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**When Two Worlds Collide: Feminist Foreign Policy and the Implications
of Militarisation**

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[Survival] is learning how to stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, and how to make common cause with those other identified as outside the structures, in order to define and seek a world in which we can all flourish. It is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths. For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change. And this fact is only threatening to those Women who still define the master's house as their only source of support.

-Audre Lorde

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List of abbreviations

AfD	<i>Alternative für Deutschland</i>
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEDAW	Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CDU	<i>Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands</i>
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSU	<i>Christlich-Sozialen Union in Bayern</i>
EU	European Union
FDP	<i>Freie Demokratische Partei</i>
FFP	Feminist Foreign Policy
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
IR	International Relations
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSS	National Security Strategy
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SPD	<i>Sozialistische Partei Deutschland</i>
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

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1. Introduction

1.1. Research Problem Formulation, Question and Intentions

2023 has seen an unprecedented rise in militarisation, with \$2.2 trillion going toward global military purposes (Tian et al. 2023, 1). Simultaneously, the number of countries that have vowed to draft a feminist foreign policy (FFP) or use feminist principles to guide their foreign policy has been steadily increasing. Militarisation and FFPs are thus weaving themselves further into the fabric of foreign policy and security actions. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the global security scene has undergone immense changes with countries rushing to accommodate it in multiple ways. Only three days after this event, German chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a *Zeitenwende*¹ that would change the course of German foreign and security policy (Dinkel, Schirwon and Stamm 2022, 2).² Since then, the militarising discourses created in Germany by public officials constructed a reality in which military means are the only efficient way to deal with Russia, while simultaneously feminising diplomacy by framing it as naive and inapt. In March 2023, a year after the *Zeitenwende* speech, Germany launched a FFP document titled "Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy: Guidelines of the Federal Foreign Office".³ The aspirations of this document were situated within the efforts to address a plethora of gender-inequality issues in foreign service and aid (mainly increased participation and representation) by providing guidelines to achieve gender equality and societal wellbeing (Auswärtiges Amt 2023a). However, the problem arises out of a document clause explicitly stating that the war in Ukraine highlighted the need to protect human lives by military means, which entails denouncing pacifism as a principle under the pretext of obligation towards humanitarian tradition (ibid., 13).

¹ Can be translated as historical turning point/turning point/ the end of an era/ a change of times. See: <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/german-english/zeitenwende>

² This is an example of a citation from a policy paper written in German that I have translated. Since this thesis focuses on a plethora of bodies of work in German, I use this opportunity to note that I have personally translated all of these articles, speeches, reports and therefore will not explicitly indicate this from this point forward. The literature in German is distinguishable in the bibliography section as it is referenced in the language in which I originally read it. Additionally, unless the phrase or document name had no research in order not to burden the main text, I often write the original German title of some documents or phrases in footnotes.

³ The original title in German : "*Feministische Außenpolitik gestalten: Leitlinien des Auswärtigen Amts*"

Feminist IR authors (Acheson 2022; Cockburn 2010; Enloe 1988, 1990, 2007; Haastrup 2020; Ruddick 1989) have reiterated that feminism(s) take an anti-militarist approach by exposing the patriarchal gender regimes in which masculinity is tied to and associated with authority and violence. By using this association, masculinity and by extension the patriarchy, actively seek militarisation and war for their own fulfilment (Cockburn 2010a, 152). Based on these principles, this thesis aims to analyse the causes and implications of uncritically embracing militarisation, and regarding its means as mechanisms for the implementation of foreign policy and in particular a feminist foreign policy.

The compatibility of militarisation and feminism remains one of the main subjects of feminist IR writing. Germany represents a state that has managed to create a symbiosis between the two in their FFP Guideline document. If feminist literature warns that militarisation is just a reproduction of patriarchy that feeds off militarised masculinities that subordinate femininities, the German move can be framed as paradoxical. To illuminate this paradox, the principal question I pose and ultimately aim to answer in this thesis is:

What are the implications of embracing military means for implementing a feminist foreign policy?

To answer this research question, I use a particularly feminist conceptual framework based on the valuable work of one of the most renowned feminist International Relations (IR) scholars Cynthia Enloe. Furthermore, I intend to pair Enloe's conceptualisations with a methodological framework informed by Lene Hansen's critical discourse analysis (CDA) intertextual models and quantitative data from pre-existing databases. This combination will assist me to deconstruct militarising and militarised discourses created by political elites in Germany on security, military, security, foreign policy, diplomacy, soldiers, feminism and gender roles. At the outset of this thesis, my research was based on two core assumptions that will be tested throughout the empirical material analysis. The first assumption is that militarisation produces valorisation and normalisation of military security and military masculinities. The second assumption is that embracing military means in a feminist foreign policy perpetuates patriarchal values.

The overarching aim of this thesis is to show that patriarchy cannot be eradicated without denouncing the militaristic ideas and structures it relies on. My goal is to contribute to the feminist anti-militarist literature by showing that embracing military means as a valid tool for

the implementation of a feminist foreign policy only perpetuates patriarchal tendencies that discriminate against women and gatekeep power from them by infantilising and subordinating them. By doing so, the German FFP document also risks being framed as inconsistent and ingenuine, proving that the endorsement itself is internally subversive to FFPs. In addition, this thesis aims to contribute to the critical feminist IR scholarship which problematises the gendered implications of foreign policies. By investigating the overlooked symbiosis of militarisation and feminist foreign policy, my research aims to expand the existing boundaries of knowledge in the feminist foreign policy scholarship. Therefore, one of the key targets of this thesis is to shed light on this seemingly paradoxical symbiosis. By doing so, this work builds on the existing work of scholars in the fields of German foreign policy, security studies and feminist IR, specifically the intersection of feminism and militarisation, to push the frontiers of knowledge further. Finally, this thesis represents a coalescence of books, texts, articles, discourses, and speeches in German and English on the topics analysed, thus overcoming the language barrier that may exist in scholarship.

1.2. Positionality Statement

As this thesis aims to contribute to the body of feminist IR writing, it is necessary to express my positionality and acknowledge its implications for my research process in the spirit of women's studies tradition. I identify as a feminist researcher with a particular interest and knowledge in feminist peace and security issues, who centres gendered power relations and women's experiences in all aspects of my research. As a result, I am hesitant to employ the concept of objectivity in science, because it has historically been attributed exclusively to the writings of male researchers. Donna Haraway (1988, 576) defines research as persuasion efforts that frame the produced knowledge as the coveted power of objectiveness. Since my research goal is always to question power relations, I acknowledge that there are many aspects of my identity that have influenced the literature choice, the research design and the argumentation. My positionality in this thesis is influenced by my identity as a young Serbian woman living in a post-conflict region who, by a chance of luck or destiny, was born in August of 1999. Growing up I'd hear stories of the utter terror and shock my young, pregnant mother felt as she fled from cluster bombings carried out by NATO and hid in a shelter with unknown people at her most vulnerable state. My mother's experience is amplified by my great grandmother's lively stories of her teenage years during the Second World War that

always end with “war is the greatest evil on earth”. The gendered nature and impact of militarisation and war that aggravated and even destroyed the liberties, rights and security of my female relatives pushed me to examine the patriarchal tendencies intrinsic to these occurrences in international relations. This helped shape my feminist curiosity and anti-militarist critique which influenced this research significantly. Finally, the German language in all its glory and complexities involves constructions that possess an essence that the English language is sometimes incapable of replicating. Therefore, as a feminist researcher with substantial knowledge of both languages, I acknowledge that positionality may influence the translation on ethical and normative dilemmas found in the sources analysed.

1.3. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis has a total of 7 chapters and a bibliography. After the Introduction, the following chapter represents an extensive review of the significant literature on the research subjects. It is grouped into 4 big topics that are related to the occurrences studied in this thesis: theorising feminist foreign policy, explaining the German foreign policy identity; uncovering the German feminist foreign policy, and exploring militarisation and its feminist criticism. The writings of Cynthia Enloe will be used to create a theoretical framework as the basis of this research in the third chapter. The fourth chapter entails a description of the research design including the choice of research methods, their significance for scrutinising the research problem, and a description of the empirical material chosen for this thesis. The fifth chapter will include a short national context under which militarisation and feminist foreign policy have been developed in Germany, thus contextualising this research in a specific timeframe. The sixth chapter will be dedicated to a thorough analysis and subsequent discussion of the findings in the chosen sources. Finally, in the seventh chapter, I will represent a synthesis of the whole thesis, conclude it and offer directions for further research.

2. Literature Review: Unravelling the Threads of Thought

2.1. Expounding Feminist Foreign Policy

Since Sweden's pioneering act of adopting a feminist foreign policy in 2014, many countries have either developed a FFP or vowed to utilise a feminist lens in their foreign policy (UN Women, 2023). This list includes Canada (2017), France (2019), Mexico (2020), Spain (2021), Luxembourg (2021), Germany (2021), Libya (2021), Chile (2022), the Netherlands (2022) and Slovenia (2023). Since then, Sweden has also been the first country to drop their FFP in 2022. Wright and Bergman Rosamond (2024, 591) frame this development as gendered silencing on behalf of the new coalition government led by conservatives who deemed FFP as irrelevant on their path to NATO membership. Since then, the strategic narratives have caused a strong tendency to treat NATO as "the masculinised protector of a feminised and silenced Sweden" (ibid., 590).

FFPs stem from similar intentions and strive for the same goal as the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, although a country's commitment to the former without significant valorisation and implementation of the latter seems ill-thought-out (Kirschner 2024, 5). In the example of Sweden, Aggestam, Bergman Rosamond and Kronsell (2019, 24) claim that such a policy indicates strong support for the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and all subsequent resolutions on WPS.⁴ The 1325 Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, adopted unanimously on 31 October 2000, addresses, among others, the issue of underrepresentation of women in decision-making and peace building processes, and the disproportionate effects of war and conflict on women and girls around the world (UNSCR 2000). National action plans, intended for contextualising concrete implementation tools and mechanisms of the 1325 Resolution are therefore crucial for the resolution's mainstreaming. A FFP may be regarded as an extension of national action plans that serves to modernise and bring together existing approaches, with a critical 'rebranding' that strengthens the legitimacy of the approaches already pursued by the government (Dinkel, Schirwon and Stamm 2022, 6).

⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1969, 2106, 2122, 2241

Before undertaking further review, I find it necessary to elaborate on how FFPs can be defined and what they entail. Thompson, Patel, Kripke and O'Donnel (2020, 4) frame a FFP as “the policy of a state that defines its interactions with other states, as well as movements and other non-state actors, in a manner that prioritises peace, gender equality and environmental integrity; enshrines, promotes, and protects the human rights of all; seeks to disrupt colonial, racist, patriarchal and male-dominated power structures; and allocates significant resources, including research, to achieve that vision. Feminist foreign policy is coherent in its approach across all its levers of influence, anchored by the exercise of those values at home and co-created with feminist activists, groups and movements, at home and abroad”. This comprehensive definition, encompasses a very important emphasis on feminist principles that are especially visible in the call for illuminating and dismantling oppressive and discriminatory power relations.

Apart from the emphasis on illuminating and dismantling oppressive power relations, in almost all definitions of FFPs there is a strong call for intersectionality which provides space to simultaneously uncover and rectify patriarchal, neo-colonial, and racist power relations (Thompson, Ahmed and Khokhar 2021, 22). Aggestam and Bergman Rosamond (2016, 323) claim that what makes FFPs unique is an implication of a normative reorientation through an ethical framework, as well as the triggering nature of the label “feminism” with its intention to challenge power hierarchies. This attributes a somewhat subversive role to a FFP, as its goal is to redefine foreign policy implementation and action in a way that utilises feminist principles to dismantle patriarchal patterns in foreign affairs.

Various research and insights have emerged on the topic of FFPs, the centrality of feminist principles and countries' intentions behind drafting such policies. Jennifer Thomson (2022) shows that countries develop a feminist foreign policy to explicitly state their commitment to gender equality, but more importantly to showcase liberal modernity and compliance with the international liberal order. In this sense, the pursuit of FFP has become “a means of managing image and enhancing prestige” within the international order based on rules (Brown 2023, 10). Thus, developing a FFP has become an ode to democracy. Nonetheless, FFP scholarship was significant in illuminating the influence of gender in inter-state relations and the foreign policy choices that states make (Rice 2017, 5).

Although the pool of literature on feminist foreign policy is expanding, there are still numerous unresearched realms as the emergence of FFPs is still a fairly recent development.

Whether it be the implications of the policy in a specific national context, the implications of ongoing conflicts on implementation of FFP, a critical examination of the policy document's content or the actions of a state, literature is still scarce in this field. There is a particular research gap when it comes to an analysis of the implications of militarisation in countries with a developed FFP, especially if the FFP document itself explicitly embraces militarisation. Making a contribution towards closing that gap is precisely the aim of this thesis. After dissecting the notorious concept of feminist foreign policy and countries' reasons for developing it, the next subchapter is dedicated to a deconstruction of the German foreign policy identity, which is necessary to illuminate the soil upon which a feminist foreign policy is cultivated. Significantly, it also discusses how and whether the *Zeitenwende* speech affected Germany's identity in foreign affairs.

2.2. The Wind of Change in German Foreign Policy

This subchapter includes an analysis of relevant literature on the German foreign policy identity and its (re)construction after the *Zeitenwende* speech. According to Maihold et al. (2021, 5) international expectations of Germany's role as a leader were always bound to be reshaped significantly after the "Merkel Era". Nonetheless, one thing these authors identify as a constant is closer amalgamation with European affairs and the nurturing of transatlantic partnerships as the traditional pillars of German foreign policy (ibid.). At the time of writing, these authors called for a foreign policy that goes beyond the "public's attention threshold and crisis-driven logic" (ibid.,8). Germany has, to a certain extent, failed to heed this advice, as the war in Ukraine was indicated as the direct cause for the embrace of militarisation in the feminist foreign policy document (Pierobon 2024, 296). Maull (2021, 55) claims that German foreign and security policy have historically and consistently relied on multilateralism to shape its identity, but the lingering challenge for Germany will be to maintain and advance the liberal-democratic form of multilateralism so that it can prevail over its neo-authoritarian counterpart. Drafting a FFP might have, therefore, been a part of the answer to which particular principles and values were agreed upon by the new coalition government in order to maintain influence in international politics.

Malici (2006) argues that Germany's foreign policy has traditionally been strongly influenced by anti-militarism and reservation towards militarisation reflected in the beliefs of

the German elite at the decision-making level. In turn, Maull (2000) strongly argued that continuity can be attributed to the German foreign policy despite the changes in the international security playing field. This consistency, claims Maull, is reflected in Germany's identity as a civilian power and has persevered despite participation in military operations (ibid.). Tkocz and Stritzel (2023) conducted valuable research into the official political discourse in Germany using the post-war "Never again" narratives⁵ and how they changed after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. They found that the "Never again war" principle has been substituted with "Never again tyranny" taking its place as the primary reference (ibid.). Tyranny here directly refers to Russian president Vladimir Putin, as his ruling is often regarded in German official discourse as such. More on this will be mentioned in the analysis section of this thesis that covers the Bundestag speeches. Authors such as Roland Czada (2020) write that the realist school had foreseen this war a long time ago. On one hand, Czada claims that the prevalent IR school in Germany believes in the importance and prevalence of soft power, above all, for questions related to conflict resolutions and framework necessary for the process (ibid.) where FFP might come in hand. On the other hand, the intensity of Germany's arms exportation, their expansion of the defence budget, and their role as a host to US nuclear weapons seem to distance Germany from the culture of anti-militarism and push it into a security minefield that exacerbates "hard power".

Nonetheless, it seems that the war in Ukraine triggered a change of times and made Germany reconsider how it implements its foreign policy. This can be seen in Germany's somewhat surprising decision to export arms to Ukraine. Namely, arms transfer represents a mechanism in which states not only enhance military capabilities, but also conceptualise their statehood and national security (Kinsella 2012). The fact that Germany has given a green light to other countries exporting German-made weapons to Ukraine and supplies Ukraine itself in order to face Russia, (Leonard and Hackenbroich 2022 quoted in Blumenau 2022, 1911) represents Germany's attempt to reconfigure its international and security identity as a military force with the grand ability to deter Russia. To explain Germany's foreign policy stance against Russia, Eberle and Handl (2020) use the concept of ontological security to argue that so far Germany has managed to maintain its continuity of identity as the civilian power mainly through narrative adjustment on the level of self, arguably since the 2014 Crimean crisis. Above all, the Russian invasion placed immense international pressure on

⁵ "Never again war", "Never again tyranny", "Never alone". For an in-depth analysis of these narratives see Maull 2011)

Germany to be more proactive (Stengel 2023, 150); a request that Germany conceded to. Apart from the highly emotional polarisation of the debate on arms exports in Germany, the reason for a turn towards arms exports might be seen in the general rhetoric of the (non-) betrayal of Ukraine, Germany's international reputation and European values (Ruppert 2022, 504). By increasing funding for the Bundeswehr, armament projects, the guarding of nuclear warheads, and working towards reaching the NATO's 2% goal and directly supplying Ukraine with weapons, the Zeitenwende speech represents a point from which dreams of a peaceful post-Cold War era and pacifism cease to exist (Blumenau 2022, 1911).

The literature on Zeitenwende by mainstream German foreign policy authors identify multilateralism and antimilitarism as the main pillars of German foreign policy behaviour. The above-mentioned authors like Malici (2006) and Maull (2000) even firmly predict continuity in German foreign policy regardless of the crises in the world, which I will show to be partially inaccurate. In contrast, the post-Zeitenwende writings of authors like Blumenau (2022), Tkocz and Stritzel (2023), Stengel (2023) and Pierobon (2024) are explicative of changes in the German foreign policy behaviour and identify the Russian invasion as the underlying cause for this change. However, apart from writings of Ruppert (2022) and Pierobon (2024), authors presented in this subchapter choose to see the changes in foreign policy action as independent of the feminist-turn attempt. Hence, the studies of Zeitenwende implications rarely include an interplay of this phenomenon with feminist foreign policy. Bridging this gap is one of the main goals of this thesis. Before doing so, I will include in the next subchapter the review of works that cover the implications of Zeitenwende on the implementation of the German FFP. As the analysis will show, it is apparent that female authors problematise occurrences related to FFP more than their male colleagues, with only a couple of male researchers featured in this pool of works and writings. Therefore, the literature review segment would not be complete without domestic insights into the idea and concept of German feminist foreign policy.

2.3. Diplomacy Reimagined: Feminist Foreign Policy in Germany

The coalition agreement from December 2021 institutionalised the “3 R+D”⁶ approach, modelling the Swedish example (Dinkel, Schirwon and Stamm 2022, 4). The “rights” aspect

⁶ “Rechte” (rights), “Repräsentanz” (representation), “Ressourcen” (resources), Diversität (diversity).

refers to protecting human rights of women and other marginalised groups, as well as the commitment to the principles of prevention and accountability (ibid.). This resource is complementary to the “development” principle as it entails the pursuit of an intersectional feminist approach (ibid.). It is often reiterated that FFPs, although they carry a feminist label, are not only intended for women. They are often drafted with the intention to serve as a comprehensive platform on which other marginalised groups could fully exercise their own rights. This is always closely tied to the principle of intersectionality as well. The “representation” principle functions on a similar premise. The “resources” principle refers to gender- and “discrimination-sensitive budgeting” (Dinkel, Schirwon and Stamm 2022, 4). However, this can also be understood as the allocation of resources to programmes and projects focused on gendered human rights and development. Militarisation affects this principle directly through divestments from social spending and by pumping money into military and defence capabilities.

