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The third wave of autocratisation and the Western Balkans

Abstract



The third wave of autocratisation began globally at some point in the 1990s. In the Western Balkans it became a clear pattern in the 2010s. The vast majority of democracies emerged during the three waves of democratisation. By analysing the annual reports of Freedom House and reviewing the relevant scholarly analyses, the author identifies the early 2010s as the beginning of the third wave of autocratisation in the Western Balkans. This trend turned all countries in the region into hybrid regimes and stabilitocracies. All relevant external actors helped this process: the EU and the USA by endorsing stability rather than democracy, and China and Russia by supporting autocratic tendencies. During global and regional waves of autocratisation it is difficult to expect local democratisations. The author suggests that only a new regional wave of democratisation could potentially reverse the process, and that it would need external support of international liberal actors.

Keywords



third wave of autocratisation, hybrid regimes, stabilitocracy, Western Balkans

Modern democracies are a relatively novel concept. Samuel P. Huntington identified the United States of America as the first modern democracy. It reached that status after the presidential elections of 1828. On that occasion, for the first time, the majority of males could vote in the United States, but that referred to white males only. During this “long wave of democratisation” (1928-1926), over thirty countries “established at least minimal national democratic institutions”. (Huntington, 1991: 17) Huntington accepted Jonathan Sunshine’s definition of 19th-century democracy. It includes male suffrage above 50%, and “a responsible executive who either must maintain majority support in an elected parliament or is chosen in periodic popular elections.” (Huntington, 1991: 16) He identified three waves of democratisation, and also two reverse waves.

During the first wave of democratisation, some of the best-known modern democracies appeared: the USA, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France and others. Yet, another stream appeared in 1922 and continued till 1942. Huntington called that stream the first reverse way. During this first wave of autocratisation, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany emerged. (Huntington, 1991: 16-18)

One cannot fail to notice that the second wave of democratisation (1943-62) overlaps with the period when Pax Americana reached its climax. It was the period when the global economic supremacy of the United States was clear, and when the USA became the leader of the so-called free world. Wherever the United States was present in both military and economic terms, democratisation followed. In this period the club of democracies expanded to include Italy, Germany, Japan, Greece, Turkey and some Latin American countries. The second reverse way, or the second wave of autocratisation, followed (1958-1975). It affected Latin America, South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece and, briefly, India (1975-1977).

The third wave of democratisation began in 1974, and there is still no consensus on when it ended, but it was at some point at the very end

of the 20th or in the early 21st century. The countries of Southern Europe were the first to join the club of liberal democracies (Portugal, Greece and Spain). They were followed by Latin American countries, the Philip-pines (1986), South Korea (1987) and Mongolia (1990). In the 1990s, the countries of Eastern Europe also joined the group. Among the countries that emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia, only Slovenia became a liberal democracy in this period.

What is important regarding the concept of the three waves of democ-ratisation is that the vast majority of cases of democratisation happened during the course of one of the three waves (1928-1926, 1943-1962, 1974-?). There is yet no consensus on when the third wave ended, but it lasted at least till 1994. The problem for the societies that aspire to become democracies is that each wave of democratisation was followed by a wave of autocratisation, and cases of democratisation during the first two reverse (autocratic) waves (1922-1942, 1958-1975) were very rare indeed.¹

In the period 1980-2000, the substantial global rise of democracies doubled their total numbers. The fall of the Berlin Wall seemed sym-bolically to be the real turning point. This led some scholars to liberal triumphalism, and F. Fukuyama even contemplated the idea of the end of history. Many a researcher was led to believe that liberal democracy had secured its global victory. All such predictions turned out to be pre-mature.

The definition of democracy was changed and expanded during the second and particularly during the third wave of democratisation. Stand-ards were substantially widened, and democracy became a complex notion that had to meet several requirements. Most researchers of de-mocracy accept the definition proposed by Robert Dahl, which includes eight institutional guarantees: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and for votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies that depend on votes and other expressions of preference. (Dahl, 1971: 3)

Global outlook of liberal democracies in the early 21st century

Some scholars believe that the third wave of democratisation turned into its opposite as early as 1994. (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1102) Fa-reed Zakaria in his well-know paper "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy" warned that illiberal democracy was "a growth industry", and he pro-

[1] V-Dem Project slightly adjusted the chronology of Huntington's second re-verse wave. For them, the second wave of autocratisation took place between 1961 and 1977. (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1102)

phetically noted: “Western liberal democracy might prove to be not the final destination on the democratic road, but just one of many possible exits”. (Zakaria, 1997: 24) While democracy flourished in the 1990s, constitutional liberalism did not. What Zakaria warned about was that, without constitutional liberalism, democracy was not only inadequate “but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war.” (Zakaria, 1997: 42-43)

Since 1972, the American non-governmental organisation Freedom House has been preparing annual reports entitled *Freedom in the World*. They categorise all countries worldwide into three groups: free, partly free and not free. That roughly corresponds to the division into liberal democracies, illiberal democracies and autocracies. These reports reflected the rise of liberal democracies in the 1980s and 1990s, and even at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2006, the percentage of the global population that lived in the free world reached its peak (46%). This percentage should not be confused with the number and percentage of UN member states categorised as democracies. Many countries of the Caribbean or Pacific are democracies, and they significantly add to the overall number of global democracies, but they have very small populations.

A huge shift with global implications took place in the Freedom House report for 2020 when India, due to a prolonged rise in violence and discriminatory policies against its Muslim minority, became a partly free country after 20 years of being considered a free country (1999-2019). By that very fact, the number of people living in democracies was almost halved, dropping from 39 to 20 per cent. The latest Freedom House report *Freedom in the World* summarizes a very bleak global outlook for democracies. In global terms, 8 out of 10 citizens do not live in the free world. At the same time, 41.3% of the global population lives in partly free countries and 38.4% in not free countries. (FiW, 2022: 4)

Even the titles of the *Freedom in the World* annual reports are self-explanatory and clearly demonstrate the recent turn towards autocratisation. The last relatively optimistically entitled report was released in 2013: “Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance”. (FiW 2013) Only two years later, the title was “Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist”. (FiW 2015) Some of the subsequent titles are self-explanatory: “Democracy in Crisis” (for 2017)”, “Democracy in Retreat” (for 2018), “Democracy under Siege” (for 2020), “The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule” (for 2021). (FiW reports 2018, 2019, 2021, 2022)²

The selection of caricatures in these reports signifies the same trend. In FiW 2018 (for 2017), the cover page of the report shows Achilles bearing the flag of democracy and human rights. His shield can hardly deflect the multitude of arrows directed against him. The knights cowering behind him hold shields emblazoned with the flags of Britain, Germany and

[2] The years in the titles of FiW reports mark the publication year, but the reports always cover the previous year.

France. The American shield is lying on the ground discarded. Behind the Western defenders of democracy sits the then US president Donald Trump, looking at his phone and tweeting. The caricature on the following cover page was even bleaker. Some world leaders have gathered in a circle to burn freedom. While the Saudi prince pours gasoline onto the fire, a group of global leaders, including Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Nicolas Maduro, Xi Jinping, Viktor Orban and Donald Trump, is literally fanning the flame. These caricatures graphically highlighted a huge and unexpected novelty: under the presidency of Donald Trump, the key defender of the “free world” – the United States of America, temporarily abandoned its advocacy and promotion of the liberal world. Unsurprisingly, the United States themselves suffered a significant decline in their democracy score, going down from 94 points in FiW for 2010 to 83 points in FiW for 2020. (FiW, 2021: 6) The US democracy was assessed as unstable, and the reasons for downgrading its democracy score included: “the politically distorted health recommendations, partisan infighting, shockingly high and racially disparate coronavirus death rates, and police violence against protesters advocating for racial justice.” (FiW, 2021: 9)

In 2019, Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg, associates of the V-Dem Institute in Gothenburg, published their study on the third wave of autocratisation. In their view, the third wave of autocratisation began in 1994. They identified 32 autocratisation episodes in the first wave, 62 in the second, and 75 in the period 1994-2017. (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1103) Within the third wave of autocratisation, post-communist East European countries had 16 autocratisation episodes, most of which were protracted. The pace of autocratisation in the third wave is slower than in the first two and the autocratisation process more gradual. However, almost all autocratisation episodes affected countries previously classed as democracies. Attacks on democracy do not happen in the same way as during the first two reverse waves, which usually involved coups, foreign invasions and *autogolpes*. Instead, they come through democratic erosion, in which persons in power undermine democratic norms but do not abolish democratic institutions. (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1105) Two years later, the associates of the V-Dem Institute warned: “Since 1994, civil liberties and political rights of one third of the global population have been substantially, and increasingly reduced due to autocratization.” (Boese, Lindberg and Lührmann, 2021: 1207)

Lührmann and Lindberg issued an important warning: “What is especially worrying about this trend [of autocratisation] is that historically, very few autocratization episodes starting in democracies have been stopped short of turning countries into autocracies.” (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1107-08) They were still moderately optimistic in 2019 about the future of democracy: “As it was premature to announce the ‘end of history’ in 1992, it is premature to proclaim the ‘end of democracy’ now.” (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1108)

The Freedom House report for 2021, published in February 2022, is slightly more pessimistic. It identified movements around the world that offer some hope for further democratisation. The authors of this report, Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, warned: “Those countries that have struggled in the space between democracy and authoritarianism, meanwhile, are increasingly tilting toward the latter. The global order is nearing a tipping point, and if democracy’s defenders do not work together to help guarantee freedom for all people, the authoritarian model will prevail.” (Repucci and Slipowitz, 2022: 1)

Selected European and other counties		
Country	Score (100 - the highest)	status
Sweden	100	Free
Germany	94	Free
Slovenia	90	Free
Italy	90	Free
France	89	Free
Greece	87	Free
Croatia	85	Free
Romania	83	Free
USA	83	Free
Bulgaria	79	Free
Hungary	69	Partly free
India	66	Partly free
Ukraine	61	Partly free
Turkey	32	Not free
Russia	19	Not free
Cuba	12	Not free
China	9	Not free
North Korea	3	Not free

Source: *Freedom in the World 2022* (for 2021)

The Western Balkans and the illusion of the fourth wave

The second episode of the third wave of democratisation took place in the Balkans. In Portugal, the Carnation Revolution happened in April 1974. Three months later, the military junta that had ruled Greece for seven years (1967-1974) fell. These two events marked the beginning of the third wave of democratisation. Spain was the following state that became a democracy (in 1977-78). When the Berlin Wall fell (November 1989), expectations were very high that communist Yugoslavia would be among the first to change its political system and become a liberal democracy. Such expectations materialised only in Slovenia. The Wars for Yugoslav Succession (1991-1999) delayed the democratic transition

of the region of the Western Balkans for a whole decade. It was only in 2000 that all the countries that had emerged from former Yugoslavia got their democratically elected governments.

At the beginning of the 21st century, there was quite widespread belief that democracy had very favourable prospects. Some experts were convinced that the fourth wave of democratisation was underway, and that it was going to encompass the countries of former Yugoslavia. The *Routledge Handbook on Democratization*, published in 2012, was a scholarly summary of research conducted in this field. Its editor Jeffrey Haynes entitled his introductory text “Thirty-five years of democratization: the third and fourth waves of democracy in perspective”. (Haynes, 2021: 1-9) The forecast for the countries of the Western Balkans in terms of their democratisation was optimistic. In the first chapter of this handbook, written by the British political scientist Paul G. Lewis, the author optimistically concluded: “So the bulk of Central Europe has democratized successfully, and things are now moving in a positive direction in much of the West Balkans.” (Lewis, 2012: 14)

The prospects outlined in 2012 in *The Routledge Handbook* and retrospective analyses from the vantage point of the early 2020s do not give quite the same results. The second decade of the 21st century brought about quite different outcomes from those that had been anticipated. This led to the gradual abandonment of the term “the fourth wave of democratisation” for the Western Balkans, but the term was also abandoned in global considerations of the process of democratisation. It was replaced by another term that describes the prospects of global democracy in a much bleaker way, and that term is “the third wave of autocratisation.” This wave followed similar patterns that appeared after the first two waves of democratisation. Each wave of democratisation was followed by a wave of autocratisation. In the Western Balkans, one could clearly see democratisation fatigue in 2010, and a wave of autocratisation followed in the second decade of the 21st century.

Depending on one’s standpoint, one could argue that the Wars for Yugoslav Succession (1991-1999) brought about their own wave of autocratisation or at least delayed democratisation in the Western Balkans. But, for the purposes of this analysis, I will focus on the situation in the region since 2010, when clear signs appeared that the previous process of democratisation was undergoing transformation towards autocratisation.

The slow pace of democratisation in ex-Yugoslavia in the first decade of the 21st century

Slovenia began its own process of democratisation after its secession from the Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia and its short Ten-Day War with the Yugoslav People’s Army in June-July 1991. In contrast to Slove-

nia, the rest of Yugoslavia was severely affected by the consequences of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and particularly the resulting wars. John R. Lampe noted: "Slovenian political life and its economy were, in addition, free from the cost of reconstituted armies, paramilitary corruption, and unchecked intelligence services that burdened both Serbia and Croatia under the Milošević and Tudjman regimes." (Lampe, 2006: 269) The death of Franjo Tudjman (December 1999), President of Croatia, and the electoral defeat of his regime in Croatia (January 2000), as well as the defeat of the regime of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia in September/October 2000, created huge expectations in terms of democratisation.

The main Freedom House publication *Freedom in the World* (FiW) categorises countries and territories around the world using a scale from 1 (least free) to 100 (totally free), with Scandinavian countries at the top of the list and countries like North Korea and Syria at the bottom. At the beginning of the 21st century, the countries of former Yugoslavia were divided into two groups. Croatia reached the status of a free country already in the FiW report for 2000, and FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the report for 2001. (FiW, 2001; FiW, 2002) (FYR) Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, could not attain that status and were categorised as partly free. When the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro ended its existence and Montenegro became an independent country (2006), Serbia took over the status of a free country from FR Yugoslavia (FiW, 2007; FiW, 2008: 616; FiW, 2009), and Montenegro was also considered a free country since the FiW report for 2008. (FiW 2008: 480, FiW 2009: 488) Since the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo, Freedom House considered this area partly free. (FiW, 2009)³ To summarize, at the end of the 2000s, the countries of ex-Yugoslavia found themselves in two categories: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro were ranked free, whereas (FYR) Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were partly free.

In the FiW report for 2010, Freedom House had a series of complaints regarding the level of democratisation of these countries. Macedonia was assessed as an electoral democracy, with corruption posing a "serious problem" and "increased [political] pressure on the media." Kosovo did not even meet the standards of an electoral democracy, with both corruption and organised crime recognized as serious problems. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the report said: "The reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina stalled and nationalist rhetoric continued to rise in 2010." (FiW, 2011: 92, 365-67, 406)

Another important annual report of Freedom House is entitled *Nations in Transit* (NIT). It is particularly focused on democratic transition and gives more detailed insight and more elaborate classification than the *Freedom in the World* reports. The NIT classification includes five

[3] Freedom House has treated Kosovo since its proclamation of independence as an independent country, but Serbia and many UN member states have not recognised Kosovo's independence by the beginning of 2022.

categories: consolidated democracies, semi-consolidated democracies, transitional governments or hybrid regimes, semi-consolidated autocracies and consolidated autocracies. In geographic terms, the report includes the countries of Central Europe, the former communist countries of the Balkans and the countries of Eurasia. The scores in these reports range from 1 to 7. Consolidated autocracies include countries like Tajikistan or Russia, while consolidated democracies are countries like the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The magic score of democracy is 4.01 because any score above 4 means that a country is indeed a democracy: a semi-consolidated democracy ranges from 4.01 to 5.00 and a consolidated democracy from 5.01 to 7. This means that liberal democracies are divided in these reports into semi-consolidated and consolidated ones.

In the same period, three countries that emerged from former Yugoslavia became liberal democracies, but none of them reached the status of a so-called consolidated democracy. While the Baltic countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary relatively quickly reached the status of a consolidated democracy, that did not happen in a single case in the Western Balkans. In the period 2001-2010, the pace of progress was very slow if the whole region of the Western Balkans is analysed. The region progressed by the end of 2010 to an average democracy score of 3.93 points. In other words, on average, it did not even reach the level of semi-consolidated democracy. During the first decade of the 21st century, the region increased its democracy score by 0.28 points on a scale from 1 to 7. (NIT 2002; NIT 2011) In 2010, with that kind of pace, the region needed an additional 34 years to reach the democracy score of a consolidated democracy.

European integration and autocratisation in the Western Balkans

In the 2010s, two EU candidate countries in the region (Montenegro and Serbia) conducted their negotiations by chapters with the EU. Montenegro began accession talks in June 2012 and Serbia in December 2015. Although the concept of the transformative power of the EU in the region of the Western Balkans, and also its EU neighbourhood, was contested recently, (Economides, 2020; Mendelski, 2015; Börzel and Lebanidze, 2017) it could still be argued that this sort of soft power of the EU is more emphasised during chapter negotiations than in any other stage of the accession process, since the period of negotiations includes harmonisation of national laws and policies of candidate countries with EU laws, standards and policies. Therefore, in general terms, the Europeanisation of candidate countries should take place during negotiations by chapters, and this should certainly include the process of democratisation and consolidation of the rule of law.

The stories of Montenegro and Serbia represent rather peculiar case studies in which the transformative power of the EU was reduced during chapter negotiations. Moreover, it was precisely during chapter negotiations and the process of harmonising their laws with the EU that the two states experienced a decline in their democracy rates. Therefore, in the cases of Serbia and Montenegro, the process of autocratisation was concomitant with the process of their negotiations with the EU! O. Komar warned that European “standards” were used in Montenegro “as a shield to cover, or even a mechanism to implement, illiberal actions.” (Komar, 2020: 76)

In the case of Serbia, the concept of stabilitocracy was used to explain its concomitant EU accession and democratic erosion in the period 2015-2021. One should have in mind that the second decade of the 21st century came in the wake of the Greek Debt Crisis that had begun in 2009. The prospects of economic collapses in the Western Balkans coupled with ethnic tensions prompted many Western leaders to accept tacitly, or even endorse openly, a new type of soft authoritarianism that scholars have dubbed stabilitocracy. (Bieber, 2018a; Bieber, 2018b) Vera Stojarova noticed that the EU played “the role of guarantor of stability in the region and has long preferred stability over democracy”. (Stojarova, 2020: 235) Bieber defined the essence of this new type of hybrid state: “Western Balkan stabilitocracies thus combine semi-authoritarian features, while claiming to be reforming democracies and receiving external support, in particular from EU member states, for the sake of the (false) promise of stability.” (Bieber, 2018a: 179)

It became particularly clear that influential Western countries, including Germany and the United States, were growing increasingly willing to prioritize stability over democratisation. (FYR) Macedonia under its Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski (2006-2016) became the first stabilitocracy in the region of the Western Balkans. Although FiW consistently considered (FYR) Macedonia partly free, NIT gave her the rank of a semi-consolidated democracy, and the country lost that rank in the NIT report for 2013. (NIT 2014) The rule of Gruevski was described as a case study of a “combination of strategies by governing elites to maximize institutional and symbolic (discursive) capture” with the aim of consolidating illiberal politics. (Gjuzelov and Ivanovska Hadjievska, 2020: 55)

The European Union had to make concessions to another candidate country in the wider region: Turkey. It never deprived Turkey of its candidate status, in spite of gross violations of the rule of law and human rights in this country. In the period 2012-2016, there was a clear fall in its level of democratisation. Freedom House warned in its report for 2012 that Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, underwent huge changes. His long term in power witnessed important reforms, but then hundreds of journalists, academics, opposition party officials and military officers were jailed “in a series of prosecutions aimed at alleged conspiracies against the state and Kurdish organizations.” Turkey became the

world leader in the number of jailed journalists. (FiW 2013: 3) Four years later, *Freedom in the World* assessed that the EU agreement with Turkey concerning refugees “became a deeper source of embarrassment after Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan embraced an unvarnished form of authoritarianism in response to a failed coup attempt in July [2016].” (FiW 2017: 2) In the FiW for 2017, Turkey fell to the lowest rank and was categorised as a not free country. In that way, its “free fall since 2014” reached its peak. (FiW 2018: 7) None of this led to the suspension of its EU candidate status. In March 2019, the European Union even held the 54th session of its EU-Turkey Association Council. (https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/negotiations-status/turkey_en)

Regarding Montenegro and Serbia and their democracy statuses, Montenegro was the first to be downgraded in the Freedom House report for 2015 when it became partly free. (FiW 2016: 19-20) The report has a special section entitled “gridlock in the Balkans.” It was noticed that Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo “all suffered from crippling government dysfunction in 2015”, and for these countries EU accession “remained a distant prospect.” (FiW 2016: 8) However, the Montenegrin progress in EU accession was seen as something that affected Union’s good repute. The EU accession of this state continued “even as the entrenched government of Prime Minister Milo Đukanović sanctioned the harassment of independent media, tarnished the bloc’s image as a purveyor of good governance and democratic norms.” (FiW 2016: 8)

Serbia lost its status in the report for 2018, after 17 years of being considered a free state. (FiW 2019; NIT 2019) The same happened to Hungary. The report stated that the decline in the status of Serbia came “due to deterioration in the conduct of elections, continued attempts by the government and allied media outlets to undermine independent journalists through legal harassment and smear campaigns, and President Aleksandar Vučić’s de facto accumulation of executive powers that conflict with his constitutional role.” (NIT 2019: 13) The same report points out that the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro “continued to consolidate state power around themselves and their cliques, subverting basic standards of good governance and exceeding their assigned constitutional roles.” (FiW 2019: 11)

The third wave of autocratisation: Central Europe and the Western Balkans in the second decade of the 21st century

The third wave of autocratisation affected more or less all countries of the Western Balkans. The enclosed chart of democracy scores of these countries for the period 2010-2021 demonstrates that, in five out of seven countries and entities of the region, democracy scores fell in this

period. The sole exception is North Macedonia, which, in 2017-2020, experienced four consecutive years of increasing its scores from 3.57 to 3.82. Even this kind of increase still left this country within the zone of hybrid regimes. Kosovo even ranked as a semi-consolidated autocracy till 2015. It also demonstrated an increase of democracy scores in 2016-2021 but only reached the level of the worst ranked hybrid regime in the region. Only one country in the region – Croatia – kept the status of a semi-consolidated democracy.

As Croatia is generally not considered a country of the Western Balkans since its EU accession in July 2013, the condition of the region in 2021, in terms of democratisation, may be aptly summarised as follows: six out of six countries and entities are transitional governments or hybrid regimes, and their scores range between 3.25 (Kosovo) and 3.82 (Montenegro and North Macedonia).

State/Entity	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Albania	3.96	3.86	3.75	3.82	3.86	3.86	3.86	3.89	3.89	3.82	3.75	3.75
Bosna and Her.	3.68	3.64	3.61	3.57	3.54	3.50	3.46	3.36	3.32	3.32	3.36	3.29
Croatia	4.36	4.39	4.39	4.32	4.32	4.32	4.29	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25
Kosovo	2.82	2.82	2.75	2.86	2.86	2.93	3.04	3.07	3.11	3.18	3.14	3.25
Montenegro	4.18	4.18	4.18	4.14	4.11	4.07	4.11	4.07	3.93	3.86	3.82	3.82
North Macedonia	4.18	4.11	4.07	4.00	3.93	3.71	3.57	3.64	3.68	3.75	3.82	3.82
Serbia	4.36	4.36	4.36	4.36	4.32	4.25	4.18	4.04	4.00	3.96	3.89	3.79
Average	3.93	3.91	3.87	3.87	3.85	3.81	3.79	3.76	3.74	3.73	3.72	3.71
Median	4.18	4.11	4.07	4.00	3.93	3.86	3.86	3.89	3.89	3.82	3.82	3.79

Source: *Nations in Transit 2020 and 2022* (for 2019 and 2021)

The wave of autocratisation was not limited to the Western Balkans. Somewhat unexpectedly, these countries were joined in this trend by some Central European countries. Two liberal democracies in Central Europe that had excellent democracy ratings and were considered consolidated democracies began to substantially fall in terms of their democracy scores. The distinction that Freedom House has made in its NIT reports between consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies implied that the first group was supposed to be rather resistant to potential autocratic tendencies. The definition of this group of countries has been that they “embody the best policies and practices of liberal democracy, but may face challenges.”

Challenges indeed appeared and turned into clear tendencies to autocratisation in several cases, of which the most striking have been those of Poland and Hungary. (Bozóki and Hegedűs, 2018), In the NIT report for 2020, Freedom House summarised its findings about the two states: “Two countries, Poland and Hungary, stand out for their unparalleled

democratic deterioration over the past decade. Hungary has undergone the biggest decline ever measured in *Nations in Transit*, plummeting through two categorical boundaries to become a Transitional/Hybrid Regime last year. Poland is still categorized as a semi-consolidated democracy, but its decline over the past five years has been steeper than that of Hungary.” (NIT 2021: 2)

The change of democracy scores for the period 2015-2021 demonstrates the highest decline in the case of Poland by 1.14 points, closely followed by Hungary with 1.03. Serbia and Montenegro also experienced a significant decline in this period: to 0.46 in Serbia’s case and to 0.25 in Montenegro’s.

This brings us to the outlook of the Western Balkans and its neighbourhood at the end of 2021. Two former semi-consolidated democracies (Serbia and Montenegro) joined the club of hybrid regimes and partly free countries, which already included three other countries and one entity of the region. The same category of partly free countries includes Hungary and Ukraine, and in the broader neighbourhood there are three more countries ranked not free: Turkey, Belarus and the Russian Federation.

