statement.⁶⁴ A month before that, Yugoslavs were assured by Carter’s foreign policy advisor and envoy and a seasoned visitor to Yugoslavia and Tito, Averell Harriman, that there won’t be changes detrimental to Yugoslavia under Carter administration.⁶⁵ Belgrade adopted a cautiously optimistic wait-and-see approach.

Soon after that, and during the transition period of two US presidential administrations, the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Laurence Silberman, resigned to his post to much relief of the official Belgrade. A Yugoslav memo for the farewell meeting of the member of Yugoslav Presidency Vidoje Žarković with the departing ambassador explicitly states that “he did not put effort into developing the friendly relations and expanding the bilateral cooperation. To the contrary, he led a string of adversary actions. At the 2nd Session of the Yugoslav-American Chamber of Commerce in June 1976 he warned the US businessmen (some 70 of them present) to be careful when dealing with the Yugoslav’s [...] He showed himself to be an exponent of those forces in American political life that believe that “it pays to put pressure” on Yugoslavia as by doing that some political gains can be made”.⁶⁶ Noting other “mischievous” behaviour by Silberman, but also the pleas of the Yugoslav to the State Department to replace him, the memo clearly instructs Žarković not to extend courteous gratitude for his service in Yugoslavia.⁶⁷ This was a low-point of ambassadorial relations, but as the same memo noted, one can claim that the bilateral relations have been favourably developing for a

⁶⁴ “Kissinger Scores Carter’s Stand Of Nonintervention in Yugoslavia”, *New York Times*, 25 October 1976. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/10/25/archives/kissinger-scores-carters-stand-of-nonintervention-in-yugoslavia.html>, (Accessed 20 December 2022).

⁶⁵ Đoko Tripković, „Kardelj – Hariman: ‘Šta posle Tita’”, *Istorija 20. veka*, 2/2011, pp. 173–186.

⁶⁶ AJ, 803, 638, 07-04, Predsedništvo SFRJ Pov. 380/76, 14. 12. 1976.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

number of years and were not essentially shaken by the poor standing a single ambassador had in the capital. In covering the standing economic questions at that time, the memo highlights the equipment for the Krško Nuclear Power Plant and the permanent air-traffic agreement between two countries.⁶⁸

After a sequence of ad-hoc and interim agreements between two states and their two flag-carriers (Pan Am and JAT), the Air Transport Agreement was signed in December 1977, with specific routes and airports designated (New York and Chicago as regular for JAT, and Los Angeles, Cleveland and Detroit on occasion, and Belgrade and Zagreb for Pan Am).⁶⁹ For JAT, it was correlated to the expansion of its newer wide-body fleet (new DC-10s instead of B-707s).

After the heyday of military assistance programs (1951-1957) from the early 1960s the Soviets became a prime supplier of most advanced military hardware.⁷⁰ Tanks (T-55), fighter jets (MiG-21), helicopters (Mi-8) and surface-to-air missiles were introduced in YPA service in that period. US doubts over the course of Yugoslav foreign policies, Yugoslav trade connections to Cuba, the wide disagreement over Vietnam War, and the prices of the US military hardware made it both unattractive and inaccessible to Yugoslavia.

Two countries became more serious about military cooperation – essentially Yugoslav purchase of US equipment and higher officers' staff education only in latter part of the 1970s. Defense Secretary Harold Brown visited Yugoslavia in October 1977 "to begin the process of modestly increasing our military relationship" and to explain to the Yugoslav side Carter's instruction to curb down US military sales in general but to try to broaden it with the Yugoslavs.⁷¹ Brown outlined to his counterpart, the Federal Secretary for People's Defence general Nikola Ljubičić, what was in principle available to the Yugoslav side – "defensive weapons only, no sensitive technology" – while admitting that the US procedures were at times problematic and hindered purchases that were principally agreed upon. Yugoslav side was not particularly happy with the scope of possibilities, but Brown assured them that the visit was just a start of conversations on the topic.⁷² The visit was also used to put behind the stir in Washington when it

⁶⁸ AJ, 803, 638, 07-04, Predsedništvo SFRJ Pov. 380/76, 14. 12. 1976.

⁶⁹ Ilija Kukobat, "Development of Air Transport between Yugoslavia and the United States of America", *Istorija 20. veka*, 2/2022, pp. 451–452.

⁷⁰ CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Changing Pattern of Yugoslavia's Arms Procurement*, January 1971.

⁷¹ FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XX, Eastern Europe, No. 246, *Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter*, October 20, 1977, pp. 699–792.

⁷² Ibid.

was publicised that Yugoslavia delivered M47 tanks that it got from the MSA program in the 1950s to Ethiopia's military regime (the "Derg").⁷³

In 1978 Yugoslavia had requested the US government approval for co-production and assembly of the TF-30 jet engine used in modern fighters and fighter-bombers (F-14, F-111, A-7), for its perspective supersonic fighter to be built in the 1980s. While the approval was given for direct talks with the manufacturer (Pratt & Whitney), the talks with P&W stalled as Yugoslavia wanted a co-production scheme and not a straight sale. The US government position was that it would be hard to make the sale and licencing anyway due to the legal and policy restrictions, despite strategic and political arguments to approve the transfer that were made by the Secretary of State.⁷⁴

A new modality of military cooperation was established in September 1979 through the Memorandum of Understanding and two standing commissions, military-economic and scientific-technical. Talks on purchasing specific equipment (mostly missiles and radars) have started soon after but Yugoslav saw high prices and restrictive end-user licencing as difficult obstacles.⁷⁵ Yugoslav side was also requesting to purchase two types of missile: M47 Dragon anti-tank missile and AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile. There were production issues with the M47 and the US Army was not willing to sell it from its own stocks but ultimately Yugoslavia lost an interest in the purchase due to "tremendous burden of procedural problems".⁷⁶ The Maverick missile was sold and was used as a weapon for the newly produced J-22 Orao attack aircraft which was built with UK engines and a host of other Western equipment⁷⁷ through the joint venture with Romania, signaling the latter's rising importance for the West in the 1970s). In general, Yugoslavs repeatedly

⁷³ FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XX, Eastern Europe, No. 245, *Memorandum of Conversation*, October 13–14, 1977, pp. 782–789; Milorad Lazić, "Arsenal of the Global South: Yugoslavia's Military Aid to Nonaligned Countries and Liberation Movements", *Nationalities Papers*, 2021, 49(3), p. 438.

⁷⁴ FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XX, Eastern Europe, No. 262, *Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter*, Washington, January 2, 1979.

⁷⁵ AJ, 803, 672, SIV, Str. pov. 637/79, *Informacija povodom zvanične posete državnog sekretara Sjedinjenih Američkih Država Cyrus Vance-e*, 21. November 19, 1979, pp. 5–6.

⁷⁶ FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XX, Eastern Europe, No. 266, *Memorandum From Robert Kimmitt, Marshall Bremont, and Steve Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)*, July 11, 1979, pp. 874–876.; FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XX, Eastern Europe, No. 270, *Memorandum of Conversation*, October 15, 1979, pp. 891–893.

⁷⁷ Bojan Dimitrijević, *Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo: 1942–1992*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2006, p. 242.

complained about the high prices of the US military equipment and the lack of practical credit lines for US foreign military sales through commercial means (as Yugoslavs sought to bypass the politically difficult congressional approval for state credits). When general Ljubičić spoke to US General Ernest Graves Jr. (director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency) in Belgrade in February 1980, he complained about the issue. Ljubičić was open towards the idea of receiving small quantities of modern US weapons suitable for the Yugoslav needs, such were FGR-17 Viper antitank rocket, Harpoon anti-ship missile, FIM-92 Stinger and Roland (Franco-German product) anti-aircraft missiles, for training purposes. The idea was that the YPA should have some experience with such weapons so that in a case of Soviet attack and the gradual retreat towards the Adriatic coast and keeping on with the resistance, the army would be capable of using the modern military aid that was to be forthcoming from the West in such an event.⁷⁸ Sometime later, the US Army provided 50 sets of TOW and Dragon anti-tank missiles and also 50 sets of FIM-43 Redeye anti-aircraft missiles for training purposes. These weapons were already in use with the US military, and it was possible to deliver them in larger quantities in case of war, so it was deemed practical to use them in that role.⁷⁹ The most significant military purchase by the end of 1980s was the acquisition of radars. The type AN/TPS-63 was bought both for the military and civilian Federal Directorate for Flight Control (8 in total, they started arriving in 1983), and later the more modern and longer range AN/TPS-70 (4 in total for the military, from 1985).⁸⁰

At the end of the 1970s Yugoslavs were fairly satisfied with bilateral relations with the US. Besides mutual Tito-Carter visits and their frequent exchange of letters on the various international topics (Mediterranean, détente in Europe, CSCE, Middle East, Horn of Africa etc), there were a number of visits of other high-level politicians to the US (Edvard Kardelj, leadership of the Federal Assembly, Federal Secretary of Defence Nikola Ljubičić etc), with Vice-president Mondale visiting Yugoslavia, Secretary of Defence Harold Brown, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance etc. Shortly before Tito's death, the main obstacle for bilateral relations from the Yugoslav point of view laid in the disagreements over other international issues (in the Middle East, US attitudes toward some of the NAM countries etc.) and in the work of groups

⁷⁸ FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XX, Eastern Europe, No. 280, *Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)*, February 13, 1980, pp. 916–917.

⁷⁹ FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. XX, Eastern Europe, No. 285, *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia*, March 11, 1980, pp. 929–932.

⁸⁰ Bojan Dimitrijević, *Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo: 1942–1992*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2006, p. 253.

opposing the closer ties (Yugoslav émigré networks, “Jewish lobby”).⁸¹ The official Belgrade eyed the economic expansion through JV projects, bringing more US companies to the Yugoslav market and attracting more commercial capita, and through the US influence in IBRD and IMF, acknowledging that for better cooperation with international capital more of a domestic effort was needed, through a process of cooperation and coordination of republics, provinces and the so-called interest communities, a form of commercial association of enterprises and municipalities within the association of labour, the core of structure of Yugoslav socialist economy since the mid-1970s.⁸²

At the time, the ruling party and state apparatus were preparing for the post-Tito era. Through constitutional amendments since 1971 when the collective Presidency was established, with Tito at its head for his lifetime, a set of institutional solutions were sought for the ‘transition’ to post-Tito period. While the 1974 Constitution decisively tilted the political and most of the economic power and decision-making process towards the republics (and provinces), the collective Presidency (with chairman rotating on an annual basis) meant that there was to be no more “Titos” after Tito – no central personality, no dictatorship, no charismatic personality to iron out the differences and give the last word. This was an answer to a (perpetual) crisis of legitimacy for post-war revolutionary parties such as LCY.⁸³

A DECADE OF YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC DECAY

The high levels of growth of material product and wages in the 1970s were based on the strong conjuncture in the domestic market, increased reliance of foreign loans (the sovereign debt rose from \$6.6 billion in 1975 to over \$18 billion in 1980) and the dependence on imported energy (oil). Investment expenditures rose sharply over the second half of the decade, to the level of 35% of the net material product, which put strain on the finances across the sectors and contributed to the rising inflation and price disparities. From the growth of 7% in 1979 – also a year with the highest post-war trade deficit as well – the growth over the next five years dropped to under 1% per annum.⁸⁴ And such growth was not followed by the corresponding growth of labour

⁸¹ AJ, 803, 658, Predsedništvo SFRJ, Str. pov. 185/2, Dugoročni odnosi SFRJ–SAD, 1. 11. 1978.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Robert Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy. Foreign Policy and Tito's Yugoslavia*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2018, pp. 171–192.

⁸⁴ Dragutin Marsenić, *Ekonomika Jugoslavije*, Ekonomika, Beograd, 1990, pp. 210–211.

productivity, which has underperformed per the view of the early 1983 NBY analysis for the FEC.⁸⁵ While there were many roots to the economic crisis of the (early) 80s, we cannot go into many details in this paper. The bottom line was that the rising costs of borrowing new money and the growing inability of socially owned enterprises to export goods to competitive (and hard currency) markets meant that the state could not levy enough of foreign currency to service its debts. Since 1980-81 both the state apparatus and the wider public were painfully aware of this.

The economic relations with the USA partially showed some elements of the looming predicament. From 1976 to 1980 the Yugoslav imports from the USA grew three-folds in dollar terms while the exports stagnated. The export structure was also worsening: the ratio of goods of higher level of manufacturing was dropping while the ratio of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods was rising. As domestic prices rose through high inflation, some products were simply more profitable in the domestic market, or at the West European markets. The SFRY Presidency saw the US market as “very important in the long term from the point of view of its enormous absorption power, and also as a source of supply of Yugoslav economy with modern equipment and technologies (for nuclear plant, commercial aviation, computers, mining equipment)”.⁸⁶ The Presidency implored Yugoslav companies to cooperate strongly on the manufacturing for the US market as such, and not to treat it as an occasional market for surpluses that couldn’t be sold domestically or in Europe, and to adjust to the quality requirements of the US market in general for continued and sustainable product export. The federal Presidency praised the US role as a technology exporter to Yugoslavia (second only to Germany). At the turn of the decade, the US firms were involved in several important industrial projects such as Krško Nuclear Plant, Trbovlje Gas Plant, Energoinvest’s wire manufacturing plant in Sarajevo, Žirovski Vrh uranium mine etc). Some joint ventures between Yugoslav and US companies for the third markets were also in play, as with Naftagas’ cooperation with Houston-based oil and gas drilling specialists for a project in Tunisia.⁸⁷ And many such projects proved to be failures, such as DINA (integrated petrochemicals plant), DOKI (a large polystyrene factory), Dow Chemicals’ joint ventures in Yugoslavia in late 1970s.⁸⁸ The Presidency also asked for fine-tuning of

⁸⁵ AJ, 130, 8464, 935, 152. *sednica SIV*, 12. 5. 1983, t. 5.

⁸⁶ AJ, 803, 695, Predsedništvo SFRJ, Str. pov. 445/2, *Informacija o ostvarivanju ekonomske saradnje sa SAD sa predlozima mjera za njeno unapređenje*, December 18, 1980, pp. 1–2.

⁸⁷ Ibidem, p. 3.

⁸⁸ Ljubiša S. Adamović, Džon R. Lempi i Rasel O. Priket, op. cit., pp. 120–121.

export subsidies to show more favour for the exports towards the US. The data showed that from 1978 to 1980 the so-called regional stimulation of exports to the US fell from 7% to the 1,7% of the price of the exported goods, and that the National Bank of Yugoslavia, Chamber of Commerce, and Interest Community of Yugoslavia for Economic Relations with Abroad should look more closely into the matter.⁸⁹

Belgrade praised the relationship with the USA at the time after Tito's death. As an internal FEC memo stated, "the bilateral relations and cooperation have been successfully developing over the last several years. The results of President Tito's visit to USA in March 1978, and of President Carter in June 1980 to our country and joint statements that were published as the established basis for long-term relations, represent thus far the highest level of mutual cooperation. That is the result of both sides' efforts, but also of the quality that through the enhanced dialogue and high-level exchange of messages, it is based on mutual respect for differences".⁹⁰ Still, economic relations were not really inductive for prospective Yugoslav development. Through the second half of the 1970s Yugoslav imports from the USA rose (to appx 1 billion dollars) while the exports have stagnated (at the level of 300-400 million dollars), thus adding to the overall trade deficit. Furthermore, more than 250 million dollars of annual imports from the USA were food imports (wheat and cattle food), showing directly the poor state of the Yugoslav agriculture. Metals and other raw materials still made around a half of Yugoslav exports. Processed food, furniture, clothing, machinery, and other products that contain added value in trade have been relatively declining as a part of the exports, thus indicating brewing problems with Yugoslav economic competitiveness. The FEC report clearly stated that the US market showed "objectively favourable conditions" for Yugoslav exports overall but has noted that newly generally restrictive US trade policies have had some negative impact on the trade with Yugoslavia. The report put the blame on the poor export performance on several factors: organizational/managerial problems, poor trade networks of Yugoslav companies, strong domestic demand and growing and favourable demand from the Eastern Bloc countries and to a lesser degree from the Western Europe.⁹¹ The US was the lead foreign investor in Yugoslav industry (at that time to the tune 181 million dollars and 39% of overall foreign investments since the late 1960s) and the second

⁸⁹ Ljubiša S. Adamović, Džon R. Lemp i Rasel O. Priket, op. cit., p. 4.

⁹⁰ AJ, 130, 8128, SIV, Str. pov. 236/81, *Informacija o američkoj spoljnoj politici i odnosima SFRJ-SAD*, April 1981.

⁹¹ Ibidem, pp. 18-20.

technology exporter (behind West Germany).⁹² The US was also the lead source of credit. EXIM bank issued 1.39 billion dollars of credits in the 1970s, OPIC issued over 77 million dollars of guarantees to US companies' ventures in Yugoslavia while the US government was instrumental in securing some 400 million dollars of loans through the US commercial banking sector in the late 1970s. From 1977 to 1981 the IBRD issued 1.215 billion dollars of development credits to Yugoslavia while some 1.5 billion were in the pipeline for the early 80s. In 1980 the IMF gave 260 million dollars in special drawing rights while at the early stages of the Yugoslav economic crisis of the 1980s the Yugoslav government expected some 2.2 billion for the upcoming three-year period.⁹³

But there were early doubts in Yugoslavia about the Ronald Reagan presidential campaign and eventual consequences of him being elected in November 1980. In a 23 July 1980 conversation with the US Ambassador Lawrence Eagleburger (right after the Carter visit to Yugoslavia), the member of the LCY Central Committee (and former Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs) Miloš Minić stated his surprise at Reagan's connection to the Croatian extremist immigration and his letter published in an "ustasha journal" in which he stated that Yugoslavia is an "artificial creation and will, as all other artificial creations in history, collapse one day". Minić then spoke of "the other" US policy towards Yugoslavia, a hidden one "that could be very dangerous for our country" and has relayed a message to Kissinger that Reagan should officially denounce the statement. Eagleburger was aware of the issue, and he assured Minić that it was the case of internal Republican Party pressures by specific East-European lobby groups that "planted a letter to Reagan" and has reminded Minić that Reagan has already made a public statement that the "internal organization of Yugoslavia is a matter for Yugoslavia and not for the USA".⁹⁴ The episode showed some discomfort over the ideological drive that underpinned future Reagan presidency regarding his attitudes towards communism, including towards Yugoslavia. The first high-level visit from the USA in that context was by Alexander Haig, the Secretary of State, in early September 1981. A short stop on Haig's European tour was meant to make a sense of the bilateral relations for both countries in post-Tito and Reagan era, and the Yugoslav side was cautiously satisfied with its results.⁹⁵

⁹² AJ, 130, 8128, SIV, Str. pov. 236/81, *Informacija o američkoj spoljnoj politici i odnosima SFRJ-SAD*, April 1981, pp. 20–21.