The German guidelines for feminist foreign policies include efforts in areas such as security, trade and climate, with a domestic dimension concerning working methodology in the German foreign service (Hauschild and Stamm 2024, 296). A feminist foreign policy for Germany needed to be conceptualised extensively and comprehensively. This means that involving the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development is not enough for a comprehensive implementation of a feminist foreign policy (Zilla 2024, 17). Its chances of effectiveness and durability may also decrease if it merely continues to do damage control work, especially with regard to development of countries in the Global South (ibid.). However, such framing of an FFP can be regarded as an attempt to “save” women of the Global South which can be labelled as “feminist imperialism” (Zilla 2022, 6).

Among German feminists there was a strong call for a shift in foreign policy and security policy from state-oriented to human-oriented, with an emphasis on the power dynamics represented in both approaches and a distinct attention to the ethics of care (Dinkel, Schirwon and Stamm 2022; Lunz 2023; Ruppert 2022). Although important for feminist conceptualisation of security, stressing human security for the sake of differentiating it from state-oriented security also creates a dichotomy. Thus, human security in public discourse becomes fruitful ground for securitisation resulting in overstretching of the security concept, and a universalist view that further ignores the gender-specific power disparity (Zilla 2024,

13) both between men and women, but also within diverse groups of men and women. However, the concept of FFP is believed to share a human rights core and a minimum transformative claim related to gender relations (Ruppert 2022, 501). As a result, Kristina Lunz, one of the creators of the German FFP on the NGO side, sees the reorientation in foreign policy and security as a step away from a realist paradigm of the “anarchy of states”, and a patriarchal status quo that equates security with military security and is based on the realist paradigm (Redaktion Femina Politica 2022, 108). However, the relationship between the development of a defence and security policy and a FFP is particularly intense from the perspective of anti-militarism that so often carries the label “feminist” (Reineke and Zilla 2024, 23). If the tension between the militaristic patriarchal reality and the self-proclamation of disarmament and care as crucial postulates of a FFP can hardly be reconciled in “times of peace”, during conflict and wartime their relationship becomes an unsolvable paradox (Ruppert 2022, 504). The outcome can then create an incoherence in Germany’s foreign policy due to its lucrative position as the fifth-largest arms exporter who safeguards nuclear weapons (Wezeman et al. 2024). The commitment to a FFP entails a substantial expansion of analytical perspectives, a rigorous (power-)critical analysis of the categories and criteria used and a review of priorities. (Zilla 2024,17).

Dinkel, Schirwon and Stamm (2022, 3) distinguish three schools of opinions that have emerged in the public discourse on FFP in Germany: 1) the normative-activist school that prescribes a FFP derived from the utopian vision of a world free of violence, where arms exportation and the logic of military deterrence represent mere examples of deeply embedded patriarchal structures; 2) the pragmatic school, to which the current coalition government belongs, which claims that arms exports are compatible with FFP but failed to articulate how and why, as well as to find the measures suitable for a short-term implementation of FFP in a crisis situation; and 3) the conservative school⁷ which considers FFP an unrealistic utopia of the German foreign policy elite. This school criticises the first school for no success in dealing with the Ukrainian situation and the second school for not making any substantial contributions to the debate on arms and mobilisation of support.

With regards to the foreign policy behaviour of Germany towards Russia and Ukraine, it is the second school that justifies the arms exports to Ukraine under the pretext of exercising the principles of “rights”. This means that due to the extent of Russian aggression in

⁷ Also refers to itself as the “realist school”

Ukraine, the endangered and marginalised group have a right to fight back, and Germany, as stated earlier, has the moral obligation to help them. These debates show how the German FFP is valorised against the backdrop of increased militarisation in Germany fuelled by the war in Ukraine. Uta Ruppert (2022) claims that the reason why German FFP is being publicly discussed in Germany is because it is being questioned for its ability to provide solutions in times of war. She claims that most of these debates never include the patriarchal masculinist analysis and logics of war itself (ibid., 500). This means that a feminist foreign policy is being discussed not for its legitimacy, but for the purpose of discarding it as unfit to provide effective solutions in a militaristic setting, thus reinforcing militarisation as the true and proper way to deal with the aggressor. Therefore, according to Ruppert (ibid.) FFP in Germany represents *rhetorical-legitimising marginalia* because there is little room for an honest feminist foreign policy turn in a context that was caused by a newly-found valorisation of militarised masculinities. There cannot be a substantial critique of militarisation without a critique of the state, and subsequently nationalism as a form of power relation – all highly gendered. Discarding feminism as a tool for conflict resolution played a bigger role in the German public discourse than criticising the patriarchal masculinist logic of war that exacerbates nationalism and racism (ibid.).

Although the FFP document itself contains a clause that embraces militarisation, Hauschild and Stamm (2024, 298-9) claim that there is provision for this document to be amended, as the guidelines operate on the self-descriptive principle of being a “living document”, thus providing room for the adoption of constructive feminist criticism. It is up to the coalition government to adapt its foreign policy tools and mechanisms to respond to the ongoing wars, crises and apartheid with respect to the feminist principles it vowed to adhere to.

The scholarship on feminist foreign policy laid out in this subchapter carries a critical feminist note. It reiterates the necessity to contextualise a FFP within the national context, but also assesses the schools of thought that have developed as a reaction to the concept of FFP in Germany. Additionally, the literature showed that FFP’s conflict resolution capabilities are measured within a newly-found militarised landscape in Germany which discredits FFP as inapt from the very start. Many of the above-mentioned brilliant, feminist German authors and researchers have provided valuable writings on the topic of FFP. However, there is still very little literature on the embrace and endorsement of military means in a FFP document

itself, particularly in Germany, and the implications of such a development. Precisely this is the gap my research intends to fill. Prior to delving into deciphering this under-researched symbiosis, the last topic left for me to discuss is the turn to militarisation, what it entails and how it is regarded from feminist perspectives.

2.4. Problematising Militarisation through a Feminist Lens

The previous subchapter provided insight into the contemporary writings on the German foreign policy identity and the impact of *Zeitenwende* on it. The speech by Olaf Scholz represented a change of times, which led to a militaristic shift in Germany's foreign and security policy. This subchapter focuses on explaining the concepts of militarisation and militarism and provides writings by influential feminist international relations authors who scrutinise these concepts.

A plethora of literature stresses the importance of distinguishing between the concepts of militarism and militarisation. Marek Thee from the Oslo International Peace Research Institute outlines the term militarism as “a rush to armaments, the growing role of the military (understood as the military establishment) in national and international affairs, the use of force as an instrument of prevalence and political power, and the increasing influence of the military in civilian affairs” (Thee 1977, 296). He in turn frames the term militarisation as “the extension of military influence to civilian spheres, including economy and socio-political life” (ibid.). Stavrianakis and Selby understand militarism as “the social and international relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, organised political violence[.]” (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013, 3).

Militarism and militarisation represent contested concepts, which have been steadily analysed mainly by feminist theorists, and works on securitisation (Mabee and Vucetic 2018, 96). Militarisation can also be regarded as a process of introduction and/or enhancement of military capabilities in the social sphere (Kinsella 2012, 105). This process includes preparations of, above all, weapon procurement in which the government aims to become better operationalised to employ military action against a foreign or domestic adversary; or it can represent the transformation of a government's relationship with another state with military force as the key component of the relationship (ibid.). There is a plethora of research that blends these two concepts, treating them as synonyms. There is also a flawed tendency to look at militarisation as a prerequisite for militarism although their particular connection is

more often than not reciprocal and mutually reinforcing instead of causal (Ross 1987 quoted in Kinsella 2012, 106).

Endorsement of militarisation and women's "right to fight" has its supporters in the broad feminist school of thought, situated in the liberal feminist realm (Kennedy-Pipe 2017, 23). This entails women's rights to exercise their freedom and citizenship in a democracy through equal participation in military activities and serving. Authors like Woollacott (1996) who support the participation of women in war and militarisation claim that by doing so, women actually exercise their rights as citizens. However, it is necessary to analyse what happens after militarised conflicts end, and not to disregard the fact that historically, the victory of militarised groups led to a significant drawback on women's human rights (Enloe 2023). Such a turn of events relies on the passivity of women, reflecting the fact that there is a need to revoke their rights means that women were never fully autonomous in exercising them to begin with. This implies a gendered hierarchy in which women are inferior to men, particularly to militarised masculinities that are glorified during and after conflict. Therefore, with the amount of literature that connects masculinities and militarisation, it may remain somewhat puzzling how Germany reconciled military means as a legitimate tool of foreign policy with feminist principles that centre gender equality in practice.

The puzzle arises mainly from the deep interconnectedness of militarisation and the superiority of masculinity. These two concepts are often regarded as two sides of the same coin (Speck 1998). Michael Mann writes that during wartime conceptions of masculinity played a significant role in the way statesmen carried themselves and made decisions, based on their distinctive fear of being regarded as weak and therefore ridiculed, with status and masculinity concerns being both national and personal (Mann 2012, 134). The relationship between militarism and masculinity is explained through the former's creation and valorisation of proactive and aggressive militarised masculinity over passive, naive and emotional femininity. (Eichler 2014). In a patriarchal society⁸ gender order creates an authoritative, prone-to-coercion masculinity and a submissive and nurturing femininity – an order perfectly suited to militarist societies (Cockburn 2010b, 108). Militarisation then indicates a sort of "coming of age", as Anderson (2010, 30) puts it. Anderson claims that the pursuit of militarisation serves as a mechanism for asserting international identity, carrying a sort of maturity with it (ibid.). This resembles the process of asserting dominance – a process

⁸ Arguably, every single one is.

usually associated with masculinity – and denouncing passivity, which is regarded as feminine. Militarisation, therefore, works solely with exclusionary binaries of masculinity and femininity, thus creating a hierarchy among the two while relying on and valorising masculinity for its own fulfilment. Sandra Via (2010, 43) identifies this as a “power hierarchy” which occurs even among different masculinities and femininities. There is a distinct superiority of masculine values in the military (ibid.), and women who enter it are asked to showcase their masculinity through physical readiness and adoption of masculine social norms (Cohn 2000). Militarism feeds off men’s willingness to prove their masculinity by soldiering, just as much as it requires women to take up mothering, caregiving and unpaid domestic labour (Kennedy-Pipe 2017, 27).

Frazer and Hutchings (2014) wrote a consequential article using the works and writings of Sara Ruddick to analyse the controversies between anti-militarist feminism and its criticism coming from radical feminists. Feminism and pacifism are connected, among other ways, through their joint recognition of causality between patriarchy, war and violence; the structural violence and the encapsulation of war in the international system, and a commitment to the development and adherence to non-violent ways of resisting domination (ibid., 113). Critics of feminist pacifists among radical feminists did not support violence as a viable tool for feminist struggles, but they never entirely ruled it out either (ibid., 114). They claimed that the focus on anti-militarism misses the feminist point, and that the concept of non-violence does not matter in the context of the ongoing patriarchal war against women, which was central and primary for radical feminists (ibid., 114-15). Instead, they claim that feminism shouldn’t deal with war as such, but with the war against women, blaming pacifistic feminists for reinforcing the socially constructed gender roles of women as inherently peaceful (ibid.).

Arguments against the inherent nature of pacifism of women can be seen, for example, in the works of feminist just war theory authors. The feminist just war theory entails a justifiable use of military violence in cases of injustice and subversion (Frazer and Hutchings 2014, 17). The radical feminist position can be interpreted in a way that frames women’s lives through the concept of everyday militarisation, where even during “peaceful times” there is a never-ending war against women. Cynthia Enloe (2007; 2023) develops this concept further, which will be laid out in the theoretical review chapter.

Despite men representing the majority of victims that fall in battle, women are disproportionately affected by war as nurturers and serve as direct targets of sexual and all other forms of gender-based violence, burdened by food, shelter, vulnerability and other consequences of indirect violence (Duncanson 2017, 40). Women's worth in conflict settings and militarised societies is often valued exclusively against their fulfilment of roles as mothers, wives and caregivers. One of the main features of the military is the hierarchy of the chain of command; the same goes for militarisation. Militarisation operates on patriarchy that produces dominant masculinities that can sustain it. The domestic femininity is the type of femininity that best serves militaristic purposes because it prepares sons for the international (war) and daughters for the domestic (caretaking).

Militarisation attempts instituted as a direct response to a crisis only fuels its consequences and causes instead of resolving them (Hoijtink and Mühlenhoff 2020, 373). The European Union (EU) specifically is no exception to this. The way in which militarism protrudes the EU's social and political domain are always highly gendered, painting the EU as a masculine military power (Hoijtink and Mühlenhoff 2020, 364). Rather than coming as a surprising change, this is a continuity of the EU's identity, where the current crises narrative is used to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and thus normalise militarisation and militarised masculinities (ibid.). I will argue that the same processes are happening in Germany. In line with this, Speck claims that no anti-militarism that takes itself seriously will fall into the patriarchal trap, reminding that this entails a radical break from masculinity which represents the core tenet of anti-militarism's theoretical analysis and political practice (ibid., 7). How and whether this maxim affected the German antimilitarist foreign policy identity will be scrutinised in the analysis and discussion chapter.

The feminist label of foreign policies is considered to contain wider ethical implications and criticism of patriarchal, racial, colonial and other power relations situated within societies in the literature on FFP. In light of this, existing scholarship showed that FFPs can be used to reiterate commitment to liberal democracy, sometimes even without any substantial changes in foreign policy behaviour. However, the German foreign policy scholarship explains that the change in security architecture that came with Russia's invasion of Ukraine threatens to distance Germany from its anti-militarism foreign policy pillar, thus reshaping its foreign policy identity. Complementary to this, Germany has introduced a FFP as a way to bring about change in their foreign policy action, but scholarship shows that even the German FFP

is valorised against the backdrop of increasing militarisation following the *Zeitenwende* speech. As shown above, the literature on feminist anti-militarisation identifies the process of militarisation as a patriarchally-intertwined process that favours the concept of hard, military security over human security and reliance on diplomacy as an efficient foreign policy tool. In turn, this process initiates a reversal to socially-constructed gendered notions of the dominant, capable, rational and aggressive masculinity versus the submissive, incapable, emotional and nurturing femininity.

With only a small number of German female authors writing about the implications of the militarisation turn on the German FFP, the specific clause about the embrace of militarisation in the document itself represents a research gap which I aim to fill with this thesis. Seeing as the development of these events is still fairly recent, substantial scrutiny of such a development is always useful. Although there is a plethora of literature on the relationship between feminism and (anti-)militarism, it is always beneficial to contribute to this body of work with a country-specific, contextual analysis. In addition, despite the vast number of authors writing about the implications of *Zeitenwende* on Germany's foreign and domestic policy and identity, there is a general shortage of researches that apply a feminist lens to these issues. Thus, applying a feminist approach to contribute to existing scholarship remains crucial and necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the issues of foreign policy and security, which is precisely one of the main goals of this thesis. Subsequently, the few German authors who have already applied this lens (mostly women) have focused on an analysis of the process of militarisation that came with the *Zeitenwende* and its implications for the feminist foreign policy. However, the discursive practices around these particular implications are not researched enough, or in fact not at all. The lack of research, therefore, also informed the choice on research methodology for this thesis. As part of my intention to research these occurrences, I have crafted a conceptual framework stemming from the meaningful legacy of the influential feminist IR author Cynthia Enloe. The next segment focuses on the work of Cynthia Enloe whose crucial concepts and ideas will be used to analyse the interplay of militarisation and feminist foreign policy in Germany.

3. Blueprints of Theory: Constructing a Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, I will employ a distinctly feminist conceptual framework for the analysis. Therefore, the theoretical framework of this thesis will rely entirely on the ideas and concepts of renowned feminist International Relations author Cynthia Enloe. Enloe claims that theory can be regarded as an explanatory generalisation that goes beyond particularity (Enloe 2004, 88). Hence, her efforts to theorise militarisation, patriarchy and globalisation by centring women prove to be the most adequate choice of framework through which to analyse the research question of this thesis. Following Enloe's footsteps, my goal is to magnify feminist conceptualisation and especially women's lived experiences. Her writings are particularly important for this thesis, as it assesses feminist foreign policy – a set of documents, speeches, practices and mechanisms with inherent ethical implications of the aforementioned approaches and concepts. That is why I consider it relevant to scrutinise a symbiosis of militarisation and FFP that may be labelled as paradoxical.

Cynthia Enloe and her advocacy for feminist curiosity led her, and subsequently me, to question occurrences that are accepted as “realistic workings of the world”, uncritically and under the pretext of inevitability. For her, feminist curiosity entails substantial questioning on the workings of feminised and masculinised constructions and meanings (Enloe 2004, 2020). Enloe describes feminist analysis as a subtle and sophisticated act that seriously addresses the variety of complexities that make up the heterogeneous group that is women (Enloe 2004). A feminist foreign policy analysis is therefore, not naive but rather dependant on systemic curiosity that poses questions about subjects deemed irrelevant or difficult (*ibid.*), affecting women, their rights, their relationships and their roles in society. To frame it in Enloe's style, feminist curiosity shines a spotlight on the ways in which the state manoeuvres women into positions of complicity with militarisation, and more broadly how it manoeuvres gender norms for those same purposes. Enloe's meaningful work on militarised prostitution, marriage, rape as a war-waging tactic, and women's participation in industrialisation processes are all substantial and traces thereof can be found in this thesis. Since this thesis mainly analyses narratives around: patriarchy, militarisation, and militarised

masculinity, the primary focus will be Enloe's ideas that contribute directly to answering the research question in the context of the *Zeitenwende* caused by the war in Ukraine.

3.1. Patriarchy

As my initial assumption is that the embrace of militarisation in FFP perpetuates patriarchal values, in order to understand the discourses created around the concept of feminist foreign policy, I will firstly present Enloe's conceptualisation of patriarchy. As a feminist researcher, it is personally unimaginable to delve into the study of IR without providing a dissection of power, the relations it creates, its perpetuation, its gatekeeping, and its particular relation to patriarchy. Patriarchy is a term that helps to interpret the notions of both masculinity and femininity while revealing patterns of causation (Cohn and Enloe 2003, 1192). It is rarely self-perpetuating, depends on decisions often masked as tradition, and often relies on women internalising it (*ibid.*) This is where feminist curiosity comes along. By employing a feminist analysis of power relations, there is a unique opportunity to question the types, sites and levels of powers engaged in the creation of structures and belief systems that "prop up the complex patriarchal international political system" (Enloe 2017, 61). For Enloe, patriarchy is a searchlight that illuminates the bond between gendered misogyny, racialised sexism and masculine privilege; bonds that otherwise stay in the dark (Enloe 2017, ix-x). Patriarchy is deep-rooted and Enloe defines it as, "... a particular complex web of both attitudes and relationships that position women and men, girls and boys in distinct and unequal categories, that value particular forms of masculinity over virtually all forms of femininity, and –this is crucial – that ensure that men who fulfil these favoured forms of manliness will be able to assert control over most women" (*ibid.*, 49). On top of embodying everyday sexism, patriarchy goes beyond sexism; it both embraces and goes beyond misogyny as well, leaving a trail of consequences more cavernous than gender inequality (*ibid.*, 16). On one hand, these values entail a constructed valorisation of manly forms of leadership and, on the other hand, they mainly praise women who perform roles as mothers, caretakers and wives (Enloe 2017, 18).