Countries of the Western Balkans in 2021		
State	Score	status
North Macedonia	67	partly free
Montenegro	67	partly free
Albania	67	partly free
Serbia	62	partly free
Kosovo	56	partly free
Bosnia and Herz.	53	partly free

Source: *Freedom in the World 2022* (for 2021)

NIT 2022 has succinctly described this trend: “In this emerging era, liberal democracy no longer prevails as the assumed goal of national political development. Increasingly, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are headed toward two different destinations: the abyss of full-blown autocracy and the grey zone of hybrid governance, where ostensibly democratic structures belie undemocratic practices.” (NIT 2022: 2) The third wave of autocratisation is also clear when the results of the *Nation in Transit* reports are summarised for the period 2004-2021:

Type of state	number of countries in 2004	%	number of countries in 2021	%
Democracies	14	48.3	10	34.5
Hybrid regimes	4	13.8	11	37.9
Autocracies	11	37.9	8	27.6

Source: NIT 2022, 2.

It is clear that the ongoing erosion of democracy has been particularly favourable for hybrid regimes. One of the reasons that this type of state is so popular is the model of stabilitocracy, which clearly demonstrated to local strongmen in the Western Balkans that the model enabled economic and political co-operation with both the liberal West and the authoritarian countries all around the globe such as China, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf countries. This created possibilities for economic growth in some of these countries, and the level of foreign direct investments in some of them actually grew concomitantly with the consolidation of local stabilitocracies. In other words, the erosion of democracy was simultaneous with the economic growth generated by both their co-operation with liberal democracies and with Asian and other autocracies. This in turn enabled local semi-dictators to advertise their populist models as very efficient and prosperous.

How to reach democracy without a global wave of democratisation?

The history of the three waves of democratisation clearly suggests that almost all democracies worldwide emerged, and some also re-emerged, during the three waves. It is also obvious that, during the three waves of autocratisation, the chances for a state to be transformed into a democracy were very limited. The third wave of democratisation began in the countries of Southern Europe (Portugal, Greece and Spain) that joined the club of democracies. In the 1990s, the democratic transition of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe followed. This wave had huge support from Western European countries and the United States and was facilitated by the fact that the countries of Central Europe took part in competitive democratisations. Out of the countries that emerged from former Yugoslavia, only Slovenia took advantage of this wave. Other countries were impacted by the Wars for Yugoslav Succession and had a decade of delayed democratic transition (1991-2000). Even Croatia never joined the club of consolidated democracies, and this was also a legacy of the wars from the 1990s. The first decade of the 21st century witnessed clear democratic progress in the Western Balkans, but this progress was not as rapid and efficient as its proponents hoped it would be. Since approximately 2010, democracy has been in crisis in the West-

ern Balkans, and since 2015 one can speak of a wave of autocratisation in Central Europe as well.

This wave of autocratisation is characterised, both globally and regionally, by the erosion of democracy and obstructions of institutions to the point of rendering them meaningless. Another feature is the extreme preponderance of executive power, which may even lie in the hands of politicians who do not have constitutionally defined dominant executive powers, like in Serbia, but who nonetheless exercise such powers. Institutions during the third reverse way continue to exist, but they are intentionally obstructed with the aim of making them dysfunctional. (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1104-05, 1108) The fact that those institutions continue to survive even as dysfunctional entities could later facilitate efforts to reverse the wave and restart democratisation. The case of North Macedonia demonstrates such possibilities.

In this respect, the key dilemma has remained how to encourage a regional wave of democratisation amid global autocratisation, and whether regional democratisation amid opposite global trends is viable at all. In the 1990s, Central European countries displayed competitive democratisation; in the 2010s, the countries of the Western Balkans seemed to compete in stabilitocratisation. Democratisation meant consolidation of the rule of law, independent judiciary, free and fair elections, free media and market reforms. Stabilitocratisation eliminated the rule of law, independent judiciary and free media from key words and has instead preached economic growth and higher salaries and pensions. One cannot deny that the stabilitocratic keywords have strong popular appeal among the electorate, especially if these governments manage to deliver at least some of the promised results. Another advantage of stabilitocracies in the Western Balkans is that they should, by definition, be able to provide local stability and should be ready to participate in European efforts to preserve stability in the region. Amidst wars or migrant crises in their neighbourhood, stability may still be an important aim even for liberal external actors, such as the European Union or the United States.

A regional wave of democratisation cannot be created on the basis of optional participation of countries of the region in this process. It will be possible only if all, or almost all, countries and entities become ready to participate in it. The external endorsement of the EU and the United States would be more than helpful and EU conditionality may give a further impulse. This impulse may be severely curtailed if what Spyros Economides calls enlargement resistance remains an important feature in major EU countries, particularly in a situation when “enlargement is not a central issue for the EU”. (Economides, 2020: 6)

External and internal factors and possible new directions

The emergence of the concept of stabilocracy as a scholarly attempt to describe and explain contemporary trends in the Western Balkans signalled that there was a mixture of external and internal causes in the process of the erosion of democracy in the region. Internal factors, above all weak institutions, allowed stabilocrats to further erode them.

However, the role of external actors, such as China and Russia, was also identified. The NIT report for 2019 includes “a snapshot of Chinese government influence,” and identifies three ways in which China influences local governments: 1. technology/surveillance, 2. debt diplomacy, and 3. influence campaigns. In six countries at least two ways of Chinese influence were detected. These countries were: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Tajikistan. (NIT 2020: 10-11) As we can see, four out of the six cases of Chinese substantial influence were detected in the Western Balkans. The authoritarian and totalitarian models of Russia and China have served as a kind of inspiration to hybrid regimes and autocracies from Hungary to Turkey, and all around the Western Balkans. In addition to the authoritarian cultural transfer, even liberal external actors, including the European Union and the United States, supported the rise and consolidation of local stabilocracies.

What was particularly worrying for external liberal actors was that their prestige was affected concomitantly with the rise of the influence of external illiberal actors in the Western Balkans. Freedom House openly criticised the role of the EU in Turkey in its FiW report and also the role of the Union in Montenegro in its NIT report. In the NIT report for 2019, Freedom House pointed out: “The increased presence of authoritarian powers like Russia, China, and Turkey in the region has spurred some reengagement by the United States, but it too has increasingly focused on backroom deals, deemphasizing any shared commitment to democracy.” (NIT 2020: 2) The role of the European Union is increasingly seen critically, as the concept of stabilocracy demonstrates. Some authors even went so far as to call the impact of the EU on the development of the rule of law in Southeastern Europe “pathological”. (Mendelski, 2015) There is, however, no other external relevant actor that could be more interested in the democratisation of the region than the EU.

Since 1999, various regional initiatives were designed by the EU to promote reconciliation and regional co-operation in the Western Balkans. In spite of EU enlargement fatigue and resistance, one would expect the Union to be involved in regional efforts for democratisation, not only due to its own preference for liberal values but also as a way to counterbalance the influence of illiberal international actors. That kind of approach could encourage a regional wave of democratisation and stop any further erosion of local institutions. To do this, the European

Union should not replace the keywords associated with stabilitocracy with the keywords associated with democratisation but should rather fuse all of them. In other words, the Union should add economic growth as one of its key goals for the countries of the Western Balkans and design programmes that would enhance economic development. This kind of approach would closely associate democratisation and economic growth and limit space for local populism and could also be an effective way to block the influence of external illiberal actors.

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Abbreviations:

FiW - *Freedom in the World*

NIT - *Nations in Transit*

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Političke poruke Srpske pravoslavne crkve u vreme poglavarstva Patrijarha srpskog gospodina Pavla i Patrijarha srpskog gospodina Irineja

Sažetak



Srpska pravoslavna crkva (SPC) istorijski je odigrala presudnu ulogu u oblikovanju srpskog duhovnog i nacionalnog identiteta. Kao posledica ovoga, ona i danas predstavlja instituciju od visokog društvenog značaja čiji stavovi bitno utiču na politički život u Srbiji. Ovaj rad analizira političke poruke koje je SPC slala nakon sloma socijalizma i obnove pluralizma u zemlji, u periodu dok su na njenom čelu bili patrijarh Pavle (1990 – 2009) i patrijarh Irinej (2010 – 2020). Tvrdim da su crkveno – državni odnosi, nakon prvobitnog opozicionog delovanja crkve protiv režima Slobodana Miloševića, te aktivnog saradivanja sa novim demokratskim vlastima koje su ga zamenile 5. oktobra 2000, postali najprisniji nakon dolaska Srpske napredne stranke na vlast 2012. godine.

Ključne reči



Srpska pravoslavna crkva, opozicija, demokratizacija, patrijarh, režim, Srpska napredna stranka

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Uvod

Srpska pravoslavna crkva verovatno je najznačajnija nedržavna institucija u Srbiji. Usled specifičnih istorijsko - političkih okolnosti koje su zadesile našu zemlju od njenog osnivanja pa do danas, Srpska pravoslavna crkva bila je institucija koja je igrala presudnu ulogu u očuvanju srpskog nacionalnog bića, i samim tim značajno oblikovala razvoj srpskog identiteta. Imajući ovo u vidu, razumljivo je zašto SPC i danas, u 21. veku, igra značajnu ulogu u oblikovanju političkog života Srbije. S obzirom na to da 84.6% populacije Srbije čine pripadnici pravoslavne vere (Republički zavod za statistiku, 2013: 46), uticaj koji stav SPC o određenim problemima ima na populaciju u Srbiji, značajan je politički faktor koji svaka vlast mora ukalkulisati prilikom rešavanja ključnih političkih pitanja.

Od uvođenja višestranačkog sistema u Srbiji, na čelu SPC promenila su se trojica poglavara - Patrijarh srpski Pavle, Patrijarh srpski Irinej i Patrijarh srpski Porfirije. Iako su po svojoj funkciji religijski poglavari, oni su, budući da su se nalaze na čelu najznačajnije religijske institucije u Srbiji, ujedno i izuzetno značajne političke figure. Svako na svoj način, i u skladu sa političkom situacijom koja je vladala u tom trenutku, slao je određene političke poruke. S tim u vezi, svrha ovog rada jeste da sa politikološkog gledišta objasni ulogu koju su u političkom životu imali patrijarsi Pavle i Irinej, kakav je bio njihov odnos prema srpskim vlastima i kakve su oni političke poruke u toku svog poglavarstva slali.¹ Polazeći od pojma *uzajamne tolerancije* koji definiše Alfred Stepan, a kojim se označavaju „minimalna ograničenja za delovanje političkih institucija u odnosu na verske vlasti, ali i za vernike i grupe u odnosu na političke vlasti“ (Stepan, 2000: 37), analiziranjem stavova SPC o raznim političkim problemima, nastojaću da odgovorim na pitanje kada se crkva po svojim

[1] Budući da je patrijarh Porfirije na čelu SPC došao početkom 2021. godine i da je on na ovom položaju tek godinu dana, period njegovog poglavarstva nije predmet analize.

stavovima najviše približila i usaglasila sa vladajućim režimom u Srbiji u periodu 1990 - 2020.

U svrhu preglednosti rada, on će hronološki pratiti različite periode moderne srpske istorije (period vladavine Slobodana Miloševića, period nakon petooktobarskih promena i period vladavine Srpske napredne stranke). U svakom delu ću nastojati da obradim stavove SPC o nekim ključnim političkim pitanjima i da ukažem na to kako se stav SPC prema vlastima u Srbiji menjao u odnosu na to kakav su stav srpske vlasti imale po pitanju raznih društvenih problema. Teza sa kojom polazim u izradu rada je da se SPC za vreme mandata patrijarha Irineja, nakon dolaska Srpske napredne stranke 2012. godine, značajno približila srpskim vlastima i prema njima slala poruke koje su bile izuzetno prisnije nego ikada do tada.

Epoha patrijarha srpskog Pavla (1990 - 2009)

Gojko Stojčević, poznatiji po svom crkvenom imenu Pavle, bio je 44. patrijarh Srpske pravoslavne crkve od 1990. pa sve do svoje smrti 2009. godine. Istorija je htela da period mandata patrijarha Pavla bude ujedno i jedan od najnestabilnijih političkih perioda u srpskoj istoriji. Raspad SFRJ, ratovi i sankcije, siromaštvo, tranzicija, bombardovanje SRJ kao i jednostrano proglašenje nezavisnosti Kosova i Metohije, samo su neki od krupnijih problema sa kojima su se u ovom periodu suočavali kako srpska država tako i SPC. Sa druge strane, godina izbora patrijarha Pavla za vrhovnog poglavara SPC ujedno je i godina obnove višestranačkog života u Srbiji, što daje dodatni impuls za analizu položaja crkve prema srpskoj političkoj sceni i njenim glavnim akterima u tom periodu.

Period vladavine Slobodana Miloševića (1990 - 2000)

Period prve decenije višestranačkog života u Srbiji nesumljivo je obeležila dominacija Slobodana Miloševića celokupnom političkom scenom. Radi konciznosti rada, smatram da je ovde nepotrebno analizirati samu prirodu režima u Srbiji u tom periodu, budući da je na tu temu napisana obima i relevantna literatura koja je pokrila gotovo sve aspekte određenog političkog režima (Orlović, 2008; Antonić, 2002; Vladislavljević, 2008). Moj zadatak je stoga da proučim kakav je bio odnos crkvenih i svetovnih vlasti u Srbiji u poslednjoj deceniji 20. veka i to kako se SPC pozicionirala u odnosu na različite periode Miloševićevog režima.

Odnos crkve i vladajućeg režima u Srbiji u ovom periodu može se podeliti na dve faze - prva od 1990. do 1992. godine i druga od 1992. do 2000. godine. Karakteristično za prve dve godine vladavine Slobodana Miloševića je to da, iako je crkva videla SPS kao nastavljачa komunističke politike, u tom periodu nije dolazilo do velikih konfrontacija na relaciji crkva - država, budući da je SPC smatrala da može naći zajednički jezik

sa režimom oko ključnih društveno - političkih pitanja. Ona je u toku ove dve godine pokušala da od režima izdejstvuje dve stvari - uvođenje versonauke u sistem obrazovanja i povraćaj crkvene imovine oduzete nakon Drugog svetskog rata. Međutim, kako se pokazalo, režim je ostao gluv na ove zahteve, što je otvorilo put uzajamnoj konfrotaciji između SPS i SPC.

Kao tačku u kojoj se SPC prvi put radikalno distancira od vladajućeg režima, i koja predstavlja prelazak iz prve u drugu fazu, može se označiti 1992. godina i „Memorandum Svetog arhijerejskog sabora SPC“, budući da je crkva tada prvi put javno osudila vlasti u Srbiji optužujući ih za nesposobnost, onemogućavanje demokratskog dijaloga i nezastupanje nacionalnih interesa (Petrušić - Anđelković, 2011: 40). U vezi s ovim, Marko Veković smatra da je ovakav akt SPC jedinstven čin u pravoslavnim crkvama u procesu demokratizacije. Od ovog momenta, kritika vlasti postaje sastavni deo svakog kasnijeg saopštenja Svetog arhijerejskog sabora, a crkva čak i aktivno podržava potonje proteste opozicije 1996/97. Samim tim, SPC ovakvom politikom postaje jedan od glavnih aktera protesta protiv režima, a takav primer se ne može naći ni u jednoj drugoj pravoslavnoj zemlji u toku demokratizacije (Veković, 2017: 254).

Ipak, sukob vlasti i crkve u periodu 1990 - 1995. nije bio toliko očit, zbog političko - društvenih prilika koje su vladale. Ugroženost srpskog naroda na postjugoslovenskom prostoru usled građanskog rata i međunarodnih sankcija, naterala je i političke i crkvene vlasti da sve svoje kapacitete usmere na očuvanje egzistencije srpskog naroda. S ovim u vezi, SPC je preduzimala mnogobrojne aktivnosti diplomatskog karaktera koje su veoma često donosile političke benefinte i za režim u Srbiji. Crkva se trudila da mehanizmima koji su joj bila na raspolaganju (posete crkvenih delegacija, slanje telegrama kao i posrednim lobiranjem preko crkvenih zvaničnika drugih zemalja sa kojima je SPC bila u dobrim odnosima) popravi sliku koja je u tom momentu vladala o Srbiji (Jevtić, 2009: 161). Međutim, čak i ova, prikrivena konfrotacija sa režimom, bila je kratkog daha i već pred kraj ratnih zbivanja sukob značajno dobija na intezitetu, kada su Miloševićev odnos prema izbeglicama i uvođenje sankcija prekodrinskim Srbima postali predmet neprestane kritike SPC (Glasnik Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 1995: 102 - 103).

Momenat kada se sukob između režima i crkve najbolje manifestovao bile su demonstracije 1996/97 godine na kojima patrijarh Pavle drži govor okupljenim demonstrantima u kojem im pruža punu podršku i čak vodi čuvenu Svetosavsku litiju 1997. godine pred kojom se povukao policijski kordon u Kolarčevoj ulici koji je trebalo da blokira prolaz demonstrantima. Ovo predstavlja jedini primer gde je vrhovni poglavar jedne pravoslavne crkve uzeo aktivno učešće u demonstracijama protiv vladajućeg režima (Turudić, 2009). Nakon ovih dešavanja, SPC više nikada nije slala pomirljive poruke prema režimu čak ni u kritičnim momentima, što je u prvoj polovini decenije bila praksa. Tako je tokom bombardovanja SRJ, SPC više puta pozivala Slobodana Miloševića i članove vlade da podnesu ostavku i praspisu izbore radi formiranja vlade nacionalnog

jedinstva koja će biti u stanju da izvuče Srbiju iz pozicije međunarodne izolacije i rata (Turudić, 2009). Ostaće zabeleženo i to da je dan pred izbore na kojima će Milošević izgubiti vlast, 23. septembra 2000, Patrijarh Pavle označio dotadašnjeg predsednika i njegov režim kao jedine krivce za katastrofu srpskog naroda na kraju 20. veka (Skrozza, 2005).

Period nakon petooktobarskih promena (2000 - 2012)

Pad Slobodana Miloševića 5. oktobra 2000. godine predstavlja najznačajniju političku prekretnicu u Srbiji u poslednjih 30 godina. Ovaj događaj radikalno je transformisao dotadašnju političku scenu ali i odnos koji je vladao na relaciji crkva - država. Međutim, ono što je iz pozicije ovog rada najznačajnija promena jeste to da su sada glavni politički akteri prihvatili crkvu kao sebi ravnopravnog učesnika i nastojali da održe dobre odnose sa njom, što do tada nije bio slučaj (Veković, 2017: 262). SPC je kod novih vlasti imala veliki kredibilitet budući da su one bile svesne njenog političkog uticaja, ali i činjenice da je dugi niz godina zajedno sa njima pružala otpor Miloševićevom režimu. U ovom periodu primetno je kako približavanje države crkvi, tako i približavanje crkve državi.

Izuzetno je važna činjenica da je neposredno nakon smenjivanja Miloševića održano vanredno zasedanje Svetog arhijerejskog sabora SPC na kojem je izjavljeno da crkva pozdravlja demokratske promene i da je zahvalna Bogu na tome što se po prvi put nakon 60 godina, Sabor sastao u slobodnoj otadžbini (Glasnik Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 2000: 242). Ovo je bio inicijalni pokazatelj nove stranice u odnosima crkve i države koji će se ogledati u uzajamnom pomaganju i toleranciji. SPC je u narednih nekoliko godina od novih vlasti uspela da izdvejestvuje rešavanje nekoliko pitanja koja je ona smatrala važnim. Tu se pre svega misli na vraćanje veronauke u sistem obrazovanja i delimično vraćanje crkvene imovine oduzete nakon Drugog svetskog rata. Ova pitanja crkva je konstantno iznosila pred srpske vlasti još od 1990. godine, međutim, ona su rešena tek sa demokratskim promenama u Srbiji 2000. godine.

Već 2001. godine vlada Zorana Đinđića donosi odluku da se veronauka ponovo uvede u sistem obrazovanja u Srbiji, čime je ispunjen dugogodišnji zahtev crkve da se verska nastava uvede kao izborni predmet u osnovne i srednje škole. Pored ovoga, 2004. godine pravno se reguliše i vraćanje Pravoslavno - bogoslovskog fakulteta u sistem Univerziteta u Beogradu, iz koga je izbačen 1952. godine.

Analizirajući period od petooktobarskih promena pa do dolaska Srpske napredne stranke na vlast 2012. godine, kao period u kome je došlo do najboljih odnosa između crkve i režima možemo odrediti četvorogodišnji premijerski mandat Vojislava Koštunice od 2004. do 2008. godine. Tada dolazi do prave „simfonije“ između vlasti i crkve, a ova vlada bila je najbolja vlada sa kojom je SPC saradivala od Drugog svetskog rata (Vukomanović, 2008: 238). Ključna činjenica je ovde bila to da su i SPC

i Vojslav Koštunica imali slične, konzervativne poglede na društvo, što je omogućilo crkvi da se pozicionira kao izuzetno dominantan politički igrač. U toku Koštuničinog mandata, usvojeni su *Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama* (april 2006.) i *Zakon o vraćanju (restituciji) imovine crkvama i verskim zajednicama* (maj 2006.) kojima je pravno regulisan status svih religijskih zajednica na teritoriji Srbije ali i dodatno učvršćena uloga SPC u društvenom i političkom životu Srbije. Crkva tada dobija mesto u pregovaračkom timu o statusu KiM i mesto u radiodifuznom savetu što je predstavljalo svojevrsnu krunu dobrih odnosa crkve i vlasti u periodu 2000 - 2012 (Todorović i Lunić, 2019: 13).

Verovatno najbitniji događaj u prvoj deceniji 20. veka bilo je jednostrano proglašenje nezavisnost Kosova 2008. godine. O tome koliko je sam značaj KiM kako za srpsku državu tako i za SPC izlišno je govoriti i usled ograničenosti ovog rada isključivo na crkveno - državne odnose mislim da nije neophodno detaljno analizirati ovo pitanje, pre svega usled činjenice da su i crkvene i svetovne vlasti imale manje više identičan pogled na ovo pitanje i među njima nije dolazilo do nesuglasica - ovaj akt kosovskih vlasti je ocenjen kao nelegalan i nelegitiman, a put za pronalaženje rešenja definisan je isključivo u okvirima Rezolucije 1244 uz zaštitu srpskog teritorijalnog integriteta, srpske kulturne baštine i srpskog naroda na KiM.

Epoha patrijarha srpskog Irineja (2010 - 2020)

Nakon upokojenja patrijarha Pavla, na čelo SPC dolazi patrijarh Irinej koji time postaje 45. poglavar SPC i on se na tom položaju nalazio do svoje smrti 2020. U toku njegovog mandata može se izdvojiti nekoliko bitnih političkih događaja koja su bila od suštinskog značaja za razumevanje ponašanja crkve. Tu se pre svega misli na pobedu Srpske napredne stranke na izborima 2012. i potpisivanje tzv. Briselskog sporazuma 2013. Takođe, bitna je i činjenica da je u toku njegovog mandata SPC proslavila 800 godina svoje autokefalnosti 2019. godine, pa će s tim u vezi biti analizirano i kakvu je ulogu srpski politički vrh imao na tom jubileju.

Iako je mandat patrijarha Irineja zahvatio i poslednje dve godine u kojima je na vlasti bila Demokratska stranka, sem uvođenja religijske službe u Vojsku Srbije 2011. godine, ovde nije bilo puno događaja koji bi zavredili pažnju dubljoj analizi odnosa crkve i države, te stoga ovaj period (2010 - 2012) nije izdvojen kao posebna celina.

Period vlasti Srpske napredne stranke (2012 - 2020)

Ukoliko zanemarimo period neposredno nakon potpisivanja Briselskog sporazuma, odnos vlasti i crkve postao najbolji upravo u periodu vladavine Srpske napredne stranke i on se u pogledu prisnosti crkveno - državnih odnosa ne može uporediti čak ni sa vremenom kada je premijer Sr-

bije bio Vojislav Koštunica. Presudnu ulogu u ovome odrigrala je ličnost patrijarha Irineja, koji se pokazao kao dosta naklonjeniji aktuelnoj vlasti od ostalih crkvenih zvaničnika u vrhu SPC.

Budući da se jedno od glavnih polja delovanja nove vlasti ogledalo u pokušaju rešavanja kosovskog problema, odnos crkve i države se u ovom periodu može oceniti kao delimično ambivalentan. U meri u kojoj je politička vlast intezivirala svoje aktivnosti na tom planu, tako je dolazilo do povremenih osuda državnih zvaničnika od strane određenih redova unutar SPC. Ovo se naročito moglo primetiti u toku 2018. i 2019. godine kada se kao jedno od potencijalnih rešenja kosovskog problema počela pominjati ideja razgraničenja. Međutim, ono što je ovde interesantno je to da takve osude gotovo nikada nisu dolazile od strane patrijarha Irineja koji je čak više puta i javno zauzimao za Aleksandra Vučića i branio ga od različitih napada (naročito onih koji su dolazili iz redova SPC), govoreći kako veruje da predsednik čini sve što može kako bi zaštitio srpski narod (Milanović - Hrašovec, 2018). Analizirajući izjave koje je patrijarh Irinej upućivao aktuelnim vlastima, smatram da one predstavljaju najpovoljnije izjave jednog crkvenog poglavara prema aktuelnim vlastima u poslednjih 30 godina.