⁹³ Ibidem, p. 21.

⁹⁴ AJ, 507, IX, 109/V-141, Pov. br. 394/1, *Zabeleška o razgovoru člana Predsedništva CK SKJ Miloša Minića sa ambasadorom SAD u našoj zemlji L. Iglbergerom*, 23. 7. 1980.

⁹⁵ AJ, 507, IX, 109/V-152, *Informacija o zvaničnoj poseti državnog sekretara Sjedinjenih Američkih Država Alexandera Haig-a SFR Jugoslaviji 12. i 13. septembra 1981. godine*.

After the financial problems of Poland in 1981,⁹⁶ the Yugoslav economic woes got wide-spread international attention in 1982. Early and unsuccessful attempts in 1982 to secure adequate loans and roll-over facilities spilled over into domestic economic policy of the tightened budgetary expenses and the spending of already dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Belgrade also devalued the dinar in June 1980 to boost the exports and stifle imports and introduced the energy consumption rationing (which was in line with the concurrent rise of global oil prices). Still, even with these measures Yugoslavia needed around 2.5 billion dollars of financial aid from abroad to avoid formal bankruptcy. Ambassadors Eagleburger and David Anderson (in office in Belgrade from 1981) and several US bankers that were well aware of the Yugoslav situation made efforts to distinguish Yugoslav case from those of other communist countries in political and economic terms and urged for aid package, fearing that Yugoslavia could face outright rejection by the Western financial markets and governments.⁹⁷

The agreement reached with the IMF in 1982 stipulated that Belgrade should decrease its current account deficit to 0.5 billion dollars (from 2.2 billion in 1980 and 1.3 billion in 1981) and to keep the inflation rate at 15%, while it hovered around 40% over the two previous years. At that moment the commercial banks were still unwilling to provide more finance to Yugoslavia and were also very unforthcoming with rolling over the short-term overdue payments. Within such a scenario, a political step-up by the Western governments to provide necessary lending was to be expected.⁹⁸ The US policy towards Yugoslavia at the time perceived that any deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic situation might have weakened its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure.⁹⁹

From April 1982 to July 1983 the LCY was strategizing the recovery and reform measures. Through elaborate inter-committee and inter-republic meetings, the party apparatus produced a document called "The Long-Term Program of Economic Stabilisation" (LPES), whose legal instruments became law at the Federal Assembly sessions in July 1983. The LPES brought measures across the economic spectrum. It tried to enforce realistic interest rates in a non-market economy, tried to stabilize the currency by sticking to a phased

⁹⁶ Ivan T. Berend, *An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe – Economic Regimes from Laissez-Faire to Globalization*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 182–185.

⁹⁷ Ljubiša S. Adamović, Džon R. Lempi i Rasel O. Priket, op. cit., pp. 139–145.

⁹⁸ Department of the Treasury, "Eastern European and Yugoslavia's Debt Situation", Washington DC, 18. 5. 1982, p. 4.

⁹⁹ FRUS, 1981–1988, Vol. III, No. 260, *National Security Decision Directive 75*, Washington, 17. 1. 1983.

plan of dinar devaluation, it allowed for the People's Bank of Yugoslavia to assume more strict control over currency flows and (quasi)sovereign debt oversight.¹⁰⁰ It was politically critical to some elements of the Yugoslav socialist self-management system as it existed in its most-elaborated form since the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Law on the Associated Labour, the "Bible" of Yugoslav model of social ownership and free association of labour. But it offered no meaningful way out and it was almost impossible to see how it could, as the party leadership would have to endorse much more radical changes and to denounce what it saw as its prime ideological achievement. It had no capacity to do so nor the true consensus on the implementation of even enacted economic reforms, and muddling through would remain the main characteristic of the party dynamics right until its very end.

The disconnect between the party and state planning and the reality was visible in many ways. In early 1983, in the first two months the volume of imports of machinery from the convertible currency area (Western Europe, USA) was already at 48% of the volume planned for the whole year. The cap on the wages was completely circumvented, as the wages rose in the first two months by 29%. They were probably just following the hyperinflation, as the monthly inflation reached 31% in February while the official goal for the whole year was 20%. On top of that the full-blown crisis in oil (crude and refined) supply has emerged: less than half of planned imports were completed for the first trimester, with the lack of hard currency as the main cause.¹⁰¹

In September 1983 Vice-president George H. W. Bush visited Yugoslavia to reaffirm the bilateral relationship, in a broader effort to assert the American presence in this region. His main counterpart was Milka Planinc, the President of the FEC.¹⁰² He used the opportunity to explain Reagan administration's economic policies (mostly the effects of rising interest rates and new protectionist measures) which had a wider international effect. He offered general assurances of further American economic aid but without specific guarantees, leaving that to the rolling performance of both American financial capabilities and Yugoslav anti-crisis measures enacted in the summer of 1983. While he was keenly interested whether such measures would have far-reaching transformative effects on economy and its system on political management, Planinc at first refrained herself within the minutiae

¹⁰⁰ FRUS, 1981–1988, Vol. III, No. 260, *National Security Decision Directive 75*, Washington, 17. 1. 1983, pp. 138–139.

¹⁰¹ AJ, 803, 791, Predsedništvo SFRJ, Str. pov. 70/1/83, *Informacija o ocenama privrednih kretanja početkom ove godine i merama za sprovođenje rezolucije*, 11. 3. 1983.

¹⁰² AJ, 803, 790, *Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Saveznog izvršnog veća Milke Planinc sa potpredsednikom SAD Džordž Bušom*, 17. 9. 1983.

of economic problems. To his question whether the people are supportive of the restrictive economic measures, Planinc said that the real disposable income fell by 20% over the previous years and 10% in 1983 alone, and that she didn't know what government could have stayed in power with such a drop if there was no cooperation and even endurance.¹⁰³ She then elaborated that the overall idea of the anti-crisis measures was to lessen the interference of (all levels of) state into economic affairs but to increase the state's financial discipline, and to allow further exposure of Yugoslav economy to market pressures of more developed countries, in order to increase the low productivity.¹⁰⁴ Bush was very satisfied with the stated orientation of the economic measures ("a music to our ears"¹⁰⁵). While expressing the gratitude for the creation of the group of "Friends of Yugoslavia", she explained how the growing trade with the Eastern bloc and especially the Soviet Union was very favourable for Yugoslav foreign trade. While Yugoslavia suffered huge trade deficit with the West, the USSR was drawing ever more Yugoslav exports in exchange for energy and commodities that Yugoslavia lacked, while not costing Yugoslavia much in terms of hard foreign currency.

Bush's visit to Yugoslavia was a part of a three-way trip to communist countries, to Hungary and Romania as well. The trip was supposed to reconnect the USA with three communist states with which over the years more productive relations have been established, and to positively influence specific economic issues in all three of them – with the "Friends of Yugoslavia" package; with resolution of the Romanian education tax and the status of the Most Favourable Nation; and with the quieter IMF/bank effort for Hungary).¹⁰⁶ These were all in line with Reagan's newly established policy towards Eastern Europe, as stated in the National Security Decision Directive 54 of September 1982.¹⁰⁷ The primary aim was to loosen the Soviet hold onto the Eastern Europe and to facilitate its eventual reintegration into the European community, through encouraging pro-Western (in a broad sense) political diversity within Eastern European countries. The State Department's takeaway from the Bush's visit was that Yugoslavia was struggling to modernize

¹⁰³ AJ, 803, 790, *Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Saveznog izvršnog veća Milke Planinc sa potpredsednikom SAD Džordž Bušom*, 17. 9. 1983, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ Ibidem, pp. 4–5.

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ FRUS, 1981–1988, Vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, No. 172. *Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz*, Washington, 25. 10. 1983.

¹⁰⁷ National Security Decision Directive 54, "United States Policy Towards Eastern Europe", 2. 9. 1982.

its economy, with emphasis on decentralization and market forces, while its foreign policy remained independent and nonaligned. The decided course of action was that the US should continue a strong commitment to support Yugoslav independence, which at that moment required the US leadership in crafting a financial assistance package for 1984 acceptable to private banks and participating governments, as well as to the Yugoslav government.¹⁰⁸

Reagan administration decided to lend the financial support to Yugoslavia in various ways, due to its retained perception of Yugoslavia as an “important obstacle to Soviet expansionism and hegemony in Southern Europe” and “as a reminder to countries in Eastern Europe of the advantages of independence from Moscow and of the benefits of friendly relations with the West”.¹⁰⁹ The administration charted the course of broad support to Yugoslavia’s efforts to overcome the economic issues in ways that tie Yugoslavia to industrialised democracies. It wanted to continue high-level political dialogue that would encourage Yugoslavia’s “moderating role within a Nonaligned movement and to counter Cuban and Soviet influence in that organisation”. Regarding technology transfer, the administration allowed for the administrative revisions of stringent standards and in that sense will have in mind the standards it applies to Austria and Sweden (also neutral European countries). Also, Yugoslavia was able to purchase military equipment “required for their legitimate defense needs on a case-by-case basis, subject to appropriate technology safeguards and financial arrangements”.¹¹⁰

Still, at this time, the official Belgrade grew increasingly worried over several trends in international relations that it saw as detrimental to its own interests. These were the heightened tensions between the USA and the USSR due to the Soviet shoot-down of the Korean airliner in early September and the prolonged crisis of the land-based missiles deployed first by Soviets and then the Americans in Central Europe. For the renewed ideological competition, the official Belgrade put the blame more on Washington, but in general it saw signs from both superpowers that they “increase, in various ways, pressures onto the NAM and DCs [developing countries] in efforts to bring them closer to the aims of their policies”.¹¹¹ While in political terms Yugoslavia saw the

¹⁰⁸ FRUS, 1981–1988, Vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, No. 172. *Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz*, Washington, 25. 10. 1983.

¹⁰⁹ National Security Decision Directive 133, “United States Policy Toward Yugoslavia”, March 14, 1984. This directive was the specific Yugoslav follow-up of the NSDD 55 od 1982.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ AJ, 803, 790, SSIP Pov. br. 4398891, *Položaj Jugoslavije u uslovima sadašnjih međunarodnih odnosa*, October 13, 1983, p. 3.

NAM and its position within it as a prime arena of its activity, in economic terms it was clear that “in our economic relations with nonaligned and other developing countries, the stated goals are not being fulfilled” with “unfavourable regional positioning of our foreign economic relationship and high level of foreign financial and technological dependency”.¹¹²

Since the summer of 1985, Deputy Assistant Secretary John Whitehead was tasked with more activist and tailor-made approach to Eastern European countries in order to exploit the early period of changes with the “ruling elites increasingly demoralized, defensive, [...] ideological elan and corporate party identity [...] now largely dissipated” and “pragmatic ‘technocratic’ communist model of the 1970’s discredited [...] leaderships are aging and tired”.¹¹³ Whitehead had visited Yugoslavia in November 1986 on talks for rolling-over the Yugoslav debt and for signing off the new bilateral consular convention and the exchange of letters on dual citizenship. Ambassador to Yugoslavia John Scanlan later relayed to Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs that the visit was met with “very positive reactions in Washington”, that it was “very successful”, even on the topics of international terrorism.¹¹⁴ The issue was the one of hijacking of Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) in October 1985. In the immediate aftermath of the hijacking, the PLF leader Abu Abbas was given safe passage through Yugoslavia (among other countries), to much consternation of the Western public and of the USA, whose citizen was killed by the hijackers.¹¹⁵ Even George P. Schultz’s visit to Yugoslavia in December was dominated by the consequences of these events and public spats with Yugoslav officials.¹¹⁶

Yugoslav economy scored a symbolical export breakthrough when a Yugo car, manufactured by *Crvena zastava* from Kragujevac, went into sales on the US market in early 1985 through a Yugo America JV company. It was marketed as a cheapest new car in the USA and by 1992 some 140.000 models were sold. As many large enterprises in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, *Crvena zastava*

¹¹² AJ, 803, 790, SSIP Pov. br. 4398891, *Položaj Jugoslavije u uslovima sadašnjih međunarodnih odnosa*, October 13, 1983, p. 5.

¹¹³ FRUS, 1981–1988, Vol. I, No. 311, *Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs*, Washington, undated.

¹¹⁴ AJ, 803, 928, SSIP, Pov. br. 566/2, *Iz zabeleške o razgovoru PSS D. Štrpca sa ambasadorom SAD u SFRJ Dž. Skenlonom, 4. decembra 1987. godine*, 8. 12. 1987.

¹¹⁵ Gus Martin (Ed.), *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, SAGE, London, 2011, pp 52–53.

¹¹⁶ “Fiery Shultz Slams Yugoslavia Action”, *Chicago Tribune*, December 19, 1985. Available from: <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1985-12-19-8503280191-story.html> (Accessed 19 October 2022).

was under political pressure to bring in hard currency from the exports so the state could use it to repay the sovereign debt, covering it up with dinars and constantly creating inflationary pressures. But it was not all politics. For *Crvena zastava*, declining domestic demand due to ongoing crisis and the saturation of European markets made the US market a somewhat interesting opportunity. Necessary changes on the model destined for export also meant that the established higher quality control had a positive spillover for the manufacturing process at large and for the domestic consumers as well.¹¹⁷

Through the complex of difficult economic situation and prolonged political stalemate in Yugoslavia, bouts of both optimism and pessimism were expressed by US Ambassador David Anderson in his talk with Serbian party leader Ivan Stambolić. He remarked that “if there was one thing that I’ve learned during my multi-year stay in Yugoslavia, it is that however your situation is politically and economically complex and difficult, you Yugoslavs have a depth and refinement to overcome many crises”.¹¹⁸ “However”, he added, “I have a reservation regarding transfer of power onto your republics. I think you went too far with it and that Yugoslavia is not economically integrated enough to be competitive with its products on the foreign market. If that part of the equation does not change and if the disintegration of Yugoslavia continues with the economic empowerment of republics, it will be difficult to continue with your country’s economic development. The time is now for Yugoslavia to make an economic leap and enters the XXI century”. “You see,” he ended, “I still don’t know why the Yugoslav worker works better in Germany than in his own home”.¹¹⁹

YUGOSLAVIA’S FINAL YEARS

While the slower growth of imports in comparison to exports in 1980-1988 period did help to stabilize the current account deficit, combined with the rather slow growth of export it led to the slowdown in industry and even to a decline in 1987–88.¹²⁰ This almost ten-year period of restrictively managed trade led to the fall of Yugoslav trade share in overall global trade, from 0.90% of global exports in 1979 to 0.47% in 1988. The strong focus on the

¹¹⁷ Ranka Gašić, *Jugoslovenski Detroit: automobilska industrija u Kragujevcu 1953–1991*, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 2017, pp. 172–184.

¹¹⁸ AJ, 507, IX, 109/V-194, *Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika CK SK Srbije Ivana Stambolića sa ambasadorom SAD u SFRJ Dejvidom Andersonom*, 13. 6. 1985.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ AJ, 130, 10031, 12, 336-7/90, SSIP, *Izveštaj o realizaciji robne razmene sa inostranstvom u 1989. godini*, februar 1990.

export to convertible currency markets has yielded some results in terms of orientation of Yugoslav exports, as its share rose from 0.25% of their overall imports in 1979 to 0.31% in 1988.¹²¹ The rolling reforms under the latter half of the Branko Mikulić's FEC in 1988 and 1989 have introduced the closing of loss-making companies (adding to the unemployment levels and pressuring the social security system), slow and fragmented release of control of some prices and wages that were previously introduced. And all that in agreement with the IMF to keep the standby programs still rolling, as in 1987 Yugoslavia reached a peak of its financial crisis.

In 1989–90 Yugoslavia was clearly a country of second-tier importance in the Western interest over the collapsing communism in the Eastern Europe and the changes across the bloc division.¹²² That was true both for the US as well as for the EEC and more relevant West European capitals. If it could have pulled off a combination of reasonable political and economic reforms in line with the newly forming mainstream – that is, to a capitalist liberal democracy – it would have gotten more positive attention. Being outside of the Soviet bloc also made sure that any problems in Yugoslavia were not truly Europe-wide, would not touch upon the most sensitive security issues (nuclear posture and proliferation) nor endanger the said forming mainstream. The US (and the EEC for that matter) differentiated approach meant that the tangible support would come only to those forces that could truly push and deliver results. Mostly because of structural and institutional reasons, the federal government was not in such a position despite making what seemed to be reasonable appeals to Washington (and Brussels).

As the new chairman of the FEC since March 1989, Ante Marković went to official visit to the US in October 1989 and met with President George H. W. Bush in the White House. Bush had reaffirmed American support for Yugoslav independence, unity, and sovereignty Marković's commitment to market-oriented economic reform and of building democratic pluralism throughout Yugoslavia. Marković was looking for 1 billion dollars for transformation of Yugoslavia's banking system and for World Bank's loan of 300-350 million dollars.¹²³ But Marković's emphasis to the American public was that the focus was on the overall support and on the money itself, he was trying to raise the image of Yugoslav companies trying to do business in the US, and he was also

¹²¹ AJ, 130, 10031, 12, 336-7/90, SSIP, *Izveštaj o realizaciji robne razmene sa inostranstvom u 1989. godini*, februar 1990.

¹²² Milan Igrutinović, „Zapadna Evropa i raspad Jugoslavije”, u: *Građanski rat u Hrvatskoj*, Udruženje Srba u Hrvatskoj, Belgrade, 2013, pp. 78–92.