Patriarchy operates on dichotomous values that it itself perpetuates. These values assign merit to reason instead of emotion, to tradition and family loyalty over other forms of commitment (Enloe 2017, 18). It is a system that involves links between militarised masculinities and militarised femininities to assert dominance of the former, while subordinating the latter (Cockburn and Enloe 2012, 553). To say that patriarchy favours

masculinity exclusively would be an ill-conceived conclusion, because the perpetuation of patriarchy does depend on femininity to sustain it. Whether it valorises masculinity over femininity, or whether it awards certain types of masculinity and femininity over their other forms, patriarchy relies entirely on the creation of hierarchies. Nonetheless, patriarchy does now permit women a seat at the table, but it is often those who, above all, internalise masculinised ways of thinking and acting, paired with women who complement but never challenge or surpass the privilege of masculinities (Enloe 2017, 22). Patriarchy does not only entail the brutal subordination and blatant devalorisation of women. In order to sustain itself, it needs to covertly create relationships that involve feelings of gratitude, suspicion, trust, loyalty and even compassion, making it easy to slip into supporting it (Enloe 2017, 23). It draws women in by making them overlook their own marginalisation and replaces this with protection and security (Enloe 2000, 274). Women who support such a system will acquire marital economic security, societal respect, will be showered in praise for their femininity, and especially their loyalty in roles that relate directly to men (Enloe 2017, 49). Precisely because patriarchy is sustained through a variety of complex (in)formal relationships, it has earned the badges of sustainability and flexibility (Enloe 2017, 49).

Enloe adopts the feminist argument “personal is political” to “personal is international” to indicate that women’s personal issues are also international issues that require international and political solutions (Enloe 2014). Patriarchy is one issue that transcends states’ borders. Likewise, occurrences and tendencies in international politics can be identified as patriarchal by unravelling their valorisation of certain forms of masculinities through the processes of power-, status- and material-rewards redistribution (Enloe 2017, 55). On the one hand, it favours a type of domicile femininity conceptualised through servitude and roles related to men and consequently, the country. Most notably, the tendency to regard women as inseparable from children through the “women and children” constellation while speaking of marginalisation represents a particularly patriarchal elision (ibid., 41). On the other hand, through the process of feminisation, anything can and will be stripped of authority and autonomy; considered inferior and exploited by the masculinised (Enloe 2017, 55). A power relations analysis is, therefore, central to uncovering the full extent of patriarchy. This is where feminist curiosity comes along. By employing a feminist analysis of power relations, there is a unique opportunity to question the types, sites and levels of powers engaged in the creation of structures and belief systems that “prop up the complex patriarchal international political system” (Enloe 2017, 61). However, if patriarchy is perceived as a

dynamic web of ideas and relationships, its dynamic nature testifies to its adaptability. The performativity in proponents of patriarchy is assumed in their efforts to reinvent patriarchy as new, reformed and sometimes even revolutionary (ibid., 21). Beyond changing times and trends, patriarchy persists and Enloe claims it is useful to conceptualise this as “sustainable patriarchy” (ibid., 16). That being said – just because something persists, does not mean it is invincible. Women across the world and across the ages have challenged patriarchal systems, impositions and subordination to reach where we stand today. In true feminist fashion, it is always a good time for women to stop and think about the women that came before us; what battles they fought for us, and the heritage they left to us.

Enloe asks important questions about the existence of a non-patriarchal state when analysing the male privilege displayed at all levels of public authority. For feminists, the constituents of a state represented in publicness, authority, sovereignty, and exclusive rights to coercion are fertile conditions similar to those that privilege masculinity in a patriarchal society (Enloe 2000, 273). These conditions are specifically created in a world of realist politics. This means that patriarchy is a proponent of the dichotomising zero-sum game in which one side’s victory is the other’s loss (Enloe 2017, 141). Patriarchy hinges on not being questioned, not being challenged and on inflicting the notion that it will never go away. Yet feminists oppose these efforts by labelling patriarchy as man-made, thus entirely susceptible to change; however, this process will need to heavily depend on the employment of feminist beliefs and curiosity (Enloe 2017, 160).

3.2. Militarisation

Assuming the role of a feminist investigator entails a deep dive into the militarising structures and cultural tendencies caused by militarisation while shining a light on the complicity that helps perpetuate it (Enloe 2017). In this paper I scrutinise the concept of militarisation and its implications for FFP in Germany, regarding militarisation as an act of perforation of the economic, socio-political and ethical spheres with the goal of creating patriarchal power structures that sustain it. The reason for this is my identification of this concept as more suitable due to its influence on the public and official discourse and its unique function of (re)shaping gendered social norms, which are precisely the subjects of my research.

For Enloe, militarisation represents “... a sneaky process that intertwines ideas, relationships and practices”; a process that transforms cultural, institutional, ideological and economical societal aspects (Enloe 2000, 3) while creeping in and slowly assuming power (Enloe 2023, 136). It is a step-by-step process fuelled by ideas that transform individuals, institutions and communities in a way that makes them dependable on militaristic ideas for their wellbeing (Enloe 2000, 3; Enloe 2023, 66). Precisely because it depends on ideas which can militarise almost anything⁹, it can be easy to lapse into it. Enloe claims that anything can be militarised “to the extent that it is based on admiration or assumptions of military values, money, protection, imagery, equipment, patronage or mindsets” (Enloe 2023, 136). Since it is a sociopolitical process, the roots of militarisation run “deep down into the soil of a society” (Enloe 2004, 219). Research and analysis of militarisation, particularly of the feminist kind, allow for the questioning of socially-constructed silences – to analyse, for example, the process of equating good soldiers (mostly male) to first-class citizens or expanding NATO for democratisation purposes (Enloe 2000, 32). Such research also provides room to frame the demands of NATO imposed on its members as militarising manoeuvres resulting in increased profitability for the defence industry (ibid., 9). However, Enloe (2004, 125-6) claims that increasing the defence budget while having NATO as a primary protector and builder of European security decreases public officials’ vulnerability. In contrast, Enloe (2023, 157) highlights that NATO was just as important of a destabiliser of Ukrainian independence and women’s authentic security as Russia in the year leading up to the invasion.

Since militarisation relies on the everlasting admiration of masculinised military institutions, it tends to shrink the analytical plane informed especially by feminist scepticism, using such silence to further its perpetuation (Enloe 2014, 7). This shows that the transformation caused by militarisation relies on very specific, patriarchal ideas – about security, belonging, caring and above all about men and women (Enloe 2023, 137). The process needs to be advanced by specific measures at the decision-making level, coming from

⁹ “A teenage girl can be militarized if she begins to imagine a man in military uniform as an attractive mate. So can a professional sport, if its executives begin using battlefield metaphors to make games more exciting to sponsors and fans. An advertising agency can be militarized if its business strategies depend on attracting defence contractors as clients. So can a marriage, if that relationship begins to rely on the civilian wife absorbing the labor expectations imposed by her soldier-husband’s employer. Professors can be militarized if they accept defence ministry research funding in exchange for keeping their findings out of the public domain. Ideas matter. Anything can become partially or fully militarized to the extent that it is based on admiration or assumptions of military values, money, protection, imagery, equipment, patronage or mindsets. “(Enloe 2023, 136).

generals but also base commanders, physicians, recruiters, mayors, social scientists, UN Officials, ethnic and/or religious community leaders, advertising companies, legislators, and opposition leaders (Enloe 2000, 292). Nothing is automatic about the process of militarisation because it is comprehensive and dependent on military institutions and bases its value on military criteria (ibid., 291).

This process can happen in every single structure of a society – from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to the government, parliament, marginalised groups in a society, etc. Often when a person, government branch, or ethnic group start being militarised it means that they express dependency on military goals which appear to rise in value; but in reality, militarisation causes a huge loss of control and of sense of self-worth (Enloe 2004, 146). What once may have begun as insurgence and freedom fighting, turns into an infliction of violence that often does not and cannot discriminate based on age, gender, religion or ethnicity. Due to its conniving and covert nature, the devastating consequences of militarisation sometimes become visible only after the process of demilitarisation has begun (Enloe 2004, 146). Nonetheless, militarisation is neither invincible nor is it unstoppable (Enloe 2023, 146). Since militarisation as the process of valorisation itself is socially constructed, it is very possible to halt the process of militarisation. This would, however, require an in-depth gendered deconstruction of the power relations and hierarchies that militarisation produces.

Enloe assembled a great test to evaluate if militarisation of women is occurring in the explicative example of the US invasion of Afghanistan. She reiterates that if concerns for women's wellbeing under the pretext of "protection of women's rights" are only instrumentalised to justify military occupation, then these women are militarised (ibid.). This implies that worth is assigned to attacks on women's rights only when they represent a justification for military activity against the constructed enemy. I will build further on this argument for the specific case of Germany's interference in the Ukrainian war in the discussion chapter.

For Enloe, there is particular importance in remembering the rewards militarisation brings with it, one of them being popular support for measures that were formerly challenged (2004, 147). Additionally, one of the first outcomes of foreign policy militarisation is the silencing of women's voices entailing the imposition of naturalness of masculinity and a tightened grip on masculine ownership of political influence – all while women's space for

political influence significantly shrinks (Enloe 2004, 128). Subsequently, governments count on the complicity of women in order to militarise their policies and operations (Cockburn and Enloe 2012, 552).

In turn, the “genderness of militarisation” implies “natural” rationality of men who do not let emotions overcome them; they will “teach naive women about the militarized ways of the world” (Enloe 2023, 137). Naivety, according to Enloe, is the antonym of rationality – a deeply feminised concept often attributed to women, necessarily to those who oppose militarism and militarisation (Enloe 2023, 140). Consequently, the military has the power to define national security, understood as the imposition of social order necessary to ensure said national security, thus invoking gendered definitions that constitute social order to further perpetuate ideological militarism (*ibid.*). Enloe warns that it is precisely during peacetime – that is defined in terms of national security and an obsession with defence – that military institutions implement intense recruitment programmes (Enloe 1988, 123). In addition, when military expenditures become a primacy, difficulties in maintaining budgetary commitments for social security and services are aggravated (Enloe 2023, 155). Kindergartens, public hospitals, centres for social work, schools, and social housing are pushed aside and priority is given to military spending and mobilisation (*ibid.*). With the possibility of acquiring substantial financial, labour and material resources, the military’s budget appetite can significantly mangle a state’s public spending structure (Enloe 1988, 12). It is important to analyse budgets and the arms industry in order to demystify militarisation, which is then set in the broader socio-political and economic context, while clarifying dynamics of IR research (Enloe 1988, 207).

Nonetheless, not everything is militarised all the time. According to Enloe (2000, 4), it is vastly different whether we use a gun to hunt for essential nutrition or whether that same weapon is used for ensuring a specific type of security, reiteration of a masculinised self-expression or confirmation of masculinised ownership of first-class citizenship resting on the right to inflict violence. The proliferation of particularly small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a serious issue, and in contexts of war and conflict it aggravates gender-based violence (GBV) due to misuse. Men who possess SALWs, even if not fired, exacerbate masculinised intimidation of the women in their families (Enloe 2023, 136). Nonetheless, to imagine the process of militarisation only through “government-directed overt violence” or war would be wrong (Enloe 2000, 2). Throughout her work, Enloe (1988, 2000, 2004, 2014,

2023) portrays the lives of military wives, military prostitutes, military nurses and rape survivors to show that the process of militarisation can enchant many people without ever forcing them to take up a rifle.¹⁰ It is hard to both track and uproot militarisation due to its pervasiveness (Enloe 2000, 3). Feminist analysis of this process can prove valuable in shining a light on the process, actors, relationships, causes and effects of militarisation – in the end it is a feminist tradition to ask tough questions and be curious.

Militaries are heavily reliant on women in a plethora of ways, but not all women are militarised the same way.¹¹ Women who have internalised militarisation have close to no awareness of being manoeuvred while talking about opportunities, love, liberation and belonging (Enloe 2000, 36). For them, militarisation may mean integration, but Enloe (2000, 285) warns that this often means marginalisation.¹² It is a process that relies on women not realising the dynamics of these manoeuvres. But militarisation is not oppressive for all women everywhere all the time; if it didn't advance some women its potency would be insignificant (Enloe 2000, 297). These advantages then become a hurdle for unification of women against militarisation (ibid., 298). Nevertheless, militarisation as a highly masculine process withholds acknowledgments from those who do not constitute the ideal archetype. Thus, the formula Enloe found that worked for male-led militaries consists of exploiting women and their war-waging, putting them in roles that militarised masculinities deem patriarchally appropriate, simultaneously marginalising those women while “jealously preserving the masculinised privileging of soldiers” (Enloe 2023, 49).

3.3. Militarised Masculinities

Scrutinising the concept of militarised masculinities reveals how occurrences in international relations related to conflict and war are deeply gendered processes with different

¹⁰ “Yet what the exploration of the lives of military wives and of women working as military prostitutes reveals for us is that militarization creeps into ordinary daily routines; it threads its way amid memos, laundry, lovemaking, and the clinking of frosted beer glasses. Militarization is such a pervasive process, and thus so hard to uproot, precisely because in its everyday forms it scarcely looks life threatening” (Enloe 2000,3).

¹¹ “Militaries have needed, and continue to need, some women to provide commercialized sexual services to male soldiers, other women to commit themselves to marital fidelity in military families; simultaneously, they need still other women to find economic security and maybe even pride in working for defense contractors. At times governments even need some civilian women to act as feminist lobbyists promoting women's right to serve in the state's military” (Enloe 2000, xii).

¹² “Women who have pursued full militarization have felt as though they are participating in a feminist endeavour because they have been called on to think hard about the nature of their state's patriarchal assumptions and to endure misogynist ridicule” (Enloe 2000, 285-6).

and often disproportionate roles and effects on men and women (Enloe 2000). Namely, Enloe pictures masculinity and militarism as two knitting needles knitting the sock of militarisation (Enloe 2004, 133). Therefore, to embody militarised masculinity is to be a man legitimised as a protector, main actor, rational strategist (Enloe 2004, 154). Military structures everywhere count on men and boys to adopt the socially constructed gendered norm that carry double expectations (Enloe 2023, 38). On the one hand, men are required by militaries to internalise the need for proving their manliness to themselves and everyone else (ibid.). In a patriarchal society, men must work hard not to be feminised and brought down to a manly figure that lacks character to exercise public authority (Enloe 2023, 140). On the other hand, the same militaries also depend on boys and men to view soldiering as a way to prove their manliness (Enloe 2023, 39). They count on men undertaking the gendered norms they were socialised for and to further perpetuate it as they grow for military purposes.

The appeal of militarised masculinity is the construction of soldiering as a ticket to first-class citizenship which is obtained by embodying the patriotic idea of dying for one's own country, which puts them on a higher hierarchical pedestal than male civilians (ibid.). In a militarised society, sentences like "be a man" are aimed at boys and men in situations where they are expected to, for example, inflict violence, make a decision about enlisting, use weapons, beat their wives who "don't listen", or exercise state-ordained superiority. Rationalisation of the use of force has a unique function to justify militarisation to normalise hierarchy, masculinism, and a culture of fear and threats (Enloe 2004, 184). However, the fact that men-hungry militaries sometimes struggle to recruit men leads to a conclusion that masculinity and militarism are not inextricably linked (Enloe 2000, 245). Hearing horror stories about sacrifices and initiation practices wouldn't make men enlist if they had a choice (ibid.). This is why the state needs to find a political tool with which to assign worth to serving in the military by distancing it from slavery (ibid.). This entails a symbiosis of military service with "first-class" citizenship (Enloe 2000, 245) that if left unquestioned, further perpetuates a masculinised value system. But this shaping process is not an automatic process; it needs to be constructed, initiated and fuelled for all purposes.¹³

Military policy-makers, state officials and especially military recruiters are identified by Cynthia Enloe as the main protagonists of militarising masculinities. In order to

¹³ Enloe gives an example of a study on artificiality of the connection between manhood and soldiering from South Africa. She explains that Zulu men have been encouraged by the leaders of the Inkatha movement to deliberately draw their ethnicised manhood from the performance of warrior roles (Enloe 2004, 109).

sustainably secure men for the military, these actors have to control the notions of both femininities and masculinities (2000, 235). These actors' actions are driven by their intention to preserve state security by manipulating such notions (Enloe 2004, 171). Enloe warns that such manipulations can often be found at the core of shaping foreign policy decision making (Enloe 2004, 152). Militarisation itself depends on very particular patriarchal ideas about both men and women, specifically on a very particular notion of masculine (Enloe 2023, 137). On top of it all, a wide variety of cover-ups, denial, distorted logic, hypocritical patriotism, racist stereotyping, coercion and misogyny are needed to keep the ranks overflowing with men (Enloe 2023, 40). Masculinity as an idea, and a militarised one at that, allows men (but not all men) as individuals to pick the long-lasting fruits of the militarisation tree (Enloe 2004, 133), which are forbidden for women.

A militarised masculinity is just one model of a variety of masculinities. Although, in patriarchal societies, hierarchies and dichotomies require a definition of masculinity antithetical to its inferior counterpart. Thus, militarised masculinity is complimented by militarised femininity stripped of its active and assertive participation in public life (Enloe 2004, 218). However, studying the workings of masculinities often coincides with an underestimation of power. Mainstream IR researchers and commentators sideline power relations to control the gendering of international politics including migration, marriage, citizenship, trade, as well as militarisation and armed conflict (Enloe 2017). In addition, masculinity and its showcasing through war is often in the centre of events, whereas femininity and women are pushed to the back despite their significant implications in these processes (Enloe 2000).

By employing feminist curiosity to ask questions about the circumstances and the level of feminine denigration under which armed conflicts are occurring, it is possible to reframe the dangerous notion about heroism and inevitability that comes with war (Enloe 2017, 85). The militaristic manoeuvring of women has been pivotal in the militarisation of governments, international relations and men themselves (Enloe 2000, 10). States are required to think about femininities and masculinities and how to manoeuvre them to achieve the militarising goal. Militarising actors shape ideas on acceptable forms of masculinity and femininity, with the latter being a necessary object of policy and persuasion through the feminised ideas of respectability, duty, sexuality and skills (Enloe 2000, 294). "Women's

wars are not men's wars"¹⁴ (Enloe 2023, 9). To say that women and men do not have similar experiences shouldn't create a hierarchical struggle or face-off. Enloe says that it is necessary to differentiate these to understand the genderness of militarisation and its effects on different groups (Enloe 2023, 18). It is the shaping of feminine respectability, patriotism, and attractiveness that enables legitimacy and persuasiveness of creating standards of manliness (Enloe 2004, 109).

After highlighting the relevant concepts found in Enloe's research, I will lay out the methodological approach chosen to scrutinise militarisation, FFP in Germany and their interplay.

¹⁴ "A woman's war starts when, as a girl, she is taken out of primary school to care for her younger siblings, enabling her parents to pay for her brother's school fees, or helping her mother collect water from further and further away due to drought. A woman's war starts when her peacetime government passes a law setting a female's age of lawful marriage at thirteen. A woman's war starts when a judge dismisses her charges of wife battering as trivial" (Enloe 2023, 15).