Prvi veliki test za novouspostavljenu vlast Srpske napredne stranke bilo je potpisivanje ztv. Briselskog sporazuma 2013. godine i sveopšte uzev, ovaj događaj se može posmatrati kao prvi ozbiljniji sukob između vlasti i crkve nakon 5. oktobra 2000. godine. Kako je položaj i simbolika Kosova i Metohije direktno usađena u temelje SPC, treba reći da je pitanje KiM ujedno i najbolnije pitanje za SPC. Stavove koje ona ima po pitanju Kosova predstavljaju najtvrdokornije stavove crkve, i njih SPC ponavlja u gotovo svim javnim obraćanjima u poslednjih 30 godina.

Sveti arhijerejski sinod odmah nakon potpisivanja ovog sporazuma izdao je saopštenje u kojem ovaj sporazum ocenjuje kao „predaju naše sopstvene vekovne i najvažnije teritorije“ (Sveti Arhijerejski Sinod SPC, 2013). Mitropolit Amfilohije Radović, koji je do svoje smrti 2020. godine predstavljao jednog od najtvrdokornijih kritičara predsednika Aleksandra Vučića iz redova sveštenstva, ovim povodom je čak u Beogradu držao i opelo Narodnoj skupštini i Vladi Srbije.

Međutim, iako je između Aleksandra Vučića i određenih zvaničnika SPC (ponajviše mitropolita Amfilohija) od 2012. više puta dolazilo do otvorenih sukoba, ovo se ipak ne može uzeti kao zvanični stav crkve, budući da smo sa druge strane imali višestruke izjave patrijarha Irineja u kojima je iskazivao potpunu podršku aktuelnom predsedniku Srbije, a to je, budući da je on bio vodeća ličnost SPC, za ovu analizu mnogo značajnije. U prilog ovome idu i aktivnosti koje je crkva prema državnim zvaničnicima veoma često preduzimala. Od 2013. do 2020. godine, SPC je odlikovala Ordenom Svetog Save prvog reda Aleksandra Vulina, dodelila Gramatu SPC glavnom uredniku pro - režimskog tabloida *Informier* Draganu Vučićeviću, odlikovala Zoranu Mihajlović Ordenom Svetog Simeona Mirotočivog i Ordenom Svetog Save drugog reda v.d. direktora

EPS-a Milorada Grčića i zamenika direktora BIA Ivana Todorova. Svima njima su odlikovanja dodeljena zbog izražene nesebične ljubavi i revnosti prema crkvi (Milanović - Hrašovec, 2018).

Ostaće upamćena i izjava patrijarha Irineja iz 2018. godine kada je pravoslavnim vernicima poručio da treba da budu zahvalni Bogu „što nam je podario čoveka koji se lavovski bori za srpski narod, a posebno za mučeničko i stradalno Kosovo i Metohiju“. Kako je patrijarh tada naveo, vidljivo je koliko se Vučić bori da sačuva KiM i da se on „nada i moli Gospodu da predsedniku Srbije da snage i moći da u tome uspe“ (B92, 2018). Iz ovih razloga, Aleksandar Vučić bio je i prvi predsednik u istoriji Srbije koji je dobio poziv da se obratiti Svetom arhijerejskom Saboru SPC 2019. godine, a nedugo zatim patrijarh Irinej dao je i jednu poprilično zanimljivu izjavu u svom intervjuu za dnevni list *Politika* u januaru 2019. godine, povodom građanskih protesta koji su se u to vreme bili u jeku u Beogradu i Banjaluci, gde je napomenuo da „ne vidi da će biti koristi za narod od podsticanja na takve proteste“ i da su „oni koji ne žele dobro Republici Srpskoj i srpskom narodu, tada bili zadovoljni“ (Politika, 2019).

Na kraju, kako je u 2019. godini SPC trebalo da proslavi 800 godina svog postojanja, postavilo se pitanje kakvu će ulogu u tome imati aktuelna vlast. Na ovom tragu, deluje da je prisnost u odnosima patrijarha Irineja i predsednika Aleksandra Vučića kulminirala upravo na proslavi povodom 800 godina autokefalnosti SPC, kada je patrijarh u ime SPC uručio najviše crkveno odlikovanje Orden Svetog Save prvog stepena predsedniku Srbije, čime je A. Vučić postao prvi predsednik Srbije odlikovan ovim zvanjem. Kako je sam patrijarh izjavio tada na svečanosti, SPC je uručila ovo odlikovanje predsedniku za „delatnu ljubav prema crkvi i neumornu borbu za celovitost Srbije, a posebno za očuvanje KiM u njenom sastavu“ i dodao da je “predsednik otvorio puteve Srbije Evropi i svetu, i da se danas posle njegovog truda o Srbiji govori i misli na drugačiji način. Do njega je Srbija kaskala u svom životu, sada se pokrenula privreda, krenulo se velikim korakom napred, vidimo svi kako se radi i šta se radi“ (Nova srpska politička misao, 2019).

Zaključak

Među političkim teoretičarima postoje autori, kao što je na primer Semjuel Hantington, koji smatraju da pravoslavne crkve nisu mogle da budu značajni akteri demokratizacije zbog svoje autokefalnosti, budući da je autokefalnost povlačila zavisnost od države (Huntington, 1991). Međutim, analizirajući ponašanje SPC prema režimu u Srbiji 1990ih godina možemo uvideti da je SPC u 8 od 10 godina koliko je trajao taj režim, predstavljala značajnog kritičara režima i nekog ko je u jednom trenutku otvoreno stao na stranu demokratske opozicije. S tim u vezi, SPC je bila, ako ne najznačajniji, onda svakako jedan od značajnijih aktera koji su doprineli demokratskim promenama u Srbiji s kraja 20. veka.

Ovo je dovelo do toga da su nakon smene režima 2000. godine uspostavljeni novi odnosi između SPC i novih, demokratskih vlasti. Budući da su sada i vlast i crkva shvatile da njihova saradnja može da bude obostrano korisna, dolazi do njihovog značajnijeg približavanja i intezi-viranja međusobnih odnosa što se najbolje primetilo u periodu 2004 - 2008. kada je premijer Srbije bio političar konzervativnog opredeljenja, Vojslav Koštunica.

Međutim, sve ovo se može smatrati kao uvod u period koji će tek nastupiti. Kako 2010. godine dolazi do promene na čelu SPC a ubrzo zatim i do političkih promena u Srbiji kada na vlast dolazi Srpska napredna stranka, može se primetiti da je ovo iniciralo i promenu u odnosu ckrva - država. U ovom periodu nastaju najprisniji odnosi između vlasti i ckrve u modernoj srpskoj istoriji. Ovome je na prvom mestu doprinela sama ličnost patrijarha Irineja koji je veoma često znao do donese neke odluke o kojima nije postojao širok konsenzus unutar SPC.² Sa druge strane, razlog za ovo se može tražiti i u činjenici da aktuelna vlast vodi donekle tvrdu nacionalnu politiku u odnosu na vlasti do 2012. godine. Kako smo na početku istakli, crkva je u 8 godina vladavine Slobodana Miloševića znala itekako aktivno da istupi protiv repersija režima. Isto tako, možemo primetiti da je u 10 godina koliko se na čelu SPC nalazio patrijarh Irinej, crkva više puta imala povod da uradi nešto slično ali da je redovno propuštala šansu da to i učini.

Political messages of the Serbian Orthodox Church during the leadership of Patriarch Pavle and Patriarch Irinej

Abstract

▼
The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has historically played a crucial role in shaping Serbia's spiritual and national identity. As a consequence of this, it still represents an institution of high social significance whose attitudes predominantly influence political life in Serbia. This paper analyzes the political messages sent by the SOC after the collapse of socialism and the restoration of pluralism in the country, during the time of Patriarch Pavle (1990-2009) and Patriarch Irinej (2010-2020). I claim that church - state relations, after the initial opposition activities of the church against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, and active cooperation with the new democratic authorities that replaced him on October 5, 2000, became the closest after the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012.

[2] O ovome nam govori razne izjave visokih zvaničnika unutar vrha SPC. Na primer, vladika Atanasija Jevtić je otvoreno izjavio da se većina episkopa unutar SPC protivi odluci da se predsedniku Srbije Aleksandru Vučiću dodeli Orden Svetog Save. Izjava dostupna na: <http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a532754/Episkop-Atanasije-Jevtic-Vecina-episkopa-je-protiv-dodele-ordena-SPC-Vucicu.html>

Key words

Serbian Orthodox Church, opposition, democratization, patriarch, regime, Serbian Progressive Party

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Prediktori glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku

Apstrakt



U okviru ovog istraživanja ispituju se prediktori opredeljivanja birača za Srpsku naprednu stranku. Od posebnog je značaja identifikovati činioce preferencije ove političke partije, budući da od 2012. godine u kontinuitetu vrši vlast u Srbiji, odnosno nijednom nije izgubila izbore i postala deo opozicije. Primenom multiple binarne logističke regresije testirana je i kvantifikovana eksplanatorna moć niza varijabli raspoređenih u četiri modela: socio-demografski, kognitivni (stavski), medijski i liderski. Analizirani su podaci iz ankete sprovedene na reprezentativnom slučajnom uzorku od 1800 ispitanika tokom 2020. godine u okviru projekta "Comparative National Elections Project" Univerziteta u Ohaju. Istraživanje je pokazalo da liderski model ima najveću eksplanatornu moć, odnosno da pozitivno mišljenje o lideru Srpske napredne stranke najbolje predviđa glasanje za SNS. Modeli u kojima su ispitivani politički stavovi (percepcije stanja ekonomije, demokratije, korupcije i izbornog procesa u Srbiji i autoritarnost) i praćenje različitih medija (televizija sa nacionalnom frevencom) imaju nešto manju, ali i dalje značajnu eksplanatornu moć. Sociodemografski model ima naslabiju eksplanatornu moć, a najsnažniji prediktor koji uključuje je nisko obrazovanje.

Ključne reči



izborno ponašanje, izborne preferencije, izbori, Srpska napredna stranka (SNS), Aleksandar Vučić

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Uvod

Glasanje za određene političke partije oblik je izbornog ponašanja kome je posvećeno najviše istraživačke pažnje (Milošević 1997, 279). Jedan od osnovnih pristupa u proučavanju opredeljivanja za različite partije na izborima je *sociodemografski* odnosno *političko-sociološki* pristup (Milošević 1997 ; Šiber 2003). Ovaj pristup teži da posredstvom određenih sociodemografskih karakteristika poput obrazovanja, godina, starosti, pola, prihoda, mesta stanovanja uoči tendenciju glasanja za neku partiju, odnosno kandidata. Drugim rečima, nastoji da predvidi postojanje pravilnosti u izbornom ponašanju društvenih grupa (Milošević 1997, 281). Izborna ponašanja nastoji da objasni i *kognitivni* koji pretpostavlja da birači imaju određene stavove o političkim pitanjima, te da ovi stavovi imaju presudan uticaj na izborna ponašanja (Milošević 1997, 287). Relevantna znanja na kojima počivaju izborne preferencije uglavnom se usvajaju posredstvom medija. Stoga istraživanja glasačkog ponašanja prepoznaju i uticaj medija, koji pak odlučuju koje teme će biti u fokusu (eng. agenda setting), odnosno koji sadržaji neće dopreti do publike (eng. gatekeeper) (Slavujević 2009). Današnju političku kompeticiju karakteriše visok stepen personalizacije politike, odnosno birači partiju najčešće identifikuju preko njenog lidera. Stoga je opravdano pretpostaviti da percepcije lidera vrše znatan uticaj na izborna ponašanja (Orlović 2014).

Istraživanja pokazuju da je uspešnost *sociodemografskog* pristupa u objašnjavanju izbornog ponašanja organičena, odnosno da glasačke preferencije određuje čitav niz situacionih i personalnih faktora koji izlaze iz skupa obeležja poput pola, starosti, obrazovanja i životnog standarda. Iako u savremenim istraživanjima *sociodemografski* pristup ima ograničen domet budući da njegova eksplanatorna moć opada u Srbiji je on, barem tokom devedestih godina prošlog veka, važio sa najuspešnijim model (Milošević 1997, 281-282). Sociodemografske varijable poput obrazovanja, generacijskih razlika, nacionalnog opredeljenja su tokom prethodno

pomenutog perioda vrlo precizno predviđale glasove na relaciji vlast-opozicija. Međutim, pretpostavka je da se usled različitih faktora eksplanatorna moć ovog modela smanjila i u slučaju Srbije. Uzroci za to se mogu tražiti i u delovanju spoljnih uticaja poput političke, ekonomske i socijalne transformacije, praćeni globalizacijom, proizvode konfuznu socijalnu i ekonomsku strukturu (Bešić 2020, 4). Kada je u pitanju *kognitivni* model, tj. politički stavovi, glasači SNS-a se najčešće prepoznaju preko stava da su izbori u Srbiji demokratski (Bešić 2020, 11). Osim toga, karakteristično za birače ove stranke je i naglašena autoritarnost (Bešić 2020, 11). U određenim zemljama, poput SR Nemačke eksplanatorna moć *kognitivnog modela* je ogromna. Naime, ukoliko je birač nezadovoljan stanjem ekonomije u 77% slučajeva će glasati za partije opozicije (Milošević 1997, 289).

O uticaju televizije na izbornu ponašanje je govorio još i Džon F. Kennedy koji je i sam istakao da je televizija više od bilo kog drugog faktora okrenula situaciju u njegovu korist (Schulz 2011, 91). Indikativan primer značaja medija, tj. televizije na opredeljivanje birača je slučaj američke televizije „Foks Njuz“. Blagonaklono izveštavanje ove televizije (koja je počela sa radom 1996. godine) o Republikanskoj stranci je poboljšala izborni rezultat Džordža Buša mlađeg na tesnim predsedničkim izborima 2000. godine na kojima je on, nakon ponovljenih izbora u saveznoj državi Floridi, odneo pobjedu (DellaVigna, Kaplan 2007, 1188). Procenjuje se da je delovanje ove televizije poboljšalo izborni rezultat Džordža Buša za između 0,4% i 0,7% (DellaVigna, Kaplan 2007, 1188). Iako se u prvi mah čini da ovo nije preveliki uticaj u obzir se mora uzeti činjenica da je Buš postao predsednik za svega nekoliko stotina glasova više nakon ponovljenih izbora na Floridi - pa se može tvrditi da je upravo uticaj „Foks njuz-a“ na opredeljivanje birača bio presudan za pobjedu (DellaVigna, Kaplan 2007, 1188). Osim toga, „Foks-njuz“ je doprineo većoj izlaskosti birača ali i je učinio da 3% do 8% neopredeljivih birača na kraju ipak glasa za Republikansku stranku (DellaVigna, Kaplan 2007, 1188). Istraživanje BIRODI-a, sprovedeno između decembra 2020. i januara 2021. godine, pokazalo je da predsednik Srbije i SNS-a Aleksandar Vučić nijedanput nije negativno predstavljen na televizijama sa nacionalnom frekvencijom (RTS, Pink, Hepi, Prva, B92) (Beta 2021). O nadmoći predstavnika vlasti u medijskom prostoru svedoči i činjenica da su mediji sa nacionalnom frekvencijom u udarnom terminu tokom vanrednog stanja izazavnog pandemijom kovida (od 16:30) u 91% slučajeva izveštavali o predstavnicima vlasti (Jovanović 2020, 74).

Robert Mihels, Vilfredo Pareto i Gaetano Mosca ukazuju na činjenicu da u partijama vlada stroga hijerarhija koja se može posmatrati i kao piramida na čijem vrhu se nalazi partijski lider (Orlović 2014). Statut Srpske napredne stranke prema kome predsednik stranke skupštini predlaže svih 300 kandidata za članstvo u Glavnom odboru govori u prilog teze o moći lidera partija (Spasojević, Stojiljković 2020, 150). Primeri Srpske radikalne stranke, Srpskog pokreta obnove, Lige socijaldemokrata Vojvodine, Liberalno demokratske partije, Nove Srbije i Jedinствене Srbije

koje od svog osnivanja nisu menjale predsednika upućuju na značaj lidera u srpskom partijskom sistemu (Spasojević, Stojiljković 2020, 168). Pored toga, čak 83% građana Srbije smatra da "samo partija sa jakim liderom može da formira jaku i čvrstu vladu" (Spasojević, Stojiljković 2019, 169). Osim toga, pozitivan stav o političkim liderima pozitivno utiče na veću izlaznost kao i na pozitivnije mišljenje o partijama tih lidera (Todosijević, Pavlović 2020, 205).

Cilj istraživanja je da utvrdi koji prediktori imaju najveću eksplanatornu moć u pogledu glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku. SNS predstavlja predmet ovog istraživanja budući da se radi o partiji koja u kontinuitetu od 2012. godine vrši vlast u Srbiji i koja u poređenju sa ostalim strankama uživa najveću podršku građana. *Prva hipoteza* je da sociodemografski pristup neće imati veliku eksplanatornu moć u slučaju objašnjavanja glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku. *Druga hipoteza* je da će modeli vezani za medijsku sferu i za političke stavove građana imati veću eksplanatornu moć od sociodemografskog modela. *Treća hipoteza* je ta da će model koji je vezan za uticaj lidera na biračko opredeljenje imati najveću eksplanatornu moć.

Metodologija

Uzorak i procedura

Istraživanje je sprovedeno na reprezentativnom slučajnom uzorku stanovnika Srbije (N = 1800, 51% žene). Ispitani su stanovnici četiri statistička regiona: Vojvodina (n = 490); Beograd; (n = 422); Zapadna Srbija i Šumadija (n = 593) i Istočna i Južna Srbija (n = 295). Prosek godina ispitanika je 48, raspon godina je između 18 i 79 (M = 48). Prikupljanje podataka je sprovedeno pomoću upitnika konstruisanog od strane istraživačkog tima Univerziteta u Ohaju u sklopu projekta "Comparative National Elections Project" (The Ohio State University 2021). Podaci su prikupljeni tokom jula 2020. godine.

Instrumenti i varijable

Zavisnu, kriterijumsku varijablu u istraživanju predstavlja privrženost Srpskoj naprednoj stranci. Varijabla je merena pitanjem u okviru kog su ispitanici označavali prema kojoj od ponuđenih stranaka ili koalicija koje su učestvovala na parlamentarnim izborima 2020. godine ili su ih bojktovala osećaju privrženost. Mogli su da označe samo jednu stranku ili koaliciju. Broj ispitanika koji je označio privrženost sa Srpskom naprednom strankom je 605. Ukupno 951 ispitanik nije označio privrženost ni prema jednoj stranci.

Upitnikom su prikupljeni podaci koji su se odnosili na sociodemografske karakteristike ispitanika. Podaci su se odnosili na pol, starost, obrazova-

nje, nivo prihoda, region (Vojvodina, Beograd, Zapadna Srbija i Šumadija i Istočna i Južna Srbija), tip naselja (ruralno, prigradsko i urbano), rad u privatnom vs državnom sektoru. Obrazovni nivo je meren pomoću 10 ponuđenih opcija (1. bez osnovne škole 2. nepotpuno osnovno obrazovanje 3. najviše završena osnovna škola, 4. srednjoškolsko obrazovanje (trogodišnje), 5. srednjoškolsko obrazovanje (četvorogodišnje), 6. viša škola, 7. akademsko obrazovanje (fakultet) - osnovne studije, 8. akademsko obrazovanje (fakultet) - magistratura, 9. akademsko obrazovanje (fakultet) - master, 10. akademsko obrazovanje (fakultet) - doktorske studije). Ova varijabla je potom rekodirana u 3 varijable, nisko obrazovanje (n = 620) - grupisanjem prve, druge i treće opcije, srednje obrazovanje (n = 879) - grupisanjem četvrte i pete opcije i visoko obrazovanje (n = 293) - grupisanjem šeste, sedme, osme, devete i desete opcije. Sedam ispitanika (n = 7) se nije izjasnilo po pitanju obrazovanja. Podaci vezani za prihod dobijeni su tako što su ispitanici označavali kojoj kategoriji prihoda pripada njihova prošlomesečna zarada. Bilo je ukupno 14 kategorija (1. manje od 10.000 rsd, 2. 10.000-19.999, 3. 20.000-29.999, 4. 30.000-39.999, 5. 40.000- 49.999, 6. 50.000 - 59.999, 7. 60.000 - 69.999, 8. 70.000 - 79.999, 9. 80. 000 - 89.999, 10. 90.000 - 99.999, 11. 100.000-120.000, 12. 121.000 - 150.000, 13. 151. 000 - 200.000, 14. više od 201. 000 rsd. Broj ispitanika koji se nisu izjasnili o visini svojih prihoda bilo je 431 (n =431). Ovih 14 kategorija je ravnomernom raspodelom pretvoreno u 3 nove varijable: nizak prihod (n = 554), srednji prihod (n =465) i visoki prihod (n = 350).

Ispitanici su označili koji televizijski program su u svrhu političkog informisanja u prethodna 3 meseca najviše gledali. Ispitanici su se opredelili za jednu od 9 opcija : 1. RTS , 2. Happy, 3. N1, 4. Nova S, 5. B92, 6. Pink, 7. Prva, 8. Lokalni ili regionalni informativni program, 9. Drugi televizijski kanal, dopišite ime. Svaka opcija je rekodirana u posebnu dihotomnu varijablu, odnosno da li ispitanici gledaju ili ne gledaju: RTS (N = 500), Happy (N = 49), N1 (N = 247), Nova S (N = 40), B92 (N = 44), Pink (N = 273), Prva (N = 178), osma i deveta opcija su spojene u jednu varijablu - ostali kanali (N =31). Broj ispitanika koji se nije izjasnio o najčešće gledanom televizijskom programu u svrhu političkog informisanja je 438 (n = 438).

U cilju otkrivanja korelacije između političkih stavova građana i izbornog ponašanje korišćeni su podaci o stavovima o izbornom procesu 2020. godine, o rasprostranjenosti korupcije u politici, o stanju demokratije u Srbiji, stanju ekonomije u Srbiji tokom poslednjih 12 meseci, a izmerena je i autoritarnost ispitanika. Stavovi o *izbornom procesu* mereni su preko pitanja u okviru kog su ispitanici izbore mogli da ocene kao: 1. slobodne i poštene, 2. slobodne i poštene sa većim problemima, 3. slobodne i poštene sa manjim problemima i 4. potpuno slobodne i poštene. Ova varijabla je zatim rekodirana u četiri dihotomne varijable, odnosno za svakog ispitanika je postojao podataka da li se slaže ili ne slaže da su izbori bili: neslobodni ($N_{\text{slažem se}} = 478$); slobodni, sa velikim problemima

($N_{\text{slažem se}} = 164$); slobodni, sa malim problemima ($N_{\text{slažem se}} = 468$); potpuno slobodni ($N_{\text{slažem se}} = 438$). Broj ispitanika koji se nije izjasnio o karakteru izbornog procesa je 251. Stavovi ispitanika o *rasprostranjenosti korupcije u politici* dobijeni su pomoću pitanja gde je moguće bilo zaokružiti jedan od sledećih odgovora: 1. gotovo da nema korupcije, 2. malo je ima, 3. prilično je rasprostranjena i uobičajna, 4. veoma je rasprostranjena i uobičajna. Potom je na osnovu četiri ponuđenih opcija u ovom pitanju načinjeno četiri nove dihotomne varijable: 1. nema korupcije u politici ($N = 51$), 2. malo je korupcije u politici ($N = 512$), 3. korupcija je uobičajna u politici ($N = 575$), 4. korupcija je veoma uobičajna u politici ($N = 581$). Ukupno 81 ispitanik se nije izjasnio o rasprostranjenosti korupcije u politici. Ispitanici su ocenili *demokratiju u Srbiji* na sledeći način: 1. demokratija u punom kapacitetu, 2. demokratija, sa manjim problemima, 3. demokratija, sa velikim problemima, 4. nema demokratije. Od ovog su potom rekoridaranjem stvorene 3 varijable: 1. potpuna demokratija ($N = 134$), 2. demokratija, sa problemima ($N = 1142$), 3. nema demokratije ($N = 358$). Ukupno 99 ispitanika nije ocenilo demokratiju u Srbiji. Ispitan je i stav o *stanju ekonomije u proteklih 12 meseci*, a ponuđene su sledeće opcije: 1. znatno je lošija, 2. nešto je lošija, 3. ostala je ista, 4. nešto je bolja, 5. mnogo je bolja. Potom su rekoridanjem napravljene 3 varijable: 1. ekonomija je u lošijem stanju - spajanjem 1. i 2. opcije ($N = 727$), 2. ekonomija je nepromenjena ($N = 707$), 3. ekonomija je u boljem stanju - spajanjem 4. i 5. opcije ($N = 324$). *Autoritarnost* kod ispitanika je merena pomoću pitanja o najpoželjnijem političkom uređenju gde su ponuđene sledeće opcije: 1. demokratija je bolja od bilo kog drugog oblika vladavine, 2. u određenim trenucima, autoritarni režim, diktatura može biti bolji od demokratije, 3. za ljude kao što sam ja, svi režimi su isti. Ukupno 100 ispitanika u ovom slučaju nije pružilo odgovor. Potom je stvorena nova varijabla autoritarnost, koja se odnosila na to da li su ispitanici odabrali opciju 2 ($N = 424$) ili nisu.