¹²³ “Bush Meets With Yugoslav Prime Minister”, *AP News*, October 13, 1989. Available from: <https://apnews.com/article/827481841e71c573f509016b542a5306> (Accessed 19 October 2022).

competing for attention with other European communist countries that have embarked on pro-market reforms (Hungary and Poland). What he got out of the visit was political support for the transformative push for the Yugoslav market integration with the emphasis on the commercial banking reform through the introduction of market mechanisms (money markets, bonds, stocks etc), on the SME financing schemes, on reform of tax system and of the public accounting system. The support was supposed to come through the mix of financial aid and expert and technical advice, and in conjuncture with ongoing project with the World Bank that had approved the loan.¹²⁴

In December 1989 the FEC pushed through the Federal Assembly the reform package¹²⁵ that envisioned dinar convertibility, monetary and fiscal policies (flexible pegging to the German mark at the 7:1 ratio, bringing down the inflation, free formation of prices besides utilities and communal and infrastructural services), and for the first time after 1945 a right of private ownership over means of production (through restrictive rights of the workers in a given enterprise to initiate the process of privatizing the public ownership). The effect of cumulative measures had a reasonable success in 1990: retail prices inflation dropped from 1700% in 1989 to 130% in 1990, and the overall supply of goods became much better thus alleviating the demand pressure. But, the federal government had to devalue the dinar once again in December 1990 (to 9 dinars for 1 German mark) and to limit the withdrawals of hard currency from the country. Following up on the demise of the LCY in the spring of 1990, Markovic launched a Yugoslav political platform which, in economic terms, fully embraced pro-market reforms and privatization ('from below', by the workers of any given enterprise). But that was too late as elections in Slovenia and Croatia had already brought new and non-communist parties with nationalist agenda, and for various reasons, he suffered defeats in other republics' elections by the end of the 1990, and no federal multi-party election were held by the time of the state collapse in late 1991.¹²⁶

By late 1990 domestic dynamics has consumed all the political attention both within Yugoslavia and internationally. The process of multi-party elections gave rise to the non-communist and reformed or quasi-reformed communists, complicating internal discussions on the common ways out of the crises. These crises were starting to coalesce around the issues of national/

¹²⁴ AJ, 130, 9718, 336-35/89, *Predlozi identifikacije ključnih segmenata i konkretnog načina organizacije, primene i realizacije ponuđene pomoći SAD*, 18. 12. 1989.

¹²⁵ György Simon, Jr, op. cit., p. 62.

¹²⁶ Josip Glaurdić, Vladimir Filipović and Christophe Lesschaeve, "The Failure of 'Yugoslavia's Last Chance': Ante Marković and his Reformists in the 1990 Elections", *Nationalities Papers*, 2022, pp. 1–20.

ethnic rights, plans and perspectives, a mixture that became explosive in 1991. Federal structures remained the main interlocutors for foreign actors, and Marković was in that sense a favourite in the West, but their/his leverages of power were quickly disappearing.

The last agreement reached between the IMF and Yugoslavia (March 1990) for over 1 billion dollars for the support of the reforms of price policies, wage control and dinar's exchange rate, was used only up to 1/3 as the internal political struggle also meant that hardly any compromises could be made amongst the republics which had to sign-off most of the FEC policies.¹²⁷

The last meeting between two heads of state – Bush and in Yugoslav case Borisav Jović, rotating chairman of the Presidency, from Serbia, happened in New York on 1 October 1990. Bush opened the talk reiterating the US support for “united Yugoslavia” and “government's political and economic reform”, brushing aside as irrelevant his short meeting with newly elected Croatian president Franjo Tuđman who was touring the US in September. He also raised the issue of violations of individual human rights in Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, while noting that the relations of “one group over another [...] that is not the business of the US”. Jović thanked him for the “staunch stand in support of Yugoslavia”. He then spoke favourable of the economic results in 1990 in terms of stabilized balance of payments, currency, servicing of foreign debt, but also spoke of the problems, that the industry was 10% on an annual basis due to the relaxation of import policies, and the effects of Iraq's war in Kuwait. On political topics he elaborated how the multiparty system mostly led to national-based parties with rising separatism in republics and that the disintegrative pressure is growing. On Bush's question what can America do more, “have we been too quiet?” [in overall support to Yugoslavia], Jović answered that “the U.S. spoke clearly about a unified Yugoslavia but didn't distinguish democratic processes and disintegrative processes [...] [In Kosovo] we say yes to human rights, no to secession. In Slovenia, we say yes for democracy but not secession”. Jović used the opportunity to ask for a high-level visit from the US to Yugoslavia, either from Bush or Baker. And at the end, on the issue of Yugoslav repair works on Iraqi MiG fighters per standing contract, Jović said that “everything is frozen, and nothing will happen on this contract”.¹²⁸

In November 1990, Bush signed into law on foreign aid for 1991 with a congressional amendment (the Nickles amendment) that barred bilateral

¹²⁷ György Simon, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹²⁸ “Meeting with President Jovic of Yugoslavia, Memorandum of Conversation”, October 1, 1990, New York, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum. Available at: <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memcons-telcons/1990-10-01--Jovic.pdf> (Accessed on 20 December 2022).

assistance to Yugoslavia and requiring U.S. representatives to oppose loans to Yugoslavia by international financial institutions unless all six of the country's republics had held free and fair multiparty elections and none was engaged in a pattern of gross violations of human rights.¹²⁹ In a way, the Washington was sending two different messages. One was from the White House and State Department that they supported the integrity of Yugoslavia and following it up with the desire for democratization of the whole country. The second was from Congress, which started to distinguish between six of the republics and build bridges with those that, in the view of Congress, took the path of internal de-communization and 'soft' relationship with other republics, without much reference to whether through such processes Yugoslavia could survive as a country.

Seven months after conversation with Jović, and in vastly different circumstances (Slovenian independence referendum has gone through in December 1990, conflict between Croatian police units and armed Serbs has started in earnest, federal institutions have been almost completely pushed aside while the YPA became increasingly involved in the internal combat, the Presidency itself failed to rotate the chairmanship on May 15 etc) Bush had a phone conversation with Marković on 20 May 1991. He was offering public political support for Marković: "If you are able to strengthen your role and fill this dangerous void of authority through constitutional means, you will have our support". Marković was thankful and was keen to present the state of affairs as under control with the crisis still ongoing: "we are continuing discussions in an effort to find a constitutional, democratic resolution of the problems facing us". Bush was talking about the ways that international community could help in that regard, while Marković reiterated the call for Baker's visit. He then raised the issue of the Nickles amendment, he lobbied that at least the US green-lights the arrival of the IMF mission for discussion on the new stand-by arrangement, but Bush was non-comital and blamed Serbia for violations of human rights of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija province for allowing the provision to remain in effect.¹³⁰

James Baker's short visit to Yugoslavia – decided upon in the last minute and as a detour of his trip to Albania after a CSCE summit in Berlin – on June 21 was a quick succession of meetings with federal and republic's officials, and with a formal nod to the preservation of unity through a message that

¹²⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Report on Yugoslavia 1992*. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/HSW-08.htm> (Accessed on 20 December 2022).

¹³⁰ "Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ante Markovic of Yugoslavia", Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, May 20, 1991, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum. Available at: <https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/memconstelcons/1991-05-20--Markovic.pdf> (Accessed on 20 December 2022).

the USA (and CSCE for that matter) “would assist Yugoslavia in its efforts to transform itself economically and politically if it did so peacefully and consensually. But to complement this positive message, we also needed to deliver a negative signal, to try to shock the various republic leaders into accepting two basic realities: that they needed to negotiate their differences, not act unilaterally; and that under no circumstances would the international community tolerate the use of force”.¹³¹ Nothing really came out of this visit. It was, in effect, a show of loss of interest, and with no hard preferences with committed political and economic resources at the moment of Yugoslavia terminal phase.

CONCLUSION

Looking holistically at bilateral relation in the 1945–1992 period, we could divide it into three very uneven periods. In 1945–1948 relations were based on ideological animosity that was the staple of the Cold War in Europe. The Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948 had fundamentally changed that, and all the way up to the 1990/91 period we can look as a single but long and winding road of fairly close, cordial and productive relations of two countries with vastly different political systems. We tried to trace the path of economic relations, rooted in various civilian and military aid programs in 1950s and partly 1960s, and their evolution into more market-oriented relations that were, nevertheless, anchored in wider political understanding.

The US aid was instrumental in relieving the dire situation in Yugoslavia in 1950s, offering credible military means of self-defence and critically important food imports, technology transfers and direct monetary support. The 1950s were the era of highest growth of Yugoslav economy, partly because of the very low base but surely due to the US aid.

The US was instrumental in aiding economic reforms in 1960s, and in humanitarian relief after the Skopje earthquake in 1963. Two countries found a way to evolve their relationship with respect to their changing interests, with some hick-ups along the way but never with a break in relations. For long time, the fundamentals stayed the same: Yugoslavia was not a conduit of Soviet power directly, as that power ended on Danube and not on the Adriatic, and the importance of Western markets as sources of finance and technology for Yugoslavia was always clear to Belgrade.

Despite those strategic bonds between the US foreign policy and Yugoslavia's position, as a communist country Yugoslavia was clearly on the

¹³¹ James A. Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The politics of diplomacy: revolution, war and peace, 1989–1992*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1995, p. 479.

losing side of the economic competition between two systems that produced ever more visible results in the 1980s. And its overall economic path since the 1960s was a only a variation of the broader processes in European communist economies. Low efficiency of domestic investment – a systemic issue for both Yugoslav self-management and East European state-managed economy – from both foreign and domestic sources, slow and structurally underdeveloped exports that did not increase Yugoslav's trade with the globalizing economy, rising unemployment (over 15% in a political system that promised permanent full employment as a feature of the communist rule), and the external factors – two oil shocks and a sharp rise in interest rates of foreign loans, had, in hindsight, a crippling effect on the Eurocommunism and Yugoslavia as well.

Four federal cabinets presided over the decade of crisis in the 1980s, through which only foreign financial aid in forms of loans and debt restructuring have kept the country solvent. And successively, these cabinets faced increasing domestic political challenges across the spectrum: ethno-nationalism, challenges to constitutional order (democratic requests for free speech and political organizations apart from the communist party, Serbia's decade-long complaints about its own constitutional arrangements with its two province), party apparatus' monumental difficulty to find within itself a stable majority for even modest reforms.

The end of Cold War spelled the end for socialist Yugoslavia too. Eventually, the country as a whole could not make a turn towards democracy and capitalism and fell out of the emerging European mainstream that was so strongly shaped by the United States.

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Serbia – US Relations in the Two Decades Since the Democratic Changes

Abstract

The paper analyzes relations between Serbia and the US which went through several phases: the phase of rising cooperation (2000–2004), the phase of both cooperation and worsening (2005–2008), the phase of cooling and silent confrontation (2008–2010), the phase of mild recovery, routinization and moderate distancing of the US from the region (2010–2017), the phase of the unsuccessful attempt of the US to lead the mediation process in the dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina (2018–2020). The central problem in mutual relations was caused by the leading role of the USA in encouraging and recognizing the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, which led to a cooling of relations. In spite of this, the previously achieved forms of cooperation did not suffer. After the adoption of the joint text of the resolution of Serbia and the EU countries on Kosovo and Metohija in the UN General Assembly (2010), relations between Serbia and the US improved. Relations between the two countries became routinized except for the brief period of the last two years of the Trump presidency. Since then, the US has returned to its role of supporting the EU integration process of the region as well as EU efforts to mediate in the Beograd – Prishtina dialogue.

Keywords:

International relations, USA, Serbia

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INTRODUCTION

The relations between Serbia and the USA in the previous two decades took place in the context of major events that had deep and lasting consequences for both countries¹.

In the US, the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, triggered US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, neither of which came close to achieving set goals. The financial crisis of 2008, which threw the whole world into recession, undermined the credibility of the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism which had served as a model for a significant number of countries up to that point.

Combining the effects of these events, the first decade of the 21st century cannot be rated as particularly favorable for the US. Since then, the leaning to unilateralism in international relations present in the Bush administration became the central feature of US foreign policy under the Trump administration. This has led to a perception of the US as a major revisionist and destabilizing power in terms of the post WWII established international order, paradoxically the very order that the US had a major role in shaping. Only this year's Russian aggression on the Ukraine has somewhat mitigated this perception.

In the post-Milošević era, Serbia returned to international institutions and had struggled to alleviate the devastating consequences of the isolation and wars of the 1990's. There was a significant increase in the standard of living. The inevitable process of transition was undertaken. On the foreign policy front, a clear commitment to achieving full membership in the EU was proclaimed enduring as a priority in official policy statements of all Serbian governments to this day. The referendum in Montenegro resulted in its independence in 2006, thus putting an end to the joint state with Serbia. In 2003, Serbia's prime minister Djindjić was assassinated. This shock

¹ There is hardly any literature on relations between the two countries covering the indicated period. An exception was the published master's thesis of Aleksandra Joksimović, *Srbija i SAD – bilateralni odnosi u tranziciji*, Krug komerc, 2007. For the analysis of the relationship between Serbia and the USA in the previous period (from literature in the Serbian language), two books by Živorad Kovačević – *SAD i jugoslovenska kriza*, Centar za antiratnu akciju, Beograd, 2000, and *Amerika i raspad Jugoslavije*, Filip Višnjić, Belgrade, 2007 are significant. See also, Ivan Vujačić „Sjedinjene Američke Države – Mene u odnosima” in Borivoje Erdeljan (editor), *Srbija i Svet*, Evropski pokret u Srbiji, Beograd, 2010, pp. 17–23; Ivan Vujačić, „Odnosi Srbije i SAD u periodu 2002–2012. Novi početak i nasleđe prošlosti”, in the collection of papers: Dragan Simić, Dragan Živojinović (editors), *Politika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država prema regionu zapadnog Balkana i Republici Srbiji*, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, 2015, pp. 207–219, ISBN 987-86-6425-003-0.

was followed by violent riots of Albanians in Kosovo aimed against the Serb minority population in 2004. In 2008, after negotiations organized by the international community, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence and was immediately recognized by the US and EU countries save five member states. Since then Serbia had achieved candidate status for EU membership (in 2012) and opened the process of negotiations in 2014. As the rest of the region it has not achieved much in this process. Since that time there has been a huge erosion of democracy, rule of law, media freedom and independence of institutions as measured by all independent European or American institutions that monitor developments in these areas.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SERBIA AND THE US IN THE 2000–2020 PERIOD

Relations between Serbia and the US have gone through several phases during the previous two decades. These phases are not strictly demarcated, but should be understood more as analytical labels, the reason being that in international relations often conflicting processes take place simultaneously. In other words, these phases should be seen as distinct in the sense that they highlight the basic and dominant characteristics of the relationship between the two countries, rather than the relationship as a whole. Historians of the relations between the two countries may have a different view of these phases, but from today's perspective, this demarcation seems to me to be well founded. These phases are as follows :

1. Phase of the rise of cooperation and upward swing in relations (2000–2004).
2. Phase of cooperation and simultaneous worsening (2005–2008).
3. Phase of cooling off and quiet confrontation (2008–2010).
4. Phase of mild recovery, routinization and a slight distancing of the US from the region (2010–2017).
5. Phase of the US attempt to restore the dominant role in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (2017–2020).
6. Phase of return to previous mode of support to EU efforts in the region.

The phase of the rise of cooperation and upward swing in relations (2000–2004)

In the first phase, the desire to normalize relations and raise cooperation to a higher level was dominant. Normalization in this context meant overcoming the legacy of the 1990's. The favorable atmosphere for the improvement of cooperation was further strengthened by the fact that new leaders elected in both countries were not personally burdened by past events (i.e. the

bombing of Serbia and the breaking of diplomatic relations). In the US, the new leadership had not participated in the making of foreign policy decisions during the period of armed confrontation. Considering the manner in which the Milosevic regime fell, it is obvious that no one in the new leadership in Serbia had participated in the decisions that had led to military confrontation.

The significant write-off of the Paris Club debt and the support in international financial institutions were the first major moves by the US that were directed both towards helping the alleviation of postwar conditions in Serbia and opening the possibilities for cooperation at a higher level. Solving the problem of unfreezing company funds and the frozen funds of the National Bank of Yugoslavia was somewhat a more complicated task due to different interests, potential legal snags and interpretations. Company funds were unfrozen in late 2002, although certain bureaucratic procedures remained. However, the funds of the National Bank of Yugoslavia remained frozen, primarily due to the objections of some former Yugoslav republics. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2003, these problems were also overcome thanks to the decisive attitude of the American administration, which released the frozen funds and distributed them according to the formula previously defined by the International Monetary Fund. This decision was purposefully and undoubtedly in favor of Serbia and Montenegro.

The status of a nation that threatens the national interests of the US was abolished by a decree of President Bush in the spring of 2003. At approximately the same time, a presidential decree lifted the ban on arms exports to Serbia and Montenegro, effectively removing the country from the list of so-called "rouge states". Various legal complications and their interpretations made it difficult to restore Normal Trade Relations, until the fall of 2003. In the fall of 2004, the country was granted the Generalized Scheme of Preferences, which enabled the export of around 4,000 products from Serbia and Montenegro to the US without customs duties. This phase is also significant for the largest influx of American investments into Serbia. The arrival of US Steel, BAT and Philip Morris, to mention only the more prominent companies of American origin, made them the largest foreign investors in Serbia during that period.

During this period, a Serbian Caucus was formed, for the first time, in the US Congress, which enriched the content of the relations between the two countries and gave them a new quality. A large number of staff members of various congressmen, as well as five senators, visited Serbia in November 2004. It was an important event in the building of Serbia's relationship with the US legislative branch. Since a negative image prevailed for many years, the formation of the caucus significantly contributed to the significant improvement of Serbia's image on Capitol Hill.

However, there were also major problems that were related to the lack of progress in cooperation with the Hague Tribunal for war crimes committed in Yugoslavia. Official US aid was conditioned by the US Congress on certification by the US Secretary of State that the cooperation of Serbia with

the Hague Tribunal was meeting the highest standards. At certain times this led to suspension of aid. The problem was overcome by raising the level of cooperation with the Tribunal. However, the US never used its influence in the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank in order to exert additional pressure on Serbia.