4. Methodological Tapestry: Methods and Research Design

4.1. Critical Deconstruction of Discourses: A Case Study Approach

This thesis is organised as a single case study with the intention of employing a qualitative critical discourse analysis method and pairing it with pre-existing quantitative sets of data on the paradigmatic case of Germany. Conducting research using a case study contributes to a researcher's personal understanding of the analysed environment (Lamont 2022, 212). In this sense, employing a case study allows for comprehensive and in-depth scrutiny of events, actors and relationships (Ebneyamini and Sadeghi Moghadam, 2018, 2). To this end, I have chosen an interpretative research design that highlights the processes of identification and exploration of the social mechanisms that shape action in IR, while focusing on a specific event, place or time period, allowing for clarity in learning objectives (Lamont 2022, 223). The decision to analyse the single case of Germany represents a choice to utilise an exemplary case, with which the researcher can provide the reader a dubious exploration of particular social phenomena. Germany was, therefore, chosen intentionally due to its government-led rise in militarisation and the simultaneous introduction of a FFP. Nonetheless, these occurrences draw upon specific historic events and relationships that are tied to the national context. Therefore, it could be difficult to apply these findings to a different national context that has nothing in common with the German one, in the sense of national security, foreign policy identity, military capabilities and human-rights-related values. However, generalisations could be applied to certain NATO member countries, as Germany may not be the only country in western Europe whose foreign policy identity is constructed largely on its affiliation with NATO.

The main qualitative research method I will rely on to answer the research question and test my assumptions is critical discourse analysis. CDA will be helpful in illuminating the discourse surrounding the advocacy for and embracing of militarisation and military means to defend human lives. Hence, this qualitative method is useful for assessing how political realities and narratives are contextualised and constructed within public discourse (Hansen,

2006), and also offers a comprehensive analysis of public and official discourse. It aims to analyse social and/or political occurrences mediated by linguistics, distinguishing it from positivism (Nonhoff 2017 in Lamont 2022, 201). Significant to this thesis is CDA's focus on discourse that assesses power relations by offering a normative stance, with the ultimate goal of emancipation (ibid., 202). This will be illuminated in the constant challenges to power relations that come with feminist research as presented throughout this thesis which will honour the assessment of normative principles as one of its main goals.

As will be uncovered in this thesis, one of the explanations behind the changes in Germany's foreign policy behaviour lies in the (re)construction of its foreign policy identity. In her study of the discourse surrounding the war in Bosnia, Lene Hansen established a significant relationship between foreign policy and identity, which epitomises post-structuralist IR research (Hansen 2006, 1). Hansen claims that "foreign policies rely upon representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced" (ibid.,). Thus, researching foreign policy as a discursive practice entails a deep dive into the ways in which states understand and respond to the world around them by using language as a medium (ibid., 15). To this end, Hansen's discourse analysis models based on the concept of *intertextuality* will be used as methodological tools in this thesis through which to study the changes in German foreign policy and identity after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Coined by Julia Kristeva, the concept of intertextuality represents the notion that texts are situated within the wider historical and social context in which "each word (text) is an intersection of words (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read" (Kristeva 1980, 66). In other words, each text-whether a document, a speech, or an article- relies upon and is shaped by another text. Intertextuality can take an explicit form mostly through direct quotes and references to older texts (Hansen 2006, 50). However, in this thesis the main focus will be on the articulation of concepts (e.g. security, diplomacy, gender roles) which rely upon implicit referencing to a wide range of texts on the same subject, also known as *conceptual intertextuality* (Hansen 2006, 51). My intention in this analysis is to use conceptual intertextuality to uncover how a specific event, in this case Russia's invasion of Ukraine, compels the German political elite to rely upon older texts (narratives and discourses) in order to create new ones, while simultaneously reconstructing the older ones to fit the newly-

formed security and foreign policy goals. For these purposes, Hansen's 1st and 2nd intertextual models offer a great basis for further scrutiny.

The 1st intertextual model encompasses a scrutiny of official foreign policy discourse stemming from any government documents related to foreign policy, speeches by members of the government on this topic, and even high-ranked military personnel (Hansen 2006, 53-54). The goal of this model is to investigate identity construction within the official discourse and its stabilisation, as well as its behaviour towards criticism. (ibid.). This model will be utilised to paint a more comprehensive picture of the official discourse in Germany related to the relationship and symbiosis of militarisation and FFP. The 2nd intertextual lays out the grounds for examining the broader policy debate by stepping away from the officials and enriching the discourse analysis with input from the opposition and other involved actors to create a wider foreign policy debate (Hansen 2006, 54). This model, therefore, testifies to the public and political hegemony of official discourse, and therefore the space to manoeuvre that it has at its disposal (ibid.). Parliamentary debates are one of the most efficient places to search for oppositional discourse, as they offer longer statements that provide us with necessary contextualisation (ibid., 55).

At this stage it is necessary to point out that the word count limit of this thesis does not allow for an all-together, complete analysis of all the actors that Hansen identifies as contributors to the creation of public, oppositional and marginal discourse – that would require a PhD dissertation. In my research intention to problematise the symbiosis of militarisation and feminist foreign policy, I have strived to incorporate relevant actors and sources to offer a substantial analysis, while trying to avoid the trap of using too many research methods and too much material.

Finally, this thesis will also include quantitative data and statistics which serves to provide a comprehensive and well-rounded research. The overarching goal here is to further expand on Enloe's idea that militarisation can develop even in peacetime, through certain ideas and narratives, but more obviously through investment in the defence budget and divestment from fields such as education, health and social policy (Enloe 2023). This leaves room to prioritise certain values and expenditures over others, and in this process the patriarchy seldom loses. Although feminist researchers have long avoided quantitative approaches and data as they are generally associated with the positivist epistemology, Obradovic (2010) claims that they can be very useful especially when analysing gendered

issues in the military and security sector. This thesis will therefore employ several pre-existing datasets created by relevant and trustworthy data sources to answer the research question and test my assumptions. The intentions behind my decision to incorporate a quantitative component in this thesis in order to present a holistic analysis of the relationship between the concepts I examine, as well as to answer the research question as comprehensively as possible.

4.2. Empirical Material

Any resources assessed using CDA, including quantitative data, will be from the period when the traffic light coalition assumed power in November 2021 until the end of the 2023. The reason for the cut off at the end of 2023 is to create a distance between the research subject and the researcher that allows for the emergence of various sources and literature on the topic, thus providing space for increased maturity in assessment and argumentation. CDA reflected in Hansen's 1st intertextual model entails an analysis of primary sources such as: The Official Guidelines for Feminist Foreign Policy, the Feminist Development Policy, The Coalition Agreement, the National Security Strategy, Chancellor Scholz's *Zeitenwende* and his other speeches, speeches by ministers Lambrecht, Pistorius and Baerbock. All the official government documents are in German along with the government officials' speeches, with some speeches delivered by Minister Baerbock in English. To apply Hansen's 2nd intertextual model, I will use primary sources such as stenographic reports of parliamentary debates in the Bundestag about national and alliance defence, military spending, the war in Ukraine, diplomacy, feminism, military aid sent to Ukraine, the special fund for the Bundeswehr, National Security Strategy and (feminist) foreign policy. In my research, I have read a total of 63 stenographic reports from the 20th Bundestag sessions, representing more than 1500 pages. All the stenographic reports are in German. Particular attention was paid to linguistic constructions used by the MPs, any relations to the usage of masculinist logic, construction of diplomacy as naivety, favouring the *Realpolitik*, equating security with military capabilities and deterrence, as well as treatment of feminism. Finally, quantitative data was drawn from sources such as the German Federal Government's budget, SIPRI's publications on military expenditure and arms trade trends, as well as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (*Börse Frankfurt*). In the following chapter I will scrutinise findings from the sources I analysed.

5. Presenting the Bundespolitik: Political Context in Modern Germany

One of the main research subjects of this thesis is the discourse created by the German Federal Government officials and the members of the German *Bundestag* (Parliament),¹⁵ the lower of the two Federal Chambers. The constitution of the 20th German Bundestag was determined at the German federal elections on 16 September 2021. The party with the most votes was the SPD, (Social Democratic Party) with 25.7%, followed by the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union of Bavaria) with 24.1% of votes (Tangian 2022, 3). The BÜNDNIS 90/ DIE GRÜNEN (Alliance 90/The Greens-Grünen) received 14.8% of votes, the FDP (Free Democratic Party) 11.5%, the AfD (Alternative for Germany) 10.3%, and die Linke (The Left party) with 4.9% of votes (ibid.). On 24 November 2021, it was announced that the SPD, FDP and die Grünen will constitute a coalition, which would become known as the traffic light ¹⁶ coalition (Rinke and Marsh 2021). Thus, the CDU/CSU became an oppositional party, and a large one at that.

The first session of this newly-formed 20th Bundestag took place on 26 October 2021. With Angela Merkel's departure, her spot was taken by Olaf Scholz from the SPD. Scholz's cabinet was officially sworn in on 8 December 2021 in the Bundestag, comprised of a total of 16 members – 8 men and 8 women – not counting Scholz. Thus, chancellor Scholz managed to fulfil his election promises of achieving gender parity in the Federal Cabinet (Sichtermann, Sawicki and Rettig 2021). Respectively, this cabinet has seen the first ever female Foreign Minister – Annalena Baerbock from the Green Party. While the position of Finance Minister was assigned to Christian Lindner from the FDP, the Ministry of Defence was headed up by another woman, Christine Lambrecht from the SPD. Minister Lambrecht served the Federal Government until January 2023. As reported, she asked the chancellor to accept her notice because “the month-long attacks on her as a person halted the meaningful work of the soldiers” (Haferkamp 2023). Although this fired up a fierce debate in Germany, what fuelled it was the fact that instead of honouring the gender parity promise he reiterated after her dismissal, Scholz named Boris Pistorius from the SPD as Lambrecht's replacement.

¹⁵ From this point forward I will use the word Bundestag for the lower Federal Chamber throughout the thesis.

¹⁶ Due to the combination of these political parties' colours resembling a traffic light

Nonetheless, it was during Christina Lambrecht's service that the Russian troops invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Framed as a significant alteration of security architecture in Germany, the Russian invasion of Ukraine urged many countries, including Germany, to recalibrate their foreign and security policy. Just three days after this event, on 27 February 2022, Olaf Scholz made his *Zeitenwende* speech which would indicate a historical turning point for the security landscape in Europe and a discontinuity in Germany's foreign policy identity. The word *Zeitenwende* became a point of reference very quickly and was ultimately chosen as 2022's word of the year. In his speech, Scholz vowed to invest 2% of the GDP in the defence sector to honour Germany's obligation as a member of the NATO alliance. In addition, Scholz introduced the Federal Government's plan to establish the *Sondervermögen Bundeswehr*, or the special fund for the German Bundeswehr.¹⁷

In this thesis I argue – and the government officials themselves will confirm through their speeches – that this sequence of events strongly affected and reshaped Germany's foreign policy and security action. Nonetheless, Germany still made efforts to mainstream their commitments to human rights and gender equality by introducing two very important documents. One is the feminist foreign policy document titled “Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy: Guidelines of the Federal Foreign Office” introduced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by Annalena Baerbock. The second is the feminist development policy document titled “Feminist Development Policy: For Just and Strong Societies Worldwide”¹⁸ introduced by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development spearheaded by Svenja Schulze. Both of these documents were introduced in March 2023, securing Germany's spot on the list of countries that have either implemented FFP or are driven by feminist diplomacy. Correspondingly, Germany has become a leader in simultaneous development of feminist foreign and development policy.

Both the feminist foreign and development policy documents are modelled on Sweden's feminist foreign policy with 3 different guiding principles – “the 3 Rs” (Dinkel, Schirwon and Stamm 2022). The 3Rs: Rights, Representation and Resources are joined by Diversity as key principles indicating the policy makers' wish for an intersectional approach to achieving gender equality (Auswärtiges Amt 2023b). The document is comprised of ten guidelines and four different mechanisms that serve diplomats including, but not limited to,

¹⁷ The Federal Armed Forces; this term encompasses more than just the military units. From this point on, I will continue to use the word Bundeswehr for the German Federal Armed Forces.

¹⁸ The original title in German : “*Feministische Entwicklungspolitik : Für gerechte und starke Gesellschaften weltweit*”

peacebuilders, field workers, and all employees of the Federal Foreign Office in conducting foreign affairs. More on this document and its content will be presented in the analysis chapter of this thesis.

Nevertheless, 2023 has seen a lot of impactful policies introduced and drafted by the Federal Government of Germany, with all-out efforts to tackle inequalities and crises that have emerged in Europe, as well as worldwide. Another example of such a development is the introduction of the first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) document under Pistorius' term as Minister of Defence. With this document, the German Federal Government defined a comprehensive outlook on security as the guiding principle, identifying it as "integrated security". What this term entails, as well as the meaning and implications it has on Germany's defence actions and identity will be laid out further in the analysis and discussion chapters of this thesis.

After a brief overture into the German political context since the federal elections in 2021, the next chapter contains a detailed analysis and thorough discussion of the previously-mentioned sources achieved through reliance on a feminist conceptual framework paired with Hansen's CDA models of intertextuality and quantitative data as methodological tools.

6. Discursive Analysis and Discussion: Unpacking Discourses and Finances

6.1. Military Masculinities, Militarisation, and Valorisation of Diplomacy

After establishing a coalition, the three political parties drafted a Coalition Agreement at the end of 2021 aimed at defining their commitments and intentions for the period that they will serve in the parliament and the government (Bundesregierung 2021). Their view of foreign policy relied heavily on the pillar of multilateralism, reinforced by their intention to further develop both the military and political dimensions of NATO's European pillar and they identified the alliance itself as the indispensable foundation of German security (ibid., 115). Nuclear sharing was confirmed as a great interest to Germany under the same pillar. In this sense, the Coalition Agreement document insisted that Germany has a self-proclaimed role and responsibility for peace, freedom and prosperity in the world, and will thus consider the use of military force as an extreme measure that is always integrated into a realistic political approach to conflicts and their causes (ibid., 119). Subsequently, the traffic light coalition vowed to enshrine a more restrictive and transparent arms export policy at the EU level, thus reaffirming that they will not issue export licenses for military equipment to countries that are "demonstrably directly involved in the war in Yemen" (ibid., 116).

In addition, the then newly-established Federal Cabinet, though cautious, reiterated its readiness to use diplomatic means prior to the war in Ukraine. This is best seen in Olaf Scholz's Bundestag speech in December 2021, where he called for a constructive dialogue that will break the escalation spiral (Bundestag 2021b, 348), while Analena Baerbock stressed that despite the worrisome Russian behaviour, diplomacy was the only solution to the tensions (Bundestag 2022a, 526). Analogously, the Bundestag debates and sessions between 9 December 2021 and 17 February 2022 (Bundestag 2021a; 2021b; 2022a) were also characterised by a consensus on the abstinence from military escalation and a reiteration of commitments to diplomacy and de-escalation. For example, while Nils Schmid (SPD), Christian Petry (SPD), Michael Georg Link (FDP) confirm that diplomacy is the "offer of the hour", Robin Wagener (Grünen) calls on the collective European identity to refuse

participation in “arms politics” (Bundestag 2021a, 277), joining Jürgen Hardt (CDU/CSU) and Michael Georg Link (FDP) in denouncing the zero-sum politics game of the 19th and 20th centuries (ibid., 276,278).

Be that as it may, some MPs were still flirting with realist ideas that prioritise military security. Since the constitution of the 20th Bundestag and throughout the analysis sources chosen for this thesis, the CDU/CSU faction, with members like Friedrich Merz (CDU/CSU), Ingo Gädechens (CDU/CSU), Florian Hahn (CDU/CSU) and Carsten Körber (CDU/CSU), has been the only faction to consistently pressure the Federal Government to increase defence investments and strengthen the Bundeswehr. (Bundestag 2022n, 8008,8082,8096; 2023f, 1460). Thomas Erndl, the Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and a member of the Defence Committee of the German Bundestag from the CDU/CSU faction warns:

[Of] course we need dialogue and willingness to communicate but we also need toughness and clear signals against Moscow. [Russia] is a central security and political challenge which we can only tackle from a position of strength [...] concretely that entails a strong Bundeswehr and strong transatlantic relations. (Bundestag 2021a, 280)

Such sentiments paved the way for militarisation and reversal to realist notions of security that ensued following Germany’s attempt to (re)establish their foreign policy identity in the wake of a raging war. With nuclear sharing and, thus, deterrence considered of particular importance to Germany; its continuous commitments to strengthening the European NATO pillar; and its stable position as the 5th largest weapons exporter (Wezeman P., Kuimova and Wezeman S. 2022), Germany’s supposed “anti-militarism culture” is questionable at best.

Intriguingly enough, just three days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Scholz changed the tune and delivered his sweeping *Zeitenwende* speech that echoed throughout the world. He started off by charging Putin with dividing the continent into familiar spheres of influence by a force of arms, alluding to the Cold War (Bundestag 2022b, 1350). The foreign-policy-defining measures that Scholz introduced to counter such a sequence of events were comprised of: economic and political sanctions; weapons delivery and export to Ukraine for defence purposes; strengthening the NATO alliance and thus preventing a war spillover into neighbouring countries; introducing the “special fund”¹⁹ intended exclusively for the Bundeswehr’s necessary investments and armament projects; and

¹⁹ *Das Sondervermögen Bundeswehr*

finally, investing more than 2% of the GDP “year after year” in their defence (ibid., 1351-53). One element that Scholz identified as constitutive for the fulfilment of all these measures was an increase in military security funding, and therefore the strengthening of the German Bundeswehr:

One thing is clear: we must invest significantly more in the security of our country to protect our freedom and our democracy. This is a major national endeavour. The goal is an efficient, ultra-modern, and advanced Bundeswehr that protects us reliably (Bundestag 2022b, 1352).

As a result, Minister Lindner claimed that the times of Bundeswehr neglect were over, confirming that the Federal Government plans to introduce both the special fund amounting to €100 billion and the 2% GDP defence investment; thus, urging the opposition comprised of the CDU/CSU coalition to help the Bundeswehr fulfil its obligations (Bundestag 2022b, 1361). With this request, Lindner announced that legalising the special fund, would require changes to the Constitution itself. At a later date, specifically on 3 June 2022, the Bundestag approved such an alteration, etching the special fund into the German Constitution (*Grundgesetz*) under Section 1a of Article 87a:

In order to strengthen the alliance and defence capability, the Federal Government may establish a special fund for the Bundeswehr with its own credit authorisation in the amount of up to 100 billion euros on a one-off basis (Grundgesetz, Article 87a, Section 1a).

The swift change of the Constitution, the supreme legal act, to secure colossal funds for the Bundeswehr’s military deterrence capabilities underscores the premise that militarisation has pervaded core fundamentals of German society. Following the militarising *Zeitenwende* speech, the veil of militarisation was lifted to reveal a Bundestag which almost unanimously sees military upgrades as the guarantor for security. Consequently, this led to a widespread support for military means as legitimate foreign policy tools in dealing with the “Russian aggressor”.

As a result, the Bundestag debates transformed into a defence of increased military and defence investments and capabilities. As framed by Alexander Dobrindt (CDU/CSU), the Chairman of the CSU Parliamentary Group:

Ensuring peace entails a strong security guarantee and a strong defence ability [...] The war in Ukraine showed that the national and alliance defence is the highest priority (Bundestag 2022b, 1367).