Stavovi ispitanika o slobodi medija mereni su pitanjem sa sledećim opcijama: 1. nema slobodnih medija, 2. delimično slobodni mediji, sa značajnim problemima, 3. delimično slobodni mediji, sa manjim problemima, 4. potpuno slobodni mediji. Kreirane su četiri varijable rekoridanjem prethodne i tako su dobijene sledeće dihotomne varijable: 1. nema slobodnih medija ($N = 424$), 2. delimično slobodni mediji sa ozbiljnim problemima ($N = 433$), 3. delimično slobodni mediji sa manjim problemima ($N = 473$) i 4. mediji su slobodni ($N = 320$). Broj neizjašnjenih ispitanika o slobodi medija je 150 ($N = 150$).

Za merenje uticaja lidera na opredeljenje birača korišćena je varijabla mišljenje o Aleksandru Vučiću, koja je ispitana pomoću jedanaestostepene skale o mišljenja o političkim liderima (0 - veoma negativno, 5 - neutralno, 10 - veoma pozitivno). Ukupno 1719 ispitanika je dalo svoje mišljenje o predsedniku SNS-a i Srbije Aleksandru Vučiću, dok 81 ispitanik to nije učinio ($n = 81$), prosečna ocena Vučića je 5,73 ($SD = 3,74$).

Rezultati

Za merenje uspešnosti *sociodemografskog* pristupa u objašnjavanju izbornog ponašanja, tj. glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku korišćena je binarna logistička regresiona analiza. Statistički značajne varijable su: nisko obrazovanje ($B = 2.201$, $p < 0.01$), srednje obrazovanje ($B = 0.735$, $p < 0.05$), Zapadna Srbija i Šumadija ($B = 1.279$, $p < 0.01$) i Vojvodina ($B = 0.973$, $p < 0.05$). Podaci ukazuju da niže i srednje obrazovani imaju 9, odnosno 2 puta veće šanse da glasaju za Srpsku naprednu stranku od visoko obrazovanih. Pored toga, stanovnici Zapadne Srbije i Šumadije, tj. Vojvodine su 3,5 odnosno 2,5 puta skloniji glasanju za SNS. Ovaj pristup ima određenu eksplanatornu moć budući da objašnjava skoro petinu glasova za Srpsku naprednu stranku (R^2 Nagelkerke = 16.8). Međutim, predviđanje glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku se može učiniti i posredstvom drugih modela čija će eksplanatorna moć u nastavku biti ispitana. Sociodemografske varijable će u budućim modelima ostati u svrhu kontrole.

Tabela 1: Binarna logistička regresiona analiza sociodemografskih karakteristika i glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku - Logit

Varijable	B (S.E.)
Konstanta	0.647 (0.551)
Nisko obrazovanje	2.201*** (0.475)
Srednje obrazovanje	0.735** (0.312)
Muškarci	-0.243 (0.263)
Starost	-0.007 (0.011)
Nizak prihod	0.098 (0.364)
Srednji prihod	-0.171 (0.287)
Državni sektor	0.510 (0.307)
Zapadna Srbija i Šumadija	1.279*** (0.376)
Istočna i južna Srbija	0.507 (0.420)
Vojvodina	0.973** (0.386)
Ruralno	-0.487 (0.297)
Prigradsko	-0.243 (0.413)
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.168

***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.1 S.E. označava standardnu grešku regresionog koeficijenta

Za merenje uspešnosti medija u predviđanju glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku je takođe izvršena binarna logistička regresiona analiza. U ovom modelu došlo je do određenih promena u pogledu sociodemografskih varijabli budući da srednje obrazovanje više nije statistički značajna varijabla dok su varijable nisko obrazovanje ($B = 1.816$, $p < 0.01$), Zapadna Srbija i Šumadija ($B = 1.174$, $p < 0.05$) i Vojvodina ($B = 1.253$, $p < 0.05$) su zadržale statističku značajnost. Statistički značajne varijable vezane za medije su RTS ($B = 1.642$, $p < 0.1$), TV Pink ($B = 2.604$, $p < 0.05$), TV

Happy ($B = 2.443$, $p < 0.05$) i Prva ($B = 1.786$, $p < 0.1$). Dakle, šansa glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku je 13,5 puta veća ukoliko je TV Pink primarno sredstvo političkog informisanja, 11,5 puta ukoliko je to TV Happy, odnosno 5,9 ili 5,1 puta veća ukoliko je reč o TV Prva, tj. RTS-u. Eksplanatorna moć ovog modela je značajna budući da on objašnjava 2/5 glasova za Srpsku naprednu stranku (R^2 Nagelkerke = 0.403). Kada ovaj model uporedimo sa prethodnim, *sociodemografskim* modelom (Tabela 1) uočavamo da se eksplanatorna moć povećala za gotovo 2,5 puta.

Tabela 2: Binarna logistička regresiona analiza uticaja TV kanala na glasanje za Srpsku naprednu stranku - Logit

Varijable	B (S.E.)	B(S.E.)
Konstanta	0.647 (0.551)	-1.143(1.177)
Nisko obrazovanje	2.201*** (0.475)	1.816***(0.544)
Srednje obrazovanje	0.735** (0.312)	0.711(0.386)
Muško	-0.243 (0.263)	-0.053(0.326)
Godine	-0.007(0.011)	-0.015(0.014)
Nizak prihod	0.098(0.364)	-0.349(0.435)
Srednji prihod	-0.171(0.287)	-0.236(0.359)
Državni sektor	0.510(0.307)	0.303(0.370)
Zapadna Srbija i Šumadija	1.279***(0.376)	1.174**(0.458)
Istočna i južna Srbija	0.507(0.420)	0.602(0.514)
Vojvodina	0.973**(0.386)	1.253**(0.497)
Ruralno	-0.487(0.297)	-0.780(0.360)
Prigradsko	-0.243(0.413)	-0.532(0.487)
RTS		1.642*(0.958)
Pink		2.604**(1.007)
Happy		2.443**(1.199)
N1		-0.771(1.004)
NovaS		0.392(1.354)
B92		-0.447(1.199)
Prva		1.786*(0.973)
R^2 Nagelkerke	0.168	0.403

***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.1 S.E. označava standardnu grešku regresionog koeficijenta

U svrhu merenja uspešnosti modela vezanog za političke stavove ispitanika u objašnjavanju glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranke je takođe primenjena binarna logistička regresiona analiza. Statistički značajne sociodemografske varijable u ovom modelu su nisko obrazovanje ($B = 2.154$, $p < 0.01$), starost ($B = -0.072$, $p < 0.01$), državni sektor ($B = 1.396$, $p < 0.01$). Statički značajne varijable vezane za političke stavove ispitanika su potpuno slobodni izbori ($B = 3.480$, $p < 0.01$), slobodni izbori sa malim problemima ($B = 3.099$, $p < 0.01$), mediji delimično slobodni sa malim problemima ($B = 1.380$, $p < 0.05$), mediji delimično slobodni sa velikim problemima ($B = 1.380$, $p < 0.05$), mediji delimično slobodni sa velikim problemima ($B = 1.380$, $p < 0.05$), mediji delimično slobodni sa velikim problemima ($B = 1.380$, $p < 0.05$).

=1.462, $p < 0.05$), korupcija uobičajna ($B = 1.485$, $p < 0.05$) i autoritarnost ($B = 1.183$, $p < 0.05$). Šanse su 32, tj. 22 puta veće da će glas pripasti SNS-u ukoliko je podržan stav da su izbori potpuno slobodni ili slobodni od manje probleme. Kada je u pitanju sloboda medija, šanse glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku su 3,9, tj. 4,3 puta veće ukoliko je ispitanik stava da su mediji delimično slobodni, sa manjim problemima ili delimično slobodni, sa većim problemima. Stav o korupciji kao uobičajnoj pojavi uvećava šanse glasanja za SNS za 4,4 puta dok autoritarnost povećava šanse za 3,2 puta. Eksplanatorna moć ovog modela je velika budući da on objašnjava više od 3/5 glasova za Srpsku naprednu stranku (R^2 Nagelkerke = 0.679). Kada uporedimo *kognitivni* model sa prethodna dva modela, *socidemografskim* i *medijskim* (Tabela 1 i 2) jasno uočavamo porast eksplanatorne moći.

Tabela 3: Binarna logistička regresiona analiza stavova građana i glasanja za SNS - Logit

Varijable	B (S.E.)	B(S.E.)
Konstanta	0.647 (0.551)	-2.017(1.171)
Nisko obrazovanje	2.201*** (0.475)	2.154***(0.729)
Srednje obrazovanje	0.735*(0.312)	0.763(0.530)
Muško	-0.243 (0.263)	-0.152(0.438)
Godine	-0.007(0.011)	-0.072***(0.022)
Nizak prihod	0.098(0.364)	-0.598(0.565)
Srednji prihod	-0.171(0.287)	-0.413(0.477)
Državni sektor	0.510(0.307)	1.396**(0.544)
Zapadna Srbija i Šumadija	1.279**(0.376)	-0.323(0.638)
Istočna i južna Srbija	0.507(0.420)	0.686(0.752)
Vojvodina	0.973**(0.386)	1.091(0.755)
Ruralno	-0.487(0.297)	-0.460(0.492)
Prigradsko	-0.243(0.413)	-0.371(0.608)
Potpuno slobodni izbori		
Slobodni izbori, sa malim problemima		3.480***(0.720)
Slobodni izbori, sa velikim problemima		3.099***(0.622)
Mediji su slobodni		1.045(0.779)
Del. slobodni mediji-manji problemi		1.422(0.868)
Del. slobodni mediji-značajni problemi		1.380**(0.678)
Nema korupcije u politici		1.462**(0.654)
Malo korupcije u politici		2.784(1.745)
Korupcija je uobičajna u politici		1.196(0.741)
Demokratija u punom kapacitetu		1.485**(0.656)
Demokratija sa problemima		19.472(6957.945)
Autoritarnost	0.168	0.059(0.794)
Ekonomija je u boljem stanju		1.183**(0.502)
Ekonomija -je nepromenjena		1.044(0.646)
R^2 Nagelkerke		0.327(0.496)
		0.679

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.1$ S.E. označava standardnu grešku regresionog koeficijenta

Za merenje uticaja lidera SNS-a i predsednika Srbije Aleksandra Vučića primenjena je binarna logistička regresiona analiza. Statistički značajne sociodemografske varijable u ovom modelu su nisko obrazovanje ($B = 1.670$, $p < 0.05$), starost ($B = -0.063$, $p < 0.01$). Varijabla vezana za mišljenje o predsedniku SNS-a i Srbije je statistički značajna ($B = 1.116$, $p < 0.01$). Podaci izvedeni iz ovog modela nam govore da se šansa glasanja za SNS uvećava za 3 puta za svaki podeok na skali kojom se meri mišljenje o Aleksandru Vučiću. Dakle, ukoliko je mišljenje o predsedniku SNS-a veoma pozitivno (10 na skali), šansa glasanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku je 30 puta veća. Eksplanatorna moć ovog modela je ogromna budući da se njime objašnjava gotovo 4/5 glasova za SNS. Ovaj model poseduje najveću eksplanatornu moć u poređenju sa svim prethodnim modelima (Tabela 1, 2 i 3).

Tabela 4: Binarna logistička regresiona analiza stava o predsedniku Srbije i Srpske napredne stranke Aleksandru Vučiću i glasanja za SNS - Logit

Varijable	B (S.E.)	B(S.E.)
Konstanta	0.647 (0.551)	-4.376(1.419)
Nisko obrazovanje	2.201*** (0.475)	1.670**(0.756)
Srednje obrazovanje	0.735*(0.312)	0.580(0.619)
Muško	-0.243 (0.263)	-0.651(0.023)
Godine	-0.007(0.011)	-0.063***(0.023)
Nizak prihod	0.098(0.364)	-0.852(0.631)
Srednji prihod	-0.171(0.287)	-0.123(0.540)
Državni sektor	0.510(0.307)	0.690(0.596)
Zapadna Srbija i Šumadija	1.279**(0.376)	-0.156(0.719)
Istočna i južna Srbija	0.507(0.420)	0.343(0.793)
Vojvodina	0.973**(0.386)	0.749(0.797)
Ruralno	-0.487(0.297)	-0.601(0.516)
Prigradsko	-0.243(0.413)	-0.890(0.767)
Mišljenje o Aleksandru Vučiću		1.116***(0.152)
R ² Nagelkerke	0.168	0.785

***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.1 S.E. označava standardnu grešku regresionog koeficijenta

Diskusija

U okviru ovog rada testirana su četiri modela predikcije glasačkog opredeljivanja za Srpsku naprednu stranku: sociodemografski model, kognitivni (stavski model), medijski model i liderski model. U okviru svakog modela ispitano je da li i u kojoj meri različiti prediktori objašnjavaju glasanje za SNS. Testiranje modela koji sadrži socio-demografske varijable pokazalo je da je jedino varijabla nisko obrazovanje u svim modelima (Tabela 1, 2, 3 i 4) u kontinuitetu imala statističku značajnost. Ovaj

nalaz govori da Srpska napredna stranka ima stabilnu podršku među niže obrazovanim stanovništvom. Ovakav zaključak upućuje na određenu pravilnost kod biračkog tela budući da su istraživanja sa početka 90ih godina ukazivala da niže obrazovano stanovništvo naginje ka provladinoj orijentaciji (Milošević 1997, 282). Uzimajući u obzir da je socidemografski model (Tabela 1) u poređenju sa ostalim modelima (Tabela 2, 3 i 4) imao najmanju eksplanatornu moć, potvrđena je prva hipoteza.

Model koji je ispitivao da li informisanje o političkim dešavanjima posredstvom različitih televizija može da objasni političke preferencije povrh sociodemografskih varijabli (Tabela 2) je pokazao da se na osnovu praćenja svih televizija sa nacionalnom frekvencijom, osim B92, može predviđati glasanje za SNS. Mogući razlog zašto varijabla B92 nije statički značajna leži u činjenici da je svega 44 ispitanika označilo ovu televiziju kao najčešći izvor političkog informisanja. Čini se da je nadmoć vlasti u medijskoj predstavljenosti (praćeno pozitivnim tonalitetom) na kanalima sa nacionalnom pokrivenošću dovela do toga da gledanje ovih kanala u svrhu političkog informisanja uspešno predviđa glasanje za SNS.

Budući da je SNS vladajuća stranka, očekivano je da će njeni birači imati stav da su izbori i mediji slobodni, sa manjim ili većim problemima (Tabela 3). Ovaj podatak je u skladu sa ranije pomenutim nalazima Bešića o stavu glasaša SNS-a da je izborni proces u Srbiji demokratski (Bešić 2020, 11). Pored toga potvrđen je i njegov prethodni nalaz o izraženoj autoritarnosti birača SNS-a, budući da je i u ovom istraživanju autoritarnost bila statistički značajan prediktor glasanja za SNS. Nalaz o povezanosti stava da je korupcija u politici uobičajna i glasanja za SNS može se tumačiti u skladu sa kontinuiranim niskim poverenjem građana u skupštinu Srbije i političare na koje ukazuju i drugi autori (Spasojević, Stojiljković 2020). Veća eksplanatorna moć ovog i prethodnog modela (Tabela 2 i 3) od socidemografskog modela (Tabela 1) potvrđuje i drugu hipotezu.

Najveću eksplanatornu moć ima poslednji model (Tabela 4) koji se odnosi na povezanost pozitivnog mišljenja o lideru SNS-a i predsedniku Srbije Aleksandru Vučiću i glasanja za tu stranku. I ovaj nalaz može se tumačiti sa prikazanim studijama u kojima je ukazivano na značaj lidera u današnjoj politici u Srbiji. Ovim je potvrđena i poslednja, treća hipoteza. Svrishodno bi bilo izraditi istraživanje o značaju lidera za određivanje birača za ostale političke partije u Srbiji, kao i ispitati činioce pozitivnog mišljenja o lideru stranke. Osim toga, treba imati na umu da u nekom od narednih ispitivanja treba prevazići ograničenje ovog upitnika koje se ogleda u činjenici da nije direktno postavljeno pitanje za koga bi glasali, već je ispitana privrženost nekoj od političkih opcija.

Voting predictors for Serbian Progressive Party

Abstract



In this research voting predictors for the Serbian Progressive Party have been examined. It is of special interest to identify the factors of preferences for this political party given the fact that from 2012 this party holds the reigns of executive power in Serbia, that is it has never lost an election and became a part of the opposition. With the implementation of binary logistic regression explanatory power of several variables which were separated into four models (social-demographic; cognitive; media and leader models) were tested and quantified. Analyzed data stem from a survey which was done by a representative random sample of 1800 participants in 2020 as a part of a University in Ohio's project named „Comparative National Elections Project“. The research has shown that the leader model has the greatest explanatory power, that is a positive opinion about the leader of the Serbian Progressive Party explains the best a vote for that party. Model in which political stances (perception about the state of the economy, democracy, corruption, electoral process, and autocracy) and most-watched media (television programs with national frequency) were examined have somewhat less albeit still significant explanatory power. The social-demographic model has the least explanatory power, and low education is the strongest predictor of this model.

Key words



voting behaviour, voting motivation, elections, serbian progressive party (SNS) - Aleksandar Vučić

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How propaganda in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum helped to shape the cause for an independent Scotland

Abstract



The article follows the key propaganda battle between the pro- and anti-Scottish independence camps in the three-year period before the Scottish independence referendum was held on 18 September 2014. By focusing on the narrative of the major pro-independence proponents, first of all Alex Salmond, at the time the First Minister of Scotland, the article points towards a changed shift in defining the reasons for independence – from a more traditional nationalistic rhetoric, towards insisting on a false dichotomy between Scotland and Westminster. At the same time, the article explains the major pitfall of the anti-independence propaganda, namely its negativity and insisting on fearmongering and warnings of possible economic hardships in case Scotland became independent. Eventually, it was the intervention of Gordon Brown, former British Labour Prime Minister from Scotland (2007-10), just days before the referendum, which crucially gave the anti-independence camp a fresh lease of energy, by reminding the Scots that there was nothing wrong in voting for the Union, as patriotism is not an exclusive domain of nationalists.

Keywords



Scotland, United Kingdom, Scottish independence, 2014 Scottish referendum, propaganda, nationalism, Alex Salmond, Alistair Darling, Gordon Brown.

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The date of the Scottish independence referendum was agreed between the British Prime Minister David Cameron and his Scottish counterpart and the leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) Alex Salmond in October 2012 and was set for 18 September 2014 (Black, "Cameron and Salmond strike referendum deal"). The Scots had already had two devolution referenda in the recent past; the first, held in 1979, on the setting of the Scottish Assembly, failed due to a lower turnout of the electorate than required. The second one in 1997, to decide again whether there was enough support for the Scottish Parliament and government with limited powers, was successful. The setting up of the parliament, sitting in Holyrood in Edinburgh, just before the turn of the century thus announced that there was a new role the SNP, until then one of smaller parties in British politics, would play in the political life of Scotland in the 21st century. Upon winning a majority in Scottish elections in 2011, Salmond confirmed his commitment to hold a referendum for full Scottish independence. Cameron's government in London would not oppose this, and throughout 2012 the two governments worked towards agreeing the technical details of the agreement, which was finally signed in October that year. When the Scottish Parliament voted for the Referendum Bill in June 2013, everything was set for the big showdown. The most important campaign group for independence, named Yes Scotland, included the SNP, Scottish Greens and Socialists. Their main rivals, headed by Alistair Darling, former Chancellor of the Exchequer (Finance Minister in the British Government) in Gordon Brown's Labour Government of the United Kingdom in 2007-10, called themselves Better together (aka No), uniting Scotland's branches of the three largest London-based national parties, Labour, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Various political organisations, think tanks, grassroots movements, minor parties and individuals gave their support to one of these two main campaign groups, while some acted on their own.

The two camps and their propaganda: The nationalism of the Yes Scotland campaign could rather be described as civic nationalism, emphasising the positive themes of equality, tolerance and citizenship across all levels of Scottish society, rather than embedded in topics such as nationality or Anglophobia (McAnulla and Crines: 2017, 479). So, there were no allusions on the movie *Braveheart* in campaign speeches, no blue-painted faces, or people dressed wearing kilts at rallies. However, a patriotic appeal to the Scots was for most of the campaign always there, if not directly spoken, then hidden in the background of Salmond's political rhetoric. In an interview for *The Economist* in January 2012, he stated that "people should reclaim their flag, and do it as quickly as possible" (*The Economist*, "Interviewing Alex Salmond"). At the SNP conference in October 2013, he made sure to emphasise that "independence would boost the morale of the nation", a message deliberately left for the end of the 45-minute talk (Sparrow, "SNP Conference – Alex Salmond's Speech"). In April 2014, in a speech at Glasgow Caledonian University, Salmond assured the audience that "this referendum isn't about politicians... it's about the people of Scotland." (McAnulla and Crines, 2017: 480). It would be hard to call it a play on patriotism, but it was a form of flag-waving, as it still aimed to trigger a sense of national pride on an emotional, rather than a rational level. On the contrary, the Better Together campaign chose the opposite, appealing to people's reason and playing on the card of aggressive warnings against the risks, focusing their narrative on the period of insecurity which independence would inevitably bring in the first phase after the potential separation. The campaign was mainly described by its opponents as a typical example of fearmongering and was nicknamed 'Project Fear', a catchy slogan which stuck to the No camp not only for the Scottish independence referendum, but also to the Remain campaign two years later, during the Brexit referendum (Jack, "'Project Fear' started as a silly private joke"). The moment which provided the fulcrum for their strategy was clarification by George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in February 2014, that an independent Scotland would not be able to continue using the pound sterling – although Osborne, as a British minister, was not part of any anti-independence camp. He thus landed a heavy blow to the idea of a currency union, which was the crux of Salmond's financial programme, and prompted the latter to accuse London of bullying Scottish voters ahead of the referendum (Black and James, "'Yes' vote means leaving pound, says Osborne").

Scotland and the Scots before the referendum: In early 2013, approximately one third of Scots supported the idea of an independent country, half of them opposed it, and the rest had no opinion on the matter, or were uninterested (Curtis, "What have the polls been saying"). These numbers remained more or less stable throughout the following year and a half or so, until mid-August 2014, five to six weeks before the referendum day, when according to the former YouGov president Pe-

ter Kellner, "the support for the Union has drained away at astonishing rate." (Kellner, "'Yes' blitzkrieg wipes out 'No' lead"). But for most of the time since the date of the referendum had been set in October 2012, Yes Scotland trailed behind in the polls. It seemed as if Alex Salmond and his SNP colleagues had too facily put an equal sign between the vote for their party at the Scottish elections in 2011 and support for an independent Scotland. Pro-independence voters were in the minority and the success of the independence campaign depended on persuading others, namely the undecided. Independence for the sake of being merely independent from London was too one-dimensional approach. More importantly, Yes Scotland needed to explain coherently the economic logic behind the idea of independence, at a time when the Scottish economy was doing seemingly better than the rest of the United Kingdom (with the exception of London): in 2012, Scottish GDP per capita was £28,100 compared to £24,600 for the country as a whole; it had higher annual economic growth rate (1.4%) in the period 1999-2012 than the UK overall (1.2%); Scotland's net fiscal deficit was slightly lower than the UK's; and a higher proportion of its working age population held higher education qualifications than in other parts of the UK. On top of that, university education was free for residents of Scotland, unlike in England and Wales (Liddell et al., 2014: 4-6). At the same time, using the so-called Barnett formula - the way in which money is shared between the four countries which constitute the UK - the government in London had regularly transferred block payments for public spending (health, education, social services) to devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland since 1978, a scheme which had often been criticised in England for the privileged position it allegedly gave to Scotland. In essence, Yes Scotland needed to overcome fears that this relatively favourable economic balance within the UK would not be jeopardised if Scotland became independent.

'Yes' campaign and its propaganda: This was achieved by combining a civic version of nationalism with the social problems. To this end, the Yes camp played on anti-Conservative sentiment in Scotland, emphasising the paradox of a nation (Scotland) ruled by the government elected mainly by votes in other parts of Britain (England and Wales). The tool used for this purpose was the narrative which created a false dichotomy of Scotland versus Westminster, rather than versus England, or Great Britain, playing on the dislike of a London political elite, apparently out of touch with the needs of ordinary people. Which at that time (and later) was not too hard, bearing in mind that throughout the country, including vast swathes of England, there were unpopular austerity measures and questionable social reforms imposed by Cameron's government (in office since 2010). In this way, Westminster (as a metonym for the British political elite) became a suitable scapegoat for any political, economic or social problem in Scotland. At a pro-independence rally in Edinburgh in September 2013, Blair Jenkins, the director of the

Yes Scotland campaign said: “Well, we would lose nuclear weapons, the bedroom tax, Tory governments we have never voted for, and what’s not to love about that?” (The Guardian, “Alex Salmond tells Scotland has natural majority for independence”). In an article for the *New Statesman* in March 2014, Salmond wrote: “[...] Scotland is part of an increasingly imbalanced UK – with high social inequalities, growing regional disparities, and more often than not, governments we didn’t vote for” (Salmond, “Alex Salmond’s *New Statesman* lecture”). At a pro-independence rally in Aberdeen in April 2014, Salmond spoke of “poverty-creating policies from Westminster” (Carell, Alex Salmond brands anti-Scottish independence campaign miserable”).