The tragic murder of Prime Minister Đinđić in March 2003 was greatly regretted and caused concern in the US administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell, upon his arrival in Belgrade at the beginning of the war in Iraq, personally expressed his condolences to his family and offered support to the Serbian government, expressing the readiness of the US to support the foreign policy goals and internal stability of Serbia. This support was also manifested by the invitation to the Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Živković, to visit Washington, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Goran Svilanović. The following year, the newly elected President of Serbia, Boris Tadić was also welcomed in Washington.

In March 2004, violence broke out in Kosovo aimed at the Serbian minority living there as well as Christian Orthodox churches and monasteries. Regardless of the robust reaction of the American troops, significant weaknesses in the coordination and reaction of KFOR units became obvious. Among the Serbs in Kosovo there arose serious mistrust regarding the credibility of the international community's role in providing for their security and the protection of their rights. A consequence of these Albanian led riots was that the US reassessed its original policy of insisting on reaching standards on human and minority rights before the negotiations on the status of Kosovo were to commence. The policy described as standards before status, was transformed to a policy of standards and status. Shortly, it went through another metamorphosis becoming a policy of status and standards, thus radically reversing the order of priorities of the original policy.

This period should be assessed as the most successful in terms of advancing the relations between the two countries since democratic changes in Serbia. In a short period, trust was restored which enabled potential cooperation in a number of sectors that were previously unavailable.

The phase of cooperation and simultaneous worsening of relations (2005–2008)

In the period from 2005 to 2008 cooperation was enhanced in several areas. Firstly, Serbia's cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was stable and more than adequate. This resulted in the admission of Serbia to the Partnership for Peace at the end of 2006, a goal of all governments since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 2000. Thanks to the admission to the Partnership for Peace, military cooperation became both broader and deeper and has steadily advanced till this very day. Military cooperation was institutionalized through the partnership of the Serbian Army with the National Guard of Ohio.

Also, during this period, Belgrade and Chicago became sister cities, and Serbia and Illinois became sister states. These arrangements provide numerous opportunities for cooperation that have unfortunately not been sufficiently used to date.

In spite of these achievements, relations were overshadowed by the commencement and the conclusion of the negotiations on the status of Kosovo. The negotiations were largely initiated and conducted in formats designed by the US. Regardless of Serbia's intense diplomatic activity, and that at the highest level – Serbian President Boris Tadić and Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica were on a working visit to the US – it became obvious that the negotiations were structured in a way that guaranteed their failure and would lead to a unilateral declaration of independence. Moreover, the US had become the chief promoter of the independence of the Republic of Kosovo. For reasons of space US motives for adopting this policy and promoting it with vigour cannot be discussed here. Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in February 2008 and was quickly recognized by the US and all but five members of the EU, with more countries following somewhat later.

This US policy necessarily led to the cooling of relations and the turning of the leadership of Serbia towards finding other points of support, primarily, but not only, in the Russian Federation. As the Russian Federation felt stronger towards the end of this period and had significantly cooled relations with the US, to the Serbian leadership it appeared as a possible guarantee, not without grounds, that the status of Kosovo would remain unresolved within the UN Security Council and that Kosovo's aspiration of becoming a member of the UN would be indefinitely blocked. This gave some hope to the Serbian leadership that at some point it would be possible to renew the negotiations on the status of Kosovo that would lead to a more acceptable solution.

This phase of the relations between the two countries was extremely beneficial and would probably have been considered most successful had it not been for the negotiations on the final status of Kosovo that ended with the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo.

The phase of cooling off and silent confrontation (2008–2010)

In this phase, there was a quiet confrontation although neither country officially named it as such. On the contrary, the common American phrase of "agreeing to disagree" was gladly accepted in order to avoid aggravating relations.

The confrontation was a consequence of Serbia's diplomatic struggle with the aim of limiting the number of countries that would recognize Kosovo's declared independence. A Serbian campaign for a new resolution in the UN General Assembly denying the right to unilateral secession ensued. In the opinion of the Serbian leadership this would potentially lead to a new

negotiation at some point. The confrontation was not only with the USA, but in an even quieter form with the leading countries of the European Union. Greater hopes for the possibility of continuing partial negotiations stemmed from the absence of a unified EU position due to the refusal of five member states to recognize the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo.

The opinion of the International Court of Justice on the issue of legitimacy of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, which was announced in the summer of 2010, was unfavorable for Serbia. However, it should be kept in mind that the opinion of the ICJ could not be legally binding given the nature of this particular case. In other words, the opinion of the ICJ was unfavorable from a purely political point of view. The hope for a favorable outcome was linked to the strategy of mitigating the conflict with the US and leading EU countries, while placing the problem in the international institutional framework. The goal was to gain time in order to gather support for actions within the framework of the United Nations to condemn the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence in a less heated atmosphere.

Estimating that the vote in the UN General Assembly on the text of the Serbian resolution would be uncertain, the leading EU countries focused on diplomatic pressure on Serbia on a bilateral basis. In August 2010, the foreign ministers of Great Britain and Germany visited Belgrade in order to secure the withdrawal of the Serbian resolution. This was not difficult to achieve as Serbia was determined to apply for candidate status in the EU in the immediate future. The turn in Serbia's policy was manifested by the withdrawal of its own version of the resolution in the UN General Assembly and its support, at the last minute, of the EU version of the resolution on Kosovo. Furthermore, an agreement to a dialogue on technical issues with Prishtina was reached.

The visit of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in October 2010, took place in a significantly better atmosphere than the one during the visit of US Vice President Joseph Biden in 2009. The atmosphere of the visit radiated optimism regarding the relationship between the two countries, with the emphasis on the US's support for Serbia's aspirations towards European integration. In other words, this phase ended with a renunciation of a direct (albeit quiet) confrontation with the USA and leading EU countries regarding Kosovo. However, Serbia simultaneously and firmly maintained its position of nonrecognition of Kosovo while maintaining institutional ties with Serbian municipalities in Kosovo and opening a dialogue on technical issues. All this meant that the EU would take the leading role in the Belgrade – Prishtina dialogue. This became the starting point of the fourth phase.

At the same time, the foreign policy orientation and position of Serbia underwent a fundamental transformation. There was a shift to a greater reliance on the Russian Federation, a closer relationship with Turkey and the gradual strengthening of relations with China. They would all increase their influence in the following years.

The phase of mild recovery, routinization and slight distancing of the USA from the region (2010–2017)

The description of this phase should not mislead. Not everything went smoothly in the relations between the two countries. There were serious frictions. The aggravation of the conflict at the Jarinje and Brnjak administrative crossings between Serbia and Kosovo, demonstrations, barricades, the burning of the Jarinje border crossing and the murder of a Kosovo police officer in the spring and summer of 2011 caused a new strain in relations with the USA and leading EU countries. The perception of the EU and the US that the Serbian government was partially behind the blocking of the crossings and that it was signaling that some kind of partition of Kosovo could be on the table, contributed to a certain delay in the restoration of better relations.

One should always keep in mind the special interest of the US in the stability of the region and especially of Kosovo. The American role during the Milošević era, NATO bombing, involvement in the period of peacekeeping and finally and an *a priori* strong support for the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, makes the USA feel responsible for the fate of Kosovo, primarily in terms of ensuring peace and stability. Kosovo was largely created by the political and military involvement of the US, so in a certain way it represents a partial test of the success of the policy of several American administrations.

This phase is characterized by a slight distancing of the US from the region, leaving the primary role to the EU. The major goal of US foreign policy in the Western Balkans region could be reduced to stability based on a long-term strategic vision of “Europe as whole, free and at peace”.² Thus, the EU became the driver of both the integration process of the Western Balkans into the EU, but also the chief mediator in the Belgrade – Prishtina dialogue.

In August 2011, during her visit to Belgrade, Angela Merkel, reacting to the aforementioned unclear signals from Belgrade and the tension that prevailed around the border crossings, ultimately demanded the dismantling of parallel institutions in the parts of Kosovo that were not controlled by the authorities in Prishtina. The stalemate in the dialogue on these topics and the lack of progress in relations with Prishtina resulted in the refusal of the EU to grant Serbia the status of a candidate for full membership in December 2011. The decision was postponed until March 2012, when Serbia finally received this status, but without a date for the start of negotiations.

The linking of the EU integration process of Serbia to the results of the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue became a method of exerting influence. With the

² The first formulation of this doctrine can be found in a speech by George HW Bush held in Mainz on May 31, 1989. The text of the speech can be accessed at <http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm>

ascent of the Serbian Progressive Party to power, this method gained intensity. For a constructive approach in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and the signing of the Brussels Agreement, which at least on paper claimed to resolve a whole series of issues between Belgrade and Prishtina, Serbia was rewarded by opening the process of negotiations on full membership. In order to institutionalize this linkage, Serbia's integration process acquired a special new chapter (no. 35) which includes a legally binding agreement between Belgrade and Prishtina as a prerequisite for completing Serbia's accession to full membership.

All this means that by the end of 2017, the relations between the US and Serbia have become stable and routine. The disagreement over Kosovo has been pushed to the background, and all previously established forms of cooperation include excellent military cooperation through a partnership with the Ohio National Guard, a general system of preferences in trade that is regularly renewed, cooperation in the fight against terrorism and international organized crime, cooperation with the Serbian caucus in the US Congress and many others, have become part of the daily routine cooperation between the two countries. In the meantime, Prime Minister Vučić visited the US in June and September 2015, as well as in July 2017 as the president of Serbia. Both times he had conversations, aside of those in the administration and Congress, with the vice presidents of the US, Biden and Pence.

The phase of the US attempt to regain a dominant role in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue (2018–2020)

In the second half of US President Trump's term, there was a new type of involvement of the US in the Western Balkans. This was prompted both by an impasse in the Belgrade – Prishtina dialogue and the specific transactional approach to international politics of the Trump administration.

After the freezing of negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina, following the introduction of prohibitive taxes by Prishtina (Haradinaj government) on imports from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU demonstrated a total lack of leverage in getting Kosovo to comply with the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) rules of which it is a member. Furthermore, it was powerless to rekindle the dialogue frozen by Serbia in protest over this unilateral action by Prishtina.

The Trump administration not only put open pressure on Pristina to cancel taxes and continue the dialogue, but threatened to downgrade relations and withdraw support in the area of security. Furthermore, the US appointed two special envoys for the region. Matthew Palmer was appointed as special envoy of the Secretary of State for the Balkans, while Richard Grenell was appointed as a special envoy of the President for the dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina. It became obvious that the White House had taken

control of the dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina not only from the EU, but from the State Department as well.

The rhetoric was also transformed with a call for “creative solutions” as a basis for a permanent agreement. Moreover, the appointment of John Bolton, who was once an opponent of the recognition of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, to the position of national security advisor to the president, created expectations that a permanent solution between Belgrade and Prishtina could be reached by a direct agreement between president Vučić and Thaci. This fit perfectly into the transactional approach to international relations as applied by the Trump administration in numerous international settings. In Serbia, *demarcation* became the new term used for a permanent settlement between Belgrade and Prishtina. This ambiguous term used by Vučić was intentionally left undefined, but an informed observer could easily assume that it meant a partial land swap between Serbia and Kosovo. Consequently, there was speculation that the European Commission had dropped its opposition to changing existing borders.

In retrospect, it is obvious that the US administration had encouraged the two sides to come to what seemed to them to be an acceptable solution and then submit this to the US administration for consideration. It seems that the European Commission also toyed with the idea under the leadership of Federica Mogherini - the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the time, although this was never officially commented on. Among the EU member states there were various reactions to this type of thinking – from tacitly supportive and agnostic to vehemently opposed. There was a general opposition to “border adjustments” of this sort among the countries of the Western Balkans. To counter US initiatives, the European Council quickly appointed Miroslav Lajcak as EU Special Representative for the Belgrade–Prishtina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues (in April 2020). Furthermore, Germany forcefully objected to any options that would involve any kind of border changes. This momentarily put the issue to rest.

To avoid further rifts with the EU in finding a lasting solution within the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue, the Trump administration shifted to supposedly economic issues. This engagement ended with the signing of what has been called the Washington Agreement in September 2020, later described as the Kosovo and Serbia economic normalization agreements. In effect, the whole affair is a misnomer as in reality what was signed was a letter of intent by each party in the presence of the US president. Some provisions had to do with resources in Kosovo, others with future investment in infrastructure, while still others had to do with subjects totally unrelated to the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. These included a range of subjects from relations between Israel and Kosovo, moving the embassy of Serbia to Jerusalem, removing 5G equipment from mobile networks provided by what was termed “untrusted vendors”, designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and supporting

the decriminalization of homosexuality around the world and a few others that not only do not have anything to do with the relation between Serbia and Kosovo, but are also totally unrelated subjects amongst themselves. In short, not only can the signed documents not be called an agreement, but will serve as a unique example of a diplomatic document that is fit for a parody on diplomatic agreements. There is no need to elaborate further on the nature of this document, as most of its elements have gone to the wayside in the meantime.

This whole endeavor was an unnecessary waste of time and energy. The US should not have encouraged the parties to search for solutions that were unacceptable to the EU. In other words, without securing the principled support of the EU and leading EU countries for changing the parameters and principles of negotiations, these negotiations, even under the leadership of the US, were doomed to failure. The leaders of Serbia and Kosovo should have shown a profound lack of realism in assessing the prospects for the success of such negotiations.

The EU, with the support of France and Germany, returned mediation in the dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina to its fold. Setting the pace in these talks did not lead to a solution, but it did exclude the US from further independent initiatives on this front. By doing so, implicitly, along with explicit diplomatic phrases about working together with the US to solve the open problems between Belgrade and Prishtina, the EU quite sharply deprived the US of the leading and dominant role in the dialogue. This put an end to this phase.

CONCLUSION – BACK TO THE FUTURE

The defeat of Trump in his bid for reelection and the election of Biden in 2020, came as relief to the vast majority of EU leaders given the unpredictability and tumultuous relations that they had experienced with the Trump administration.

It is obvious that the Biden administration is more supportive of EU policy and the European aspirations of the countries of the Western Balkans. From that perspective, the role of the US would still be significant, primarily in material and political support for the accession process of Serbia and other countries of the EU region. In this light, the role of the US could rather be reduced to using its influence on Prishtina, which is large for obvious historical reasons, to accept solutions that are in line with EU policy in the region. In short, it can be assumed that the US will once again leave the leading role in the Western Balkans to the EU, i.e., to its leading countries.

Summarizing the analysis of the relations between the USA and Serbia in the two decades since the democratic changes in Serbia, it can be concluded that they have been brought to a level that is good and relatively routinized.

It is difficult to assume that there would be a return to a period of sharp confrontation and that the institutional cooperation arrangements of the two countries would suffer.

Foreign policy, however, is not always constant, although powerful nations try to stick to long-term strategies. It is certain that the intensity of the crisis in relations between the US and Russia and the EU and Russia will greatly affect Serbia, not only in terms of international but also domestic politics.

When it comes to the relations between the US and Serbia, what can be observed from the analysis of the period in question, is that the inherited problems create significant limitations for the relations between countries, even when the ruling political elites had no part in their creation. These limitations are difficult to overcome, even when there is a desire by both sides to improve and strengthen relations. In the context of relations between Serbia and the US in the observed period, what is encouraging is that, despite a certain cooling and deterioration in relations caused by the recognition of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, there was no revision of institutional and other forms of cooperation that resulted from the previous period of normalization, expansion and the deepening of relations between the two countries. Simply put, the relations between the countries are good, stable and routine. In view of the historical circumstances it would have been overambitious to ask for more.

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The Reshaping of Global Relations in the 21st Century: Multiple World Orders?

Abstract

After almost half a century of fundamentally stable structure of international system during the Cold War, and with an intermezzo in the form of the "unipolar moment" immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the first decades of the twenty first century brought about a series of turbulences and cued deep reshaping of the global relations. Unable to achieve or maintain the global- or block-level hegemony at the scale which had been attainable within the bipolar and multipolar systems of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, the great powers predominantly fight to consolidate their positions within their respective spheres of influence, whether these are designated geographically (as regions) or functionally (as domains). On its own part, this has initiated the development of concepts like the "multi-order world" (Trine Flockhart), and multiplicity in international relations (Milja Kurki, Justin Rosenberg). Although these and similar concepts take up positions critical towards the traditional positivist theoretical approaches, it can be stated that, at the same time, they reaffirm them: while aspiring to transcend the embedded disciplinary boundaries, they necessarily, although most often unwillingly, affirm the significance of the state as not just the key actor, but also as the key reference framework for constituting the very notion of "the international". Similarly, the aforementioned historical and theoretical-methodological changes in the study of global relations produce immediate consequences for our understanding of international realities, as well as for our presuppositions on the directions of its future development. By combining the traditional, dominantly realist postulates with the critiques and innovations put forward by contemporary approaches to the study of

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international politics, the author aspires to shed light on some of the key aspects of the reshaping of contemporary global relations.

Keywords:

global relations, international politics, hegemony, world order, multiplicity, realism, post-positivism

INTRODUCTION

Discussions on the changes of global order have traditionally pervaded International Relations scholarship following major political tumults, intense crises, or other international critical junctures. This was true after the World Wars and the Cold War, and it is no less true in the post-unipolar period the world currently finds itself in.¹ After almost half a century of fundamentally stable structure of international system during the Cold War, and with an intermezzo in the form of „the unipolar moment“ immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the first decades of the twenty first century brought about a series of turbulences and cued deep reshaping of the global relations² – conditions marked by the re-opening of the (geopolitical) Grand Casino.³ Terrorist attacks on US soil in 2001 followed by the onset of what was to become America's longest war (Afghanistan), the rise of new major actors like China, a series of great power armed interventions of questionable legality and dubious prudence or success rate (most notably Iraq, Libya, Syria, Georgia, Ukraine), as well as a number of calamities and disasters in the areas of economy and finance, migration, or public health, have all contributed to the circumstances wherein the global system has kept undergoing profound changes since the beginning of the century.

Obviously, the impending changes in system polarity seem like the most consequential ones. Still, apart from reshaping the system structure as defined by major actors' capabilities, the whirlwind of significant global events has impacted great powers' respective perceptions of their own, and their rival's positions and interests. Such a peculiar form of post-unipolar global competition propels major powers to redefine the scope of their

¹ Charles Krauthammer, „The Unipolar Moment“, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/1991, pp. 23–33.