The investments in the Bundeswehr are seen as primary investments in Germany's and NATO's security. For example, Jörg Nürnberger (SPD), Thorsten Rudolph (SDP), Alexander Müller (FDP), Anikó Glogowski-Merten (FDP) and Friedrich Merz (CDU/CSU) all contributed to the construction of discourse on the urgency and absolute necessity of increasing military funds (Bundestag 2022c; 2022d; 2022i; 2023c, 2023d). This showed that the *Zeitenwende* speech became a precedent for blatant elision of increased military capabilities with enhanced peace and security in the German Bundestag. Since 27 February 2022, these two processes were used almost synonymously both by foreign policy and defence government officials, as well as by MPs. For instance, Agnieszka Brugger (Grünen), Rebecca Schamber (SPD), Jörg Nürnberger (SPD) and their colleagues defend the refurbishment of the Bundeswehr, framing it as the defender of German territory, the EU and the NATO alliance and thus equating the Bundeswehr to the sole guarantor of German security (Bundestag 2022e; 2022g; 2022l). The CDU/CSU refused for the special fund money to go into anything related to FFP (Bundestag 2022d, 1840), identifying the Bundeswehr as the only reliable instrument of smart and hard power (Bundestag 2022j, 3337; 2022n, 8086). Such statements serve as confirmation of Enloe's identification of the distinct power of the military to shape and define national security, thereby imposing a specific order for those purposes, which in turn furthers ideological militarisation.

Under the "Defensible" aspect of the NSS, the German government vows to achieve the 2% GDP investment into the Bundeswehr special fund, only now it is supposed to be achieved through that same fund and on a multi-year average. (Bundesregierung 2023, 13).

The discourse around the process of Bundeswehr upgrade created somewhat of a controversy around what that process will entail. For example, there is hesitance among German MPs from the traffic light coalition to call the process of Bundeswehr refurbishment armament (*Aufrüstung*), so they always refer to it as equipment (*Ausrüstung*) even when it entails both. The praise for Bundeswehr revival can be heard from the AfD as well. For instance, Dr Michael Ependiller praises the government for finally waking up and realising how "deeply necessary an adequately equipped Bundeswehr is for the security and the

sovereignty of Germany” (Bundestag 2022h, 2676). Despite this, his party colleague Rüdiger Lucassen finds the MPs’ hesitance to call the Bundeswehr refurbishment as armament hypocritical, accusing the ruling coalition of trying to spare the voters of the brutal imposition of land war, framing it as “motherly care comprised of warm jackets and socks” (Bundestag 2022e, 2000). Since the equipping of the Bundeswehr will necessarily have to entail buying and crafting weapons and ammunition of all sorts, this process represents armament itself. However, the MPs’ hesitancy to call it that may be driven by their intention to garner wider public support for such drastic funding of the Bundeswehr, while keeping the armament alerts low. Despite these efforts, the latest Armament Report (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2024) by the German Ministry of Defence confirms 17 ongoing armament projects at different development stages. The only ones denouncing such developments are MPs from the Left party.

Although the focus of the thesis is on implicit, contextual intertextuality, German MPs sometimes showcased explicit intertextuality in the form of quotes in order to get their militarising points across. While Marja-Liisa Völlers (SPD) quotes George Washington’s words that those who are prepared for war are best able to keep the peace (Bundestag 2022k, 3993), Friedrich Merz (CDU/CSU) uses the Estonian president’s quote that peace must always be better armed than tyranny to portray the need for increasing military capabilities (Bundestag 2023d, 10440). Additionally, I argue that this specific choice of quotes works towards defending military deterrence, framing it as indispensable for achieving peace.

Throughout all the analysed speeches, there is an obvious and serious effort to rely on Germany’s affiliation with the NATO alliance and stress the importance of responding to security threats and constructing solutions exclusively in accordance with alliance partners. Weapons are sent in accordance with NATO partners, sanctions are imposed in accordance with NATO partners and the Bundeswehr is strengthened in accordance with the needs of the alliance. Michael Georg Link (FDP), Dr Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP) and Andreas Schwarz (SPD) and their colleagues argue that Germany has a distinct responsibility towards its NATO allies to increase its defence capacities while they urge for Germany to take on a leadership role as the largest troop contributor (Bundestag 2022e, 1973; 2022k, 3991; 2022n, 8083; 2023g, 14611). Jörg Nürnberger (SPD) and Thomas Erndl (CDU/CSU) take this to the next level, with the former urging for an establishment of an EU intervention force to be led by Germany, while the latter pleads for an establishment of an Arms Industry

at the European level²⁰ that will guarantee continuous military support to Ukraine (Bundestag 2022l, 5376; 2022n, 8079). Even in the NSS under the title “Defensible: Peace in Freedom” credible military deterrence is framed as indispensable for Germany and NATO in the document (Bundesregierung 2023, 31). There is a plan to further develop NATO politically and militarily, through investment in the defence budget, joint armament projects and their exportability, as well as nuclear sharing and therefore nuclear deterrence, which is supposed to not only maintain peace, but “prevent aggression and nuclear blackmail” (ibid., 31-32).

In the same sentiment, Dr Marcus Faber (FDP) argues that a €20 billion investment in ammunition is needed for credible deterrence, but that they won’t use it (Bundestag 2022e, 2001), while Serap Güler (CDU/CSU) repeatedly argues that those who do not want war cannot rely exclusively on diplomacy, but also on military deterrence (Bundestag 2022k, 3988; 2023 c, 10120). Additionally, Rolf Mützenich (SPD), Alexander Dobrindt (CDU/CSU), Johann David Wadephul (CDU/ CSU) and Nils Schmid (SPD) thus consider military deterrence as a crucial and constitutive aspect of Germany’s successful (re)establishment of foreign and security policy identity, summarised by Johannes Huber (independent) as follows:

Putin’s regime must be stopped with military deterrence, which is why Germany cannot keep avoiding a rapid and massive enhancement of the Bundeswehr and mandatory military service for the defence of its own country (Bundestag 2022b, 1381).

Military and especially nuclear deterrence are particularly masculinist notions which function on realist assumptions of actors’ rationality. Deterrence relies on a constructed “rationality” of actors in which the increased weapons arsenal paired with a modern military will dissuade “the other” from retaliating, and yet Putin’s attempts at this are always framed as irrational in the Bundestag debates. Feminists have long been pointing to the detrimental implications of nuclear weapons, and thus deterrence. (Nuclear) deterrence is a direct product of patriarchy and a grand delusion, according to Ray Acheson (2018; 2019; 2022). It serves as a security provider in times of crisis; constructing a delusion of almightiness and untouchability that feminises, and therefore devalues disarmament efforts (ibid). Maintenance and further development of global arms control, as well as non-proliferation and disarmament policies are labelled as important in the NSS document; however, the practice of working towards

²⁰ In his speech, Erndl calls this “*Rüstungsinitiative*”. In the context that this word was used, I deemed “European arms industry” as the adequate translation.

disarmament, specifically while increasing defence budgets, arms exportation and production tells a different story.

In the NSS document it is clearly stated that nuclear deterrence will be instrumentalised to counter increased nuclear risks (Bundesregierung 2023, 32). Thus, nuclear deterrence is expected to reduce risks and support arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ibid.). This statement represents a paradox that functions based on the fear of retaliation to coerce other countries into subordination – an inadequate strategy for achieving sustainable peace and security (Acheson 2018). Consequentially, findings showed that the public officials strived to position Germany on the right side of history which gives it the right to employ nuclear deterrence. Moreover, they constructed a discourse in which Germany's morality and ethics on the issue of nuclear deterrence are superior to those of Russia. However, German public officials refuse to consider the fact that Russia, as a nuclear power, may rationalise the instrumentalisation of deterrence in the same way Germany does. Such a scenario is, however, framed as an attack on European freedom, values, security and peace by the 20th Bundestag. The morality and ethics of nuclear deterrence thus become divergent depending on who applies it.

The support for the above-shown realist notions falls in line with Enloe's warning that the militarising direction of state's foreign policy and security action is bound to take a realist turn. After the Russian invasion, the German state and the NATO alliance became the main referent objects of security for both the Federal Cabinet and MPs. There is a distinct transposition to zero-sum politics in Germany, best seen in the loss-win dichotomy created by German public officials. Although female ministers are not as explicit as their male counterparts, both Baerbock and Lambrecht, alongside Scholz, assert the importance of Putin's loss in this war, framing his victory as their own defeat. Such a dichotomous portrayal of war only serves to reiterate the security dilemma in Europe. This creates a false scenario in which wars have winners – blatantly and dangerously disregarding human rights and security costs on both sides.

By developing this inextricable assimilation of EU values and Ukrainian values, MPs very often present what seem like war speeches, often proclaiming that Putin must not win this war. Enloe alerts that militarisation raises dependency on militaristic ideas and capabilities for societal wellbeing. As a result, MPs' speeches during the debates titled "defending peace and freedom in Europe" almost always and exclusively deal with supplying weapons to

Ukraine and increasing the Bundeswehr capabilities as a strategy to “defeat” Russia. The phrase “Ukraine must win” was used twice in the debates that I reviewed: by Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU) and Michael Roth (SPD) (Bundestag 2022n, 8086; 2023h, 17263). However, statements about how important it is that Putin must not win this war can be heard at least 8 times. As Thomas Erndl (CDU/CSU) puts it:

Russia must not win this war militarily, and Russia must not be militarily successful in Ukraine (Bundestag 2022g, 2281).

Led by Enloe’s example of intervention in Afghanistan, I argue that MPs deemed it necessary to supply Ukraine with weapons and military aid as the means to an end that prioritised Russia’s defeat over Ukraine’s victory. This correlates to Enloe’s point about how justification of interventions under the pretext of defending human rights often serves to justify the military aspect of intervention itself. Here, it is important to stress once more how harmful it is to back one side, seeing as conflict and war often bring devastation to both parties involved.

From their revised outlook on the security architecture in Europe – based largely on Germany’s necessity to (re)shape their identity against the backdrop of the Russian invasion – a first ever formalised and written NSS was created. With the title “Defensible. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany”, the Federal Government already showed its commitment to a comprehensive term for security – namely integrated security. At this stage, I wish to point out the translation of the title before proceeding, with a special focus on the first word in the original document title: *Wehrhaft*. This word translates to being defence-ready/defensible/ being in a state to fight/defend oneself. For my translation I decided to use the word defensible. However, in the official English translation of the NSS document, the Federal Government uses the word “robust” which has little to no indication of the above-mentioned meaning and context in which the German word *Wehrhaft* was operationalised. Although it may seem meaningless at first, I argue that using the specific word in German serves the militarisation purpose domestically, with efforts to camouflage it internationally. Just as Thomson (2022) claims that countries establish FFP to showcase liberal modernity, I argue that this translation is employed to avoid invoking any fears of a militarised reflex amongst international allies considering Germany’s infamous history; seeing as the translated document is aimed at an international audience.

Due to an apparent priority given to military foreign policy mechanisms, the concept of security itself acquired a different meaning, and thus a different definition post-Zeitenwende. Consequentially, this also affected the status of diplomacy as a foreign policy mechanism. In turn, the concept of security acquired the adjective “integrated” to explicitly both include military and human aspects security. Thus, through implicit conceptualisation, the Federal Government transformed the concept of security to fit their foreign policy and security agenda. In Baerbock’s foreword at the beginning of the NSS document, she defines integrated security as:

[...] consistent thought about security issues: not only when making decisions on equipping the Bundeswehr, but also when considering how reliable our supply chains are or how free or media landscape is [...] But security does not only mean the absence of war. Security also means being free to organise our lives, our democracy and our economy as we wish (Bundesregierung 2023, 6).

Following the Zeitenwende speech, diplomacy is seen as complementary to weapon use and export, paired with the partnership of the international community (Bundestag 2022n, 8086; 2023f, 13426).

The NSS contains a special disclaimer related to German history and its influence on its contemporary foreign policy and security identity and obligations (Bundesregierung 2023, 19). Throughout the speeches by Federal Government officials, those of the MPs in parliament, and in the NSS document itself, the responsibility Germany had for the Holocaust during Second World War will be used to construct the identity of Germany as the protector of peace, freedom and security in Europe. Framed as the supreme task of the state (ibid., 20), it is written in the NSS that:

Germany carries a special responsibility for peace, security, prosperity and stability, as well as a sustainable approach towards our livelihood in Europe and internationally. We act with the awareness of our history and the fault our country has in unleashing the Second World War and charging the breach of the civilization through the Shoah²¹ (Bundesregierung 2023 2023, 19).

²¹ Hebrew for “downfall/catastrophe”. Here refers to the Holocaust. See: [https://www.demokratiewebstatt.at/thema/thema-holocaust-shoah/shoah-holocaust-churban-was-ist-damit-gemeint#:~:text=Das%20Wort%20Shoah%20\(manchmal%20auch,w%C3%A4hrend%20der%20nationalsozialistischen%20Herrschaft%20verwendet.](https://www.demokratiewebstatt.at/thema/thema-holocaust-shoah/shoah-holocaust-churban-was-ist-damit-gemeint#:~:text=Das%20Wort%20Shoah%20(manchmal%20auch,w%C3%A4hrend%20der%20nationalsozialistischen%20Herrschaft%20verwendet.)

The concept of historical responsibility is used almost always as justification for increasing Bundeswehr funding, acquiring fighter jets, battle tanks and ammunition, as well as exporting weapons to Ukraine. Another such example comes from the Minister of Finances himself who claims that German history was often used as an excuse to do nothing, but that war in Ukraine has given Germany a responsibility to act (Bundestag 2022h, 2665). Baerbock identified it as a sign of strength and responsibility rather than a weakness that the Greens are now supporting a special fund for the Bundeswehr that they would never have backed a few years ago (Bundestag 2022e, 1968). These statements led me to conclude that MPs and the Federal Government controlled the discourse on the correct response to the war in Ukraine. Before Russia's invasion, this response meant increased diplomatic efforts to break the escalation spiral and maintain peaceful relations with Russia, as shown at the beginning of this subchapter.

In contrast, Scholz's *Zeitenwende* speech marked the beginning of discourse constructions which represent a justification for the acceptance of militarised and militarising measures that would otherwise have been denounced. The militarising actors among the MPs and the Federal Cabinet have constructed a reality in which the line between the militarisation ends and means is heavily blurred. Despite initially being used as the means to face the constructed aggressor, once the Pandora's box of militarisation is opened, it allocates power built on discrimination and suffering to its agents, thus beguiling them to regard it as the ultimate end. It slowly normalises the disregard for such suffering, arguing that these actions serve to protect democracy, European values and freedom. Hence, the Germany that took pride in its "anti-militarist culture" is now ruled by a government that changed the Constitution to involve a staggering amount of funds for the military, and embraced military means as the preferred response to Russia's invasion. This is an example of Enloe's concept of militarisation rewards, illustrated in the ability of the German political elites to garner support for militarising measures that were formerly challenged or difficult to achieve. Such conceptions illustrate a divergent and flexible application of Germany's historical responsibility towards peace and freedom in Europe. The politics of memory is instrumentalised to justify all kinds of foreign policy and security actions even if they are contradictory. This discourse is, in turn, malleable depending on the foreign policy and security needs of Germany's political elites. As a result, after the *Zeitenwende* speech, the only concrete steps taken to achieve historical responsibility that I have identified are those related to military security and military deterrence.

There are efforts from MPs like Markus Grübel (CDU/CSU), Dr Ralf Stegner (SPD), Sara Nanni (Grünen) who actively try to reconcile diplomacy with military, but they always identify military spending and deterrence as a priority in dealing with the war in Ukraine. Most MPs keep trying to convince the German people and each other that they are constructing a foreign policy action formula which represents an equitable symbiosis of diplomacy and military deterrence, yet most of the debates on foreign affairs and defence revolve around the Bundeswehr, weapons export and military deterrence. The Greens, who were historically against the strong emphasis on the military now have a Minister of Foreign Affairs who defends its prioritisation. Consequentially, in the 20th Bundestag the Greens find themselves on the same political spectrum as the CDU/CSU faction regarding military security, the Bundeswehr and foreign policy towards Russia. The only difference between the two parties is the latter's constant request for achieving the 2% goal, as well as a higher level and intensity of militarised statements.

Some of the most blatant militarising manoeuvres were identified in statements of the Ministers of Federal Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. In her speech at the Council of Europe, Annalena Baerbock called for unity in Europe to help Ukraine, and for an end to the blame game because “we are fighting a war against Russia” (Baerbock 2023). Minister Lambrecht claimed that the Zeitenwende has enabled Germany and their partners to be more honest about the military, defence and security issues, and that whoever wants to live in peace needs the military to defend it (Bundestag 2022h, 2668; 2022k, 3976). Boris Pistorius went one step further during an interview on the TV show “Berlin Direkt” airing on 29 October 2023 to warn that Germany must get used to the idea of a war possibly running amok in Europe again, which is why it is absolutely essential to make the Bundeswehr “war ready” (*kriegstüchtig*) (Pistorius 2023). When confronted by Gesine Lützch about using what she deemed to be a dangerous term that deviates from the Constitution, which employs the term “defence ready” (*verteidigungsfähig*), he replied that the task of the Bundeswehr is to wage a defensive war, and to do so they must be fit for war (Bundestag 2023i, 17680). J. Ann Tickner (1992) warns that the compulsion nations feel to prepare themselves for war is deeply patriarchally intertwined. Such formulations that speak about Germany fighting and/or needing to fight a war in its near future are quite problematic, seeing as they border closely with panic- and fear-inducing declarations of war. Their purpose is to promote militarisation, but Enloe warns that military goals cause a huge loss of control and sense of self-worth.

Additionally, these statements and debates have unveiled a blatant identification of security as military security, which is openly endorsed by the Federal Government itself.

Having explained the valorisation of military deterrence and the Bundeswehr, I will now turn to how discourses around diplomacy were constructed in the sources I analysed. Militarisation enthralled public officials to value military over diplomacy, equate military capabilities to human security and revert to realist notions which are substantially dichotomising, and therefore discriminatory in their nature. In light of an altered security landscape in Europe, and therefore Germany, diplomacy is often rendered passive and incapable of bringing effective solutions by both the 20th Bundestag and the Federal Cabinet. Sven-Christian Kindler (Grünen) explains:

The times in which governments sit back in crises and hope that everything will somehow pass are over. The “too little, too late” principle has had its day. It has exacerbated crises and made them bigger. What we need now is active government action in crises. (Bundestag 2022d, 1844).

This statement and different versions of it can be heard throughout the sources analysed for this thesis. The discourses that were constructed in the Bundestag about foreign policy mechanisms to tackle the war in Ukraine identified diplomacy as a weak foreign policy tool. In contrast, a strong Germany, according to the MPs, represents a Germany that is able to defend itself militarily, can do the same for the EU and NATO, and subsequently Ukraine. Jamila Schäfer (Grünen) and Dr Marcus Faber (FDP) stress that crises need to be tackled proactively and decisively (Bundestag 2022e, 1974), while Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU), Agnieszka Brugger (die Grünen) and Jürgen Trittin (Grünen) argue that there needs to be an application of smart power and clever value-based Realpolitik that brings diplomacy and toughness together and is not afraid to apply hard power (Bundestag 2022e, 1969,1990; 2023g, 14597). These arguments serve to create a discourse in which a state is “strong” as long as its military capabilities are high, constructing diplomacy as a weak foreign policy tool. What’s more, these arguments construct diplomacy as a passive tool with little to no effective solutions for ongoing security crises.