But this is a good example of a false dichotomy, as neither the Yes camp, nor Scottish society, were a monolithic block firmly united in opposition to, or against Westminster. Quite apart from those Scots who actually supported the Union, there were pro-independence Scots who resented the charismatic, but divisive personality of Alex Salmond and disliked him as their first choice for the First Minister of an independent Scotland; just like there were others who disagreed that SNP had a monopoly on Scottish independence (Thiec: 2014, 4-5). More importantly, in peripheral parts of Scotland, such as the islands around the North Sea oil depots and the coastal regions dependent on fishing, scapegoating Westminster was unconvincing, as it was the London government which had successfully defended their fishing rights in Brussels (Taylor, “Independence best for fishing sector, says Sturgeon”). The idea of replacing Westminster with Holyrood, with the mere excuse that it would now mean that Scots decided on Scotland, or that it would bring new and improved forms of public participation in politics, did not turn out to be of popular appeal if it meant economic uncertainty (Cairney, “Scottish Independence: a rejection of Westminster politics?”).

Despite these difficulties with explaining the reasons for a Yes vote in outlying regions and in sections of society which depended on specific industries, Yes Scotland started to rapidly gain ground from mid-August 2014 and in only three weeks support for independence surged, reaching a majority in polls with 51 percent for the first time ever on 6 September (Dahlgreen, “‘Yes’ campaign lead 2 in Scottish referendum”). Salmond and his Yes Scotland suddenly broke the deadlock in almost every political, social and age category of Scottish voters, except the Conservative Party voters, significantly rising its support among young voters, Labour voters, women and working-class people (Kellner, “Scotland: ‘Yes’ blitzkrieg wiped out ‘No’ lead”). One of the key events in this turning of the tables was the second television debate between the leaders of the two camps, Darling and Salmond, on 25 August 2014 and it deserves a more detailed analysis.

Salmond versus Darling: The first debate between the two politicians took place on 5 August and according to the first polls immediately after it ended, Darling had won it 56%:44%, mainly thanks to successful-

ly grilling his opponent on the question of the future Scottish currency in the event of independence. However, deeper analysis showed that both participants overall received a more negative than positive reception (*The Herald*, "Debate: snap poll declares Darling winner"). Yet, as the main purpose of the televised debates is not to come out victorious from a TV duel, but to significantly attract the undecided or voters from the other camp, this particular debate did not change much, as opinion polls in the following days did not show a significant shift in voting intentions (Curtis, "Who won the leader's debate?").

The second debate in Glasgow was held in the same format as the first, in front of an audience and broadcasted live on the BBC. Salmond opened it with the statement: "In 1979, we didn't get the Parliament we voted for, and instead we got 18 years of Tory government". This is a good example of a misleading claim, as the Tory governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major in the period 1979-1997, were hardly the result of the outcome of the 1979 Scottish referendum. [Instead, in the aftermath of the referendum, the SNP members of the British parliament voted for the Conservative motion of no confidence in James Callaghan's Labour government, thus helping to trigger the general election. This is where any link between the two events stops, as the core reason for Labour losing the ensuing elections were the long-term economic difficulties the UK was experiencing]. Speaking about the North Sea oil extraction, Darling presented estimates which allegedly reflected a doubtful value for the oil reserves (Macalister, "Questions over value of Scotland's oil"), as suited his cause, which is an example of the so-called cherry-picking propaganda technique, as there were other analysis pointing to the contrary. Continuing on the issue of an independent Scotland's currency, Darling again played the card of sparkling fears of risks for Scottish finances in case of the continued use of the pound sterling, "because our budget would have to be decided and approved not by us, but by the foreign country [i.e., the rest of the UK]". Asked by Darling what his plan B would be in case London refused to allow further use of the pound sterling in independent Scotland, Salmond instead asked his opponent if he would accept the sovereign will of the Scottish people if Yes Scotland won the referendum, successfully changing the focus, and received enthusiastic applause from the audience. This was an expected tactic, bearing in mind that Salmond lost the first debate primarily on the currency question; moving away from it as quickly as possible was the best he could hope for.

It was then his turn to spark fears about the future of the National Health Service (NHS). Albeit admitting that Edinburgh could not be forced to privatise its healthcare, Salmond warned "[The danger for Scotland is] if England goes down the road of privatisation and charging [for health services], and general cuts to public spending, then it's not because they can force us to privatise the health care of Scotland, because they can't; it's the financial pressure [which] makes things extremely dif

ficult for the health care in Scotland. And that is why to have a health service we can all trust and rely on, we've got to have a health service where we have financial control, as well as policy control ...". Basically, Salmond here manipulated with fears that London would deliberately financially choke the Scottish health system, unless Scotland became independent. A few moments later, he warned that "general cutbacks in England are moving towards privatisation and charging...", when in reality nothing off the scale has happened in the UK. Questioned about the potential privatisation of the health service and accused of personal links with private medical companies, Darling avoided giving a direct answer and repeating that all he wanted was to keep the NHS safe from the uncertainty the independence would bring. He then continued scare-mongering about the potential loss of jobs in shipbuilding and military manufacturing industries in the event of independence. Moving onto the theme of social policy, Salmond did not miss the opportunity to make a scapegoat of the government in London, accusing it of responsibility for the plight of 100,000 Scots with disabilities, allegedly victims of Conservative government welfare reforms. Questioned by Darling about the six-billion-pound budget deficit if Scotland went independent, Salmond made a false claim, saying: "Alister, the director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies said that Scotland would be a prosperous economy [if independent]". However, the November 2013 IFS report clearly stated:

"Despite the considerable uncertainty surrounding the future path of borrowing and debt in Scotland, the main conclusion of our analysis is that a significant further fiscal tightening would be required in Scotland, on top of that already announced by the UK government, in order to put Scotland's long-term public finances onto a sustainable footing" (Amior, Crawford i Tetlow, "Fiscal sustainability of an independent Scotland").

Then, for the first time visibly annoyed, he continued: "Alister, you had a deficit of 150 billion pounds when you were Chancellor of the Exchequer! I will not take lectures from the man who undermined the entire economy". Pinned by Salmond with the loaded question about his knowledge of living conditions of the poorest in Scotland, Darling replied with laughable generalities: "Salmond: Do you know how many children it is estimated will be moving to poverty in Scotland by 2020 with the welfare reforms by the Westminster government? Darling: Too many children will be moving to poverty".

On the question of the British Trident nuclear programme, based at Clyde Naval Base in western Scotland, both politicians showed how one potentially divisive issue could be manipulated in different contradictory contexts. Darling spread fears of the loss of over eight thousand jobs created by the military base, if it was forced to relocate from Scotland; while Salmond spread fears of Trident as a nuclear weapon which makes Scotland a legitimate enemy target in case of war. Using his final eight minutes to cross-examine Darling, Salmond skilfully profited using the technique of guilt by association: "It's all very well of you to say you are

a Labour politician Alistair, so why are you standing here defending Conservative policies on a joint platform with the Conservative party!?" The first polls immediately after the debate gave Salmond an overwhelming victory of 71%:29% (Carrell and Brooks, "Salmond scores victory over Darling in fractious debate").

Intervention from London: Partly as a result of this debate, according to Kellner's words, "the Yes campaign has not only invaded No territory; it has launched a Blitzkrieg" (Kellner, "Scotland: 'Yes' blitzkrieg wiped out 'No' lead"). When YouGov announced its first ever poll which gave Yes a lead on 6 September, only 12 days before the referendum, panic overtook every pro-Unionist in the UK and pointed to how compliant they were by taking hitherto favourable polls for granted for far too long. Cameron, who had for two years insisted that London politicians would not interfere in campaigning, leaving the debate instead to Scottish politicians, suddenly got cold feet and according to some insiders, personally urged the leaders of the biggest businesses in Britain to assist publicly (Rigby, Felsted and Thomas, "Business finds its voice on independence"). A string of the most important companies, mainly from the service sector, willingly jumped onto the scaremongering campaign, with consistent warnings of increased costs of travelling, borrowing and insurance in Scotland if Yes won; or that they would simply relocate their offices south of the English-Scottish border. These included some serious business heavyweights, such as British Petroleum, insurance company Aviva, investment fund Blackrock, investment company Standard Life, energy company SSE, Royal Bank of Scotland, travel and tourist giant Thomas Cook, to mention the biggest (*BBC*, "RBS confirms London HQ if Scotland votes independence"; Jordanova, "Insurer voices concerns over independent Scotland"; Chu, "Corporate giants Standard Life and BP issue Yes vote warning"; Macalister i Kollwe, "BP urges Scotland to vote against independence"). By throwing their support to the No camp in such a dramatic fashion only days before the referendum, these corporations, which combined provided jobs for tens of thousands of Scots, basically justified the nickname 'Project Fear'.

At the same time, the leaders of the three national parties, Prime Minister Cameron, the opposition Labour leader Ed Miliband and the Liberal Democratic Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, promptly arrived in Scotland on 10 September to urge voters to reject independence. Speaking emotionally at a rally in Edinburgh, Cameron said: "I would be heartbroken if this family of nations that we've put together - and we've done such amazing things together - if this family of nations was torn apart." (*BBC*, "Cameron, Clegg and Miliband make Scotland 'No' vote plea"). This chain of events gave Salmond even more ammunition for turning Westminster into the common foe of every Scotsman and woman. On the day when Cameron, Miliband and Clegg arrived in Scotland, he nicknamed them 'Team Westminster' by saying: "Today what we have got is an example of Team Scotland against Team Westminster" (*BBC*,

“Alex Salmond attacks ‘Team Westminster’”). In his final appeal to Scottish voters, the night before the referendum, Salmond compared the Yes campaign to an underdog, saying: “We know that Westminster will throw the kitchen sink at us... The reaction of the Westminster establishment to this demonstration of people power is the reaction of the powerful few who believe they always know what’s best for the many, that power should be in their hands... Tomorrow, we can deliver for Scotland real power; the power to choose hope over fear, opportunity over despair” (YouTube, “Alex Salmond’s final push for votes”).

Brown comes to the fore: An important moment in turning the tide back in favour of the No campaign happened on 8 September, two days after YouGov published their above-mentioned first ever poll in favour of independence, when the forceful personality of the former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown stepped in and took over the shambolic No campaign from the hands of Darling in the final week. In a couple of rallies, he first offered a carrot to the Scottish people, announcing the new devolution plan which would grant more powers to the government in Edinburgh in deciding on taxes and welfare issues if Scotland voted against the independence. His promise was immediately backed by the leaders of three biggest national parties (Morris and Green, “Gordon Brown steps into the breach as Tories duck fight for Union”). Then, he finally broke away from the confusing and damaging fearmongering rhetoric of his predecessor, and began to talk more positively and passionately. With his loud voice and at times almost angry look, Brown was a sharp contrast to the unconvincing personality of Alistair Darling. Speaking in Glasgow on 17 September, at the final rally before referendum day, he thundered:

“Let us tell also those people who have been told unfairly by the nationalists that, if you vote No, you are a less than patriotic Scot. Tell them this is our Scotland. Tell them that Scotland does not belong to the SNP. Scotland does not belong to the Yes campaign. Scotland does not belong to any politician - Mr Salmond, Mr Swinney, me, or any other politician - Scotland belongs to all of us. And let us tell the nationalists this is not their flag, their country, their culture, their streets. This is everyone’s flag, everyone’s country, everyone’s street” (O’Neill, “Gordon Brown’s passionate speech in defence of the Union”).

This is what many among the Scottish proponents of the Union had wanted to hear for months - that there was nothing wrong with being both Scottish and British, that being for Britain was not automatically being against Scotland, and that nationalists did not have the copyright on patriotism. After two years of campaigning against independence, only in the final week were the Scottish people reminded of all the positive things the Union had brought over the past three centuries, equally for Scotland and England.

Scotland voted No, but lessons were not learned: The result of the referendum in the end was nowhere near as close as it had seemed just a few days beforehand. A comfortable majority of 55% voted against

independence and Alex Salmond resigned both as the SNP leader and Scottish Premier (*BBC*, "Salmond to quit after Scots vote No"). Two years later, there was a copycat situation at the Brexit referendum, with the Leave [the EU] campaign using similar propaganda techniques as Yes Scotland had, by waving their Union Jack flags, playing the card of a false dichotomy between British people and Brussels (as a metonym for the EU) and scapegoating the EU administration for most of their country's ills. The Remain campaign totally echoed Better Together in fearmongering, playing the card of risks for the economy and people's living standards if Britain left the EU. As we know, this time the Leave block prevailed, winning the referendum with 52%:48%. So why was the outcome in the two similar situations different?

As a matter of fact, Salmond achieved a similar success in convincing many more people than initially expected, as did the anti-EU campaigners, mainly among the English electorate south of the border river Tweed in 2016. Let us not forget that support for independence in Scotland rose by 10-12% over the course of the Scottish independence campaign, 2012-14. Salmond's heritage is a very solid starting position for any of his successors from the SNP who would next call for a new referendum. And six years later, on 12 August 2020, support for independence was 53 per cent – 20 per cent up from when he began the campaign in 2012 (Webster, "Yes support in 53% in YouGov poll"). In a future referendum, as things now stand, the Unionists will be the underdogs. Salmond's most important contribution was that by using skilful propaganda, he crystallised the main reason for Scottish independence.

Scotland versus Westminster: Firstly, there were always some vague ideas in Scotland about an alleged British or English exploitation of the country. *The Economist's* reporter on the way to interviewing Salmond in early 2012 was shouted at in Stirling that "Scotland was sick of paying for Britain" (*The Economist*, "Interviewing Alex Salmond, the man who wants to break up Britain"). This was a largely unfounded construction, as in reality, more or less, Scotland gives approximately as much as it takes from the joint British kitty (Worrall, "Has Scotland subsidised the rest of the UK"). Secondly, there were now and then allusions about Scotland being oppressed; for example, a famous reference from the movie *Trainspotting*: "It's shite to be Scottish! We're the lowest of the low, the scum of the fucking Earth, the most wretched, miserable, servile, pathetic trash that was ever shat into civilization. Some people hate the English, I don't. They're just wankers. We on the other hand are colonised by wankers. Can't even find a decent culture to be colonized by" (YouTube, "Trainspotting – Going for a Walk"). However, Scotland was never forced to join the union with England (and Wales) as a conquered or oppressed nation, as was the case of Ireland. Upon the death of Queen Elisabeth I, there was a union of crowns, when in 1603 James VI of Scotland became James I of England. Then, in 1707 there was a voluntary union of parliaments, when both Scotland and England formed

Great Britain and became one political nation. And thirdly, there is a sense of national pride, as the Scots are proud people with great history; so, why use the Union Jack when they could use their St Andrew's Cross? This is where identity issues come to the fore: how did the sense of being Scottish integrate with also being British. However, apart from being on their own for the sake of being on their own, in the minds of the majority in 2012 there was little economic reason for becoming independent from a union in which Scotland was neither exploited nor oppressed, and which it voluntarily joined 300 years ago.

To overcome this deficiency of the independence platform, Salmond had to move away from the standard nationalist themes revolving around a play on patriotism, and offer something that would resonate, that could reach and appeal to the widest possible strata of the Scottish population, regardless of their emotional attitude towards an independent Scotland, a united Britain, or the relationship with England. For this reason, especially in the final stages of the campaign, the rhetoric of Yes Scotland focused entirely on exploiting this binary opposition of Scotland versus Westminster – pointing to allegedly the insurmountable rift between the Scottish people on the periphery and the decision-making class in a distant capital, alienated from ordinary people and their worries. Some might say that despite shedding outdated ethnic nationalism and being careful to avoid references to Anglophobia, Salmond's rhetoric still ended being negative; and whether he wanted it or not, by pointing a finger at Westminster in such a passionate way, he did suggest that England and Scotland did not share same values, or that they were too different from each other to share political institutions (McDougall, "Scottish nationalists don't have a monopoly on Scottishness").

Of course, dissatisfaction with Westminster as a symbol of class division, its ruling elite and its style of doing politics, had already existed before Alex Salmond; and was probably even stronger across northern England, or places like Liverpool, than in Scotland. But what Salmond did was to articulate this feeling of dissatisfaction into a proper political platform and use it in his propaganda rhetoric in which people were led to believe that every possible vile decision against Scotland could be expected of the heartless Westminster politicians. Once this barrier in people's minds was overcome, the shallow and one-dimensional scaremongering campaign of the No camp actually started to play into the hands of Salmond, making their proponents look like London proxies in Scotland. Brown's intervention was eventually important, because it turned a negative campaign, based on fear, into a positive one, with an emotional reminder of how successful the Union has been for all its people, Scottish and English alike. Still, Salmond paved the way, demonstrated how it should be done and created a solid platform for his successors to move forward; at this moment, it seems possible that a future referendum could result with an independent Scotland. Unless pro-Union politicians in both London and Edinburgh learn the most important

lesson from the 2014 referendum campaign: that positive propaganda is always a better tool than fearmongering. Judging by the mistakes made in the 2016 Brexit referendum by another No (to leaving the EU) camp – they did not learn much.

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EFEKTI OTVORENIH LISTA PROPORCIONALNE REPREZENTACIJE NA IZBORIMA ZA POLJSKI SEJM 2001-2019.

Sažetak



Zajedno sa Finskom, Poljska danas primenjuje najotvoreniji model lista proporcionalne reprezentacije u Evropi. Ne samo da je redosled izbora poslanika u parlament uslovljen jedino brojem preferencijalnih glasova koje pojedinci, pretendenti na mesto u Sejmu osvoje, već su i birači u obavezi da na glasačkom listiću obeleže jednog kandidata sa partijske liste, kojem daju prednost nad ostalima. Cilj našeg članka je da odgovori na pitanje kakve podsticaje ovakav elektoralni model daje ključnim akterima: kandidatima, izabranim poslanicima, stranačkim liderima i oligarhijama, kao i partijama celini. Pre toga, kratko dajemo pregled razvoja izbornih institucija u predratnoj, komunističkoj i Poljskoj devedesetih godina prošlog veka, kako bi bila razumljiva celokupna istorija elektoralnih pravila u ovoj srednjeevropskoj državi i kontekst današnjeg sistema.

Ključne reči



otvorene liste, proporcionalna reprezentacija, efikasnost izbornih institucija, izborne reforme

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Uvod

Iako je relativno kasno institucionalizovan (2001. godine), izborni sistem otvorenih lista u Poljskoj danas je među najplodotvornijim proporcionalnim modelima za proučavanje u svetu. Osim što je, prema Šugartovim parametrima (Shugart, 2001: 25-51) gotovo idealno reprezentativan na međupartijskoj osi, tako je i u teorijskom smislu potpuno inkluzivan za birače i kandidate, jer redosled prolaska pojedinaca u donji dom sa partijskih lista isključivo zavisi od broja preferencijalnih glasova koje svaki od njih osvoji. Naizgled savršen, poljski sistem, međutim, pati od deficita unutarpartijske demokratije, jednako kao i svi srazmerni modeli u post-komunističkim zemljama i većina preostalih sistema iz porodice proporcionalnih na evropskom kontinentu. Otuda je u Sejm, za dve decenije otvorenih lista, gotovo četiri petine poslanika izabrano po predloženom redosledu od strane partijskih lidera i centrala, dok je svega 20 odsto parlamentaraca do mandata došlo sa pozicija koje ne bi bile prolazne da su u upotrebi bile zatvorene blokirane liste. Cilj našeg članka je da odgovori na pitanje zašto izrazito stimulativne elektoralne institucije nisu produkovale veći uticaj birača na personalni izgled poljskog parlamenta, kao i zbog čega su, i nakon 20 godina od uvođena otvorenih lista i više od tri decenije obnovljenog pluralizma, izborne kampanje u toj državi uperene mahom ka liderima, dok je značaj preostalih kandidata drugorazredan.

Izborne institucije u predratnoj i komunističkoj Poljskoj

Prvi izbori u nezavisnoj državi Poljskoj održani su 1919. godine po proporcionalnom izbornom sistemu u 50 izbornih okruga (Groth, 1965: 653). Biran je jednodoman parlament, veličine 394 mesta (Nohlen & Stöver, 2010). Nakon što je donet novi ustav 1921. godine, promenjen

je i izborni zakon, a parlament je postao dvodoman. Na izborima godinu dana kasnije, od ukupno 444 poslanika donjeg doma, 372 su birana u 64 izborne jedinice magnituda između četiri i 14, a 72 sa nacionalnih lista, po Dontovoj izornoj formuli. Liste su bile zatvorene i blokirane (Holloosi, 2015: 128-129). Veliki broj izbornih jedinica otvorio je vrata donjeg doma regionalnim partijama, koje bi teško stekle parlamentarni status u *at large* elektoralnom okrugu. Pored toga, karakteristično za međuratnu političku scenu Poljske je često formiranje šarolikih predizbornih blokova, koji bi se odmah nakon održanih izbora raspadali. „U Sejmu bi se razvili zasebni klubovi oko pojedinih partijskih vođa, a čak se i broj poslanika koji nisu pripadali niti jednoj stranci značajno uvećavao” (Berecz, 1932: 232-233). Rezultat toga je hiperreprezentativan i fragmentiran parlament, što je odlika i većine kasnijih saziva, ne samo u međuratnoj, već i u postkomunističkoj Poljskoj. Za prvih deset godina, pobjednička partija nijednom nije osvajala više od 30 odsto glasova na izborima. Istovremeno, broj parlamentarnih stranaka konstantno se uvećavao. Početkom 1922. godine, u Sejmu je bilo 10 nacionalnih i šest manjinskih partija, dok je nakon izbora 1928. parlamentarni status dobilo čak 14 poljskih i osam stranaka nacionalnih manjina, pre svih Nemaca i Jevreja (Holloosi, 2015: 136). Izvršna vlast bila je izrazito nestabilna. Od prvih izbora pa do sredine 1926. godine, Poljska je imala 26 različitih vlada, čija prosečna dužina trajanja je iznosila pet meseci i 20 dana. Čak polovinu od nepunih sedam godina potrošili su tzv. „tehnokratski kabineti”, koji su vodili državu u vakuumu između dve vlade (Berecz, 1932: 233).

Hronična politička nestabilnost bila je jedan od najvažnijih uzroka državnog udara, koji je 14. maja 1926. godine izvršio maršal Jozef Pilsudski (Rothschild, 1963: 224-244). Ovaj događaj pokazao se „kao značajna prekretnica u istoriji Druge poljske republike, pošto je okončao parlamentarnu demokratiju, uspostavljenu 1918-1919” (Kacperski, 2011: 43). Nakon toga, faktički, nije bilo slobodnih i kompetitivnih izbora u Poljskoj sve do pada komunizma u Evropi. Jer, kao i u ostalim državama real-socijalizma, izjašnjavanja građana bila su fasadnog karaktera, sa ciljem legitimizacije *de facto* jednopartijskih poredaka komunističkih partija. Izuzimajući izbore 1952. godine, gde je bilo moguće glasati jedino za kandidate režima, koji su dobili 99,8 odsto glasova, uz izlaznost od 95,03 procenata (Sakwa & Crouch, 1978: 406), u prvoj dekadi komunističke Poljske, stvarnu opoziciju predstavljala je samo Seljačka partija Stanislava Mikolajčika, osvajajući između 10 i 26 odsto glasova (Staar, 1958: 200-218). Jovanović navodi da je smirivanje Poznanjskog ustanka 1956. godine „između ostalog” izvršeno i „kroz napuštanje prakse jednog kandidata i uvođenjem mogućnosti nominacije više kandidata od broja mandata u izornoj jedinici”. Drugi ustupak bila je dozvola nominovanja i „nezavisnih katoličkih vernika”, a ne samo kandidata odobrenih od strane partijskih komiteta (Jovanović, 2006: 12).

Kasnije, sve do kraja sedamdesetih, aktivnosti opozicije gotovo da i nije bilo, a u hibridnoj vrsti autoritarizma, koji Sakva i Krauč nazivaju

„konsultativnim”, partijski aparat je pojedine zahtevne funkcije u vlasti prepuštao nezavisnim stručnjacima, dok je „kvazi pluralistički poredak” oponašan u interakciji različitih partijskih frakcija, od kojih je svaka imala sopstvene interese i računicu (Sakwa & Crouch, 1978: 406). Čak ni „Praško proleće” 1968. godine, niti visoka inflacija 1970. koja je rezultirala „socijalnom eksplozijom”, nisu doveli do većih gibanja unutar poretka poljskih komunista, pa je režim 1972. učvrstio svoje pozicije, tako da su i naredni izbori bili relativno dobro kontrolisani od strane vlasti (Sakwa & Crouch, 1978: 406-407).

Stidljiv uvod u pluralizaciju otpočeo je postepenom reformom tokom 1984. i 1985. Tom prilikom, smanjena su „ograničenja prilikom kandidovanja”, a „ojačana je legitimnost predstavničkih institucija” (Jovanović, 2006: 13). Nešto, kasnije, „slobodni, ali delimično konkurentni izbori u junu 1989. godine”, pružili su „efikasan mehanizam” za „transformaciju poljskog političkog sistema” (Birch et al, 2002: 28). Međutim, kako navode pojedini autori, izbori u Poljskoj 1989. godine, za razliku od prvih tranzicionih u Mađarskoj i Čehoslovačkoj, bili su „mehanizam demokratizacije, ali ne i demokratije” (Birch et al, 2002: 28-29), budući da je 65 odsto mesta u Sejmu bilo rezervisano za komuniste, tj. Poljsku ujedinjenu radničku partiju (*PZPR*), dok su se za sve ostale mandate borili nerezimski kandidati (Kaminski & Nalepa, 2004: 370).

Partijska nadmudrivanja izbornom geometrijom - reforme od 1991. do 2001.