² Charles Krauthammer, „The Unipolar Moment Revisited“, *The National Interest*, No. 70, 2002/2003, pp. 5–18.

³ C. Dale Walton, *Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic Perspective*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, pp. 39–49.

impact: the struggle for global influence is increasingly formulated as a struggle to influence outcomes in one's own critically important portion of the international system. In other words, unable to achieve or maintain the global- or block-level hegemony at the scale which had been attainable within the bipolar and multipolar systems of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, the great powers predominantly fight to consolidate their positions within their respective spheres of influence. Such spheres may be designated geographically – as regions, or functionally – as domains. On its own part, this has initiated the development of innovative IR concepts, tools and frameworks like the “multi-order world” (Trine Flockhart), and multiplicity in international relations (Milja Kurki, Justin Rosenberg).⁴ Such innovations question both the notions of centrality of the state as the key actor of international affairs, as well as the idea of the global system as the framework within which we observe and understand major issues of international relations. At the same time, as will be shown, they somewhat paradoxically reinforce the pervasive understanding of the state as the crux of international reality, not least by implicitly utilizing it as a frame of reference in devising novel conceptions about the structure of global politics.

Still dominantly determined by the number and capabilities of its major actors, such structure, as noted before, remains shaped by policies of great powers. The distinction between *status quo* and revisionist powers has been somewhat distorted in the post-unipolar era, mostly since the global structure has become increasingly dispersed: major powers can now be upholders of status quo in some regions/domains and revisionist actors and others. They can also be status quo powers at the system level, and revisionist actors within specific regions/domains: this is particularly typical of the United States, given its unique position as the former unipole: while struggling to maintain its status of a global hegemon, it pursued revisionist policies in regions such as the Balkans or North Africa and domains like international trade, particularly post-2017. At the same time, possessing large capabilities obviously does not automatically translate into power, understood as ability to induce outcomes which affect the system structure, whether the goal is to maintain or alter it. Therefore, some authors have proposed the concept of structural power – “the authority and capacity to set the rules of the game and to determine how the others will play the game. Those who attempt to play other games can be persuaded or coerced to conform only by those with superior structural

⁴ Trine Flockhart, “The Coming Multi-order World”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2016, pp. 3–30; Milja Kurki and Justin Rosenberg, “Multiplicity: a new common ground for international theory?”, *Globalizations*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2020, pp. 397–403.

power”.⁵ However, to be in a position⁶ to exert structural power in the first place, an actor still needs to be a state, and a powerful one: a great power.

New IR scholarship demonstrates attempts at theoretical innovation, but its significant share remains deeply embedded in traditional realist approaches. According to Rosato and his “intentions pessimism” theory, great powers are destined to compete because they “encounter extraordinary difficulties accessing firsthand information about each other’s current and future intentions”, so “they can rarely if ever trust their peers”. Diverging from Rosato’s structurally informed strain of realism and advocating a classical realist perspective, Kirshner stipulates that “states, especially great powers, make basic international political choices, choices that are profoundly shaped by their historical experiences, ideational frameworks, and ideological dispositions”.⁷ Still, new concepts and research programs witness that the need persists to reach beyond the existing theoretical and paradigmatic limits of the discipline. Many of them are devised specifically to assess the changes brought about by the ongoing dispersion and diversification of the international order.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: MULTIPLE ORDERS?

Traditionally, international orders have been dominantly distinguished by the distribution of power, i.e., the number of states with sufficient capabilities to act as poles within the system, thus crucially shaping political outcomes. Undoubtedly, distribution of power remains a crucial feature of contemporary international order, but as it becomes increasingly hard to identify poles, as well as with amplified problems in great power communication, we have been witnessing the increase in regional blocs with structures of their own. These blocs sometimes show features of emerging mid-level orders, and may be the result of authentic, grass-roots initiatives by regional players, as well as of great power meddling and design. The functions such orders play make them not only a level of analysis of international politics, but almost a kind of unitary actors in and of themselves. Such proliferation further complicates the already turbulent state of contemporary international system. Henry

⁵ Kalevi Jaako Holsti, *International Politics: a Framework for Analysis*, 7th Edition, Prentice Hall [NJ], 1995, p. 69.

⁶ Sebastian Rosato, *Intentions in Great Power Politics*, Yale University Press, New Haven [CT] – London, 2021, p. 43.

⁷ Jonathan Kirshner, *An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton [NJ] – Oxford, 2022, p. 42.

Kissinger has rightly noted that the “contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions, and to relate these regional orders to one another. These goals are not necessarily identical or self-reconciling: the triumph of a radical movement might bring order to one region while setting the stage for turmoil in and with all others. The domination of a region by one country militarily, even if it brings the appearance of order, could produce a crisis for the rest of the world.”⁸

In Kissinger’s classical view, to be stable, international political orders need to rest not just upon a sustainable balance of power, but also upon an internalized sense of legitimacy of the order within the powers maintaining it. Herrmann’s theory of motivated reasoning, informed by social psychology, stipulates that preferences, such as attachment of social identity to the country, shape beliefs about international politics.⁹ In the current, rather unstable international constellation, the globally observed pre-existing preferences seem to be more firmly attached to the notions of sovereignty and the nation-state than was the case immediately after the end of the Cold War. This means that the positions of systemic legitimacy will largely be measured against its correspondence to these reemerging values.

Given great powers’ mixed record of shaping and sustaining the international order throughout modern history, it is probably natural that middle and smaller powers increasingly tend to hedge and turn to bottom-up regional cooperation as a means to achieving basing security and prosperity instead of relying solely on external, top-down design. Dragan Simić notes that, while the contemporary world order is closer to the constitution of separate regions as clusters of power than to the establishment of global institutions, this does not automatically guarantee that interests of middle and small states within such regions would be more efficiently protected.¹⁰

Existing global rifts go far beyond the established historical patterns of discord and collaboration. It is precisely the fact that there seem to be no satiated major actors that makes contemporary international order so volatile. As Menon correctly observes, there are currently no clear-cut status quo forces. Instead, all the key players are revisionist to a larger or lesser extent: “if major powers harbor doubts about the rules-based order, weaker countries have steadily lost faith in the legitimacy and fairness of the international system. This is certainly true of countries in the global South. They have seen the

⁸ Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, Penguin Press, New York [NY], 2014, p. 371.

⁹ Richard K. Herrmann, “How Attachments to the Nation Shape Beliefs About the World: A Theory of Motivated Reasoning”, *International Organization*, Vol. 71, No. S1, 2017, pp. S61–S84.

¹⁰ Dragan R. Simić, *Rasprava o poretku*, Zavod za udžbenike, Beograd, 2012, p. 322.

UN, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, G-20, and others fail to act on issues of development and, more urgently, the debt crisis plaguing developing countries – a crisis made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic and food and energy inflation caused by the Ukraine war”.¹¹ States will respond to pervasive revisionism by turning inward and forming ad hoc coalitions. This produces incentives for proliferation of new security arrangements and alliances, as well as other types of regional political frameworks.¹² At the same time, great powers (self)perceived as “civilizational states”, including, but not limited to China and Russia, propose models of order which challenge older, Western-dominated structures.¹³

Such developments, as usual, open the question of whether the existing theoretical schools and concepts offer adequate tools to grasp the novel intricacies of order transformation. Scholars of various provenances have put forward diverse proposals, more or less grounded in previous IR scholarship. Although some of them aspire to transcend the nation-state as the main reference point, they end up vindicating it as long as the understanding of the international element keeps relating to societal relations transpiring across the borders of territorially organized, sovereign structures – regardless of the changes the concepts of territoriality or sovereignty have undergone over the one century-course of IR’s development as a discipline.

THE EMERGENCE OF INNOVATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

As asserted in an earlier work, “as the international system changes, so do the tools for its assessment. One way of conducting such a change is for each theory to sharpen its own research tools by devising additional hypotheses in response to new empirical challenges, while conserving the theoretical ‘hard core’, i. e. the set of its main assumptions – in Lakatosian terms, this would represent an intra-paradigmatic problemshift. Another way is to alter the very

¹¹ Shivshankar Menon, “Nobody Wants the Current World Order”, *Foreign Affairs*, August 3, 2022, Available from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/nobody-wants-current-world-order>.

¹² Bruno Tertrais, *Entangling Alliances? Europe, the United States, Asia, and the Risk of New 1914*, The Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., 2022, pp. 10–14.

¹³ Adrian Pabst, *Liberal World Order and Its Critics: Civilizational States and Cultural Commonwealths*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2019, pp. 50–54.

core of the theory, thus changing its very nature to the extent that it becomes something genuinely new (inter-paradigmatic shift)".¹⁴

Although often particularly innovative and original, the newest attempts at offering conceptual tools which would transcend existing paradigmatic faults are by no means a pioneering effort. It would be nearly impossible to refer to all the instances of struggles towards paradigmatic innovation. For instance, studying the prospects for international cooperation outside the hegemonic framework in the 1980s, Robert Keohane famously put forth a theory of non-hegemonic cooperation as an approach which would "build an institutionalist edifice on a realist foundation", supplementing but not replacing the erstwhile dominant realist theories.¹⁵ Somewhat later, Viotti and Kauppi are known to have pursued an endeavor to reassess and transcend the major IR paradigms, identifying four major trends in innovative theory-building: the disrepute of pure empiricism, heightened awareness of the importance of the system structure, growing interest in the historical development of key concepts, and greater emphasis on theoretical rigor.¹⁶ Contemporary efforts often build on previous scholarly attempts, if sometimes only implicitly.

Writing in 2016, Trine Flockhart offered one of the most succinctly put reassessments of existing tools for grasping crucial issues of contemporary international order, introducing the concept of a "multi-order world". According to her, international orders are founded upon four distinctive components: power, identity, and primary and secondary institutions, whereas primary institutions are "patterns of shared practices rooted in the values held commonly by the members of the order and embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles", and secondary institutions represent a more or less formalized "institutional architecture designed to manage relations between states within the international society and provide an organizational setting for meeting common challenges and for providing public goods within the order and in the wider system".¹⁷ This goes for all conceivable

¹⁴ Mladen Lišanin, "Possibilities of Assessing the Changing Nature of International Politics in the Coming Multi-Order World", *Croatian Political Science Review*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2017, p. 154.

¹⁵ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, 2nd Edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton [NJ] – Oxford, 2005, pp. x, 14.

¹⁶ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond*, 3rd Edition, Allyn and Bacon, Needham Heights [MA], 1999, pp. 430–431.

¹⁷ Trine Flockhart, "The Coming Multi-order World", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2016, pp. 15–16.

iterations of international orders, including unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar ones. What is different about the impending changes towards a multi-order world, however, is that the new “primary dynamics are likely to be within and between different orders, rather than between multiple sovereign states”.¹⁸

The concept of multiplicity in International Relations scholarship has emerged at a similar time, largely based on Rosenberg’s proposition that IR has an inherent issue of functioning within a “borrowed ontology”, having emerged from Politics or Political Science, instead of constituting itself as a “discipline in its own right”: one which would focus on the problematique of the very notion of the international. This would encompass acknowledging that human existence is it is distributed across numerous interacting societies, which makes the notion of societal multiplicity a disciplinary starting point.¹⁹

Milja Kurki offers a wider, looser, and more expansive understanding of multiplicity: according to her, “central to multiplicity, from multiple perspectives, seems to be ‘co-determination’, or ‘co-becoming’, with others; a kind of precarity, or vulnerability, or exposure to others. What multiplicity highlights so well then is, I believe, the dynamics and opportunities created by the condition of exposure to others in relations”.²⁰ She previously assesses how existing theories, approaches, and schools such as realism, liberalism, social constructivism, post-colonialism, and others, have engaged with issues of multiplicity, or how such issues may be “read into” them.

When responding to criticism that the concept of multiplicity as proposed by Rosenberg is prisoned by Waltzian spatial conceptions and thus guilty of methodological nationalism, Tallis asserts that “multiplicity posits a notion of the international, as a particular, contingent and non-monopolistic historical form of inter-societal multiplicity”.²¹ He proceeds: “the thoroughgoing interpenetration (again: interaction, combination and dialectical change) of these societies, in their diversity and with scant respect to borders or the dominance of state actors (...), should dispel notions that this reproduces a Waltzian world or a territorial trap.” And while the accusations of methodological nationalism are certainly out of place when it comes to multiplicity, there is more than a semblance of truth to the idea that, by trying

¹⁸ Trine Flockhart, “The Coming Multi-order World”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2016, p. 23.

¹⁹ Justin Rosenberg, “International Relations in the Prison of Political Science”, *International Relations*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2016, *passim*.

²⁰ Kurki, Milja, “Multiplicity expanded: IR theories, multiplicity, and the potential of trans-disciplinary dialogue”, *Globalizations*, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2020, p. 569.

²¹ Benjamin Tallis, “Multiplicity: Taking Responsibility for the International”, *New Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2019, p. 170.

to transcend the state as the crucial form of actorness, multiplicity does, in fact, vindicate it through its conception of the international.

In comparison to Flockhart's notion of a multi-order world, approaches based on the concept of multiplicity are less material and more domain-oriented, as they attempt to grasp the international as a spectrum of inter-societal relations across a multitude of spheres, including the seemingly non-political ones such as art, music, or architecture. In other words, they are more assertive in their effort to transcend territoriality as a key feature of existing approaches studying the international system. The paradox of such an attempt is that it is only as successful as it pertains to the very framework it tries to overcome: a plethora of relations occurring not just across social domains, but across territorially conceived borders of sovereign nation-states.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is not unusual that deep turbulences announcing the shifts within the international system induce the formulation of innovative theoretical paradigms, which may subsequently have a mixed record of success in assessing crucial global issues and developments. The newest scholarly approaches are, thus, yet to be tested against international realities which will emerge from the perpetual conundrum marking international relations over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. It may well turn out that the best chance to succeed is to set innovative concepts upon the groundwork provided by the existing and more traditional approaches, instead of pursuing innovation for the sake of innovation.

Per Cornelia Baciú, for instance, what is needed to properly grasp the issues of contemporary order, is not necessarily an entirely new paradigm, but a way to better bridge the three levels on which the existing approaches operate: the international level, the national level, and the citizen level. She offers the concept of "interpolarity" as a general framework for such an endeavor; an international order wherein interdependent poles of different sizes, epitomized by states, inter-governmental organizations, non-state actors, and other agents interact.²² This would entail the acknowledgement of multiple poles as well as their diverging capacities, which makes it distinct from major realist views on power distribution. Also, the concept recognizes the importance of the dynamics of relations between such uneven poles, making it sensitive enough to the issue of agency of lesser powers, which is yet another problem that traditional IR approaches have not always been

²² Cornelia Baciú, "Interpolarity. Re-visiting Security and the Global Order", *Defence Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2022, pp. 572, 576.

successful at solving. The last two major global crises – Covid19 pandemic and Russian war against Ukraine – have compellingly demonstrated of taking such nuance into account.

For instance, crucial rifts in trans-Atlantic relations have been overcome or at least concealed after the beginning of the Russian war in Ukraine; still, it would be injudicious to assume that they are permanently removed.²³ The longer the conflict lasts, the bigger the risk of dissonance among allies, within the EU as well as in trans-Atlantic context. Simultaneously, the differences between the West, its political structures and allies, and the rest of the World epitomized by BRICs and most countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, have been amplified since February 2022. This was succinctly highlighted by the Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in June, at the GlobSec Forum in Bratislava, Slovakia. Reflecting on India's reluctance to side with the Western position on Russia and Ukraine, he commented that "Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe's problems are the world's problems, but the world's problems are not Europe's problems".²⁴ The issue of major powers' persisting conviction that they are entitled to conformity by lesser powers, particularly those in the Global South is underlying such misunderstandings.

The issue of spheres of influence infamously figures in the discussions of the dissipating global order. Spheres of influence are widely viewed as either an unfortunate remnant of the past or an unacceptable policy course of malign actors questioning the value of rules-based international order. It is, however, hard to think about the world of emerging regional blocs or topical coalitions without considering major power aspirations to exert control therein. O'Rourke and Shiffrinson make it clear that, regardless of one's one stance on the acceptability of spheres of influence in contemporary international politics, they undoubtedly exist as "descriptive statements reflecting the geographic boundaries wherein states are unwilling or unable to challenge another's dominance, given both the balance of power and balance of interests", before proceeding to assess the costs and benefits of having such arrangements among major powers.²⁵

²³ Lišanin Mladen, "Biden Administration's Transatlantic Challenge", *Politika nacionalne bezbednosti*, Vol. 21, No. 2, p. 24.

²⁴ Lan Jianxue, "Jaishankar's remarks reflect India's objections to European centralism", *Global Times*, June 3, 2022, Available from: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1267313.shtml>, (Accessed 7 August 2022).

²⁵ Lindsey O'Rourke and Joshua Shiffrinson, "Squaring the Circle on Spheres of Influence: The Overlooked Benefits", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2022, p. 107.

On the other side of paradigm/policy spectrum, G. John Ikenberry offers what may be defined as an overly optimistic view of contemporary international order and the US position therein: "The United States enters today's struggle to shape the twenty-first century with profound advantages. It still possesses the vast bulk of the material capabilities it had in earlier decades. It remains uniquely positioned geographically to play a great-power role in both East Asia and Europe. Its ability to work with other liberal democracies to shape global rules and institutions is already manifest in its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and will stand it in good stead in any future collective response to Chinese aggression in East Asia. Although China and Russia seek to move the world in the direction of regional blocs and spheres of influence, the United States has offered a vision of world order based on a set of principles rather than competition over territory."

Neither the historical record, nor the ongoing development of current events, however, seem to corroborate such claims. It is hardly provable that Russian, let alone Chinese actions, are a key determinant in the shift towards a more dispersed world order, of which regional blocks are but one, albeit important, feature.²⁶ Russian policies may be explained by a twofold endeavor: on one side, to consolidate its position of an undisputed hegemon in the "near abroad", as well as to find a place in a wider construction of European and global security architecture – a place which would entail the status of an equal among the system-shaping great powers. These prospects have, at least in the short to medium term, been seriously hampered by the Ukraine invasion. As for China, it is increasingly clear that it perceives itself as a power which has outgrown its immediate region and is prepared to pursue policies of global reach – particularly in the sphere of economy. Supporting regional blocks will not necessarily be a part of this strategy; it will only occur to the extent it supports Chinese global ambitions.