Such constructions of diplomacy were fertile ground for MPs to stress the inevitability of realist notions of security. For example, Friedrich Merz (CDU/CSU) and Alice Weidel (AfD) point out that this war is a wakeup call, reverting to the cruel world of Realpolitik in which morality and “nice words” do not create a more peaceful world (Bundestag 2022b, 1357,

1360). Merz also cited a newspaper opinion piece in which the author claims that security is imposed by the aggressor, but it only becomes dangerous with weakness (ibid., 1358). While the MPs start regarding diplomacy as a useless foreign policy tool in dealing with Russia, the military shift in Germany is framed as courageous by the SPD MPs who, like Michael Roth, argue for putting aside moral dilemmas to make it clear that they are ultimately prepared to make far-reaching decisions (Bundestag 2022g, 2277). In addition to making a baffling case for deterrence at the expense of social, economic and political consequences, MPs see military deterrence as something inevitable, while they sideline diplomacy. Based on the analysis of the above-mentioned speeches and texts, diplomacy as a foreign policy tool is being explicitly framed as supplementary by male members of the German Federal Government.

However, not only do they sideline diplomacy, some MPs also securitise attempts to rely on diplomatic mechanisms. In turn, anyone who is against the militarisation, the export of weapons, the increase of the defence funding and for a ceasefire followed by a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Ukraine is considered a security threat, and therefore framed as the “Other”. For example, Johann David Wadehul (CDU/CSU) claims that those who oppose military deterrence jeopardise the security of the West, thus defending NATO’s nuclear deterrence (Bundestag 2021a, 269; 2022b, 1375). Apart from being considered a security threat, the advocacy for diplomatic solutions is also deemed irrational and idealistic. Bernhard Loos (CDU/CSU) calls upon realist notions to say that:

[...] peace without security,²² and therefore without effective deterrence through weapons and effective defence capabilities in the case of conflict is pure utopia (Bundestag 2023e, 11729).

Another way in which diplomacy is sidelined is when it is labelled as naive by MPs and the cabinet, and therefore classified as inapt to deal with an aggressor like Putin. Diplomacy is regarded by Christian Lindner, the Finance Minister, as “sitting back and doing nothing”, while the war in Ukraine brings about the responsibility to act (Bundestag 2022h, 2665). Defence Minister Boris Pistorius declared that Germany cannot afford to compromise on its own security in the wake of a war (Bundestag 2023f, 14603). In addition, Scholz himself claimed that calls for a ceasefire and halt to arms export to Ukraine cannot lead to peace


²² Here framed as military security

(Bundestag 2023d, 10434). This was all defended in light of the turning point, which the German chancellor sees initiated by Putin:

Putin's war marks a turning point, also for our foreign policy. As much diplomacy as possible without being naive – that remains our aspiration. But not being naive also means not talking for the sake of talking (Bundestag 2022b, 1354).

The discourse created by the German political elite on the proper response to the crisis in Ukraine instilled a hierarchy among the concepts of military deterrence and diplomacy. The notions of diplomacy's passivity and military's dynamism that were created can be represented in the following figure inspired by Hansen's processes of linking and differentiation:

Figure 1. Linking and differentiation of foreign policy mechanisms in Germany post-Zeitenwende



The figure shows that the MPs and Federal Government have constructed diplomacy as a foreign policy method that is idealistic, naïve, weak and passive through what Hansen calls the *positive process of linking* (Hansen 2006, 17). However, in the sources analysed, diplomacy is not only assessed for what it is, but also for what it lacks in relation to military deterrence through Hansen's *negative process of differentiating* (ibid.). As the superior response to the crisis in Ukraine, military deterrence is framed as realistic, mature and proactive and strong. It is important to note that these correlations can be unstable and will not be applicable in Germany's relations with all countries. Although both of these mechanisms can be analysed separately, it is necessary to point out that both the process of

linking and differentiating are simultaneously constitutive of Germany's foreign policy behaviour in the context of war in Ukraine.

Importantly, such characterisation of military deterrence reiterates Enloe's concept of "genderness of militarisation". This concept implies the "naturalness" of the masculine that is always considered as rational, dominant, strong, dynamic and brave. In turn, labelling the process of diplomacy as naive, inapt and inferior is a prime example of what Enloe calls the process of "feminisation". Naivety and passivity become both feminised and feminising concepts; characteristics ascribed mostly to women, thus utilised to label anything "feminine" as insignificant, inapt, passive, submissive and weak. In this sense, all of the above-mentioned labelling of diplomacy as such by the MPs and Federal Government, transform it into a deeply feminised foreign policy tool, incapable of providing an adequate response to security architecture changes in Europe. The main discourse revolving around foreign policy behaviour and identity, thus, revolves around smearing diplomacy to pave the way for a construction of a strong, military-capable and dominant Germany, all of which represent particularly masculine notions of identity.

Although not cast aside as a legitimate tool, diplomacy is still in a power-discrepant relationship with military deterrence. I argue that through valorisation of military deterrence, the Bundestag also valorised military masculinities. This can be seen, for example, in valorisation of military deterrence through military service. Rüdiger Lucassen (AfD), along with Johannes Huber (independent), argue for a reinstatement of mandatory military service, and urge for spiritual and moral change in Germany modelled according to the patriotism or *Vaterlandsliebe*²³ of Ukrainian soldiers (Bundestag 2022e, 2000, 2001, 2681). Speaking of patriotism, Gerold Otten (AfD) calls for a patriotic change seeing as the armed forces represent a central expression of national sovereignty and the expression of a nation's will to assert itself (Bundestag 2022k, 3986). Subsequently, most of the "moderate" coalition MPs assign merit to the work soldiers do more subtly with gratitude for putting their lives on the line to defend the country and urging for a respectful treatment of their profession by financing the Bundeswehr. As Ingo Gädechens (CDU/CSU) puts it:

The job of soldiering is something special because these women and men have sworn to defend our land and our democracy with all its values (Bundestag 2022e, 2003).

²³ *Vaterlandsliebe* literally translates to "love for the fatherland" and is a synonym for patriotism; a more colloquial one. The word for patriotism is *Patriotismus*, and I believe that the former word was used intentionally in the context of the speaker glorification of armed Ukrainian male soldiers.

Enloe warns that such valorisation of soldiering creates a hierarchy that places militarised masculinities – embodying the patriotic ideas and values of serving their country – at the top. The war in Ukraine is regarded as of particular concern for Germany’s and EU’s security interests, through which Ukrainians are labelled as freedom fighters of not only their own security, but Germany’s and EU’s as well. When Lambrecht, Lindner and Pistorius speak about the soldiering call in the German Bundeswehr, all three of them use both female and male forms of the word soldier (*Soldatin/Soldat*), however the male form is always used before the female form²⁴; which they do not do for other positions and job titles.

As a final point in this subchapter, it is now necessary to analyse the decision of the Federal Government to arm Ukrainians with weapons. Framed as a break from the long-standing tradition of their predecessors, arms export to Ukraine is justified by all the above-mentioned members of the government, who throughout their speeches constantly reassure MPs and the public that sending weapons to a conflict-affected region is the right thing to do. Dr Ralf Stegner (SPD), for example, illustrated just how “heavy hearted” it made the governing coalition MPs to export weapons to a conflict zone by constructing a reality in which security now involves weapons and ammunition by default, while simultaneously denying this as militarisation (Bundestag 2022j, 3335). Debates about supplying weapons to Ukraine in the Bundestag seemed like discussions about an arms-race, with CDU/CSU constantly urging the government to send more weapons, joined by a small number of SPD and FDP MPs. This is most prominent in their request to send more battle tanks like Leopard 1 and 2 and Marder, as well as powerful missiles like the Taurus KEPD-350, as they are convinced that this will end the war faster.

One of the main arguments in this thesis is that the war in Ukraine represents a precedent that has opened the Pandora’s box of weapon export frenzy. This can be found in Baerbock’s staggering speech during her visit to Israel in January 2024. In her speech, Baerbock confirmed that because Saudi Arabia is “contributing greatly to the security of Israel”, Germany sees no issue with the UK proceeding with the delivery of Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets to Saudi Arabia anymore (Baerbock 2024). This dereliction of Germany’s initial refusal to send weapons to conflict parties in Yemen in favour of Saudi Arabia represents a flagrant disregard for the serious human rights violations they have caused. By launching

²⁴ In Germany, this is a point of contestation, since German is a gendered language. While conservatives oppose gender-sensitive language and advocate for the use of the “male form” as the neutral one, the female form for some positions and identities is still widely used and accepted, and specifically written/said before the male form.

over 25,000 indiscriminate and devastating air strikes on schools and hospitals in Yemen, Saudia Arabia has killed and injured thousands of children (Becker 2022). Such a seemingly surprising decision may indicate that sending weapons to Ukraine set a dangerous precedent in a country where political elites construct and alter discourses – particularly regarding their responsibility in the world – to fit the security agenda. This precedent normalises a military response to crises by discarding democracy and foreign aid as an efficient tool for conflict resolution and mediation. Thus, I regard the urges in the Bundestag and the decisions of the cabinet to assume a more active military role in NATO and Europe as an embodiment of *feminisation anxiety*. Developed by V. Spike Peterson (2010, 22), this concept is used to portray Americans' perception of a United States defeated in Vietnam, humiliated by a people considered ethnically and racially inferior.

The freedoms of arms export are, however, limited by the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Treaty represents a multilateral binding agreement that regulates international export and trade of conventional arms. Prior to exporting weapons, this Treaty obliges its signatories to conduct a human-rights-violation assessment, including a GBV assessment. This obligation is portrayed in Section 4 of Article 7 on Export Assessment:

The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children (United Nations 2014, Article 7, Section 4)

Since Germany is a signatory, this section assigns it the responsibility of performing an informed and non-discriminatory assessment of gender-based-violence risks before exporting weapons to a country. However, in a session on Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Mines on 6 June 2024 with Hardy Giezendanner, Senior Researcher in Conventional Arms and Ammunition at UNIDIR, it was confirmed that it was up to the countries whether they would include remarks on this obligation when submitting the yearly reports on the implementation of the Treaty. Thus, I argue that this assessment, though binding, leaves room for manoeuvre, and very little room for ensuring responsibility, as shown above. It is, therefore, unclear whether Germany even assessed the state of GBV in Ukraine before exporting weapons. The justification of the export is framed as the right to self-defence by most MPs, yet not a single one questions what happens to marginalised groups in the recipient countries. None of the

MPs or government officials have mentioned Germany's obligation to report on GBV risk under ATT in their speeches. This obligation appears only once in the FFP document (Auswärtiges Amt 2023b, 28).

6.2. Militarisation of Women and Feminist Foreign Policy

The coalition agreement between SPD, die Grünen and FDP dedicated a specific chapter to gender equality in which they laid out their commitment to an intersectional gender equality policy within the EU and internationally (Bundesregierung 2021, 91). Such commitments fall under the coalition's efforts to comply with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). It is stated in this document that these efforts also include an equality-oriented policy for boys and men (ibid.). To address the gaps of gender inequality, the coalition laid out their plan to introduce a feminist foreign policy as early as 2021. Under the multilateralism chapter in the, the coalition writes:

Together with our partners we want to strengthen the rights, resources and representation of women and girls in the world and promote social diversity in line with a feminist foreign policy²⁵ (Bundesregierung 2021, 114).

The final confirmation that Germany will adopt a FFP was signalled with the Conference on Shaping Feminist Foreign policy that took place in Berlin in September 2022. During her speech which she dedicated to women and girls of Afghanistan, Annalena Baerbock made the case for the FFP as she explained briefly what it entailed and why it is necessary (Auswärtiges Amt 2022). Baerbock represented the three R principles as tasks to tackle with this document, giving an example of the representation principle stemming from her own back yard with about only a quarter of Bundestag members being female (ibid.). In this speech, Baerbock identified mainstreaming as a crucial tool for FFP implementation, urging for a pervasion of FFP in the entire foreign and security policy, and not just as an afterthought (ibid.). Though it is a very important and valuable opinion, I conclude that the German government failed to mainstream the FFP principles both domestically and internationally. On one hand, it is because feminist foreign policy represents a significant point of contestation in the German Bundestag. It is often criticised and labelled as naive in the

²⁵ The term "feminist foreign policy" is written in English in the original document.

debates among foreign affairs and defence politicians, while mostly understood as a valuable thing in the sessions that fall under the Federal Ministry of Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth Affairs. On the other hand, the previous subchapter explained the subordination of diplomacy which is considered one of the most valuable mechanisms of feminist foreign policy.

In the Bundestag, the loudest antagonists of the FFP are members of the AfD faction: Alice Weidel, Markus Frohnmair, Norbert Kleinwächter, Stefan Keuter, Tino Chrupalla and Joachim Wundrak who claim that a FFP is a scary, irrational and deeply ideological tool, discriminatory of other countries due to its western nature and unnecessary for German society (Bundestag 2022b, 1361; 2022e, 1978, 1983; 2022f, 2221; 2022m, 6589; 2023d, 10445; 2023f, 13430). The MPs' speeches related to the Women, Life, Freedom protest movements in Iran after the Iranian morality police brutally murdered Jina Mahsa Amini, for example, served as the plane for questioning the regime on the efficiency of a feminist-oriented foreign policy (Bundestag 2022m, 6587). Although not numerous, there are MPs who prescribe immense value to a FFP, like Merle Spellerberg (Grünen), who rightly points out the potential that FFP has to shatter unjust power structures (Bundestag 2022m, 6594). Gabriela Heinrich (SPD) joins her in identifying FFP observes society as a whole, representing an embodiment of freedom, equality and democracy in which peace and security mean that women have equal access to rights (ibid., 6588). While Frank Schwabe (SPD) honours Margot Wallström and claims that debates on FFP are progressive, Lamya Kaddor (Grünen) gives a slightly more comprehensive view on FFP, framing it as:

Not only intended to be from women to women [,] it is also about a comprehensive emancipatory and protectionist approach with regard to marginalised groups. Feminist foreign policy calls for the monitoring of human rights, especially those of children, people with physical disabilities, discrimination based on nationality, sexual orientation, skin colour or religion. Such an understanding of feminist foreign policy is based on a great potential for peace, which is indispensable for international diplomacy (Bundestag 2022p, 9010).

Although it is refreshing to read these statements after what seemed like a sea of smearing remarks against the FFP, the above-mentioned MPs that defend FFP (almost all female), still manage to hesitantly reconcile it with militarisation. For example, Heinrich reiterates that priority will always be given to diplomacy as a foreign tool, but blames the Russian invasion

for being put in a position to send arms as a deeply necessary foreign policy measure (Bundestag 2022l, 5362). Spellerberg seems to be the most sceptical about militarisation, with her warning:

When one has only a hammer for their security, they see nails all over (Bundestag 2022j, 3339).

When it comes to the values and principles the German FFP, and subsequently the German foreign policy identity is based on, the answer is ambivalent. In her speech at the FFP Conference in 2022, Baerbock rightly points out that there are always interests at play when it comes to power and resources (Auswärtiges Amt 2022). However, she does not clearly identify the place and ownership of these interests. Stemming from this statement, my analysis uncovers a valorisation of interests situated within militarising structures and elites in Germany that see the Ukrainian war as an opportunity to distance themselves from feminised naivety. Simultaneously, the war in Ukraine becomes a justification for strengthening the identity of Germany as a masculine actor that possesses the character, power and resources to actively exercise public authority and use grandiose military capabilities to face the constructed oppressor.

In addition to the defining role the Russian invasion had in shaping a lot of the current government's foreign policy and security actions, as already mentioned, it has also influenced the NSS. As a part of their dedication to feminist foreign policy, feminist development policy and principles of gender equality, this document reaffirms the current governments commitment to tackle issues of women and other marginalised groups such as promoting participation and diversity, eliminating discriminatory power structures, and making sure that all groups can participate in decision-making and have access to resources (Bundesregierung 2023, 14, 52). This comprehensive task is described more thoroughly in the FFP Guidelines document.

When The Guidelines for Feminist Foreign Policy: A foreign policy for all were introduced in March 2023, Baerbock held a speech to officially announce and present this document to the country and the world. In her foreword, Annalena Baerbock declares that in order to recognise and address certain vulnerabilities and achieve equality for women and girls worldwide, as well as all marginalised groups, feminist foreign policy is bitterly necessary (Auswärtiges Amt 2023b, 2-3). Baerbock stresses that such a policy is an integral part of this government's value-based foreign policy actions, which require for feminist

policy to be shaped by real principles as well as necessary pragmatism to ensure its effectiveness (ibid., 4). It is important to say at this point that this document is a product of the Federal Government's consultations that took place in 2022 with think tanks, civil society and experts, as opposed to just being treated as intraministerial action.

The FFP Guidelines identify the main goal of feminist foreign policy as achieving gender equality worldwide, through equal representation, equal access to resources and equal rights. (ibid., 9-12). Consequentially, the document takes up the task of identifying and overcoming historically-evolved power structures to ensure fair participation and equality of all people worldwide (ibid.3, 9). Although these have traditionally been one of the main goals of feminist efforts, the label "feminist" itself represented a point of contestation in Germany. Baerbock rightfully identified feminism as a "trigger word" but explained that this concept is a representation of matters of course in the 21st century: equal rights, freedoms and chances regardless of gender, religion, age, physical appearance or sexual orientation (Auswärtiges Amt 2023b). Still, there is a wide-spread aversion to the label of feminist and feminism in general. Again, most notable opposers are the MPs from AfD, who claim that feminism ruins families, causes poverty, is the reason Germany isn't taken seriously on the security front. They label anything feminist as untrustworthy and feminist chauvinism (Bundestag 2022b, 1361; 2022f, 2194).

Despite the common defamation of feminism, few female MPs from the traffic light coalition recognise maleficent attempts to silence feminist voices. Merle Spellerberg (Grünen) explicitly calls out the members of the Bundestag for calling it a women-oriented policy instead of a feminist-oriented policy. Apart from Spellerberg, mainstreaming the FFP in the Bundestag may be unsuccessful. For example, members of the CDU/CSU faction are joined by Wiebke Papenbrock (SPD), Michael Georg Link (FDP), Michael Müller (SPD) and Christian Petry (SPD) in referring to the foreign policy as either German or value-based, never feminist. In all the Bundestag reports I have reviewed, very rarely is FFP mentioned for its values, possibilities and goals. In turn, MPs direct criticism towards everything bearing the feminist label, often pointing out its incapability to deal with conflicts and crises around the world. This confirmed Ruppert's point – as laid out in the literature review chapter – that FFP in Germany is looked at through the prism of its capabilities related to addressing and solving the crisis in Ukraine exclusively.