Koautori zbornika „Otelotvorenje demokratije - dizajn izbornih sistema u postkomunističkoj Evropi” smatraju da naučni pristup maksimalizacije mandata pruža najbolji uvid u izborne reforme u postkomunističkoj Poljskoj. „Bez obzira na međusobnu interakciju institucija, konačni ishod je određivan relativnom snagom političkih aktera u Sejmu i načinima na koji su oni shvatali svoju prednost” (Birch et al, 2002: 26). Ovakvo tumačenje, prema našem mišljenju, prihvatljivo je za sve, osim za reformu iz 1991. godine, čije ključne dimenzije podsećaju na izborni sistem iz 1921. Stoga prvi postkomunistički elektoralni model Poljske možemo smatrati produktom „učenja iz prethodnog demokratskog iskustva” (Lago & Martinez, 2012: 413-421). U oba slučaja u upotrebi je bila proporcionalna formula, sa velikim brojem izbornih jedinica, bez zakonskih pragova i dva nivoa alokacije mandata. Doduše, 1991. godine Sejm je bio neznatno veći (460 mandata), a ukupno 391 poslanik birao se u 37 izbornih jedinica, sa otvorenih lista, uz pomoć Her-Nimajerove formule. Na drugom nivou alocirano je 69 mesta, sa zatvorenih blokiranih lista, pomoću Sen Lagijeve formule. Cenzus je postojao samo na nivou nacionalne liste i iznosio je pet odsto (Birch et al, 2002: 26-27).

Ključni autori koji su se bavili genezom izbornih institucija u Poljskoj slikovito isključuju motiv maksimalizacije mandata u reformi 1991. godi-

ne. Kaminski i Nalepa pišu da je „borba za izborni zakon rezultirala velikom krizom, nizom predsedničkih veta i očajničkim pokušajem promena putem ustavnih amandmana”, dodajući da je konačno glasanje „sprovedeno pod snažnim pritiskom da se uopšte donese neka vrsta zakona” (Kaminski & Nalepa, 2004: 371). Birč i koautori još upečatljivije navode da „niko nije u potpunosti prihvatio zakon”, iako su ga „mnogi branili kao najbolji kompromis u datim okolnostima (Birch et al, 2002: 37).

Izbori od 27. oktobra 1991. godine predstavljali su pravi šok za novu političku elitu, dok su u narodu „pojačali osećaj zbunjenosti i neizvesnosti” (Millard, 2010: 55). Izborni favorit Demokratska unija (*UD*) osvojila je svega 12,32 odsto glasova, što je bilo dovoljno za relativnu pobedu, dok je u usitnjeni Sejm ušlo 29 različitih partija, kvazi partija i lokalnih grupacija (Birch et al, 2002: 30). Proliferaciji političke scene pogodivale su velike izborne jedinice (prosečna magnituda 12,1) i odsustvo zakonskih pragova u okviru njih. Čak devet partija osvojilo je između pet i 12 odsto glasova, otvarajući mnoštvo mogućnosti za postizbornu kombinatoriku. Efektivni broj elektivnih partija iznosio je čak 12,98 a Galagerov indeks disproporcionalnosti 3,58. Formiranje stabilne vlade nije otežavala samo razdrobljena partijska scena, već i činjenica da dve vodeće stranke, Demokratska unija (*UD*) Tadeuša Mazovječkog i Savez demokratske levice (*SLD*), sačinjen od bivših komunista, nisu imale gotovo nikakav koalicioni potencijal. Demokratska unija zbog neoliberalne „šok terapije”, sprovedene u prve dve vlade pod vodstvom pokreta „Solidarnost”, u kojima je učestvovala, a Savez demokratske levice zbog svoje neslavne istorijske uloge (Birch et al, 2002: 30-31). Otuda i ne čudi što je prvi postkomunistički mandat Sejma trajao svega 20 meseci, od kraja oktobra 1991. do početka juna 1993. Milard navodi da je „složeni mozaik grupacija zastupljenih u Sejmu, zajedno sa neiskustvom velikog broja novih poslanika”, od samog početka ukazivao da će formiranje održive vlade biti đavolski težak posao (Millard, 2010: 55). A kada je manjinski kabinet partija centra, okupljenih oko Jana Olševskog i formiran, svoju kratku vladavinu proveo je u stalnim previranjima, podeljen iznutra i vani često sukobljen sa predsednikom Poljske Lehom Valensom. Nakon pada vlade Olševskog, poljski građani su do 1993. godine bili svedoci još tri kabineta, koji su „konstantno balansirali na ivici sloma” (Kaminski & Nalepa, 2004: 370).

Vanredne izbore 1993. godine gotovo sve partije čekale u ubeđenju da izborni sistem mora biti promenjen iz korena, jer je dotadašnji nivo fragmentacije paralisao ključne političke procese u Poljskoj. Demokratska unija (*UD*) je već početkom 1992. godine aktuelizovala svoj raniji predlog za uvođenje mešovitog sistema, u kome bi se tri četvrtine poslanika Sejma birale preko zatvorenih blokiranih lista, a četvrtina u jednočlanim okruzima po većinskoj formuli. Demokratska unija u obrazloženju svog predloga isticala je da neophodno stvoriti uslove „predstavljanja političkih snaga sposobnih da formiraju stabilne tabore vlasti i opozicije”, što

će biti moguće jedino ukoliko „političke stranke budu ugrađene u izborni proces“ (Birch et al, 2002: 38).

Sa ciljem iznalaženja održivog reformskog rešenja, formirana je vanredna parlamentarna komisija, o čijem predlogu se glasalo 28. maja 1993. godine, u atmosferi nadolazećih izbora. Ključni cilj promena bio je smanjivanje broja parlamentarnih partija, a on je postignut povećanjem broja izbornih jedinica sa 37 na 52, u kojima je uveden zakonski prag od pet odsto za pojedinačne partije i osam odsto za koalicije. Sen Lagijeva izborna formula zamenjena je Dontovom, a izborni prag u nacionalnoj izbor jedinici, čija magnituda je ostala 69, povećan je sa pet na sedam procenata. Za izgled ovakvog izbornog zakona glasalo je 239 poslanika Sejma, 132 su bila protiv, a četvero se uzdržalo od glasanja. Čak 18 odsto poslanika bojkotovalo je glasanje i nije prisustvovalo sednici (Birch et al, 2002: 41). Iako su male stranke novi izborni zakon prozvali „ishitrenim potezom“, „izbornom prevarom“ i „diktatom velikih partija“ (Chrusciak, 1999: 107-108), doneta rešenja su samo delimično odražavala interese velikih. Zapravo, „nijedna od devet vodećih partija nije bila velika, a stranačka disciplina bila je ograničena“, s obzirom na to da „su mnogi pojedinačni govornici u debati odstupali od stavova svoje partije“ (Birch et al, 2002: 41). Na kraju, nova izborna geometrija i povećani pragovi učinili su svoje. Galagerov indeks disproporcionalnosti višestruko je uvećan u odnosu na 1991. godinu i iznosio je čitavih 17,80. Samo sedam lista ušlo je u Sejm, od kojih je jedna bila manjinska (lista nemačke zajednica). Efektivni broj elektivnih partija smanjen je za tri, sa 12,98 na 9,87. Formirani su jasni blokovi partija vlasti i opozicije. Milard piše da je izjašnjavanje građana 1993. donelo „određenu stabilnost upravljačkom procesu, prvi put od predsedničkih izbora 1990. godine (Millard, 2010: 78).

Elektoralni model ostao je nepromenjen i za parlamentarne izbore 1997. godine. Političke posledice izbornog sistema bile su slične onima iz 1993. Galagerov indeks disproporcionalnosti bio je nešto niži, nego ciklus ranije, ali i dalje veoma visok - 10,64. Takođe, i efektivni broj elektivnih partija dodatno je umanjen na 4,59. Vlada Jiržija Buzeka, formirana glasovima poslanika Izborne akcije „Solidarnost“ (AWS) i Unije slobode (UW), izdržala ceo četvorogodišnji mandat. Milard je izbore iz 1997. godine, upravo zbog toga nazvao „rutinskim“ (Millard, 2010: 96). Nedugo nakon formiranja vlade, najveća stranka pokušala je da iz temelja izmeni elektoralni model, sa ciljem maksimalizacije sopstvenih mandata. Rein-karnirana Izborna akcija „Solidarnost“, nastala od malih parlamentarnih i vanparlamentarnih frakcija nekada velikog, istoimenog pokreta, osvojila je nešto više od trećine glasova i predložila institucionalno rešenje, pomoću koga bi učvrstila svoj dominantni položaj. Sve češće mogle su se čuti spekulacije o mogućoj saradnji Izborne akcije „Solidarnost“ (AWS) i vodeće opozicione Demokratske leve alijanse (SLD), sa ciljem uvođenja jednokružnog većinskog „*first past the post*“ sistema. Međutim, Demokratska leva alijansa nije se odricala proporcionalne izborne formule. Njihov portparol objašnjavao je da Poljska još nije sazrela za dvopartijski

sistem, budući da je postojanje dve velike i dve stranke srednje veličine omogućavalo formiranje stabilnih vlada, a prisustvo pragova sprečavalo prekomernu fragmentaciju (Birch et al, 2002: 33).

Prilika za narednu elektoralnu reformu ukazala se 1999. godine, kada je nastala potreba za usklađivanjem izborne geometrije sa novim granicama provincija, definisanih ustavom iz 1997. Jedan od promotera novih izbornih institucija ponovo je bila Izborna akcija „Solidarnost” (AWS), čiji cilj ovaj put nije bila maksimalizacija sopstvenih mandata, već minimalizacija mesta koalicije Demokratske leve alijanse i Radničke unije (SLD-UP), jer se njihova pobeda činila gotovo izvesnom (Benoit & Hayden, 2004: 396-427; Millard, 2010: 98). Svoju pivotalnu poziciju u izbornoj reformi, Izborna akcija „Solidarnost” posebno je aktuelizovala nakon predsedničkih izbora 2000. godine, koji su se pokazali „kataklizmatičnim po AWS”, istovremeno „napravivši pustoš i u Uniji slobode (UW)” (Birch et al, 2002: 44). S obzirom na to da je pobjedu na predsedničkim izborima ostvario kandidat leve alijanse Aleksandar Kvašnjevski, prokrčivši put toj koaliciji i za trijumf na predstojećem glasanju za oba doma skupštine, Izborna akcija „Solidarnost” izdejstvovala je da, najpre vanredna parlamentarna komisija, a zatim i Sejm usvoje novi izborni zakon, čija suština je bilo povećanje magnituda okruga, ukidanje nacionalne zatvorene blokirane liste i vraćanje Sen Lagijeve formule za raspodelu mandata. Zakon je izglasan u izbornoj godini, implementirajući odredbe za koje se smatra da „favorizuju stranke srednje veličine” (Birch et al, 2002: 44). Ukidanjem drugog nivoa raspodele mandata i smanjivanjem broja izbornih jedinica sa 52 na 41, značajno je uvećana prosečna magnituda okruga (sa 8,85 na 11,22), što je uz zadržavanje pragova od pet odsto za partije i osam odsto za koalicije, omogućavalo veću proporcionalnost i pravedniju alokaciju mandata. Na to ukazuje i niža vrednost Galagerovog indeksa disproporcionalnosti u odnosu na 1997. godinu - 6,32. Efektivni broj elektivnih partija bio je za nijansu niži nego u prethodnom izbornom ciklusu (4,50). Novi dizajn izbornih jedinica i inkluzivnija Sen Lagijeva formula sprečili su koaliciju Demokratske leve alijanse i Radničke unije (SLD-UP) da osvoji apsolutnu većinu mandata, ali nisu onemogućili formiranje levičarske vlade.

Međupartijska efikasnost sistema otvorenih lista u Poljskoj

Elektoralni model potpuno otvorenih lista u Poljskoj, inistitucionalizovan 2001. godine, do danas je ostao gotovo nepromenjen. Jedino je Sen Lagijeva formula raspodele mandata zamenjena Dontovom, pred parlamentarne izbore 2005. Prvenstveno zahvaljujući ukрупnjavanju izbornih okruga i povećanju njihovih magnituda, Šugartov indeks međupartijske efikasnosti u periodu od 2001. do 2019. godine, povoljniji je nego u poslednjoj dekadi 20. veka. Analizirajući šest izbornih ciklusa u pomenutih 18 godina, računica pokazuje da je poljski sistem potpuno otvorenih li-

sta gotovo efikasan, sa vrednošću indeksa međupartijske efikasnosti od -0,11 (Tabela 1.). Uz solidan nivo unutarpartijske efikasnosti, o čemu će biti reči u narednom odeljku, aktuelni poljski elektoralni model spada u red najefikasnijih proporcionalnih modela u Evropi, iako je u praktičnoj primeni svega dve decenije.

Tabela 1: Međupartijska efikasnost izbornog sistema Poljske na izborima za Sejm između 2001. i 2019. godine

Godina održavanja izbora	Pre - election identifiability (ID)	Majority approximation (MA)	Electoral linkage (L)	Plurality enhancing (P)	Einter (E)
2001.	0,50	0,94	0,72	0,12	-0,16
2005.	0	0,68	0,34	0,14	-0,52
2007.	0,75	0,90	0,83	0,06	-0,11
2011.	0,75	0,90	0,83	0,12	-0,05
2015.	0,75	1,02	0,89	0,26	+0,15
2019.	0,75	1,02	0,89	0,14	+0,03
Srednja vrednost	0,58	0,91	0,75	0,14	-0,11

„Hibridni izborni sistem“ (Passarelli, 2020: 106), koji je na glasanjima 1991, 1993. i 1997. godine pored otvorenih, podrazumevao i zatvorene blokirane liste na nacionalnom nivou, s druge strane, bio je hiperreprezentativan, sa srednjom vrednošću indeksa međupartijske efikasnosti od -0,42 (Tabela 2.). I to pre svega usled disproporcionalnosti uzrokovane većim brojem izbornih jedinica (52), ali i pretežno neprepoznatljive predizborne ponude, kada su u pitanju moguće opcije za formiranje nove vlade. Sasvim drugačija politička klima vladala je na izborima u 21. veku, budući da je u svim ciklusima, osim glasanja 2005. godine, bilo lako predvideti koji bi od blokova, u slučaju pobede, mogao okupiti poslaničku većinu u Sejmu. Dok je 2001. godine bilo uočljivo postojanje dva korpusa podeljena na ideološkoj ravni levo - desno, od kojih je koalicija Demokratske leve alijanse i Radničke unije (*SLD-UP*) bila potpuno profilisana prema biračima, a na drugoj strani nalazile su se sve ostale relevantne partije, dotle su se na izborima 2007, 2011, 2015 i 2019. godine za vlast borile Građanska platforma (*PO*), čiji je utemeljivač Donald Tusk i desničarsko-populistička partija „Pravo i pravda“ (*PiS*), dugogodišnjeg lidera Jaroslava Kačinjskog.

Tabela 2: Međupartijska efikasnost izbornog sistema Poljske na izborima za Sejm od 1991. do 1997. godine

Godina održavanja izbora	Pre - election identifiability (ID)	Majority approximation (MA)	Electoral linkage (L)	Plurality enhancing (P)	Einter (E)
1991.	0	0,26	0,13	0,02	-0,85
1993.	0	0,74	0,37	0,34	-0,29
1997.	0,50	0,88	0,69	0,20	-0,11
Srednja vrednost	0,17	0,63	0,40	0,18	-0,42

Na bolju funkcionalnost sistema otvorenih lista u odnosu na pređašnji, ukazuju i preostali indikatori međupartijske efikasnosti, pre svih efektivni broj elektivnih partija i Galagerov indeks disproporcionalnosti (Tabela 3.). Efektivni broj elektivnih partija (ENEP) više je nego dvostruko niži u odnosu na period pre 2001. godine, a slično je i sa Galagerovim indeksom disproporcionalnosti (LSq index).

Tabela 3: Efektivni broj elektivnih partija (ENEP) i Galagerov indeks disproporcionalnosti na izborima za Sejm od 1991. do 2019.

„Hibridni sistem“ (1991-1997)

Godina	ENEP	LSq index
1991.	12,98	3,58
1993.	9,87	17,80
1997.	4,59	10,64
Prosečno	9,15	10,67

Otvorene liste (2001-2019)

Godina	ENEP	LSq index
2001.	4,50	6,32
2005.	5,86	6,96
2007.	3,32	4,67
2011.	3,74	5,94
2015.	4,45	12,55
2019.	3,41	6,46
Prosečno	4,21	7,15

U Poljskoj, kao i u svim ostalim državama sa demokratskim porecima, postoji snažna međuzavisnost partijskog i izbornog sistema. Dok je na početku tranzicije bila izražena volatilnost partijske scene (McMenamin & Gwiazda, 2011) i elektoralni model pokazivao je znake nefunkcionalnosti, determinišući fragmentiran parlament, pojavu „fleš stranaka“ i nepredvidive vlade. Umereni višepartizam, utemeljen na prelazu vekova, aktuelan je i danas, a nešto više od decenije na vlasti se smenjuju Građanska platforma i partija „Pravo i pravda“. Ukрупnjavanje partijskog sistema (Gwiazda, 2009) praćeno je stabilizacijom izbornih institucija, povećanjem njihove međupartijske i, kao što ćemo u narednom odeljku videti, unutarpartijske efikasnosti.

Efekti otvorenih lista na partije, kandidate i birače

Aktuelni poljski elektoralni model, zajedno sa preostala dva sistema tzv. „kvazi lista“ u svetu (Finska, Čile), spada u red umereno kandidatocentričnih, sa vrednošću indeksa unutarpartijske efikasnosti od -0,43 (Shugart, 2001: 25-51). Srednja veličina izborne jedinice u Poljskoj (11,22), barem teoretski, pruža dovoljno prostora za isticanje individualnih karakteristika pretendena za mesta u Sejmu i vođenje ličnih kampanja, tim pre jer je davanje jedne preference obavezno, a ukupni rezultat liste je zbir glasova koje su osvojili pojedinačni kandidati. Ipak, da bi izborni sistem Poljske do kraja bio efikasan, neophodna je dodatna demokratizacija unutarstranačkih procedura prilikom odabira kandidata. Jer, prema mišljenju pojedinih autora, poljske partije nastale su relativno kasno, preskočivši većinu faza razvoja, kroz koje su prolazile stranke u demokratijama zapadnoevropskog tipa. Otuda su političke elite u postkomunističkoj Poljskoj imale „mnogo manje mogućnosti i podsticaja da razvijaju moderne partije sa masovnim članstvom“ već im je bilo „lakše i efikasnije uspostaviti postmoderne, personalizovane stranke“ (Bucur & McMennamin, 2015: 123). Stepen prezidencijalizacije partije u najvećem određuje i način odabira kandidata prilikom sastavljanja izbornih lista.

Sokolovski navodi da mahom sve relevantne stranke, izuzev Poljske narodne partije (*PSL*), koriste „ekskluzivne metode“ selekcije poslaničkih kandidata za Sejm. „Poljska narodna partija je jedina stranka u kojoj regionalni predstavnici igraju glavnu ulogu u procesu kandidovanja“, dok „nacionalna izborna konvencija samo formalno potvrđuje liste“ (Sokolowski, 2012: 464). Kod velikih igrača mnogo je veći uticaj partijskih oligarhija na konačan redosled kandidata. U najvećoj partiji „Pravo i pravda“ (*PiS*) finalnu odluku donosi Politički komitet, centralni izvršni organ stranke, koji je pod velikim uticajem predsednika stranke. U Građanskoj platformi (*PO*), uloga uticajnih lokalnih moćnika, tzv. „partijskih barona“, mnogo je veća. Tamo je proces nominacije „pre konglomerat različitih regionalnih interesa i partijskih frakcija“, nego centralizovana odluka“, a uloga predsednika je da izmiri i uravnoteži sve grupacije (Sokolowski, 2012: 464-465). Slično desno-populističkoj partiji „Pravo i pravda“ i u Novoj levlci, nastaloj 2020. godine iz Demokratske leve alijanse (*SLD*), ključnu ulogu u selekciji kandidata imaju centralni izvršni organ i partijski lider.

Iako u Poljskoj redosled izbora u parlament određuju isključivo preferencijalni glasovi, pokazalo se da, pre svega od poretka kandidata na glasačkom listiću, zavisi ko će zauzeti mesta u Sejmu. Pojedina istraživanja pokazuju da je u četiri izborna ciklusa od 2011. do 2015. godine, približno 20 odsto kandidata osvojilo mandat sa pozicija sa kojih ne bi ušli u Sejm da su u upotrebi bile zatvorene blokirane liste (Gendzwill & Raciborski, 2014: 47-69). Zapravo, „kandidati postavljeni blizu vrha glasačkog listića privlače više glasova od onih postavljenih niže na li-

sti" (Marcinkiewicz, 2014: 322-334). Na parlamentarnim izborima 2007. godine, na primer, šanse kandidata da dođu do mesta u Sejmu, ako su se nalazili na čelu izborne liste iznosile su 47 odsto, a ako su bili poziciju niže 32 odsto. Izgledi preostalih kandidata zatim eksponencijalno padaju, pa tako pozicionirani oko sredine liste imaju verovatnoću od 1,6 odsto da dođu do mandata, dok oni iz donje četvrtine skoro i nemaju čemu da se nadaju, sa 0,9 procenata šansi (Stegmaier, Marcinkiewicz & Jankowski, 2016: 893). Na delu je fenomen „elitizacije lista" (Dodeigne & Pilet, 2019: 1-12).

Analizirajući rezultate poslednjih parlamentarnih izbora od 13. oktobra 2019. godine, dolazimo do sličnih pokazatelja. Ukupno 78 od 460 poslanika Sejma, ili skoro 17 odsto, osvojilo je mandat sa pozicija koje bi bile neprolazne u sistemu zatvorenih blokiranih lista. Takav skor neznatno je niži nego za period od 2001. do 2011. godine i pokazuje stabilan trend međusobnog uticaja preferencijalnih glasova i pozicija kandidata na listama. Pored toga, zahvaljujući bazi podataka sa izbora 2019. godine, moguće je izvesti još nekoliko zaključaka, na koje ukazuje poljski model kvazi lista, u kome je davanje preferencijalnog glasa obavezno.

Prvo, fenomen „elitizacije lista" najmanje je izražen kod pobednika izbora, partije „Pravo i pravda", a kasnije raste kako pada broj mesta koja su osvojile stranke na izborima. Naime, u partiji „Pravo i pravda" tačno 20 odsto izabranih poslanika osvojilo je mandat sa pozicija koje bi bile neprolazne u sistemu fiksiranih lista, u drugoplasiranoj Građanskoj koaliciji neznatno manje (17 odsto), a u levoj koaliciji 14 procenata. U četvrtoplasiranoj Poljskoj koaliciji, koju su sačinjavale manje stranke, okupljene oko Poljske narodne partije, samo jedan poslanik uspeo je da dođe do mandata sa pozicije koja nije liderska, dok su u Konfederaciji slobode i nezavisnosti svih 11 izabranih poslanika ujedno bili nosioci lista u svojim izbornim jedinicama.

Drugo, poslanici su sa uslovno neprolaznih mesta, u najvećoj meri, dolazili do mandata u izbornim jedinicama magnitude 12 (Legnica, Bido-gość, Helm, Zijelona Gora, Sieradz, Siedlce, Varšava 2, Opole, Gdanjsk, Katovice 2, Kaliž i Šćećin). **Treće**, za ulazak u Sejm na izborima 2019. godine, u proseku je bilo potrebno osvojiti 5,64 odsto od ukupnog broja glasova u izornoj jedinici. Najteže je bilo doći do mandata u najmanjem okrugu Čestohova (magnituda 7), gde je prosek osvojenih glasova izabranih poslanika gotovo osam odsto, a znatno lakše u petnaestomandatnom Ržešovu, sa 3,5 odsto glasova. Razlog je logičan. Sužen izbor kandidata u manjim izbornim jedinicama dovodi do koncentracije glasova i povećanja granice neophodne za ulazak u Sejm, dok je u velikim elektoralnim okruzima mehanizam delovanja otvorenih lista suprotan. Tako je u najvećoj izornoj jedinici Varšava 1, u kojoj se biralo 20 poslanika, kandidatkinji Joani Fabisjak iz Građanske koalicije bilo potrebno svega 0,39 odsto glasova za mesto u donjem domu. Dakle, na primeru Poljske još jednom je moguće potvrditi ranije iznetu pretpostavku da se stepen personalizacije izbornog sistema povećava sa smanjivanjem magnitude izborne jedinice.

Četvrto, slično kao i kod fleksibilnih lista, partije su formirale izbornu ponudu sugerišući predloženim poretkom i redosled izbora kandidata u Sejm. Na čeonim pozicijama u izbornim jedinicama nalazili su se mahom partijski lideri, sadašnji i bivši premijeri i ministri, poslanici sa iskustvom i regionalni „stranački baroni”. Posao srednjim partijskim ešelonima dodatno otežava pravilo po kome stranke mogu da predlože dvostruko više kandidata nego što se bira poslanika u izornoj jedinici. Na taj način, dodatnim razvodnjavanjem preferencijalnih glasova na više slabijih kandidata, uvećavaju se šanse miljenicima partijskih oligarhija sa vrhova lista, za koje se inače češće glasa, kako pokazuju poljska iskustva za dve decenije funkcionisanja čistog sistema otvorenih lista.