Rodrik and Walt also recognize the manifold centrifugal forces and the tendency towards fragmentation of the international order: "looking ahead, it is easy to imagine a less prosperous and more dangerous world characterized by an increasingly hostile United States and China, a remilitarized Europe, inward-oriented regional economic blocs, a digital realm divided along geopolitical lines, and the growing weaponization of economic relations for strategic ends."²⁷ Being aware of all the ways in which the erstwhile "partially liberal, rules-based system" has contributed its own demise, they propose a much more restrained framework as a remedy: a "meta-regime" within

²⁶ G. John Ikenberry, "Why American Power Endures", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 101, No. 6, 2022, p. 72.

²⁷ Rodrik, Dani and Stephen M. Walt, "How to Build a Better Order: Limiting Great Power Rivalry in an Anarchic World", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 101, No. 5, 2022, pp. 144, 146.

which the major powers “need not agree in advance on the detailed rules that would govern their interactions”, instead achieving a “minimal consensus on core principles.”²⁸ This would obviously entail the recognition of opposing interests of major players, as well as different domains and regions in which they are to be pursued. Rodrik’s and Walt’s proposal thus combines features of a more traditional, realism-embedded approaches, as well as institutionalism-driven instinct for cooperation and “strategic transparency”. It is, therefore, something of an echo of Keohane’s proposal from the 1980s, calibrated to account for the newest issues and challenges facing the international system. The concept seems rational and plausible, although it will certainly face fierce opposition from various sides, since no major actor or block seems willing to forfeit the maximalist causes for the sake of uncertain gains from subjugating oneself to pre-arranged set of rules, however minimally conceived.

Historically, international orders have been made through perilous and often unpopular political bargains.²⁹ It would hardly be surprising if the outcome of the next grand bargain would not be a world order, but a world of multiple orders. Equally unpopular to grasp, such development has equal chances of being a chance for a thorough restart, or a road to demise, with leading powers in the system having the final say.

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Matthew M. Ployhart*

Expert Designs or Fragile Understanding? The Competence of American Diplomacy and Influence in the Creation of the First Yugoslav State

Abstract

This paper analyzes the extent of American involvement in the creation of Yugoslavia and, more importantly, answers the question of whether the attempt of American statesmen at the creation of a united South-Slav state following the conclusion of the Great War was well-executed and based on thorough research and planning, or if it was engaged with a series of swift and rash decisions based in incompetence and a lack of adequate information of the region, its people, and its politics. I will include an analysis of the circumstances of the Western Balkans just prior to and during the occurrence of the Great War; and, more relevantly, the ideological and strategic reasons for which the United States engaged itself in the creation of the First Yugoslavia, as examining both are necessary in analyzing how these motivations demonstrated either the thoughtfulness or neglect of the American policymakers involved. I conclude that American involvement in the creation of Yugoslavia, while lacking complete thoroughness, was in many places significantly well-informed, though it did allow for the incorporation of paradoxes and weaknesses into the new state that would prove fatal in the long-term existence of the country.

Keywords:

Yugoslavia, United States, formation, Peace Conference, Wilson, creation, Serbia, inquiry

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INTRODUCTION/RESEARCH QUESTION

Larry Wolff, in his 2020 book, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, opens with the affirmation that “it would be difficult to overestimate either the enthusiasm for Woodrow Wilson in Eastern Europe during and after World War I or his huge impact on the political transformation embodied in the peace settlement at Versailles, which gave Eastern Europe its twentieth-century form on the map as a system of interlocking national states.”¹ Indeed, Wilson’s famous *Fourteen Points* indicates a clear concern with the maintenance of a new and peaceful post-war world, in which the Balkans are not neglected. Countries such as Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro are mentioned directly (Point Nine), and, in President Wilson’s own words, “the relations of the several Balkan states to one another [should be] determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.”²

In the closing sentences of his speech, Wilson remarked on the importance of justice, liberty, and safety to and between all peoples, regardless of their strength: “unless this principle be made its foundation [of his new order],” he states, “no part of the structure of international justice can stand.”³ In addition to Wilson, of course, there was a plethora of other American academics and experts, many specializing in, and concerned about, their own parts of Europe, eager to share with Wilson and his staff their knowledge of various European territories and their recommendations for the new European order. These policymakers and experts, however, also had other, more-strategic goals in mind when formulating their reports and conducting their research, as well.⁴

Such experts – one-hundred fifty of whom were grouped under the frequently-cited initiative called “The Inquiry,” organized by Dean Sidney Menzes of City College at the request of the president in 1917 – were composed significantly by professors, cartographers, geographers, historians,

¹ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2020, p. 1.

² Woodrow Wilson, *Fourteen Points*, from Arthur S. Link et al., Eds., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 45 (1984), 536, 2009, Available from: https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~wggray/Teaching/His300/Handouts/Fourteen_Points.pdf, (Accessed April 28, 2023), pp. 1–2.

³ Woodrow Wilson, *Fourteen Points*, op. cit., p. 2.

⁴ Uroš Lipušček, “The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919,” *125 Years of Diplomatic Relations Between the USA and Serbia*, 2008, pp. 53–70.

and so forth.⁵ Such efforts as the Inquiry, led by Archibald Cary Coolidge, were supposed to fill the gaps in the president's knowledge of the European continent. As far as the Western Balkans were concerned, for example, "the Inquiry supplied over a thousand maps, and the geographer Isaiah Bowman played a leading role on Wilson's team at the peace conference," including, for instance, by providing "...a map to prepare him to address the conflicting claims of the Italians and the Yugoslavs..."⁶ This is merely just one example, of more to be explored later, of the extent of research and study that went into Wilson's peace initiative.

However, despite these measures, and the extent to which American diplomats did have genuine interest in ensuring the stability of Europe and the world after the Peace, there were many aspects of America's involvement in South-Eastern Europe that were, at best, rushed, and, at worst, horribly misguided and underinformed. Thus, the question should be asked: was the attempt of American statesmen at the creation of a united South-Slav state following the conclusion of the Great War well-executed and based on thorough research and planning, or was it engaged with a series of swift and rash decisions based in incompetence and a lack of adequate information of the region, its people, and its politics, or perhaps something between the two? It can be stated that American involvement in the creation of Yugoslavia, while lacking complete thoroughness, was in many places significantly well-informed, though it did allow for the incorporation of paradoxes and weaknesses into the new state that would prove fatal in the long-term existence of the country.

INITIAL CHALLENGES AND BROAD COMPLEXITIES

"In 1917, Southern Slav representatives from Austria-Hungary — including Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and representatives of the Serbian state that had already been founded in 1835 — met on the Greek island of Corfu. Together they agreed to announce the founding of a common state."⁷ This "Declaration of Corfu," in calling for unification of Southern Slavs, stated that "the names, symbols and religions of the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Slovenes and

⁵ Uroš Lipušček, "The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919", op. cit.

⁶ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 237.

⁷ Nenad Kreizer, *Yugoslavia, 1918: Birth of a dead state*, Deutsche Welle, Bonn, Germany, 2018, Available from: <https://www.dw.com/en/yugoslavia-1918-birth-of-a-dead-state/a-46538595>, (Accessed 28 April, 2023).

Croats should be recognized as equal..." Regardless of the difficulties and complexities of ensuring that this promise could actually be implemented effectively, there was evidently a desire for the creation of a Southern-Slav state, one that was shared by those from across the important ethnic groups that would later be included in the new country (in the case of Bosnia, for instance, "the strongest advocates of both revolutionary terrorism and romantic, ill-defined Yugoslavism came...from Bosnia-Hercegovina."⁸).

The United States was not entirely unaware of this. Although communication between the US and Serbia was relatively slight when compared to that between more-relevant players as it related to America's immediate foreign concerns, diplomatic relations between America and Serbia were essentially underway by 1879.⁹ This does not change the fact, however, that American politicians, even through the First World War, were severely underinformed about the circumstances existing in the Western Balkans at the time.

It was not as if the United States barged into South-Eastern Europe in 1919 and restructured boundaries on zero basis, however. As illustrated, there was significant desire among the peoples of the Western Balkans for the formation of a South-Slav state. John R. Lampe, author of *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)* – and others – demonstrates this very well. The Balkan territories – isolated and fragmented geographically, yet unprotected from foreign invasion – were nonetheless fairly docile in that their various religious and cultural groups were not, in fact, constantly engaged in ethnic-based conflict, as one may assume would have been the case given the disastrous events during the collapse of Yugoslavia.¹⁰

Instead, even by the time of the modern era, conflict on purely-ethnic grounds was rare. For instance, in the late 1700s, "Serbs and Croats lived peaceably without religious antagonism in neighboring hamlets, if not the same ones, and served together without incident in the same regiments,"¹¹ on the Hapsburg Military Border (in modern-day Croatia). Increases in industry

⁸ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

⁹ Dragoljub Živojinović, "The Establishment of Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between the United States of America and Serbia, 1878–1881", *125 Years of Diplomatic Relations Between the USA and Serbia*, 2008, pp. 17–36 (Also mention religious freedom of Serbian constitution somewhere, maybe).

¹⁰ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit.; Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: A Short History*, Modern Library Paperback Edition, United States, 2000.

¹¹ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit., p. 31.

and commerce after 1900, as well as improving education, not to mention rising population, far from fanning ethnic conflict, actually implied economic benefits that had not existed in prior times that could accommodate a more-modern, unified state (though economic activity was still only moderately increasing). Farmers and peasants, who composed some four-fifths of the population of future Yugoslavia, were perhaps the least divided. In other words, recent conflicts cannot be explained by age-old rivalries.

However, that is not to say that there were not reasons for suspicion of the successfulness of a Southern-Slav state. Tensions between ethnic groups in Bosnia, for example, were on the rise in the late 1880s, and despite the increasing connectedness that came with the modernizing world, the Balkan lands still lacked significant inter-Balkan trade, which posed a potential threat to unity. Tensions were also heightened between the various ethnicities of the Balkans due to growing political involvement, and thus increasing political polarization. The Assimilation of Balkan lands by greater powers, particularly Austria-Hungary, was another significant factor in creating division, as assimilation was often done poorly, and its benefits were rarely distributed considerably or fairly. Nevertheless, a sort of Yugoslav nationalism was present as early as the 1860s in Dalmatia, particularly in light of Croat-Slovene unity in hostility to Italian nationalism along the coast of the Adriatic. However, as Lampe notes, “only the course of the First World War...made it possible to form the first Yugoslav state in December of 1918.”¹²

Prior to this, however, how aware was the US about the complicated circumstances of the Western Balkans? Furthermore, with hindsight, given the events of the 1990s, one must also wonder if US efforts to create a Yugoslav state were misguided or futile in the first place – this is not a debate, however, on whether the existence of a lasting Yugoslavia, given different circumstances, would or would not have been possible. But, in fact, far from pushing against cries and warning signs to create a united Southern-Slav state, much of the evidence at the time actually painted a very-favorable picture to the idea of what would become Yugoslavia.

By 1918, the majority of opinion in regard to the future Yugoslavia (save in Kosovo) was in favor. The Serbian military, though it suffered heavily, survived the war, which would prove vital in making the creation of Yugoslavia a possibility, physically speaking. “By the middle of 1915, both the Serbian government and a newly-formed Yugoslav Committee of Croatian and Slovenian exiles had proclaimed war aims that would overturn the pre-1914 order and create some sort of South-Slav state,”¹³ Lampe notes.

¹² John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit., p. 71.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 102.

The Yugoslav Committee, though essentially in exile in London during the war, would embody many of the desires of Balkans peoples in regard to what much of the population wanted the future Yugoslavia to look like. Essentially, the project of the creation of Yugoslavia politically, though there was existing opposition to it, was already in the works prior to the US even joining the war – interestingly, the Corfu Declaration of 1917 even had fourteen points, although this was purely coincidental, as it was created before Wilson's *Fourteen Points* had been spoken.¹⁴ Finally, cruel treatment under Hapsburg rule also made Yugoslavia seem like a better alternative to many individuals.

Given the confusion and the sudden and rapid scramble of the United States to gather information on the Western Balkans, it comes as no surprise that political figures in Washington were at first very clumsy concerning how their information was acquired. For starters, it did not help matters that US knowledge of Serbia, and the Balkans in general, was not only very narrow, but also largely informed by Austrian sources.¹⁵ Furthermore, while the propaganda of other ethnic groups, such as the Poles and Czechs, had access to the ears of politicians that mattered, Yugoslav propaganda was notably absent. In fact, within the US, the only American Serb with solid influence and reputation was pro-Yugoslav and pro-monarchist Mihajlo Pupin, “honorary Serbian consul in New York, as well as one of the most respected professors at Columbia University.”¹⁶ Pupin even mediated with American leaders at Versailles, representing the delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS), especially as borders were concerned.

Yet, due to the overall slim amount of actual Balkan (in this case, Serb) diplomats in contact with American statesmen, the result was often that important political decisions regarding the future of the region – decisions that were to shape millions of lives for decades to come – were handled on the basis of the little bits information that were be presented by a few individuals, and they could often be very biased. In addition, the foreign diplomats that politicians in America had at their disposal were prone to fluctuation.

This was seen through actions of Nikola Pašić, the Serbian prime minister during the Great War, who would later become the future prime minister of Yugoslavia. It can be presumed that Yugoslav ambitions would have been fulfilled more accurately and more completely, had not Pašić, a royalist who was in favor of a united, centrally-governed Yugoslavia, replaced the diplomat to Washington, Ljubomir Mihajlović, last-minute. This was done

¹⁴ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit., p. 31.

¹⁵ Uroš Lipušček, “The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919”, op. cit.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 55.

after August, 1918, due to Mihajlović's disrespect of Pašić's wishes as prime minister, yet the former's replacement left Serbia without any diplomats in Washington who had any real experience just before the conclusion of the war, when they arguably needed one most. An underlying reason for this alteration was because Ljubomir Mihajlović was an increasing sympathizer of Ante Trumbić, president of the Yugoslav Committee, which was quite enthusiastic about establishing a republic organized as a federal state, contrary to a monarchy.¹⁷ Interestingly, Pašić's decision to replace Mihajlović placed him in the same position as some Italian officials, who were also attempting to delegitimize the Yugoslav Committee, though in this instance with the goal of rendering the dream of a united South-Slav state illusory entirely. It would appear, therefore, that the internal politics of the Balkans were simply not conveyed well through their limited and ununified number of diplomats in Washington: the canvas of political issues being painted for American statesmen was simply not manned by enough individuals to represent all of the political changes and diverse viewpoints relevant in South-Eastern Europe.

The United States was not entirely ignorant of this fact, however. For instance, the Wilson administration was quite aware of, and even concerned about, the consequences of the disunity between the Yugoslav Committee and Pašić and the other royalists; though, they did not go as far as involving themselves in the dispute. The internal and foreign disagreements over the operations, views, and legitimacy of the Yugoslav Committee, thus, ensured that the United States would not take its representation of the Southern Slavs seriously, according to Lipušček, instead giving more legitimacy to Pašić and the royalist vision of a Yugoslavia that existed as a centralized state.¹⁸ The difficult position of the United States towards the future Yugoslavia was even implied in written form by Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Wilson, in which he stated that "...the jealousy of Italy and the desire of Serbia to absorb the Yugoslavs rather than to become federated with them makes it necessary to become cautious in deciding on a policy."¹⁹ This "policy" referred to that towards Poland and the Czechs and Slovaks, the nationalist organizations of whom the United States was hesitant to recognize when compared to the other Entente powers, largely in anticipation that the Yugoslavs would then demand recognition, which of course Italy was opposed to, and Serbia wanted a greater role in.

¹⁷ Uroš Lipušček, "The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919", *op. cit.*, pp. 64–65.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 66.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

Challenges to diplomacy aside, however, there were certainly competent individuals within the US government who engaged in understanding, and even proposed solutions to, the historical and contemporary problems facing the Balkans as it pertained to the creation of a South-Slav state. Lipušček outlines one of them very well: Albert H. Putney.

Putney was then head of the Near-East Department, and before long, Lansing ordered him to investigate the national difficulties acting against Austria-Hungary. "Putney was in all actuality, the first higher functionary in the State Department to take interest in the 'Slavs' problem,"²⁰ according to Lipušček. In May, 1917, he had composed a memorandum, entitled, "Nationalistic Aspirations in the Near East," that dealt with many of the problems facing the South Slavs. Later revised, he proposed three potential solutions (the third one being his favorite), broadly defined as a union of Yugoslavs in an Austro-Hungarian-type political arrangement; the existence of borders as they then stood, with the expectation that "Austria-Hungary establish a liberal system of government;"²¹ or a united Yugoslavia, composed of Serbs, as well as others of the then-Hapsburg lands, such as the Croats – although, he was largely opposed to the admission of the Slovenes into this united state due to perceived historical and linguistic differences.

Putney was, relatively speaking, quite capable in terms of his knowledge of, and his action on, the situations facing the South-Slavs, enough to even pose solutions to the dilemmas facing them with confidence. However, in spite of Putney, and people like him, who did exist to some degree in meager capacity, there are unfortunately accounts of their concerns and insights being overlooked, as the foreign interests and goals of America's politicians wavered and shifted over time. One of the most-prominent examples of this was the question of what was to become of Austria-Hungary.

Putney, for instance, read into the problems that would continue to occur should sizeable ethnic minorities exist under large empires such as that of Austria-Hungary without adequate representation – something Wilson took painfully long to respond to in practice. He wrote that "any peace which will leave the Jugo-Slavs partially residing in free states and partially under the Austrian and Hungarian despotism will mean a continuance of that strained condition in the Northern Balkans which for so many years has contained within itself the germ of the present war."²² However, Putney's written concerns – and recommend solutions – largely fell on deaf ears, as President Wilson at that time was still operating on the assumption that Austria-

²⁰ Uroš Lipušček, "The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919", *op. cit.*, p. 57.

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 57–58.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 58.