Assessing FFP only through the prism of immediate conflict resolution capabilities serves as confirmation that the inaptitude discourse surrounding FFP in Germany is created in an environment that valorises war and military masculinities, and thus cannot fulfil the cruel militarising tasks of Realpolitik. As shown above, these signals became apparent once the Zeitenwende speech was held. This led me to conclude that the Federal Foreign Office spearheaded by Annalena Baerbock tried to reconcile the apparent conflictions between feminism and hunger for militarisation. The writing on the wall became clear in the “Combining firm principles and pragmatism” subchapter of the FFP Guidelines, where denunciation of pacifism as a FFP principle is asserted:

Russia’s war against Ukraine shows that, in the wake of brutal violence, human lives must be protected with military means as well. That is why feminist foreign policy is not synonymous with (tantamount to) pacifism. It is bound by humanitarian tradition, from which peace politics and armament control originate. Thus, it recognizes realities and addresses growing dilemmas. It takes into account both the values and the interests of German foreign policy (Auswärtiges Amt 2023b, 13).

With an altered security architecture and the simultaneous militarisation of the whole world, the normalisation of prioritising military mechanisms and means paved the way for it to envelop every aspect of German society – even the Feminist Foreign Policy document. This is starkly amplified by the internally subversive and realist statement that the use of military means falls under humanitarian tradition, and therefore is necessary for defending human lives. When defending the FFP and what it stands for, Baerbock identified the document as a clear guideline to the regime about the meaningful inclusion of women, but also a sign to the world that they can rely on Germany. Baerbock explains this reliance:

This shows that feminist foreign policy is not easy as it is connected to insanely tough decisions. Because it is not just about pretty words, it is about the real problems of real people. It is about real feminism²⁶ (Auswärtiges Amt 2023b).

The calls for solving real problems with the help of realistic feminism is a problematic formulation. Such a formulation represents an exclusionary statement that views a singular type of feminism as capable of solving and responding to ongoing crises, thus creating a discursive hierarchy of “feminisms”. This discourse is aggravated when the acceptance of

²⁶ “*Real-Feminismus*” - Although this is very ambiguous for translation, I have decided to translate it as “realistic feminism”, considering the context in which Baerbock used this formulation; as opposed to real (true) feminism, which I believe she would have framed as “*Echte-Feminismus*”.

military means is institutionally supported in a document carrying the “feminist” label, without any critical assessment of the patriarchal tendencies these means rely on. In the feminist literature, the type of feminism Baerbock is referring to is identified as liberal feminism. This type of feminism supports militarism and views representation of women as one of the most important goals of feminism (Zhukova, Sundström and Elgström 2022, 201), which are precisely the main goals of the FFP Guidelines.

The acceptance of military means in a FFP subsequently not only to hierarchisation of feminisms itself, but also reaffirmed the hierarchisation of foreign policy means by the Minister who brought on a feminist foreign policy herself. To illustrate, Baerbock claims to make efforts to solve real issues of Ukrainian people swallowed by war by reiterating that:

[...] while it is important for us to have controversial discussions particularly at this time, while indeed this is the defining feature of strong democracies: to my mind this naive approach fell short as early as 2014 and ultimately at the choice to continue diplomatic relations (Auswärtiges Amt 2023c).

Alluding to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Baerbock confirms that the mistake of operationalising diplomacy with Russia was made as early as then. The naivety of diplomacy, as framed by Baerbock, now serves as a lesson to keep supporting Ukraine militarily in the midst of a war caused by the Russian president who is not recruiting negotiators, but rather soldiers (Auswärtiges Amt 2023c). The type of feminism employed here is the one used to justify sidelining diplomacy under the pretext of “being realistic”. It functions on the exact same principles that subordinate diplomacy, which I have laid out in the previous subchapter. The type of feminism Germany has relied on helped construct a reality in which anti-militaristic feminism is an unattainable and absurd utopia, while issues of the “real world” are solved militarily. With the military solutions being taken as inevitable and adequate, they further perpetuate the silences surrounding the questioning of gravely discriminatory power relations they produce.

One statement about the embrace of military means is as far as the FFP Guidelines go in determining the type of feminism that informs the content of the document. While the Federal Foreign Office limits itself explicitly to one kind of feminism, the Feminist Development Policy Guidelines of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development takes a different approach:

The ministry of economic cooperation and development recognises that there is not just one feminism. Feminist thoughts and movements have been and remain diverse, dynamic and pursue(d) various approaches and goals. One thing is clear: Feminism is in no way an invention of the west or a white, European-centric perspective. For more than 200 years feminist theories and movements have been emerging worldwide, taking various forms depending on the epoch and the societal contexts. The diverse feminist movements have defined feminism differently [...] What is common for all forms of feminism is their resistance to discrimination and oppression, along with their commitment to establishing a gender-equal power balance (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2023, 5).

The Feminist Development Policy document recognises that the discrimination and oppression of women and girls is a consequence of patriarchal power structures that have been prevalent for centuries (ibid., 4), while also acknowledging colonialism, racism, sexism, ableism and classism as violent and unequal power structures (ibid., 10). In its quest for mainstreaming gender-transformative projects, the Feminist Development Policy document explicitly states the importance of examining images of masculinity and involvement of male actors (ibid., 17). The goals and tasks of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development have been comprehensively laid out in the Feminist Development Policy document, with generous use of feminist terms and notions, paving a way for meaningful awareness-raising and mainstreaming. Therefore, in terms of feminist efforts, it seems that this document is more in line with critical feminist tradition than the FFP document.

The feminist efforts of these documents can be seen in identifying the source of women's marginalisation. As feminism aims to disrupt hierarchies which subordinate women, it is diametrically opposed to accepting them under the pretext of inevitability without ever questioning them. Worryingly enough, the eighty-nine-page-long FFP document not once mentions the word patriarchy, neither as a noun nor as an adjective. Moreover, the number of mentions of the term "power structures" amounts to two. In contrast, the forty-page-long Feminist Development Policy document (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2023) mentions patriarchy as a noun 5 times, and uses it as an adjective 9 times. Additionally, the term "power structures" (*Machtstrukturen*) is mentioned 10 times, the term "power relations" (*Machtverhältnisse(n)*) 10 times, "power imbalances" (*Machtgefälle*) 5 times, "power systems" (*Machtsysteme*) twice, and "power hierarchies" (*Machthierarchen*) and "power balance" (*Machtverhältnis*) once. Since

Sweden's move in 2014, a plethora of states have identified FFPs as possible solutions to addressing unjust power relations worldwide with each of them adapting such policies to their national contexts. This means that oftentimes the first step to tackling GBV and the marginalisation of women is recognising and acknowledging the patterns of subordination that rest upon unequal power relations and distribution. In other words, in order to sustainably solve an issue, the root cause must be clearly and explicitly identified. My position is that Feminist Development Policy does that, however, the FFP does not. This missed opportunity in the FFP diminishes the space for questioning, and, thus, for dismantling harmful power relations in foreign policy that Enloe, alongside many feminist researchers, deems central to fighting the perpetuation and deepening of patriarchy. If the goal is to mainstream and work towards gender equality, it is necessary to constantly illuminate and criticise the structures and hierarchies upon which marginalisation and insecurity rely. Otherwise, they remain obfuscated, leading to superficial initiatives that do not provide sustainable peace and security for women. As shown in the conceptual framework and literature review, patriarchy thrives on discriminatory power relations that enjoy silences and a lack of feminist curiosity.

As a result, Enloe describes what ensues as performativity of patriarchy's proponents; and in this thesis, it can be found in the embracing of military means in the FFP Guidelines. Precisely because patriarchal structures are persistent, they explore clever ways to disguise themselves. I argue that one such example is a seemingly unproblematised and unquestioned symbiosis of militarisation and feminist foreign policy. The crucial feminist goal of dismantling oppressive power structures cannot be critical of the foreign policy and security action without a critique of the militarising structures that revert femininity to traditional, socially-constructed roles in which they are considered inferior to masculinity on almost all counts. The previous subchapter highlighted the utilisation of means and the creation of discourses in which militarisation achieves this. Drawing on Enloe's claim that states need to think about manoeuvring femininities and masculinities to achieve their militarising goals, I argue that this is precisely the intention and outcome behind the incorporation of militarisation in FFP. In a country occupied by militarisation, the normalisation of military means is inevitable. With such an altered playing field – and just a little over a year after the *Zeitenwende* speech – the German Federal Government published a FFP document that will be used to uphold the liberal image to the world while softening the militarisation blow. A highly militarised world enabled Germany to instrumentalise feminist foreign policy for its military purposes and foreign policy agenda following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In

addition, I see this attempt as a blatant denigration of the feminist struggle to dismantle power relations, as the document that embraces military means can only produce ill-conceived, superficial and contradictory guidelines towards providing peace and security for women worldwide.

The superficiality of the FFP becomes evident throughout the 10 guidelines in the document, all in accordance with the WPS agenda. An overwhelming number of pledges towards increasing the participation of women and other marginalised groups in peace and conflict resolution processes can be found throughout the document. Apart from this, the FFP Guidelines are expected to bring about efficient fight against sexualised and gender-based violence in armed conflict; strengthen humanitarian arms control; and advocate for nuclear disarmament (Auswärtiges Amt 2023b, 20). While increased participation and equal representation of women as one of the “3 R” principles of the FFP Guidelines are crucial, there is a lack of concrete and comprehensive measures that are planned to address these issues. With a general emphasis on percentage targets such as the percentage of women employees in the Federal Foreign Office and in peace missions, the FFP document exhibits a tendency to just “add women and stir” – an idea which focuses simply on increasing women’s representation, without the necessary concrete steps to achieve it (Dharmapuri 2011, 65). In addition, simply adding women does not necessarily entail a representation of feminist ideas. As stated before, without a focus on uncovering power relations that lead to women’s marginalisation, the root of the problem cannot be identified, resulting in ambiguous measures and actions. The ambiguity is evident in the disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts, or rather the lack thereof. When it comes to strengthening arms (export) control, non-proliferation and disarmament, the document reiterates their obligations as per the ATT. However, the Federal Foreign Office remains quite obscure in their intent to enforce this.

Having explored the German efforts in achieving sustainable peace and security for women with the help of Feminist Foreign and Development worldwide, it is essential to now assess how women are viewed and portrayed domestically to begin with. The Coalition Agreement from 2021 reaffirms the dedication to countering and combatting violence against women to comply with the Istanbul Convention, thus securing the right of protection for “every woman and her children” (Bundesregierung 2021, 91). From this point in the analysis timeframe chosen for this thesis the constellation “women and children” becomes somewhat mainstream. Depicting women alongside children is often a means to infantilise them, thus

making them passive victims that require masculine protection. Moreover, this constellation will become the norm for almost every women-related topic in the foreign policy and defence debates. Enloe's portrayal of the "women and children" constellation as a particularly patriarchal notion illustrates just how impossible it is to meaningfully acknowledge the specific issues and needs of women as a group, but also the needs of diverse groups within the social category of woman.

Thus, it is apparent that women are almost never regarded independently, but rather in relation to their roles vis-à-vis men and children, as mothers and wives both by the Federal Cabinet and by MPs. Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU/CSU) goes one step further by inflicting guilt upon the government to persuade them to export Leopard and Marder battle tanks to Ukraine, claiming that the German government owes that to the Ukrainian widows whose late husbands would have survived had these tanks been available (Bundestag 2022n, 8086). This attempt represents one of the most blatant instrumentalisation of women for militarising purposes. However, not only do the MPs instrumentalise women themselves, women's identities are almost always constructed in regards to their relation with men and children. MPs very often, if not always, use the line "women and children", creating an image of Ukrainian women almost exclusively as desperate mothers or suffering wives of male soldiers, mere passive victims of the Russian aggression. But this does not only relate to Ukrainian women affected by war, seeing as Wolfgang Hellmich (SPD) made his fellow Bundestag colleagues accountable for the change of the Constitution to include the 100-billion-euro-heavy special fund for the Bundeswehr so that he could reassure his fearful 96-year-old mother that he will ensure she lives in peace, making everyone in there responsible for his ability to face her again (Bundestag 2022h, 2681). On this example, I once again contend that such manoeuvring of women is in service of the militarisation cause. This statement is, also, another example of how public officials manipulate the notions of masculine and feminine to amplify the militarisation process.

The identification of military masculinities, let alone their connection to militarisation is not a popular topic in the Bundestag. Unfortunately, the foreign policy and defence MPs often steer clear of these debates. These can be heard in few debates for Women's Day, about CEDAW and the Istanbul Convention. For example, Ariane Fäscher (SPD) took the opportunity to identify harmful notions of masculinities, whose perpetrators represent:

[...] role models of exaggerated masculinity. Masculinity is considered masculine, strong, protective and as the provider of the family. Subsequently, it entails acting dominant and superior and is thus devaluing, brave and power-centred (Bundestag 2022o, 8042).

There are talks about toxic, violent masculinity and what it entails but those talks are led far away from foreign policy and defence debates. The MPs from Foreign Policy and Defence Committees do actually talk about women affected by the war in Ukraine. However, it is almost exclusively to portray them as scared, passive victims in dire need of protection. By doing so, MPs place Ukrainian women in discursive juxtaposition to Ukrainian men, who are almost exclusively regarded as armed protectors who courageously face the Russian army. This is best illustrated in Andrea Lindholz's (CDU/CSU) statement that women, children and old women are looking for protection in Ukraine and Germany, while their men and sons stay behind in their homelands to defend it with their lives (Bundestag 2022c, 1449). On a similar note, Dirk Wiese (SPD), Renata Alt (FDP), Derya Türk-Nachbaur (SPD), Alexander Müller (FDP), Petr Bystron (AfD) and Dr Johann David Wadephul (CDU/CSU), to name a few, all portray of women as defenceless, passive victims who hide from the atrocities of war in metros with their children (Bundestag 2022b; 2022c; 2022g; 2022i; 2022l; 2022o).

Manoeuvring women in this way narrows the window to successfully portray women as active actors both in Ukraine and at home. According to Matthias Moosdorf (AfD) women and feminism are the ones who have destroyed the German defence policy. Female MPs are often talked over during the debates on defence, with some female speakers in the Bundestag being blatantly disrespected. One such instance happened when Falko Droßmann (SPD) replied to a comment made by Gesine Lötzh using a German colloquial saying literally translating to "When the cake speaks, the crumbs take a break",²⁷ used to indicate superiority over the inferior speaker (Bundestag 2022l, 5396). Another example is Ingo Gädechens (CDU/CSU) and his preference for the use of the colloquialism "mother of the company" instead of "company sergeant major" (*Kompaniefeldwebel*) of the Bundeswehr, so he could say that the German soldiers regard her more as the Bundeswehr's evil stepmother who is endangering the institution with her diffused notion of effective security policy (Bundestag 2022n, 8081). There is also hesitancy in identifying women as active soldiers and freedom fighters in Ukraine mostly on the AfD front. On the other hand, the only MP in the reviewed materials who mentioned equality among the German troops is Niklas Wagener (Grünen),

²⁷ "Wenn der Kuchen spricht, haben die Krümel Pause"

who urged the government to include a gender-sensible purchase of equipment suitable for female soldiers (Bundestag 2022k, 3990). Although the FFP document sets MPs, among others German actors, the goal of internalising feminist strife for equality, there is hardly any will or action to achieve it. In turn, the mainstreaming tool of the FFP document does not seem to have enough domestic reach, while the honouring of the 3 principles remains limited to Federal Foreign Office officials.

After dissecting the FFP document, I am left with the task of exploring equal access to resources in Germany and globally (which is a feature of the 3rd R principle of the FFP Guidelines) to show the financial manoeuvres of militarisation. I intend to employ Enloe's recommended feminist curiosity by drawing a full analytical circle using quantitative data on the German Federal Budget, arms export and military expenditure.

6.3. The Budget, Arms Export and Military Expenditure

After presenting the findings from speeches and debates of the German Federal Cabinet and the 20th Bundestag, in this subchapter I set out to demonstrate how certain funding allocations and spending enhance militarisation and subordinate diplomatic means. Before the special fund was brought to life in the Constitution, both Annalena Baerbock and Christine Lambrecht advocated for these developments in their Bundestag speeches. The establishment of the special fund intended for the Bundeswehr and the efforts put in by the traffic light coalition to garner support for the change to the Constitution from the CDU/CSU oppositional faction might be one of the most blatant and conspicuous display of German society's militarisation. With die Linke constantly opposing this development of events and rightfully labelling it as militarisation, the majority of the CDU/CSU party's criticism of the government's actions stemmed from its role in the Bundestag as the opposition. Regardless of their criticism, their support for these measures was immense. Consequentially, their vote was secured for a necessary alteration of the Constitution itself. The increase in defence spending was saluted by almost all the factions (besides die Linke), who agreed that enhancing the Bundeswehr's capabilities is exactly what Germany needs to defend itself in the wake of a raging war. After a qualitative analysis, what follows are findings on pre-existing data from several credible and significant sources. Firstly, I will start with Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) reports on world military expenditure and arms export in 2022 and 2023. Then, I will lay out the allocation of funds in the German

budget for the 2022 and 2023. Lastly, inspired by Gesine Löttsch's remarks that militarisation will benefit the German arms industry the most (Bundestag 2022e), I will look at stock prices of Germany's leading arms group and arms manufacturer Rheinmetall from the moment the traffic light coalition announced their union until the end of 2023, including its highest recorded price-per-share documented in 2024.

SIPRI reports that the world military expenditure was a staggering \$2,240 in 2022, which, at that point in time, represented the highest level ever recorded by SIPRI (Tian et al. 2023, 1). Russia's invasion of Ukraine was identified as the main culprit of this development. In Europe, military expenditure increased by 13% in 2022 which represents the largest annual increase in total European military expenditure since the end of the Cold War (ibid.). In both 2022 and 2023, Germany ranked 7th on the global military expenditure list, and it was one of 6 countries out of the top 15 to increase their military expenditure as a share of GDP, in addition to France, Japan, UK, Russia and Ukraine (ibid., 2-3; Tian et al. 2024, 2). Military spending as a share of GDP amounted to 1.4%, which represented a 2.3% increase since 2021 (Tian et al. 2023, 2). SIPRI's estimation of the German budget in 2022 was \$55.8 billion including the \$2 billion for financial military aid to Ukraine (ibid., 9). After the German Federal Government announced the special fund for the Bundeswehr, as mentioned above, the German plan was to rely on debt as a tool to cover their military escapade. While ranked as 7th on the global military expenditure list, Germany found itself higher on the list of top arms exporters coming in at 5th place (Wezeman P., Gadon and Wezeman T. 2023, 2). Germany's arms export dynamics make up 4.2% of global arms exports (ibid., 3), the main recipient being Egypt, followed by South Korea and Israel in 2022 (ibid., 2).

Global military expenditure in 2023 amounted to \$2,443 billion, which became the new highest level recorded by SIPRI (Tian et al. 2024, 1). The upsurge came as a result of the war in Ukraine, as well as conflicts in Asia, Oceania and the Middle East (ibid.). Spending by NATO member states also rose, amounting to \$1,341 billion or 55% of world military spending, with 11 of 31 members reaching NATO's 2% of GDP spending target (ibid.). Germany's military spending rose by 9% in 2023 (to equal a total of 1.5% of the GDP since 2022) and by 48% over the decade spanning 2014-2023, amounting to a 2.7% share of world military spending in 2023 (ibid., 2). For comparison purposes, although the Russian invasion made Ukraine increase their military expenditure to 37% of their GDP; with a 2.7% share of world military spending, Ukraine takes the 8th spot on the military expenditure list for 2023 – one spot below Germany (ibid.). Germany's 7th position ranking included an increase in their

spending amounting to \$66.8 billion, and, following a revision of the spending plan, it was announced that the 2% of GDP investment may possibly be made on an annual basis from 2024 onwards (ibid., 9). In 2023, Germany's global share of arms export rose to 5.6% which allowed it to maintain its position in the top 5 (Wezeman et al., 2024, 2-3).