Uprkos nedostacima, empirijski podaci ukazuju da je važeći izborni sistem Poljske u velikoj meri efikasan i na unutarpartijskoj i na međupartijskoj ravni. Na taj način, u ovom trenutku, isključeni su inherentni faktori za potencijalnu izbornu reformu modela otvorenih lista proporcionalne reprezentacije, iako je, kao što ćemo videti u narednog odeljku, bilo više različitih predloga. Takođe, nije bilo ni kontingentnih faktora, u vidu dramatičnih događaja okidača, koji bi otvorili kritične raskrsnice institucionalnih promena. Prema indeksu političke stabilnosti organizacije „*The Global Economy*”, za period od 1996. do 2019. godine, Poljska spada u red stabilnih država. Pomenuta država nalazi se u gornjoj trećini (65. mesto), u konkurenciji 194 svetske države, sa indeksom političke stabilnosti od 0,52¹.

Zaključak

Posmatrajući poslednje održane parlamentarne izbore u državama sa otvorenim listama proporcionalne reprezentacije, Poljska prednjači, kada je u pitanju ukupna efikasnost pomenutih elektoralnih sistema. S obzirom na to da je indeks unutarpartijske efikasnosti, prema Šugartovim kriterijumima, identičan (-0,43) u svih sedam država (Grčka, Kipar, Letonija, Poljska, San Marino, Slovenija, Finska), diferencija izbornih sistema uočljiva je na međupartijskoj dimenziji. Tu je poljski model gotovo u potpunosti efikasan (+0,03), za razliku od izrazito hiperreprezentativnih sistema Letonije (-0,80) i Slovenije (-0,59) i nešto efikasnijih, ali i dalje i hiperreprezentativnih elektoralnih institucija na Kipru (-0,41) i Finskoj (-0,38). Jedino su u Grčkoj (+0,17) i u San Marinu (-0,25) izborni sistemi na granici reprezentativnosti, ali su skorovi međupartijske efikasnosti lošiji nego u Poljskoj. Čini se da su odnos između veličine parlamenta, broja izbornih jedinica i njihovih magnituda, kao i nacionalni pragovi za pojedinačne partije i koalicije, uspostavili najbolji balans između brojnosti političkih aktera, predvidivosti njihovog postizbornog ponašanja i proporcionalnosti sistema, što u konačnom opredeljuje koliko je neki model efikasan na međupartijskoj ravni.

[1] Види на: https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/.

Kao što je poznato, instituti primarnih izbora, tek su sporadična pojava u evropskim demokratijama. Konačan izgled partijskih kandidacionih lista u najvećem broju slučajeva odluka je centralnih stranačkih organa, u kojima pravo glasa ima ograničen broj najviših funkcionera. U tom smislu ni Poljska nije izuzetak. Videli smo da u pogledu procesa kandidovanja relevantne poljske partije laviraju između različitog stepena prezidencijalizacije, kod većine parlamentarnih aktera (Bucur & McMennamin, 2015; 107-123), i „visoko autoritarnog stila upravljanja“, što je slučaj kod partije „Pravo i pravda“ (Hloušek, 2015: 277-299). Deficit unutarpartijske demokratije i slab uticaj stranačkih baza na konačan izgled lista udaljavaju poljske elektoralne institucije od potpune efikasnosti. I to je manjkavost ne samo postkomunističkih država u srcu, na istoku i jugoistoku Evrope, nego i pojedinih zemalja sa dužom demokratskom tradicijom. Elite nisu spremne da se upuste u riskantan eksperiment pune unutarstranačke demokratije.

Poljska je interesantna za psefološka proučavanja i iz ugla nastanka i razvoja izbornih institucija. Dok je za prvu deceniju nakon pada komunizma, koju su obeležili nestrukturirana partijska scena i pokušaji njene konsolidacije, evidentno da prati zakonitosti pravca racionalnog izbora, dotle je kasniji period objašnjiv pristupom istorijskog institucionalizma. Ne može se reći da u vremenu iza 2001. godine nije bilo partijskih inicijativa za izmenu izbornog zakonodavstva, u cilju maksimalizacije mandata ili moći pojedinih aktera, ali za razliku od poslednje decenije 20. veka, nije bilo dovoljnih podsticaja u vidu sinergije inherentnih i kontingentnih faktora reformi. Izborni sistem Poljske je u poslednje dve decenije manje-više efikasan, a istovremeno izostao je učinak egzogenih šokova, koji otvaraju kritične raskrsnice, kratke vremenske okvire za nastanak novih institucija.

EFFECTS OF OPEN LISTS PR ON THE ELECTIONS FOR THE POLISH SEJM 2001-2019.

Abstract



Poland today, along with Finland, applies the best model of the open-list proportional (PR) electoral system in Europe. Not only the order of election of deputies in the parliament is conditioned only by the number of preference votes gained by the individual candidates for a seat in the Sejm but also the voters are required to cast a preference vote on the ballot paper for a single candidate from the party list they are giving preference over the others. The purpose of this article is to respond to the question about what type of incentives such electoral model can offer to the key stakeholders - candidates, elected deputies, and party leaders as well as political parties as a whole. Before that, we are giving a short overview of the evolution of the electoral institutions in Poland in pre-World war II period, during communist era and the 1990s in order to have better understanding of the entire history of the electoral rights in this Central European country and the context of the current system.

Keywords



open lists, proportional representation, efficiency of electoral institutions, electoral reforms.

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Engagement without Recognition: The Relationship between Sarajevo and Pristina

Abstract



Twelve years since Serbian southern province of Kosovo and Metohija (thereafter Kosovo) unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a body in charge of conducting Bosnia and Herzegovina's foreign policy, considered recognizing Kosovo. The central argument suggests that the lack of recognition does not prevent Sarajevo and Pristina from engaging, particularly at the regional level. The article analyses how polarized political scene is in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the issues of recognition of Kosovo and what are the limitations to these relations from advancing. It will be argued that the internal political dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina play a decisive role in shaping Sarajevo's relationship with Pristina. By relying on the state recognition theory, the article aims to analyse bilateral and multilateral elements of diplomatic engagement without recognition. It will be argued that the key element of interaction between the two is the lack of a formally shaped intent on the Bosnian side to recognize Kosovo as an independent state.

Key words



engagement without recognition, state recognition, Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo

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Introduction

Twelve years since Serbian southern province of Kosovo and Metohija (thereafter Kosovo*¹) unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a body in charge of conducting Bosnia and Herzegovina's foreign policy, considered recognizing Kosovo. The internal political dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina play a decisive role in shaping Sarajevo's position on Kosovo's self-declared independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina thus belongs to the club of non-recognizers with a strict visa regime with Kosovo and *vice versa*, visas are required for Bosnians to enter Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina issues visas to Kosovars only on a separate sheet of paper, as it does not recognize any Kosovo document. In a nutshell, from Sarajevo perspective Kosovo is perceived as a part of Serbia.

On the other hand, internal disputes in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the recognition issue were, at least formally, put under the carpet up until the summer of 2020 and the Washington deal on economic normalization between Belgrade and Pristina.

In Washington, Serbia agreed to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which triggered the Serb Member of the tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik, to initiate the same – Bosnia and Herzegovina to relocate its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Reacting to Dodik's proposal, the Croat Member of the Presidency, Željko Komšić, obviously discontented with Dodik's initiative, requested a special session of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina with one item on the agenda – the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. After the first round of voting, divergent positions of the three members of the Presidency were noticed. While Bosniak Member, Šefik Džaferović, and

[1] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

Croat Member, Komšić, voted in favour of recognition; the Serb Member, Dodik, voted against it. As the three members of the Presidency failed to find a common ground, the item was tabled again. In the second and final voting, with Džaferović and Komšić not voting and Dodik's no, Bosnia and Herzegovina for the first time formally confirmed its non-recognition policy towards Kosovo.

A fundamental reason behind the decision of five European Union (EU) Member States, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus, not to recognize Kosovo are internal issues, primarily centrifugal tendencies of some of their regions, which have the potential to deteriorate if a central government decides to recognize Kosovo. Although centrifugal tendencies also occupy significant public attention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reason for insisting on non-recognition policy is the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina disapproval of treating Kosovo as an independent state and insisting on Kosovo being treated as a southern province of Serbia. Kosovo and Metohija has been considered as the cradle of Serbdom and hence any political decision contrary to the Belgrade one would have a negative effect on both relations with Serbia's capital and local electorate which take this issue very sentimentally. While the Bosniak and Croat political elites have nothing to lose if Bosnia and Herzegovina eventually recognizes Kosovo, the Serb ruling but also opposition parties, providing they favour recognition, would lose significant political credit and most probably will not be able to recover. The 'traitor' label will hunt them forever. On the contrary, a pro-recognition policy from the Bosniak and Croat political elites' point of view is justified by the fact that the majority of EU Member States and regional influencers, such as Croatia and Turkey, have recognized Kosovo's statehood. To sum up, the Bosniaks and the Croats have no obstacles to the recognition of Kosovo whereas in the eyes of the Serbs it would represent a betrayal of Serb national interests. Noteworthy, on important foreign policy matters, such as recognition of Kosovo, a unanimous position of all three members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a prerequisite for any decision to take effect.

Having such context in mind, the aim of this article is to examine the extent of diplomatic interaction between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo despite the fact that one side rejects to recognize the other as independent. The article finds no issue with Kosovo recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina whatsoever as Kosovo seeks to be recognized and admitted to the independent states' club not *vice versa*. As for the time frame, the article covers period from 2008, when Kosovo recognition emerged as a subject of discussion internationally, until the attempt of the official Sarajevo to discuss the matter of the recognition of Pristina.

The central argument suggests that the lack of recognition does not prevent Sarajevo and Pristina from engaging on a regular basis, particularly at the regional level. By examining the official positions and moves of bearers of the highest-level functions in charge of foreign policy in the

two, the article is divided into several chapters. The article will first provide a brief overview of the state recognition theory. The following chapter focuses on the case study through twofold analysis: first, an analysis of bilateral exchange that although existent does not lead to formal recognition; and second, an analysis of the engagement of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo at the multilateral and regional level. Finally, the concluding remarks will provide an analysis of the trend and explain what are the limitations to further deepening of diplomatic engagement without recognition between Sarajevo and Pristina.

Theory of State Recognition

A 'territorial entity' in order to be recognized by other states as 'a state it must be a state' (Radan, 2020: 49). It has to reassure other states that it can effectively join their club and hence enjoy the stemming rights and obligations. According to Bartmann (2004:12-13) the issue of inclusiveness and acceptance of would-be states as 'normal states' in the global system was triggered by the two processes - decolonization and the collapse of communism including the wars of succession in Yugoslavia. In this article, recognition is understood as:

(...) the way for the conduct of diplomatic relations, recognition of passports, recognition of a nation's consular protection of its citizens, trading in a national currency, trading in state assets and debts, acceptance of state guarantees, the possibility of concluding binding inter-state agreements, the possibility of becoming party to inter-state conventions, of taking a seat in the United Nations, and of acceding to other inter-state organizations (...) (Bailes, 2015: 253).

The theory of international relations identifies two traditional approaches of state recognition - the constitutive and the declarative. The constitutive doctrine suggests that a state becomes a subject of international law 'when a state is recognized by other states that belong to the international community' (Geis et al., 2015: 10). The constitutive conception of state recognition was best summarized by Lassa Oppenheim: 'A state is, and becomes, an International Person through recognition only and exclusively' (Grant, 1999: 2). According to the constitutive theory, it is an arbitrary and independent decision of a state to recognize another state as a state without being bound to some criteria. Following this logic, recognition is an 'additional requirement of statehood' (Dugard and Raič, 2006: 97). In contrast to the constitutivists, 'declarativists characterized recognition as an acknowledgment of statehood already achieved' (Grant, 1999: 4). According to the declarative theory, the argument of effectiveness prevails and, in the absence of internationally recognized set of requirements, it entails an obligation of a to-be-state to meet the criteria of statehood as enshrined under the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Grant, 1999; Ker-Lindsay, 2015;

Nicholson and Grant, 2020). The Montevideo Convention pinpoints four qualifications which a state has to meet in order to be recognized as a person of international law: a) a permanent population; b) a clearly defined territory; c) an effective government; and d) a capacity to engage in international relations (Grant, 1999: 5). In other words, a state has to fulfil the 'credentials of statehood' that is to accomplish the 'functions of statehood' which can be seen as a 'measure of a state's 'survivability'' (Bartmann, 2004: 15).

The combination of two approaches, statehood and act of recognition, led to what Nicholson and Grant (2020: 29) called the 'hybrid approaches to recognition'. According to the first 'recognition and the criteria for statehood both play necessary roles in constituting statehood', whereas according to the second there are situations in which 'the criteria suffice on their own but, in particular circumstances, recognition may also suffice' (Nicholson and Grant, 2020: 29). The former acknowledges the significance of criteria but also requires some kind of an '*authoritative certification*' (Paul Guggenheim, 1953 cited in Nicholson and Grant, 2020: 29). The latter deals with the situation in which recognition represents a 'legal obligation' for the states that failed to meet the criteria (Nicholson and Grant, 2020: 31).

Other scholars offered other thoughts on state recognition. Wendt (2003) introduced the concept of 'thin' and 'thick' recognition. While thin recognition is about being 'acknowledged as an independent subject within a community of law' and having 'the judicial status of a sovereign person', the thick recognition, on the other hand, is about being respected for its particular difference (Wendt, 2003: 511-2). In other words, as Allan and Keller suggest a thick recognition means that 'each party needs to understand the Other in terms of essential elements composing its identity' (Geis et al., 2015: 13). Further, Caspersen (2012: 15) differentiates internal and external recognition where the latter is understood as an international recognition.

The method of recognition may be either unilateral (bilateral) or collective (Dugard and Raić, 2006; Ker-Lindsay, 2015; Radan, 2020). Further, bilateral may take form of either 'explicit' or 'implied recognition' (Ker-Lindsay, 2015: 272). Ker-Lindsay (2015: 275) argues that 'the most usual form of recognition is for a state to indicate its decision directly through a bilateral process' and it could do so, for instance, through issuing an official statement notifying another state of its decision. On the contrary, implied recognition indicates that one state treats another as an independent but without formal notification (Ker-Lindsay, 2015: 272). In conclusion, an act of recognition is a 'discretionary judgment' of a state that includes a wide range of considerations from legal and political, to moral, economic and security considerations (Fabry, 2013: 166).

While both traditional theories take recognition as a unilateral act of states, with the EU Member States wishing to act unanimously on foreign policy matters including the recognition requests, a collective rec-

ognition received particular attention. Most notable methods of 'direct collective recognition' (Ker-Lindsay, 2015: 273) were the European Community's (EC) recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1992 and the EU's recognition of South Sudan in 2011, which rendered the individual Member States' statements of recognition unnecessary. By way of contrast, in the case of Kosovo a joint statement 'signalled that there was no uniform opinion' of the EU and that Member States had to reach out decision individually (Ker-Lindsay, 2015: 274). Moreover, the EC, building on the declarative theory of state recognition, went out with a catalogue of additional requirements for recognition in response to Yugoslav republics' request for recognition. The EC Guidelines on Recognition stipulated that recognition would only be granted if a republic, *inter alia*, endorses the UN Charter, the OSCE Helsinki Final Act and guarantees the rights of ethnic and national minorities (Radan, 2020: 52). By applying these guidelines, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized by the EC in 1992.

The second method of collective recognition is an 'indirect collective recognition' which entails a situation when a territory with statehood aspiration is 'admitted into an organisation that is composed of states' (Ker-Lindsay, 2015: 274). On the other hand, '[a]dmission to the UN, although an important step towards achieving international recognition, does not, of itself, amount to recognition by any of its member states' (Radan, 2020: 56). Notwithstanding, the membership in the UN used to be a requirement to enter other international organisation like the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). As Radan (2020: 56) pointed out the UEFA in order to admit Kosovo had to change a part of its Statute that implied that only a state which has been recognized by the UN as independent might be admitted to this international football association. As a reminder, a UN door for Kosovo has remained closed.

This article finds a combination of two traditional approaches more appropriate for the discussion to follow. Meeting only the effectiveness criteria does not immediately imply the admittance to the club of independent and recognized states. It should be rather seen as a first step towards the completion of statehood request. The entire process is encircled once the other actors in the international arena green-light a new actor's membership bid. According to Fabry (2013: 165) '[a]n entity has the status of a 'state' internationally not only because it asserts so internally, but also because it is acknowledged as such externally'.

The significance of recognition is additionally proven by examining the case of Kosovo. Berg (2009: 231) rightly concludes that '[r]ecognition per se does not imply universal treatment of applicants'. At the first glance, Kosovo meets effectiveness criteria, but fails to get a wider international recognition. Caspersen (2015: 395-6) argues that 'Kosovo's recognition, in some ways, simply added to the confusion over state recognition that dominated the post-Cold War era' in a sense of the normative criteria applied and 'it further emphasized the importance of political considerations'. Furthermore, judging by the level of interaction coun-

tries (non)recognisers enjoy with Pristina administration, Ker-Lindsay and Ioannis Armakolas classify them into four categories, namely 'strong recognisers', 'weak recognisers', 'soft non-recognisers' and 'hard non-recognisers' (Ker-Lindsay, Armakolas, 2020: 3). Ker-Lindsay and Armakolas (2020: 3) justify their typology by claiming that '[e]ven amongst 'hard non-recognisers' there is a degree of pragmatism between those that do not recognise and actively try to prevent Kosovo from integrating into the wider international community, and those that oppose recognition and have little engagement, but are not trying to lobby against Kosovo.' The two authors (2020: 3) therefore conclude that 'while recognition is certainly a binary choice, the ways states actually interact with Kosovo tell a very different and far more interesting and nuanced story than recognition alone.'

It can be argued that recognition, nowadays, represents 'a political decision that does not, by definition, universally and impartially attribute sovereignty to all actors equally and on the same merits' (Berg, 2009: 221). The following chapter aims to analyse diplomatic engagement of Sarajevo and Pristina, which although occasionally on the verge of recognition does not amount to recognition.

Engagement without Recognition: The Case Study

Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, an act which divided not only world powers but also Balkan countries. The insistence that Kosovo's self-declared independence was 'a "unique case" whose recognition did not set a precedent reinforced the dominance of politics over international law, specifically great-power politics' (Caspersen, 2015: 397). Soon after the Kosovo Parliament adopted the Declaration of Independence, Albania, Turkey, Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria recognized Kosovo. In October 2008, North Macedonia and Montenegro reached a decision to recognize Kosovo's statehood.² Romania, Greece and Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained a non-recognition policy throughout. As per usual diplomatic practice, countries recognizers established direct diplomatic relations with Pristina and exchanged ambassadors. Other countries, non-recognizers, also established some kind of diplomatic presence in Kosovo. For instance, through opening a liaison office as Athens and Bucharest.

Despite its tough non-recognition position, Sarajevo engages with Pristina at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Pristina benefits from such engagement, as from the Pristina perspective, it is a waiting room for recognition in full sense. For Sarajevo, engagement is a way to move things forward without tackling the recognition issue. However, as

[2] A list of states that recognized Kosovo with a date of sending notification is available at the website 'Kosovo Thanks You' which keeps the record of all new developments regarding the international recognition of Kosovo - <https://www.kosovothanksyou.com/>.

Caspersen (2015: 407) argues '[e]ngagement may be pursued, but it is a poor substitute and such a policy will be subject to significant pressures.'

This article finds particularly valuable an elaboration of diplomatic engagement with 'contested states'³ as put forward by Ker-Lindsay (2015). It can be argued that engagement without recognition can take bilateral and multilateral form alike. Following the Ker-Lindsay's (2015: 276-82) analysis, this article groups five sub-forms under the bilateral form of engagement without recognition: a) the interaction between officials, an area with 'high degree of latitude'; b) titulation and terminology used at these meetings; c) the venue of meetings indicative of statehood; d) establishment of a permanent diplomatic mission in an unrecognized state; and e) the presence of officials at ceremonies indicative of statehood. Additionally, the article finds it important to analyse the statements of officials in charge of creating foreign policy, which touch upon the recognition issue. Furthermore, diplomatic engagement without recognition in multilateral context concerns the interaction of officials at 'external multilateral events' as such meetings/ summits are generally 'understood to be indicative of statehood' (Ker-Lindsay, 2015: 282). Participation in such meetings at multilateral and regional scenes could be 'construed as recognition' or an 'unacceptable degree of legitimation' (Ker-Lindsay, 2015: 282).

Bilateral Engagement

The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 'the only constitutionally entrusted institution for designing foreign policy and spearheading foreign affairs' while the role of the Ministry of Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to execute 'the policies brought by the Presidency in the domain of foreign affairs, mainly through sustaining a diplomatic network' (Hasić, Karabegović, 2019: 10). When it comes to statements of those officials in charge of creating the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina two trends have been noticed. The first wave of statements following Kosovo's declaration of independence showed a consensus among all three members of the Presidency – a declarative non-recognition position was taken. A fierce reaction of the Serb politicians who claimed that the same opportunity should be given to the Republic of Srpska as it was given to Kosovo and that the double standards have been applied contributed to the Bosniak and Croat Members of the Presidency somewhat calming statements which primarily aimed to stress that the status of Kosovo has nothing to do with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and then that Bosnia and Herzegovina will not recognize Kosovo.

[3] The contestation can refer as Ker-Lindsay (2015, 268) puts it to 'their status on the international stage or to whether they are states at all.' As an example of a contested state Ker-Lindsay uses, among others, Kosovo.

Reacting to Kosovo's independence declaration, the then-Chairman and the Croat Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Željko Komšić, in an official press release underlined that Bosnia and Herzegovina would not recognize the independence of Kosovo in the forthcoming period, as there was no consensus on the matter within the Presidency; furthermore, Komšić stressed that a fact that one third of population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. Republic of Srpska) disagrees with Kosovo secession represents an obligation of elected officials to respect it (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008a). At that time the Bosniak Member of the Presidency, Haris Silajdžić, stated that Kosovo's declaration of independence had no effect on Bosnia and Herzegovina and underlined that the change of the status of Kosovo would not endanger the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2008b). The then-SDA (the Party of Democratic Action) President Sulejman Tihić, probably the most influential politician in Bosnia and Herzegovina in those times, stated that:

Bosnia and Herzegovina should not rush to recognize the independence of Kosovo and will probably be the last country to recognize Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot recognize Kosovo until an internal consensus is reached among all peoples. It is a process that will be related to EU membership (Čubro, 2008).

The major Croat parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HDZ (the Croat Democratic Union) of Bosnia and Herzegovina and HDZ 1990 took a balanced stance stressing that the act of Kosovo Parliament should not destabilize political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the recognition of Kosovo should be carefully approached having in mind stances of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Čubro, 2008). On the other hand, Serb officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately and vociferously rejected the one-sided declaration of the independence of Kosovo. The National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska adopted the 'Resolution on non-recognition of the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo and Metohija and the commitments of the Republic of Srpska' on 22 February 2008 (National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska, 2008). The Resolution (2008) called on all representatives of the Republic of Srpska in the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from recognizing Kosovo. The Resolution (2008) also touched upon the status of Srpska and stressed that if the majority of EU and United Nations (UN) Member States recognize Kosovo, the Republic of Srpska will decide about its future status via referendum. Ever since Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, the Serb officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina more loudly drew parallels between the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo.

The first trend was also manifested with occasional disagreements within the Presidency when Kosovo was in question. In 2011, the troika in the Presidency failed to agree on the final text of Bosnia and Herzegovina's address at the UN Security Council debate on the UN Mis-

sion in Kosovo (UNMIK). According to the then-Serb Member Nebojša Radmanović, the other two members, Komšić and Bakir Izetbegović, did not support a line which aimed to emphasize Bosnia and Herzegovina's support to territorial integrity of Serbia (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011). Similarly, during Mladen Ivanić mandate as the Serb Member of the Presidency (2014-2018), Ivanić would exclusively refer to Kosovo as a southern province of Serbia and not as an independent state (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017a).

The emergence of the second trend is linked with the session of the Presidency on the recognition of Kosovo's statehood of October 2020, which showed that the Bosniak and Croat Members have started officially to advocate recognition of Kosovo while the Serb Member maintained a strong non-recognition position. Couple of months ahead of the session, Komšić stated that 'Kosovo is a state. Done. That's the end of the story.' (Rose, 2020). A reason for the shift could be found in the fact that both the Bosniaks and Croats have nothing to lose if Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizes Kosovo primarily because the announced referendum on the status of Republic of Srpska, pinpointed in the Assembly's Resolution, has never been materialised despite the fact that the majority of EU Member States have recognized Kosovo. In addition, the advancement of the EU and United States (US) facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina made the Bosniak and Croat side think that Bosnia and Herzegovina should change its position regarding the status of Kosovo.

The fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina has not recognized Kosovo as an independent state did not prevent high officials of the two to interact bilaterally, the practice that has been established only recently. Following the session on the recognition of Kosovo independence, Kosovo Prime Minister (PM) Avdullah Hoti reached out to the Bosniak Member of the Presidency, Džaferović, and thanked Džaferović for his initiative to have Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize the Republic of Kosovo (Prime Minister Office, 2020). PM Hoti also urged Bosnia and Herzegovina to abolish visa requirements for Kosovo citizens and to exchange a liaison office (Prime Minister office, 2020). Bosniak Member Džaferović and the Kosovo PM Albin Kurti also interacted in their official capacity in May 2020 after Kosovo authorities' decision to abolish the 100 percent customs tariffs for goods imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020a). Džaferović, on this occasion, stressed that regardless of the fact the issue of the recognition of Kosovo has not been resolved, due to the lack of consensus about it in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary to improve economic cooperation and simplify procedures for free movement of people, goods, services and capital; The officials also agreed that it is unacceptable for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to have the most rigid relationship in the region (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2020a). By way of contrast, Dodik assessed these meetings as private talks and not official meetings

(Srna, 2020). For the time being, only Džaferović has bilaterally engaged with Kosovo officials.