Hungary would remain intact, even if threatened by domestic differences and internal divisions. Furthermore, as Lipušček illustrates, “it does well to bear in mind that there was a great general opinion that Austria-Hungary would survive the war, although in a diminished capacity.”²³

According to Wolff, Wilson first approved a statement that an independent ethnic people were at war with Austro-Hungary “itself” in September, 1918, when a statement of his regarding the Czechs and the Slovaks was made public. In hindsight, this assertion probably came shockingly late, given the ultimate fate of the empire. However, Wolff also notes that, “if the Habsburg monarchy was already ‘doomed and dissolving,’ it would be Wilson who pronounced the word that would consummate that doom and dissolution by calling forth a new world, a new society of nations to displace the empire of nationalities.”²⁴ Wolff states that the aforementioned “recognition of the Czecho-Slovak Council [as a belligerent government] on September 3 certainly offered such service, and finally pointed toward an American policy dedicated to the disappearance of the Habsburg monarchy.”²⁵

Wilson’s idea of peace, after all, did seek to ensure that ethnic minorities were not unrepresented by larger, overburdening empires. “The establishment of the new states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia on the postwar map of Europe,” notes Wolff, “is closely associated with Wilson’s principle of self-determination at the Paris Peace Conference, which also vindicated the dissection of the Habsburg monarchy into national components.”²⁶ It should also be noted, however, that the decision to cultivate national feelings among those of Austria-Hungary was also intended to pressure the country into breaking from Germany, thus being as strategic as it was ideological.²⁷

Regardless, the empire was doomed. As noted by Lipušček, the highly-influential Inquiry (which was less enthusiastic about dividing Austria and Hungary as the State Department was), “began to conclude that the days of the Habsburg monarchy were numbered.”²⁸ As illustrated by Wolff, due to many circumstances, the evolution of events ensured that “Wilson himself shed every possible sympathy for Habsburg Austria-Hungary and led the

²³ Uroš Lipušček, “The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919”, op. cit., p. 59.

²⁴ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 89.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 94.

²⁶ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 17.

²⁷ Allen Lynch, “Woodrow Wilson and the principle of national self-determination”, *Review of International Studies*, 2002, pp. 419–436, p. 430.

²⁸ Uroš Lipušček, “The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919”, op. cit., p. 59.

peacemakers in Paris to embrace the demolition of the multinational Habsburg monarchy and its supplantation by supposedly national successor states, including Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia."²⁹

This wavering of political goals was not helped by the fact that US knowledge of the Balkans, was, as mentioned, quite narrow to begin with. However, the conditions of the Great War prevented a return to the former Balkans layout, with Austria-Hungary dissolving and Italy somewhat tamed, or at least weakened.³⁰ Wilson, as well, had fully accepted the dissolution of Austria-Hungary not too long after the end of the war, a dissolution which the formation of Yugoslavia was to secure. Yet, Lipušček goes as far as to state that "the State Department only began to closely examine the dilemmas surrounding the Balkans and Austria-Hungary when the question of the future of the Austro-Hungarian empire and its constituent nations arose. It is clear from the majority of documentation on the subject that Serbia was regarded mainly in the light of the dissolving monarchy and the arising Yugoslav question."³¹

The distinctly disinterested approach of American statesmen to the fate of Austria-Hungary is well-stated by Lampe, who said that "...Anglo-American diplomacy accepted rather than promoted the monarchy's disintegration,"³² a statement that demonstrates the degree to which American politicians did, at least prior to the peacemaking process, largely overlook the factors essential to comprehend for the creation of a sound Yugoslav state. However, it should still be noted that America was the first of the Great Powers to recognize the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The New Yugoslav state was not recognized at beginning of the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, but by February, it had been recognized by the United States. Only following the German delegation's recognition of the state three months later would Britain and France similarly recognize it, something which does represent a significant new devotion of American attention to the Yugoslav movement.³³

Another personification of America's confidence in the abilities (or perhaps concerns about the weaknesses) of the new country was the Blair loan of 1923, which promised to raise \$100,000,000 for railroad construction

²⁹ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 58.

³⁰ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit., p. 101.

³¹ Uroš Lipušček, "The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919", op. cit., p. 56.

³² John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit., p. 110.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 113.

from Zagreb and other inland areas to the coast of the Adriatic Sea. However, once again to illustrate the lack of decidedness of American foreign policy – much of which, one could argue, was influenced by domestic conflicts in the political ring – the Blair loan ended up being largely a false promise to Yugoslavia, with only a small portion of the total sum ever being provided. Thus, regarding Yugoslavia, as with the rest of the world, the US later moved itself into the position of one taking on a far more-distant role in the conditions and matters of Europe, the US Senate never even so much as ratifying the Treaty of Versailles.



Figure 1 Article announcing the Blair loan in *The New York Times* newspaper, March 30, 1925.³⁴

In essence, while America did indeed possess individuals competent on the subjects and peoples of the Western Balkans, the actual extent to which the suggestions and the recommendations of these individuals were heeded, and the degree to which the United States' political interest in them was firm, was, unfortunately, greatly hindered by the seeming uncertainty in the decisions of American statesmen to support particular nationalistic or

³⁴ "Yugoslavia Near Loan," *The New York Times*, 1925, Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/1925/03/30/archives/yugoslavia-near-loan-blair-arranging-100000000-americanenglish.html>, (Accessed 28, April, 2023).

statehood movements. There can be little doubt, however, that while the degree to which America set itself on a definite, unwavering course of action from the very beginning can be called into question, the goals in reorganizing a post-war Europe – broadly defined as enhancing the liberalization of the continent and providing for the self-determination of sizeable ethnic groups – were sought by many, particularly Wilson, from relatively early on.

IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Thinking back to Wilson's *Fourteen Points*, its central pillars were of justice and self-determination, all part of still a greater effort to maintain peace. This is demonstrated repeatedly throughout his speech, including in the desire that Russia should be dealt with leniency, and that Germany should be forgiven and included in the post-war order. Thus, it should come as no surprise that, as far as America was concerned for the Balkan states, while "the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty" (Point Twelve), other national groups under the control of the Turks "should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of an autonomous development."³⁵

Woodrow Wilson was, after all, an academic at heart (and the first and so far only American president to ever hold a PhD). His academic mindset and idealism stood starkly and stubbornly opposed to the imperialistic old-world order, at least as far as his foreign policy was largely concerned. Indeed, it is no secret that his correlation of nationality with sovereignty, and the other progressive ideals his foreign policy embodied, has earned itself its own name, Wilsonianism, as a leadership style. It is no mistake, therefore, to focus so much on Wilson, as well as his signature stubbornness, when examining America's role in the Peace in general, as it was, to a large extent, his idealism which brought America into such direct involvement with the political matters of the obscure European countries such as those of the Balkans, and made quite a significant impact on the post-war order as a whole.

However, the president was not without his faults. Indeed, his own repressive actions and opinions concerning people of color within the US domestically is nothing less than horribly hypocritical. His foreign policy, as well, though ideal in intention, was often similarly ironic or hypocritical in execution. According to Lampe, for instance, "if the principle of ethnic self-determination introduced by US President Woodrow Wilson justified the dissolution of the multi-ethnic Hapsburg monarchy, how could it accommodate another one in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as

³⁵ Woodrow Wilson, *Fourteen Points*, op. cit., p. 2.

the first Yugoslavia was christened?"³⁶ Indeed, the empires of Germany and that of the Ottomans were multi-ethnic, as well, and the creation of the multi-ethnic states, not only that of the first Yugoslavia, but also of Czechoslovakia, seemed to promote a version of what Wilson sought precisely to dissolve. This overlooked paradox would, interestingly, spell tremendous difficulty for the future Yugoslavia. Yet, "any nation-state, it was assumed before 1914," Lampe notes, "had the potential to assimilate smaller ethnic groups, not by force but by the attraction of the successful European-style modernization that was supposed to follow from political unification."³⁷ Thus, despite its hypocritical nature, the assimilation of ethnic groups was not new, even as Wilson actively disintegrated other multi-ethnic states in creating the new ones.

While such ironic thinking may not necessarily have led to the outright failure of the country – and, indeed, may have seemed of little consequence at the time – unfortunately, it was far from Wilson's only questionable trait. Wilson's personal feelings and sympathies, for instance, were prone to being influenced and affected by others to an alarming degree: the queen of Romania's being late for lunch with the president genuinely damaged Wilson's sympathy for her country,³⁸ while a pair of socks knitted for him by a Serb woman supposedly moved him strongly to complete the "knitting together" of the new Yugoslavia.³⁹ This potential flaw in character, thus, extended to the president's decisions regarding the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. For example, Colonel Edward M. House, arguably Wilson's most-trusted advisor – and an extremely-effective fix-it-all – who was of constant influence on Wilson's decision making regarding the status and restructuring of Europe, as well as many other matters, was clearly more occupied with Italian sympathies than that of the Yugoslavs – he himself authorized the Italians to occupy the land that was guaranteed to Italy under the secret London Pact of 1915, against the wishes of the latter.⁴⁰ The American delegation and Wilson's additional friends, furthermore, were in fact often divided in opinion – notably between those who harbored Italian sympathies and those who harbored Yugoslav sympathies, the former of these being the

³⁶ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit., p. 4.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 8.

³⁸ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., pp. 141–143.

³⁹ Ibidem, pp. 143–144.

⁴⁰ Uroš Lipušček, "The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919", op. cit., p. 67.

larger one. Such individuals had a significant personal influence on Wilson's own opinions.

Nevertheless, the degree to which he could be influenced did have its limitations. In the end, the state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was ultimately protected by Wilson – though this largely had to do with his distain for the stubbornness and expansionist dreams of Italy (which can frankly be considered a personal reaction of Wilson in its own right). Indeed, despite the opposition of the Italians, and the disunity among the Southern-Slavs – made particularly visible from politicians in Croatia and Montenegro, notably King Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš, who wished for his Montenegro to remain independent⁴¹ – Wilson, while no doubt still unsure about the success that the new state would have, ensured that “the US was the first of the large powers that recognized the new state.”⁴²

Despite his stubbornness, however, Wilson, gradually but undeniably, began to concede more and more to the old, traditional European ambitions that his idealism usually placed him in stark opposition to. In fact, according to contemporary sources, though Wilson “was capable of digging his toes in,”⁴³ his slowness often meant that he failed to realize and take advantage of the opportunities to do so until it was too late. Of course, Wilson was, understandably, cautious in his disagreements with the other Great Powers, seeing as he hoped that his grand project – the creation of the League of Nations – would, in fact, be seen through, and this can likely explain many of the instances in which he conceded his plans of continental redesign to European influence.

However, it would be difficult to overlook the degree to which Wilson, in his action at the Peace Conference, worked for the creation of ethnic states, founded on principles of minority representation and ethnic self-determination. Such was the thinking that convinced him of the necessity of the birth of the First Yugoslavia. And yet, even despite these grand aims, there was a notable additional layer of strategic political and economic concerns that were important in America's involvement in the formation of the new state.

⁴¹ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., pp. 134–139, 143.

⁴² Uroš Lipušček, “The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919”, op. cit., p. 68.

⁴³ John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Macmillan and Co, London, 1920, pp. 39–41.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The Balkans, it should be noted, were never at the top of America's radar. Despite the expansionist policy of Theodore Roosevelt, "...the Balkans remained an aptly named 'dead hand' to the American sphere until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914."⁴⁴ Indeed, of those Americans who were in any way familiar with the far-off Balkan regions, there can be little doubt that they were viewed with the most-minuscule degrees of importance, if they were even paid attention to at all. But with the Great War and, later, the Peace Conference, attention was eventually drawn to the Balkan peoples, and the geopolitical potential that their reorganization held.

Perhaps the greatest foreseer of the potential of the Balkans to provide for decent political conditions was the aforementioned Putney, who, having composed the memorandum ordered by Lansing, was expressly of the opinion that the creation of a Yugoslav state would have the potential to eliminate Balkans tensions that, otherwise, could remain "...a constant potential cause of a new gigantic war...."⁴⁵ This was in a world, it should be noted, that had just emerged from a reeling conflict, half a decade that claimed tens of millions of total civilian and military lives across Africa, Asia, and, most-directly, Europe.⁴⁶ The threat that the "powder keg of Europe," as the Balkans were once known (quite accurately, as history had showed), would erupt again was no doubt at the back of the minds of most politicians. Putney and many of his contemporaries were no exception.

In addition to this, however, Putney thought, as did other American statesmen, that establishing the Southern-Slavs in their own state had the potential to be conducive to the prevention of German Southward expansionist ambitions. The Inquiry, in fact, hoped that, with Italy, which also acted as an obstacle, the two countries – Yugoslavia and Italy – would serve as friends to one another in opposition to Austria, as well. Of course, this did not end up happening – they would rather become starkly suspicious of one another due to their territorial contestations – yet the existence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes itself served, in the eyes of many

⁴⁴ Uroš Lipušček, "The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919", op. cit., p. 53.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 58.

⁴⁶ Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (n.d.), *World War I 1914–1918*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago, Available from: <https://www.britannica.com/discover/World-War-I#:~:text=Combat%20and%20disease%20claimed%20the,%2C%20military%20action%2C%20and%20massacres>, (Accessed 18 April 2023).

experts at the time, to dissuade further imperialistic advances from central Europe.⁴⁷

However, not all strategic considerations placed the nationalistic aspirations of statehood of the Southern-Slavs in the advantaged position as far as the US government was concerned.⁴⁸ Indeed, tensions did exist between matters of strategy and necessity and those of ideology.⁴⁹ Wilson, for one, ceded Brenner Pass, of the Tyrol, to Italy (although he afterward insisted on only pursuing a policy of organizing countries on ethnic rather than strategic considerations).⁵⁰ Furthermore, foreign concerns were often not of any major consequence to American statesmen at all, as paying off debt largely preoccupied the Allies, including the US, following the war. Nevertheless, there were strategic considerations which were investigated diligently that often aligned well with Wilson's idealistic policies (such as that with Austria Hungary, for instance⁵¹) – to say otherwise would be to imply that the idealism of American foreign diplomacy during the time of Wilson and the strategic reorganization of Europe following the conclusion of the Great War were polar opposites. Although House allowed Italy to occupy the territory it was promised in the Treaty of London, and although Italy desired the Dalmatian Islands from the Slavs, many worried that, should Italy, in its imperialistic ambitions, acquire the land successfully, it could have the result of upsetting the Slavic peoples and driving them towards pan-Slavic Bolshevik ideologies.⁵² Incidentally, the strategic thinking that necessitated, in America's eyes, the provision of Dalmatia (save, in the end, Zadar⁵³) to the Slavs lined up well with Wilson's idealistic ambitions for a united Southern-Slav state that did not exclude large groups of ethnic Slavs to other countries.

⁴⁷ Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (n.d.), *World War I 1914–1918*, Encyclopædia Britannica, Chicago.

⁴⁸ Allen Lynch, "Woodrow Wilson and the principle of national self-determination", op. cit., p. 427.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, pp. 425–426.

⁵⁰ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit., pp. 113–114.

⁵¹ Allen Lynch, "Woodrow Wilson and the principle of national self-determination", op. cit., p. 431. What is illustrated here is that the backing of Yugoslav and Czecho-Slovak nationalistic movements were largely strategical, in that it secured the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Yet, this also benefited the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugoslavs.

⁵² Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 153.

⁵³ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit., p. 114.

As far as the Italians were concerned, it was strategically beneficial for them to support the continued independence of Montenegro in order to oppose Serbia and the Southern Slavs, effectively weakening the latter (thus strengthening their claim to Dalmatia). However, that would weaken the Yugoslav state as a whole, which, given the strategic reasons for its formation by American diplomats, could have disastrous consequences on a global scale. Thus, even despite Wilson's personal reassurances to King Nikola of Montenegro, the state was ultimately combined with the greater Southern-Slav state.⁵⁴

This illustrates the notable concern that, as expressed by Wilson (citing Pupin), "if the Yugoslavs have the impression that they have not been treated justly, they will throw themselves on the side of the Slavic world against the Western world."⁵⁵ Wilson, and others, sought to be extremely cautious concerning the potential development of a hostile Eastern-European realm – particularly, as noted, one that could turn to Bolshevism. This required very delicate acts on behalf of American diplomats, such as the strenuous balancing of Italian and Yugoslav desires. Indeed, Wilson himself was, ultimately, quite favorable (one may even say biased) towards the Slavic side (he hated the Treaty of London, and secret treaties in general⁵⁶), and even despite Italy's accurate conviction of this preference of Wilson's, he and others nevertheless continued to push for a unified Yugoslav state, largely because of its strategic, in addition to ideological, merit as a country.

CONCLUSION

One can see from this analysis that the United States, its leadership, and its diplomats, were in several cases extremely skilled and capable in the implementation of their well-researched policy decisions. However, in other instances, rival views clashed, political missteps were made, gaps in knowledge were persistent, personal sympathies were affected or appealed to, and idealism occasionally contrasted with strategic reasoning. One cannot argue that the US was entirely and completely informed on the circumstances of the Western Balkans prior to their involvement in the creation of the first Yugoslavia. In fact, there were many gaps in their research, and there were many political considerations that should have been taken seriously into account by American statesmen that were ultimately overlooked. However, it would be similarly baseless to argue that the US did not possess a significant

⁵⁴ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 143.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 153.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, pp. 40, 45.

– and at many times, skillful – hand in the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

According to Lipušček, the creation of the first Yugoslavia “would have been almost impossible” without the aid of the United States.⁵⁷ The United States recognized the state of Southern Slavs when no other Great Power would, and it ultimately defended the lands of Dalmatia and the Adriatic coast against the imperial advances of Italy, shaping the course of events in South-Eastern Europe for decades to come, for better or worse. Wolff states, “the map of Eastern Europe today still reflects Wilson’s problematic preoccupation with delineating an interlocking complex of national states, and its origins can be traced in the intellectual history of Wilson’s writings and thoughts as they emerged from the cultural context of mental mapping during and after World War I.”⁵⁸

Examining America’s missteps further, Lipušček also illustrates an almost-eerie claim: “what is striking from today’s point of view is that many of the analyses and studies carried out by the State Department and the Inquiry during the time of the First World War literally predicted the outcome of events in the Balkan region at the end of the last century.”⁵⁹ In other words, the concerns of many American statesmen and experts regarding the potential dangers and ultimate fate of the new – and, in earlier instances, purely-theoretical – country to a large extent came to fruition.