Throughout her speeches since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Lambrecht continuously tries to diffuse the armament panic by reiterating that the spending is not only about armament, but also about equipment (Bundestag 2022h, 2668). However, the breakdown of the Federal Budget for 2022 and 2023 tells a slightly different story. Before I continue with the analysis of the budget for this year, it is necessary to measure that the Ministry of Finances Interactive Budget website which serves as a source for the following data shows two different budgetary values. The users can review the proposed budget with planned spending for a certain fiscal year (*Sollwerte*) or the final budget with actual spending compiled after the fiscal year has passed (*Istwerte*). For the purposes of this thesis, I will be using the latter as it allows for a more accurate and reliable analysis.

The total Federal Budget for 2022 amounted to €481 billion, with a decrease in 2023 to €458 billion (Bundesministerium der Finanzen n.d.). Figure 2 represents the total spending amounts for each Ministry in both 2022 and 2023, with the addition of the federal public debt, both in euros and as a share of the total Federal Budget:

Figure 2. Spending across the Federal Ministries including federal debt in 2022 and 2023

Federal Ministry	2022 Amount (in thousands of euros)	Share of the budget	2023 Amount (in thousands of euros)	Share of the budget
Labour and Social Affairs	168,508,107	35.01%	171,712,528	37.52%
Health	65,474,081	13.6%	39,203,179	4.99%
Defence	50,598,838	10.51%	51,176,635	11.18%
Digital and Transportation	40,073,015	8.33%	36,168,473	7.9%
Education and Research	20,035,903	4.16%	21,351,324	4.67%
Federal Debt	15,735,453	3.27%	39,203,179	8.57%
Economic Cooperation and Development	13,820,275	2.87%	12,100,502	2.64%
Interior and Community	13,750,146	2.86%	14,170,764	3.1%
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth	12,373,360	2.57%	12,647,540	2.76%
Economic Affairs and Climate Action	9,587,594	1.99%	11,827,420	2.58%
Finances	8,527,199	1.77%	9,678,494	2.11%
Federal Foreign Office	7,964,720	1.65%	7,423,243	1.62%
Food and Agriculture	6,496,383	1.35%	6,813,182	1.49%
Housing, Urban Development and Building	4,400,725	0.91%	6,408,909	1.4%
Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection	2,027,457	0.42%	2,361,508	0.52%
Justice	902,028	0.19%	984,139	0.22%

Source: Bundesministerium der Finanzen n.d

As shown in the table, more than a third of the Federal Budget went towards labour- and social-affairs-related spendings in both 2022 and 2023. The Federal Ministry of Health came in 2nd place in 2022, which can be apportioned to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this Ministry's spending dropped significantly in 2023 to barely 5% of the budget share. In contrast, the expenditure of the Ministry of Defence, which ranked 3rd in 2022 under Minister Lambrecht's service, became the 2nd highest spending of the 2023 budget. Although this table portrays the importance the Federal Government assigns to social and labour affairs, it is important to consider that the spending of other Ministries (with the exception of Health in 2022) came nowhere close to the spending of the Ministry of Defence. In 2022, the military procurement budget, which falls under the spending of the Ministry of Defence, amounted to €8.7 billion out of the € 50.6 billion total spent by the Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Finanzen n.d.). In comparison, the "securing peace and stability" budget category under the spending of the Federal Foreign Office amounted to €4.9 billion that same year, with a total of €3.1 billion allocated from that category to humanitarian aid purposes, €574 million allocated to "crisis prevention, stabilisation, peacebuilding, climate and security policy", and €31 million allocated to the subcategory "disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation measures" (ibid.). This can be contextualised within the militarisation narrative created and cultivated by German public officials. Considering the average over the two-year period of the analysis timeframe, the defence budget is 6.6 times greater than the Federal Foreign Office budget, 4.1 times bigger than the budget dedicated to family affairs, senior citizens, women and youth, 3.9 times greater than that of economic cooperation and development and 2.5 times greater than the education and research budget. This stark difference falls in line with Enloe's argument that militarisation values military spending at the cost of spending on education, health, housing, women's affairs and even foreign aid – all necessary for securing human security of women in a country that has a feminist foreign policy and feminist development policy.

Although the defence budget rose by €578 million the military procurement subcategory of the defence budget dropped to €6.9 billion in 2023, but so did the "securing peace and stability" subcategory, which fell to €4.2 billion (ibid.). In addition to the defence budget, the "disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation measures" subcategory rose to €60 million in 2023, while the "humanitarian aid" decreased to €566 million and the "crisis prevention, stabilisation and peacebuilding" subcategory decreased to €2.7 billion for the same year.

Importantly, federal debt increased by approximately 150% percent in 2023. This sharp increase may steer the Federal Government into introducing austerity measures. Bohoslavsky and Rulli (2024) warn about the disproportionate effects of such measures, enhanced by inadequate debt analyses that exclude unpaid care economy vital to the reproduction of social structures. In turn, governments frame any sort of social rights failure as the reason for increased debt, which then leads to a simultaneous increase in household debt, most notably for poor women (ibid.).

For some industries, crises can be quite lucrative. In this case, the increase in military expenditure was particularly beneficial to the arms industry, and one such example is the German arms company Rheinmetall. Below is a chart representing Rheinmetall shares in euros, with the establishment of the traffic light coalition as a starting point, until the end of 2023.




Figure 3. Rheinmetall Shares in €, 2021-2024

Source: Börse Frankfurt n.d.

The dates seen in the chart above represent the timeframe mentioned in the methodology chapter of this thesis. The dates in the chart represent the key dates mentioned in this and the previous chapters, including the value of shares at the end of each year. As can be seen, the share price has never dropped below €100 per share since the beginning of the Ukrainian war in February 2022. Little over three months later, there was quite a sharp increase on 3 June, which represents the date on which the special fund for the Bundeswehr became constitutional. With occasional and slight decreases, the shares have not dropped below €200 ever since. The only date that goes beyond the scope of the methodological timeframe chosen

for this thesis is August 2024. The reason for this is to showcase the highest-recorded share price amounting to €563.8 of German Rheinmetall, which is the highest cost per share recorded since 1990.²⁸ This could be ascribed to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, of which Germany is a significant arms contributor (Wezeman P., Gadon, Wezeman S. 2023; Wezeman P. et al. 2024). By incorporating quantitative data, the findings showed the financial extent of Germany's militarisation and participation in the arms exportation frenzy with great profits for the German arms industry. Identified by die Linke the only ones profiting from wars and human suffering, the arms industries, and specifically the case of German Rheinmetall confirm Baerbock's statement that specific interests are always at play when it comes to power and resources. On multiple occasions, these have proven to be interests of the militarising and militarised kind.

Thus, with a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the research materials and sources chosen for this thesis, such as parliamentary debates and speeches, speeches by the Federal Cabinet, government policy documents, strategic documents and agreements, expert reports on military spending and arms exportation, the budget, and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, I hereby conclude this chapter. In the following chapter, which is also the final chapter of this thesis, I will lay out my concluding remarks. Furthermore, I will reflect on the literature review, conceptual framework, methodological framework and arguments I put forward in this thesis. Lastly, I will provide further research directions stemming from my own research on the assumptions made at the beginning of this thesis.

²⁸ The maximum span offered on the source website.

7. Synthesis and Concluding Remarks

Encouraged by ongoing crises and wars, militarisation has been putting down its roots in every corner of the world for years now. Germany is no exception. Simultaneously, by introducing the Feminist Foreign and Development Policy Guidelines Germany secured its spot on the list of countries upholding liberal values. Since Germany is a country that managed to create a paradigmatic elision of militarisation and FFP, this thesis employed a single-case-study method for an in-depth scrutiny of this elision. To provide comprehensive answers to my research question on the implications of militarisation for FFP in Germany, I undertook an analysis on the process of militarisation itself, its causes, the militarising actors, as well as the discourse that it has yielded and that further perpetuates it. Subsequently, the aim of this thesis has been to reveal the implications of militarisation for the freshly-created Feminist Foreign Policy Guidelines.

The research results aimed at answering the research question (“What are the implications of embracing military means for implementing a feminist foreign policy?”) indicate that a reversal to realist politics and the zero-sum game politics informed the debates and speeches that produced militarising discourses among the German public officials. In the same vein, the journey of examining the reconceptualisations shed a light on the creation and dissemination of discourses that valorise masculinist notions of IR, military security and military foreign policy mechanisms. Moreover, they showed an explicit prioritisation of military security mirrored in military and nuclear deterrence by constructing discourses that feminised diplomacy, while simultaneously devaluing foreign aid, peacebuilding efforts and calls for a ceasefire. As a result, I have identified a new-found valorisation of military masculinity by means of feminisation of diplomacy; reinforcement of socially-constructed gender norms; valorisation of soldiering; and rendering of women as passive victims in need of protection to be products of ongoing militarisation in Germany.

In addition, the findings showed that German public officials controlled and altered the discourses on their historical responsibility for World War Two to garner support for the militarising measures of sending weapons and arming the Bundeswehr through which they intended to face Russia. In parallel, this research illuminated how increases to the military and defence budget occur at the expense of education and research, health, women’s affairs,

youth causes, climate and foreign aid. Thus, I argued that these actions were in service of constructing Germany's identity as a dominant, enforcing and active NATO partner who can "bring out the big guns"; traits which are associated with the discursive notions of the masculine.

Therefore, one of my main contentions lies within the conclusion that in such a militarised environment, the deliberation and decisions on foreign policy and security measures become contingent upon the process of militarisation itself. As a result, the German feminist foreign policy contains the inevitability and absolute necessity of utilising military means to defend human lives. This symbiosis prevents the feminist aspect of this foreign policy document from being critical of patriarchal power relations and discriminatory power ownership imposed by militarisation. In addition, the research indicates that by embracing military means, feminist foreign policies make concessions at the expense of fundamental enhancement and protection of women's rights, freedoms, peace and security, thus never really cutting all ties with patriarchy. With such discrepancies, it will be difficult to sustainably fulfil the goal of ensuring peace and security of not just women, but other marginalised groups as well. Given the increased backlash against women's rights in Europe (Bergsten and Lee 2023), feminism is needed more than ever to constantly challenge the power relations and attempts at diminishing the rights that have been earned over the centuries. However, I have identified the attempted unification of militarisation and feminism as a reinvention of patriarchy employed in an effort to obscure the devastating effects of militarisation on women and soften their blow. The implications of this union thus lead to a disingenuous effort at creating sustainable peace and security for women worldwide by denigrating the feminist struggle to dismantle unequal power relations. This makes the symbiosis of feminist foreign policy and militarisation internally subversive, leading to ambiguity in implementation while reducing the hope of developing a feminist reflex in Germany to a simple instrument of ongoing militarisation.

As can be seen in the literature review chapter, significant emphasis is placed on the FFP goal of shattering unequal power structures, whether they be racist, patriarchal, homophobic, classist or intersectional. However, this does not seem to be a central goal for Germany's FFP that relies most notably on liberal feminism, with an attempt to draw upon intersectional feminism (Auswärtiges Amt 2023a, 30, 60). In my efforts to dissect and critically assess the shortcomings of the German FFP, my intention is not to frame liberal feminism as the wrong choice. My intention is, however, to criticise the conspicuous

disregard for discrimination, women's rights violations and gender-based violence that renowned feminist researchers have tied to militarisation and military instruments long before I took up this task. I find this disregard for oppressive militarised manoeuvres so blatantly included in a government-produced foreign policy document bearing the label "feminist" to be indicative of the German Federal Government's and Bundestag's foreign policy interests and priorities.

Consequently, it is my conviction that the documents that carry this label and attempt to shape their policies according to feminist principles, generate inherent ethical implications, but also commitments. These efforts in Germany become disingenuous through undiscerning foreign policy and security actions when preference is given to all-consuming embrace of military means in the FFP document as a reinvention of patriarchal patterns. Thus, consistent with the literature on feminism and militarisation, as well as the conceptual framework crafted from Cynthia Enloe's work, the analysis confirmed my initial assumption that embracing military means in implementing FFP perpetuates patriarchal values and is internally subversive due to militarisation's reliance on patriarchal assumptions about the state, foreign affairs, diplomacy, peacebuilding and security, and ultimately, men and women.

The pervasiveness of militarisation made it the "new normal" and framed military foreign policy mechanisms as inevitable. A reality is then constructed in which feminism can be instrumentalised for military purposes and considered an ally when using a patriarchal structure to deter and defeat the constructed enemy – the "other", in this case is Russia. This makes feminism in the German FFP complicit with diminishing efforts towards peaceful conflict resolution, constructive diplomacy, effective peacebuilding, and ultimately total global nuclear and conventional disarmament. Moreover, the concept of feminism is manoeuvred for military purposes just like the discourse on the German responsibility to fight for peace and freedom in Europe and worldwide with military means instrumentalising this concept for militarisation purposes can lead to empty actions and false hopes. My research paints a picture of Germany that adopted the FFP as a decoy, with vague intentions of adhering to the feminist struggle of dismantling power hierarchies. In other words, it reflects Germany's intentions of adhering to liberal feminist principles, which condone and endorse militarism in women's "right to fight" as a contribution to women's representation (Kennedy-Pipe 2017, 23), with no critical inquisition into the structures that militarisation relies on. This can indicate that Germany has adopted its FFP to soften the blow and criticism of

reinforced militarisation, framing the endorsement of military means as feminist principles, thus producing democratic legitimacy for the heavily-militarised Zeitenwende.

As shown in the SIPRI reports on military expenditure and arms exportation, the Zeitenwende brought a neoteric valorisation of militarisation, which consumed not only Germany, but the whole world. A discourse was constructed in which investing more than 2% of its GDP in the Bundeswehr and the 100-billion-euros special fund for the Bundeswehr represents the *sine non qua* of German security. Deemed as secondary to military intervention, it becomes apparent that the allocation of funds towards diplomatic foreign interventions like foreign aid and disarmament affairs is deprioritised over the budget for military procurement alone. In addition, the analysis of Rheinmetall's shares confirmed the warnings of die Linke, and those of feminist IR researchers, that the arms industry is one of the biggest beneficiaries of war and conflict.

The literature review I have presented in this thesis was split into 4 subchapters that aim to encapsulate the gist of militarisation, feminist foreign policy and German foreign policy identity, and have served as a valuable compass that steered my research and ultimately my argumentation. My findings mainly complimented the research laid out in the literature review sections, with the exception of some ideas on German foreign policy identity. As a feminist researcher, I find it difficult to characterise German foreign policy identity as pacifistic and anti-militaristic, given its comprehensive role in global arms supplies and exportation, as well as its participation in nuclear sharing, irrespective of the Zeitenwende. On the other hand, German authors who are deemed experts in German foreign policy seem to totally disregard the feminist attempt at foreign policy action, which is indicative of its significance in German society. Despite its scarcity, the literature on the implications of militarisation for FFP in Germany, the literature I read represented insightful, critical research that complement the conclusion I have laid out in this thesis.

The conceptual framework I have used as a springboard for building arguments was useful in dissecting and illuminating patriarchy, militarisation and militarised masculinities. Cynthia Enloe's priceless work helped guide this thesis and build arguments that illuminate the noxious effects of militarisation on society and on feminist initiatives. The findings in this thesis that illuminated the creation of militarising discourses, the feminisation of diplomacy, the allocation of massive amounts of money to defence and military deterrence, the neglect of feminist curiosity and the subsequent endorsement of military means in a FFP further

reinforce the feminist critique of militarism and militarisation expounded in the literature review section, but especially in Enloe's research.

Lene Hansen's intertextual models and conceptual intertextualisation proved to be valuable mechanisms for researching how the official and oppositional discourses in Germany deconstructed and reconstructed concepts like security, military deterrence, diplomacy, and feminist foreign policy with the goal of reconstructing Germany's foreign policy identity. Because I identified the public officials from the federal cabinet and the 20th Bundestag as the protagonists of militarisation in Germany, I found the critical discourse analysis method to be of great use particularly in researching foreign policy and security from a feminist perspective. Although pairing a qualitative method with quantitative data entailed an extensive research task, it also amplified the critical nature of this thesis.

This thesis was based on a paradigmatic, singular case study, which is why it can be difficult to generalise the findings. For example, considering its significant military history, I showed that German public officials constructed a discourse on the correct response to the Russian invasion. This response is heavily infused with Germany's military past, in particular their role in the Holocaust. Hence, the particular construction of contemporary security and foreign policy discourses in Germany is quite unique. In addition, although they may rely on a similar type of feminism, FFPs of all countries are heavily shaped by the national context. Moreover, the forms patriarchy takes on in its efforts to accommodate to the 21st century also vary from state to state. However, there is room for generalising regarding specific points in the analysis. For example: the implications of militarisation for further perpetuation of discriminatory, patriarchal power structures and inequalities. Lastly, although the level of military masculinity valorisation is nuanced depending on the national context, its emergence is implied during militarising times.

Correspondingly, this thesis aims to contribute to the body of literature on German foreign policy identity, (anti-)militarisation and feminist foreign policy in Germany by employing a particularly critical feminist perspective. With this thesis, I also aimed to contribute to critical feminist IR scholarship. In addition, this research serves to expand the feminist scholarship in the study of German foreign policy identity, and contributes to the academic efforts towards illuminating the implications of the *Zeitenwende* speech on Germany's foreign policy and security actions. Furthermore, this research can also serve as a warning and/or recommendation for other NATO countries in light of current conflicts and

wars on how to approach the idea of refining their FFPs to be more sustainable and inclusive without having to yield its authenticity for the sake of militarisation. Lastly, my objective is to make a contribution towards unifying literature on militarisation, feminist foreign policy and German foreign policy identity in English and German. This unification allowed my research to be more inclusive and enhanced the depth thereof while highlighting localised contexts by bridging existing knowledge gaps brought about by linguistic shortcomings.

Throughout my analysis, I kept reassessing the decisions I made regarding literature review, conceptual framework and methodology. In the end, various research options appeared that could steer this research in several directions in further studies. One such proposition would be to research the implications of militarisation for German FFP in the context of the conflict in the Gaza strip; given that Germany is actively supplying Israel with weapons— while the narrative of protecting Israel due to historical responsibility is massively amplified. In addition, for more comprehensive research this thesis could be extended to include the 1st, 2nd, 3a and 3b models crafted by Lene Hansen, which would include marginalised and potentially subversive discourses, thus painting a comprehensive picture of the narratives and discourses around militarisation and FFP in Germany. Moreover, ontological security theory may be a useful theoretical framework to scrutinise these issues for further research, seeing as the *Zeitenwende* was regarded as a change in Germany's foreign policy identity, and thus interrupted its continuity. With that being said, I deem it absolutely necessary for any sort of research in IR, in particular research on FFP and militarisation, to require a distinct and tireless feminist curiosity. On the example of Swedish feminists, Enloe (2017,116) claims that feminists never fooled themselves about where the “real political clout lies or that they can relax their feminist scrutiny of the government”. Thus, despite patriarchy's innovations jostling to maintain its sustainability badge, patriarchal patterns that inform these occurrences can be easy to spot for those who actively work towards developing a feminist reflex.

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