On certain occasions Bosnian officials see no issue in using official titles for officials of a contested state, non-recognized by Bosnia and Herzegovina. On other occasions, but with no clear rule, Bosnia and Herzegovina uses terms which avoid legitimising Kosovo as an independent state. An official press release issued by the Presidency following the Džaferović-Kurti telephone meeting of May 2020 reads that the 'Chairman Šefik Džaferović spoke with Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti' (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020a). On the other hand, when the Serb Member of the Presidency, Dodik, was in position to interact with Kosovo officials he avoided any terminology indicative of Kosovo's statehood. The invitation of Dodik, in capacity of Chairman of the Presidency, to Hashim Thaçi not as the President of Republic of Kosovo but as a representative of Pristina resulted in Kosovo boycotting the Southeast Europe Cooperation Process Summit hosted by Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2019 (Beta, 2019). A few years back, in an official press release of the Presidency from 2013, the then-Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga was referred to as 'Atifete Jahjaga from Kosovo' avoiding thus mentioning Jahjaga's official capacity unlike in the case of other leaders from the region who participated in the meeting (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013). On the other hand, the release from 2017 reads that the then-Chairman of the Presidency Dragan Čović participated in the meeting also attended by the President of Kosovo Thaçi (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017b). Moreover, the release covering an informal Brussels's meeting of February 2020 stressed that the Croat Member Komšić participated the meeting with, among others, the President of Kosovo Thaçi (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2020b).

As for the venue of bilateral meetings, thus far only telephone meetings among the high level officials were held. Moreover, no bilateral visits have been paid by the officials in charge of foreign policy. An exception was an experts' level meeting initiated and hosted by Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2019, which aimed, although unsuccessfully, to make Kosovo to consider the abolition of discriminatory trade tariffs on goods originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fena, 2019).

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have not established any kind of diplomatic presence in their respective capitals neither Bosnia and Herzegovina officials attended ceremonies indicative of Kosovo's statehood. The initiative for exchanging liaison offices was put forward by Kosovo Parliament Bosniak minority representative Duda Balje, but was immediately refuted by the Serb officials rejecting any possibility of Pristina having diplomatic presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gazeta Express, 2020; RTRS, 2020).

In conclusion, this chapter showed the two trends, the initial non-recognition consensus within the Presidency which lasted from the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo in 2008 through 2020 when

the Bosniak and Croat Members of the Presidency have deviated from their previous, declarative non-recognition position and have started to openly favour the recognition of Kosovo by Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniak Member of the Presidency almost exclusively conducts bilateral interaction with Kosovo officials and does so via telephone conversation. The titulation and the usage of official titles for Kosovo officials appears not to be an issue for the Bosniak and Croat Members while the Serb Member sticks to avoiding any terminology, which might be taken as unacceptable legitimization of Pristina authorities. The fact that no bilateral visits have taken place and that there are no established permanent diplomatic missions clearly indicates that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are far from the engagement enjoyed by the entities that recognize each other.

Multilateral Engagement

As indicated above, even participating in the same international organisations could be treated as implied recognition simply through not vetoing the state's membership request. Since 2008, one of the main tasks of the Pristina administration was to assure international recognition through membership in the international organisations. It could be concluded that Pristina has been more successful in obtaining the membership status in regional than in international organisations. Pristina is not admitted in the UN, furthermore, Pristina has no seat in other important organisations in European continent such as the Council of Europe (CoE) or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). On the other hand, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are members of, *inter alia*, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Energy Community, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Pristina is much more visible in the regional organisations and initiatives. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo officials equally participate in the work of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 2006, the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO), the Western Balkans Fund, the Berlin and Brdo-Brioni Process.

Notwithstanding, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo participate in the work of the same organisations, Bosnia and Herzegovina voted against the Kosovo International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) November 2018 membership bid. On this occasion, Bosnia and Herzegovina aligned its position with Serbia's in blocking Kosovo from joining the INTERPOL. In retaliation, which was criticised by the EU, Pristina authorities decided to introduce first ten percent, and soon after 100% custom tariffs on goods originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (Koleka, 2018). The real aim of tariffs was to exert pressure on Belgrade and Sarajevo alike to reconsider their non-recognition pol-

icy as both made surpluses in trade with Kosovo (Reuters, 2018). Although the decision of Pristina to introduce the discriminatory custom tariffs was in violation of CEFTA rules, Pristina insisted on their application until April 2020 when the caretaker Government led by Albin Kurti lifted the tariffs. (European Western Balkans, 2020). A financial loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina incurred due to Pristina's decision eventually did not yield any political benefits for Pristina as Sarajevo did not even consider recognition of Kosovo while the tariffs were in place. This was a concrete example of an attempt of the Pristina administration to make Bosnia and Herzegovina to recognize its statehood by using the instruments of economic pressure. Since the tariffs were lifted, the trade flow has resumed. The long-run consequence of the tariffs will be borne by Bosnian companies which will certainly face difficulties in regaining previously held position in Kosovo market now filled in by other competitors.

The two engage with more success in regional initiatives with occasional setbacks. A reason behind it should be found in the Belgrade-Pristina normalization dialogue, under the EU auspices, and its outcome – the technical agreements. For this article the Agreement on Regional Cooperation and Participation between Belgrade and Pristina reached in February 2012 has prime importance. It allowed Pristina to take part in regional initiatives and organisations and sign new agreements on its own account (before agreements were signed by the UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo) under the usage of an asterisk - Kosovo* - which implies that the 'designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence' (European Union, 2012). The full-fledged participation of Kosovo with asterisk in regional meetings brought also protocol readjustments. Ever since regional meetings were organised without display of any statehood insignia, such as flags or official titles of participants. This allowed Bosnian and Kosovo officials to interact without facing domestic criticism primarily from the Serb electorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As a result of the regional initiatives Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo signed several multilateral agreements. The 2019 Poznan Western Balkans Summit of the Berlin Process endorsed the clean energy transition declaration, the regional roaming agreement, a connectivity package and the Roma integration declaration (European Commission, 2020). The two are also founding members of the Transport Community, an international organisation in the field of mobility and transport, consisting of EU Member States and the Western Balkans economies established in 2017 (Transport Community, 2017).

On the other hand, Pristina officials were less cooperative and ready to engage when State institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina were represented by Serb representatives. As an illustration, regional summit of the Brdo-Brioni Process hosted by Tirana in 2019 showed the real taste of Sarajevo-Pristina relations. Thaçi rejected to take part in the joint lunch after the Summit because the Serb Member of the Presidency,

Dodik, was also invited (Faktor, 2019). During the plenary, Dodik used the occasion to replicate Taçi who stated that he cannot support the creation of a subnational, intermediate level of authority that resembles the Republic of Srpska in Kosovo (meaning the establishment of the *Association/ Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo*⁴) by stressing that Srpska has its Constitution and territory and went on by saying that the Republic of Srpska has no territorial claims towards Kosovo, because Kosovo is in Serbia (Klix, 2019). Taçi also rejected the invitation to attend the annual European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) conference in Sarajevo because Bosnia and Herzegovina did not recognize Kosovo (Faktor, 2019).

As the engagement at regional level is concerned, worth mention is the Regional Cooperation Council efforts in pursuing the travel with ID cards only within the Western Balkans region. The bottom line aim of this initiative, which was endorsed by Western Balkans leaders at the 2020 Sofia Summit of the Berlin Process, is to, from the back door, abolish visas between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Its importance is recognized in the fact that as it stands now, any bilateral agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo is not feasible, as it would require Bosnia and Herzegovina's recognition of Kosovo. In addition, an initiative to simplify the visa procedure for Kosovo travel document holders has been shelved for quite some time. Even if the two manage to abolish visas by endorsing multilateral agreement, special attention would need to be paid on other practical issues such as the recognition of car plates, driving licences, insurance issues etc. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina will face additional difficulties internally in making all parties to agree on abolishing visas for Kosovo. Whoever occupies the opposition benches from the Serb ranks in time when ratification of the multilateral agreement on travel with ID cards only is tabled before the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina gets a great chance to blame ruling parties for a betrayal of Serb national interests and also a campaigning tool for the next elections.

Together with other Western Balkans economies (Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia), Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo signed the Declaration on Common Regional Market and endorsed the Common Regional Market Action Plan 2021-2024. The Action Plan aims to achieve regional integration in four areas: trade area (free movement of goods, services, capital and people), investment area (promotion of the region to foreign investors), digital area (integration of the region

[4] The 2013 EU-brokered deal granted an autonomy to Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo in exchange for their integration with Kosovo's central government. The signed deal between Kosovo and Serbia Prime Ministers was challenged by the Kosovo Constitutional Court 2015 ruling. The deal has not been implemented yet. A detailed overview of the Association/ Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, see at: <http://www.kord-kim.gov.rs/eng/p17.php>. On the Kosovo Constitutional Court decision, see at <https://www.dw.com/en/kosovo-top-court-finds-parts-of-eu-sponsored-deal-with-serbia-unconstitutional/a-18937945>.

in the pan-European digital market) and industrial and innovation area (transformation of the industrial sectors) (Regional Cooperation Council, 2020). It seems that Bosnia and Herzegovina by committing to the abovementioned lack the understanding of the process and more importantly the requirements and necessary steps towards Pristina which are required in order to make the Common Regional Market happen.

This chapter showed that in spite of facing occasional hiccups Sarajevo and Pristina interact with more success at regional than at bilateral level. It could be argued that it is because of a greater interest in regional initiatives paid by the EU and the US. Most probably without Brussels and Washington facilitation efforts, very few initiatives would see the light at the end of the tunnel. Moreover, status-neutral meetings introduced at regional meetings benefited to the relations between both Belgrade and Pristina but also Sarajevo and Pristina. In addition, such outcome can also be attributed to Sarajevo's focus on regional cooperation as an arena where all 'matters immanent to all countries within the region could be mutually resolved' (Marković and Subašić, 2019: 199). It remains to be seen how the two plan to approach demanding obligations stemming from their commitments made at the Berlin Process summits, which undoubtedly tackle their bilateral relations. The next chapter will provide a final analysis of the trend and provide conclusions.

Conclusions

By relying on the state recognition theory, the article attempted to analyse bilateral and multilateral elements of diplomatic engagement without recognition between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. It showed that Kosovo's self-declared independence, found Bosnia and Herzegovina unprepared to deal with a new-born entity in the Balkan region. Initial non-recognition consensus aimed primarily to secure territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, it aimed not to fuel centrifugal tendencies in Republic of Srpska caused by Pristina's move. The polarization in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina came to the surface once the Bosniak and Croat Members were reassured, as the time passed, that the announced referendum on the status of the Republic of Srpska triggered by Kosovo's unilaterally declared independence would not materialise.

The key element of interaction between Sarajevo and Pristina will remain to be the lack of a formally shaped intent on the Bosnian side to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. The existing interaction may be dubbed as *functional non-recognition* - the non-recognition position does not prevent Sarajevo from engaging with Pristina, as seen primarily at the regional level. The scope of formal engagement highly depends on the position taken by the Serb representatives in the joint institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The position taken by Belgrade will certainly

continue to be a guiding principle for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina on this matter.

The position of Bosnia and Herzegovina on Kosovo's independence, as illustrated at the Presidency session, is rather driven by ethno political interests than it is exemplifying a unique position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The divergent positions of the three members of the Presidency will certainly continue to occupy public attention and send dissonant messages to internal and external audience. While Bosniak officials are more keen to interact with Kosovo's and the Croat officials are readier to make the statement acknowledging Kosovo's statehood, the Serb officials remain committed to adhering to the non-recognition position by all means and at all occasions. Moreover, the soft pressure of Pristina officials to make Sarajevo recognize Kosovo through rejecting to attend the regional meetings hosted by Bosnia and Herzegovina or the hard pressure by introducing custom tariffs did not yield any results in making Bosnia and Herzegovina reconsider its non-recognition position. Such state of play leads to a conclusion that the recognition of Kosovo will be shelved for quite some time.

The lasting consequence of Kosovo's one-sided declaration of independence will be the attempts to link the status of the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo and draw parallels between the two. It comes from the end of Serb officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina who claim that the Republic of Srpska should have the right to be treated the same way as Kosovo because the circumstances and historic prerequisites of the two were nearly identical. Serb Member of the Presidency, Milorad Dodik, continuously points out that the Republic of Srpska will demand a UN seat if Kosovo gets one and that Srpska will stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina providing that Kosovo remains part of Serbia. Such statements could potentially aim to put the weight of the Republic of Srpska on the negotiation table between Belgrade and Pristina. The Bosniak officials, on the other hand, are firm that redrawing borders would directly jeopardize peace in the Balkans and that Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be dragged into Belgrade-Pristina negotiation talks in any way.

The advancement of Belgrade-Pristina normalization dialogue facilitated by the EU and the US, subsequently relaxed Bosnia and Herzegovina's tough non-recognition position on Kosovo. Regional initiatives, following commitments and status-neutral meetings somehow brought the two around the same table. Apart from supporting inclusive regional cooperation, the EU has no alternative mechanisms at its disposal to further relax Sarajevo-Pristina relations. Moreover, it would be particularly challenging since the EU from within struggles to reach a common ground on Kosovo's self-declared independence.

As Sarajevo's interaction with Pristina is not driven by any binding document, its interaction is highly influenced by initiatives agreed at the regional level. Hence, the two may explore other mechanisms of diplomatic engagement without recognition without changing the current

status quo. However, the likelihood of Sarajevo and Pristina exchanging liaison officers or liaison, information or trade office is minor. Some Pristina officials have put forward an initiative for Sarajevo and Pristina exchanging liaison offices or officers modelled on Belgrade-Pristina⁵ or Athens-Pristina arrangement. The initiative has not been formally toppled down yet, but knowing the internal political dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina such initiative is far from materializing. On the other hand, if the two keep committing to regional initiatives such as the one on free movement of goods, services, capital and people under the auspices of the Regional Cooperation Council some sort of diplomatic link between Sarajevo and Pristina would be needed if such initiatives are to be implemented in their full capacity.

Given the unpredictable nature of the engagement of Sarajevo with Pristina, fluid and regionally driven relationship, a possible deterioration of their interaction below the currently achieved level should not be excluded.

Angažovanje bez priznanja: Odnosi Sarajeva i Prištine

Apstrakt

Dvanaest godina od kako je južna srpska pokrajina Kosovo i Metohija (dalje Kosovo) jednostrano proglasila nezavisnost od Srbije 2008. godine, Predsedništvo Bosne i Hercegovine, telo zaduženo za vođenje spoljne politike Bosne i Hercegovine, razmatralo je priznanje Kosova. Centralni argument sugerise da nedostatak priznanja ne sprečava Sarajevo i Prištinu da se angažuju, posebno na regionalnom nivou. U članku se analizira koliko je politička scena u Bosni i Hercegovini polarizovana po pitanju priznavanja Kosova i koja su ograničenja za napredak ovih odnosa. Jedan od zaključaka tvrdi da unutrašnja politička dinamika u Bosni i Hercegovini igra odlučujuću ulogu u oblikovanju odnosa Sarajeva i Prištine. Oslanjajući se na teoriju državnog priznanja, ovaj članak ima za cilj da analizira bilateralne i multilateralne elemente diplomatskog angažmana bez priznanja. U radu se tvrdi da je ključni element interakcije između Sarajeva i Prištine nedostatak formalno oblikovane namere na bosanskohercegovačkoj strani da prizna Kosovo kao nezavisnu državu.

Ključne reči

angažovanje bez priznanja, priznanje država, zapadni Balkan, Bosna i Hercegovina, Kosovo

[5] As a result of the 2013 normalization agreement, Belgrade and Pristina agreed to exchange liaison officers (not offices) with a task to monitor the implementation of key agreements reached between Belgrade and Pristina. See more at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2013/06/17/kosovo-and-serbia-exchange-liaison-officers/>.

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The Civilizational States and Liberal Democracies

Christopher Coker, *The Rise of the Civilizational State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019).

At the beginning of the 21st century attempts to historically re-evaluate the past and redefine key social values took place in some of the leading world powers. Such efforts are especially noticeable in two countries that are today the main opponents of the global pretensions of liberal democracy: Russia and China. In the second decade of the 20th century these two states began to see themselves as separate civilizations and as “civilizational states”, and to view the West as the main threat to their existence. In 2019, Christopher Coker, British political philosopher, war theorist and professor of international relations at the London School of Economics and director of LSE IDEAS published the book entitled *The Rise of the Civilizational State* that offered anatomy of this type of state.

Although in the West there is no adequate example of the civilizational state (*цивилизационная страна* in Russian), there is a tradition of understanding the West as a type of civilization. The so-called liberal or Euro-Atlantic civilization would be one such concept that includes an important difference because it does not define an individual state as a civilization, but a group of nation-states that claim to share similar values.

However, the author points out that this type of civilisation has faced serious challenges regarding its pretensions to universal application and

challenges have come both from non-Western societies and its own citizens who are not rich. In the section entitled “the myth of liberal civilization” he warns that the West “no longer looks robust enough to carry the intellectual fright it once carried.” Echoing Freud’s book *The Civilization and its Discontents* the author writes of liberal discontents and points out that the liberal internationalists came to realise that “many remain largely unmoved or uninspired” by their message at the same time when Western intellectuals “have begun to question whether civilization itself is even an ethically acceptable category”.

The book identifies Imperial Japan of the 1930s as the first example of the civilizational state. The change of the school program clearly outlined the ideals of such a state. “The Bureau of Thought Control” then published a textbook entitled *Kokutai no Hongi* in which Japanese students were taught that their emperor represented the essence of the nation. The people could not have any special will, but only unconditional love for the emperor and readiness to sacrifice for the royal family. Thus, the ethos of the samurai was reworked, and Buddhism was transformed into a warrior Zen in which the idea of overcoming the self was transformed into an unconditional commitment to sacrifice for the emperor. Such a system led to an incredible identification with Japanese civilization, but failed with Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s attempts to revive it failed due to the cultural and political influence that the United States still has in Japan.

The book is primarily focused on the contemporary incarnations of the civilizational state. The concept was renewed in China and Russia at the beginning of the 21st century. Statesmen, spiritual leaders and some prominent thinkers and opinion makers in the two countries have no doubts on whether there is a category called civilization and believe that their countries are and should remain separate civilizations.

Considering the endurance of China’s existence in various forms, Prof. Coker was surprised not by the fact that this country decided to see itself as the civilizational state, but rather by the fact that it took so long for China to do it. At the heart of this Chinese self-perception is the notion that the concept of the West is dangerous. It is claimed that a Chinese path has been quite opposite to it. It is a peaceful, non-expansionist and non-imperialist path. Xi Jinping presented exactly what this concept looks like at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China, when he presented a combination of Confucianism and Leninism as an alternative model to the West. This was certainly a surprise to many because the attitude towards Confucianism as a religion was defined by the atheistic nature of the Chinese regime, but the leader of the Chinese Communist Party changed that in 2014 when he attended the commemoration of Confucius’ death. The tradition from Japan has continued. It is only that in this case research centers for Xi Jinping’s “thought” have been introduced instead of the Bureau of Thought Control. Part of this “thought” is that China’s CP is seen as an “unbroken line of Chinese civilization”. The

Confucian notion of harmony is singled out, and China is presented as a peaceful country that contributes to a “harmonious world”.

The teaching of history is set within the framework of the so-called patriotic history courses in which the central part refers to the “century of humiliation” that began with the Opium War and ended with the victory of the Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China (1839-1949). Christopher Coker estimates that two decades of such teaching have led the Chinese youth to “a virulent strain of nationalism imposed by the state”. Behind everything, there is a great fear of Western values. Chinese civilizational values are offered instead. In the official version, this civilization is unique. Like any civilizational state, this one is “special” because it is claimed to be the only civilization that has ever existed and that included harmony at home, accompanied by harmony abroad, without colonial pretensions and civilisational missions.

Prof. Coker provides analysis of Russia, the other major contemporary civilisational state. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, there was a number of analysts in the West who believed that Russia, as a transitional state, could, sooner or later, become a part of the Euro-Atlantic world. Even Samuel Huntington was among those who thought it was possible. After Yeltsin’s resignation as President of Russia in 1999, the civilisational state gradually began to emerge in Russia. Like China, Russia has returned to religious tradition, and even the Russia’s secret service - FSB got its own church of St. Sophia. The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church was equally embracing and Patriarch Kirill called Vladimir Putin a “miracle of God”. In the second decade of the 21st century, there was a renewal of messianic ideas that were absent from the Russian cultural mainstream for about a quarter of a century. Anti-Western rhetoric was renewed, but sudden attempts to deny Russia’s Europeanness failed. When the Russian Ministry of Culture drafted the Basics of Russian Cultural Policy in 2014, it also contained the claim that “Russia is not Europe”, but it had to be withdrawn. Six years later, the Russian National Security Strategy included the following assessment: “it is necessary to adopt a sublime attitude towards historical memory”.

The West has once again become a central antagonist in Russia and has begun to be seen again as decadent, as a set of nation-states having no values, as opposed to Russia that contains them. According to Christopher Coker, that made it easier for Russian President Vladimir Putin to oppose exactly those values that stood in the way of full consolidation of power: liberty, freedom and democracy. In this he found a ready ally in the church and Patriarch Kirill, who considers human rights to be a “Jewish-Protestant invention”.

The attitude towards Russians outside Russia has been defined as a matter of special concern for the Russian civilizational state. Thus, Dmitry Medvedev, during his time as President of Russia, defined a new foreign policy goal related to the sphere of “civilizational privilege”. Russian President Putin was clear that Russia was ready to pay a high price

for such goals, so after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, he said that sanctions against Russia were the price she had to pay “to preserve herself as a civilization.” He reiterated that the protection of Russia’s cultural heritage outside Russia was one of the country’s priorities. As Christopher Coker correctly and prophetically noted in 2019, the idea that Russia must protect Russians outside Russia is “bad news if you happen to be a citizen of a neighboring country with a large Russian minority.”

What one may conclude from this insightful and far-reaching book is that there are several features that are common for the two contemporary civilizational states and their predecessor in Japan. Each considers itself to be unique and the only one of that kind, and each sees itself as self-sufficient. They all feel threatened by the West, and only a departure from Western values is seen as a path to save them to continue to exist as separate civilizations. All civilizational states are anti-liberal, with a complex relationship to modernity. They accept the technical-technological aspect of modernity, but reject the political philosophies of the Enlightenment and liberalism that came with it. These states are particularly repulsive to the postmodern ideas, and are afraid of its de-essentialization which easily calls into question the very foundations of the civilizational state.

Along with Russia and China, Prof. Coker has identified other candidates for civilizational states, namely India and the Caliphate, which could rise again from the ashes of ISIS. Turkey under Erdogan had similar pretensions.

Thinking of the logical conclusions that this book brings is that the division to free, partly free and no free world is not sufficient anymore. Within those countries that belong to “not free world” there is now an additional category that should be taken into account: that of the civilizational states. That is why the world today, following the findings of this book, could be recategorized and divided into three groups of states: liberal democracies, illiberal nation-states and civilizational states. What happened after the publication of this book was that the Liberal Club suffered a heavy blow in 2021, when India, after many years, was assessed as partly free country by the Freedom House, thus losing the attributes of liberal democracy. From that moment universal pretensions of liberal democracies have faced a new severe blow.

The book ends with a warning to the liberal West. And the author has warned Western liberals since the publication of his brilliant book *Twilight of the West* in 1998 that the concept of the West was in crisis. He ends the book with two warnings. The first is about Western liberal arrogance: “We are still far from being as civilized as we like to think. In fact, even a rudimentary study of history suggests that a huge gap has always existed between civilization and its pretensions to civility”. The second is about postmodern rejection of essentialist notions. Similarly to the concept of culture, that represents a huge bone of discontent among scholars, but that cannot be abandoned, civilisation is another contested

concept. In spite of that, the author claims, the idea of civilization is: “indispensable if we aspire to become more civilized”.

Along with his previous books, among which I would single out *Twilight of the West* (1998), *The Future of the War* (2004), and *Can War be Eliminated* (2014), this book puts some of the most disturbing questions that the Western (Liberal) camp or civilisation has faced including: how universal the values of the West are, how can the West reconcile its increasingly fluid ideas with essentialist realities, and how can it protect its values in the world that indeed becomes less and less unipolar? Finally, if war has its almost certain future among humans, as Prof. Coker has claimed, then what is the predicament not only of the West, but of human civilisation in general? The rise of civilizational state coupled with the idea that wars would continue provide another double and far-reaching warning by this author.

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Politički život, časopis za analizu politike izlazi od 2011. godine. Izadavač je Univerzitet u Beogradu – Fakultet političkih nauka, Centar za demokratiju. Časopis se bavi analizom institucija i političkih struktura (polity), analizom političkih aktera, procesa i područja delovanja različitih aktera (politics), i analizom rezultata i uslova delovanja politike, odnosno političkim sadržajima u vidu javnih politika (policy). Osim politikoloških, časopis pokriva širi spektar tema i problema u oblasti društvenih nauka. U poslednjoj evaluaciji Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja prema Pravilniku o kategorizaciji i rangiranju naučnih časopisa unapređenu je u kategoriju vrhunskog časopisa od nacionalnog značaja (M51). Svi naučni radovi objavljeni od početka 2022. godine biće do daljeg vrednovani prema novom rangu.

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