Indeed, as Lampe writes, even within Yugoslavia, “against the combination of an intolerant political culture and regional imbalances, Wilsonian liberal assumptions of a democratic future in a multi-ethnic state had little chance of survival by the 1930s.”⁶⁰ It was not the isolated histories of Balkan peoples that rendered their cultures inherently incompatible; indeed, the majority of Southern-Slavic society, save a few nationalistic factions, were, without outside influence, more than capable of overlooking their own ethnic differences, as history shows. Thus, the country that would enter tumultuous times prior to the Second World War – and that would still possess rifts paved over by Tito, before its collapse in the 1990s – was influenced by foreign powers and ideologies to such a degree as to disrupt local politics and

⁵⁷ Uroš Lipušček, “The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919”, op. cit., p. 70.

⁵⁸ Larry Wolff, *Woodrow Wilson and the Reimagining of Eastern Europe*, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵⁹ Uroš Lipušček, “The USA and the Establishment of the Kingdom of SHS 1918–1919”, op. cit., p. 70.

⁶⁰ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History – Twice There Was a Country (Second Edition)*, op. cit.

to give birth to strong senses of nationalism that would taint the potential cooperation that could have been.⁶¹

It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that a state rendered unstable due to contemporary external influences and modern interpretations of history should essentially have been made possible due to the outside influence and intervention of the United States, and ironic furthermore that that same United States, and NATO, would ultimately be instrumental the destruction of that state by way of the Wilsonian tradition.⁶² The actions of the US in the First Yugoslavia's eventual creation, while in some cases based on the expert advice of well-studied and capable officials, and executed with confidence and efficiency, in other ways was prone to disagreements and missteps, unintended outside influences, and blindness to various political problems and paradoxes that, not having been resolved during the country's creation, ultimately contributed, at least in part, to the dissolution of the state much later on in history.

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⁶¹ Mark Mazower, *The Balkans: A Short History*, op. cit., pp. 147–148.

⁶² Allen Lynch, “Woodrow Wilson and the principle of national self-determination”, op. cit., p. 420.

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„Priča sa istočne strane”: šta nas još jedna istorija Sovjetskog Saveza u „starom” može naučiti o „novom” Hladnom ratu

Sergey Radchenko, *To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War bid for Global Power*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2024, 770 p.

Hegel (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel) je jednom rekao da ako hoćemo nove ideje treba da čitamo stare knjige. Ovo možemo shvatiti i na način da ako hoćemo da razumemo vreme u kom živimo treba da se

bavimo onim što je bilo. Delo Sergeja Radčenka (Сергей Сергеевич Радченко), „Kako upravljati svetom: hladnoratovsko stremljenje Kremlja za globalnom moći”, spada u upravo takvo štivo. Knjiga velike teme, suštinske hipoteze i dubokih uvida, postaće, po našem mišljenju, nezaobilazna literatura za sve one koje zanima ne samo vreme dvadesetovekovnog Hladnog rata već i onog (ili onih) koji nas čeka(ju) u godinama i decenijama koje dolaze.

Knjiga je izašla iz štampe krajem maja 2024. i bavi se onom supersilom koja je u decembru 1991. godine doživela kolaps i povukla se iz najveće ideološke i geopolitičke utakmice 20. veka, a kad se uzmu u obzir nuklearni kapaciteti koji su SSSR i SAD posedovali, verovatno i najvećeg rivalstva u istoriji. Naime, u jednom trenutku zajednički nuklearni arsenal ova dva kolosa bio je toliki da je planeta na kojoj živimo mogla biti uništena više puta (overkill capacity). Da li će današnje rivalstvo Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Narodne Republike Kine dostići te mračne visine ostaje da se vidi. Ekonomski posmatrano, Kina je svakako daleko premašila Sovjetski Savez kao konkurenta Sjedinjenim Državama, a kad se pogleda paritet kupovne moći, NR Kina je vodeća ekonomska sila sveta još od 2014. godine. Trenutni proces

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modernizacije nuklearnih kapaciteta Kine i njen pokušaj da se u pogledu toga izjednače sa Sjedinjenim Državama i Ruskom Federacijom svakako će doprineti produbljenu i proširenju tog rivalstva.

Sergej Radčenko je Vilson Šmit profesor na Školi za napredne međunarodne studije Univerziteta Džons Hopkins (Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies). Rođen je i odrastao u Sovjetskom Savezu, na krajnjem istoku današnje Rusije, na ostrvu Sahalin, a najviše naučne titule (magistraturu i doktorat) stekao je na prestižnoj Londonskoj školi ekonomije i političkih nauka (The London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE). Pre SAIS-a, predavao je na Univerzitetu Aberistvit (Aberystwyth) u Velsu, Vudro Vilson centru (Woodrow Wilson Center) u Vašingtonu, u Kini i u Mongoliji. Napisao je, uz ovu, još dve knjige samostalno, i još dve uredio. Govori, naravno, pored maternjeg ruskog, i engleski, mandarinski kineski i mongolski jezik. Predstavlja jednog od vodećih stručnjaka u svetu za odnose Sovjetskog Saveza i Narodne Republike Kine, kao i za sovjetsku i rusku spoljnu politiku.

Knjigu je, kako sam navodi, pisao čitavu deceniju, a imao je tu sreću da mu se otvaranjem sovjetskih arhiva od strane vlasti Ruske Federacije, posle dvadeset godina pauze, ukaže čitav jedan novi svet, dosad nepoznat istraživačkom oku. Ovaj rad nas, posle dugo prisutnog trenda kojim se bavio, da pozajmimo naslov knjige

poznatog hrvatskog historičara Tvrtka Jakovine, „trećom stranom Hladnog rata“, ponovo vraća na dva glavna rivala, odnosno u ovom slučaju na jednog od njih, Sovjetski Savez. Knjiga je dobila odlične prikaze, a zavredila je i pažnju „patrijarha hladnoratovske istorije“, Džona Luisa Gedisa (John Lewis Gaddis), na stranicama uticajnog „Foreign Affairs-a“.

Ključni doprinos knjige po samom autoru je taj što nudi „radikalno novu interpretaciju motivacije sovjetske spoljne politike, usredsređujući se na moskovske narative legitimnosti, i kako su ti narativi bili pregovarani preko konstantne interakcije između sovjetskih ambicija i onih koji ih priznaju i na taj način ih legitimizuju ili onih koji odbijaju da ih priznaju, ali preko svog odbijanja priznavanja, takođe ih (ne očekivano) legitimizuju“ (p. 3). Ta želja za priznavanjem statusa velike sile, ili sovjetske veličine i značaja, bila je i ostala glavna težnja spoljne politike Moskve, jer, „biti priznat od ostalih centralna je preokupacija sovjetske spoljne politike od Staljina do Gorbačova“ (p. 5).

Ako smo do sada mislili da su glavni ciljevi stvaranja sovjetske imperije bili bezbednost ili širenje komunizma i komunističke ideologije, po Radčenko to nije dovoljno objašnjenje jer ima nešto i u poštovanju i prihvatanju kojem je Sovjetski Savez težio od prvog dana nastanka, iz haosa građanskog rata i neuspesne intervencije zapadnih sila. Uvek ili parija ili na ivici da postane parija, prihvatanje od strane najmoćnijih sila Zapada kao aktera jednakog

njima je nešto čemu je Rusko carstvo (Radčenko tu vidi neprekinuti kontinuitet na liniji Rusko carstvo – SSSR – Ruska Federacija danas) težilo još od reformi Petra Velikog i uspona u „velikoj igri moći“ posle pobede nad Švedskom u Bici kod Poltave 1709. godine. Poštovanje, čast ili *doxa* je, kao što znamo, motiv prisutan još od Tukidida i njegovog Peloponeskog rata u kome Tukidid iznosi onu svesvremensku tvrdnju da je ljudsko ponašanje vođeno strahom (*phobos*), vlastitim interesima (*kerdos*) i čašću (*doxa*). Sa druge strane, priča o časti i želji za poštovanjem kao glavnom motivu ruske spoljne politike kroz istoriju takođe nije nova i možemo je videti, između ostalog, i kod profesora Andreja Cigankova (Андрей Павлович Цыганков), koji je prati od vremena Aleksandra I (Александр I Павлович Романов) pa do Vladimira Vladimiroviča Putina (Владимир Владимирович Путин).

Sama knjiga se, pored uvoda, zaključka, reči zahvalnosti i standardnih stvari koje prate ovakva izdanja kao što su izvori i spisak literature, sastoji od četiri celine koje prate četiri faze u životu Sovjetskog Saveza od okončanja Drugog svetskog rata pa do njegovog raspada: I) Ambicija; II) Hibris; III) Opadanje i IV) Kolaps. Naravno, u okviru svake te celine postoje poglavlja (ukupno njih 20) u kojima je opisana i objašnjena konkretna problematika u posmatranim vremenskim periodima.

U prvoj celini knjige ključna figura je Josif Visarionovič Staljin (Иосиф Виссарионович Сталин). Ovaj vešti i beskrupulozni vlastodr-

žac vremenom se menjao nagore, postajući na kraju simbol destruktivnosti, koncentracije moći, zločina, ali i stvaranja imperije koja će na kraju po svom obimu, direktnoj ili indirektnoj kontroli nad drugim akterima, nadmašiti teritoriju koju su kontrolisali ruski carevi. Ostavši jedini od „velike trojke“ koji će na funkciji dočekati i kraj rata protiv Japana, video je sebe kao nekog kome pripada i poštovanje i bezbednost i da su mu to poštovanje garantovale silne žrtve koje je SSSR podneo u pobedi nad Hitlerom (Adolf Hitler). Pošto je Staljin pod bezbednošću uvek podrazumevao kontrolu nad teritorijama (kako je to i priznao u svojim razgovorima sa Milovanom Đilasom), a budući da je očekivao da dođe do sukoba unutar zapadnog bloka jer je tako to socijalistička teorija predviđala, smatrao je da njegov oportunizam ima i moralno opravdanje. Ipak, pokazalo se da je time samo pokrenuo lavinu nepoverenja, koja je na kraju dovela do sukoba, odnosno izbijanja Hladnog rata. Tome svakako nije pomoglo ni uključivanje SSSR-a u rat u Koreji koji je dodatno sekuritizovao politike obe strane i u amanet nam ostavio najdestruktivnije oružje koje je planeta ikad videla u vidu termounuklearnih bombi, što je sve dovelo do rasplamsavanja Hladnog rata.

Druga celina ne nosi slučajno naziv Hibris. Mora se istaći da je Radčenko majstorski odabrao naslov ove celine. Ovde Sovjetski Savez otkriva čitav jedan novi svet za širenje svoje ideologije i revolucije, a to su tek dekolonizovane zemlje. Takođe, posle Staljinove smrti i borbe

za prevlast kao novi lider pomalja se Nikita Sergejevič Hruščov (Никита Сергеевич Хрущёв). Niskog porijekla, sa vrlo istančanim osećajem za preživljavanje, prevalivši preko leđa sve Staljinove čistke i hirove, dokopao se vlasti posle rivalstva sa Georgijem Maljenkovim (Георгий Максимилианович Маленков). Za Hruščova Radčenko tvrdi da je, poput njegovog prethodnika, bio nesiguran, ali da je bio i „poslednji revolucionarni romantik među sovjetskim liderima” (p. 12). Taj njegov romantizam i želja za priznanjem i namećanjem autoriteta koji je imao Staljin možda je doprinela najvećem avanturizmu koji je Sovjetski Savez ikad imao tokom svog trajanja a to je Berlinska kriza koja je rezultirala podizanjem Berlinskog zida u avgustu 1961. godine ili, pak, Kubanska raketna kriza u oktobru naredne godine. U vreme Hruščova lansiran je „Sputnik”, poslat je prvi čovek u Kosmos, izvršena najveća nuklearna eksplozija ikada sa bombom „Car”, čule su se pretnje da će SSSR ekonomski sahraniti Ameriku i slične stvari. Istovremeno, pokvario je odnose sa NR Kinom jer izgleda da Mao (Mao Zedong) nije bio spreman da prihvati autoritet Hruščova kao što je prihvatao Staljinovo prvenstvo, čime će dodatno oslabiti komunistički blok. Na kraju, Hruščov biva smenjen u oktobru 1964. godine, odnosno doživljava svoj nemezis. Ipak, mnogi će kasnije u smislu otvorenosti tvrditi da nije bilo Hruščova ne bi bilo ni Gorbačova, a neki su čak videli njegov uticaj i polagali nade, tokom mandata Dmitrija Medvedeva (Дмитрий

Анатоольевич Медведев) na mestu predsednika Ruske Federacije, da će Rusija biti mnogo saradljivija i opustljivija prema Zapadu nego u vreme Putina. Bio je to, vreme će pokazati, samo još jedan “wishful thinking”.

Treća celina se bavi najdugovečnijim sovjetskim liderom posle Staljina (vladao je 18 godina, Staljin skoro 30), Leonidom Brežnjev (Леонид Ильич Брежнев). Ukratko, Brežnev je povukao neke važne poteze, pre svega tokom procesa detanta, ali je istovremeno, u drugoj polovini svoje vladavine, već fizički i psihički nesposoban da upravlja tolikom imperijom, posejao seme njene kasnije propasti. Priznanje i poštovanje kojem je SSSR težio u prvom periodu njegove vladavine dobijeno je, kako piše Radčenko, direktno od glavnog rivala, Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i to u vreme republikanskih administracija Ričarda Niksona (Richard Nixon) i Džeralda Forda (Gerald Ford), kada su potpisani sporazumi SALT 1 (1972), kao i Helsinški završni akt (1975). Ti spoljnospolitički uspehi pomogli su mu da se izdigne nad Kosiginom (Алексей Николаевич Косыгин) unutar sovjetske hijerarhije, ali i unutar socijalističkog bloka. Brežnev je smatrao da ako „Sovjetski Savez i Sjedinjene Države uđu u rat oko Evrope... evropska civilizacija će biti uništena, a neko drugi će doći umesto njih.” (p. 383). Radčenko, naravno, zaključuje da bi to bila Kina. Drugi period Brežnjevljeve vladavine obeležen je pogoršanjem odnosa sa svojim arhivalom. Predsednik Ford već tokom kampanje za predsedničke izbore 1976.

godine prestaje da koristi reč detant, a radikalno krilo Republikanske stranke, koje je predvodio bivši guverner Kalifornije, Ronald Regan (Ronald Reagan), smatra da je politika vođena prema SSSR-u bila katastrofalna i da su Sovjeti iskoristili američko popuštanje da prošire svoj uticaj i ojačaju svoju imperiju. Kada u decembru 1979. godine sovjetske trupe budu ušle u Avganistan biće to i formalni kraj detanta, ali i početak agonije i „sovjetskog Vijetnama”.

Četvrti deo knjige bavi se sa poslednja tri lidera Sovjetskog Saveza, Jurijem Andropovim (Юрий Владимирович Андропов), Konstantinom Černjenkom (Константин Устинович Черненко) i Mihailom Gorbačovom (Михаил Сергеевич Горбачёв). Naime, u periodu od nepune dve i po godine, od novembra 1982, kad umire Brežnjev, pa do marta 1985. godine, kad sa životne scene odlazi Černjenko a vlast preuzima Gorbačov, na čelu SSSR-a promeniće se tri lidera. Kriza, kako spoljna tako i unutrašnja, tražiće nove odgovore i nove pristupe, pogotovo što je sa one strane Atlantika na mesto predsednika došao čovek koji enormno povećava vojni budžet i koristi mnogo agresivniju retoriku nego njegovi prethodnici. Posebno se, po svom potencijalu za izbijanje novog svetskog rata, izdvaja 1983. godina, kada Regan pokreće program „Strateška odbrambena inicijativa” (Rat zvezda), a Sovjeti obaraju južnokorejski avion u blizini Sahalina usmrтивši svih 269 putnika i članova posade. Takođe, razmeštanje raketa srednjeg dometa u Evropi dodatno

doprinosi tenzijama koje dostižu svoj vrhunac. Pokazivanjem prekomerne snage i agresivnosti, obe strane su tražile legitimnost u očima one druge. Sovjeti su, vodeći se načelom Ivana Groznog, verovali da samo ako imperija bude jaka ona će biti i priznavana (p. 538). Međutim, novca je, pogotovo na sovjetskoj strani, bilo sve manje, a održavanje imperije koštalo je sve više. Takođe, životni standard građana plaćao je cenu povećanih vojnih izdataka. Sve to zajedno iziskivalo je promenu u pristupu dolaskom Mihaila Gorbačova na mesto generalnog sekretara KPSS-a. Njegovi pokušaji ekonomskih i političkih reformi završiće se kolapsom ne samo imperije, nego i samog Sovjetskog Saveza za samo dve godine, od 1989. do 1991. Da li je sve moglo da se završi drugačije pitanje je kojim će se baviti i generacije koje dolaze.

Knjiga je posebno značajna imajući u vidu rat u Ukrajini i duboki sukob na liniji Zapad – Ruska Federacija, a koji, između ostalog, može da se tumači i kao rezultat želje Ruske Federacije da se njen glas u međunarodnim odnosima više čuje i, što je još važnije, više poštuje. Kao i u vreme „starog Hladnog rata”, agresivan i previše ostrašćen odgovor Zapada na asertivno i veoma agresivno ponašanje Rusije proizveo je na Istoku produbljenje tog sukoba i krug se pokrenuo još jednom, ovog puta bez naznaka kad i kako će se završiti. Bez obzira na to ko je kriv za ovaj „najnoviji krug pakla” u međusobnim odnosima, činjenica je da ovo katastrofalno pogoršanje odnosa između Moskve i Vašingtona pred-

stavlja jedan od najvećih neuspeha kako ruske tako i američke spoljne politike posle Hladnog rata, posebno imajući u vidu stratešku anksioznost, koja za obe zemlje dolazi od Narodne

Republike Kine. Radčenkova knjiga, u tom smislu, može biti korisna pouka za političke odlučioce kako u Moskvi tako i u Vašingtonu.

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