The University of Belgrade

The Faculty of Political Science

Master Academic studies

Module: Peace, Security and Development

Master's Thesis

A Defense of Liberal Peace Building: A Case Study of Two African UN Missions

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Belgrade, September 2024

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Introduction

Liberal peacebuilding (LPB) has been recently quite maligned and characterised as outdated, due to certain flaws and failures. We wish to argue that while there have been certain failures related to LPB, much of these originate in the implementation, and that there are valuable concepts in it that can be salvaged and integrated with the local turn in peacebuilding. Through a critical approach to LPB and Liberal norms, which have proven useful in the past as can be seen in the corelation of them and peacefulness in many cases, we seek to analyse their usefulness in contemporary situations and the possibilities of their continued application. We seek to both critique the failings of LPB, as well as its critics, to provide an objective analysis of its reaches and development.

As Tolstoy says, every happy family is happy in the same way, and each miserable family is miserable in its own way. Can there truly be a model, or elements of a model, which can be applied globally? As LPB is a reformist and optimistic concept which seeks not only to end conflicts but to remove the causes of them through reform based on certain norms, and as it is related to norms at the basis of the UN, we expect it to continue being useful, while taking into account the need to understand local contexts, local needs and local values.

The Subject, Goals and Significance of the research

Our main subject is LPB as attempted by UN peacebuilding missions, and we hope to illuminate why some UN missions succeeded and some don't. in relation to liberal norms. We aim to use a comparative case study in order to understand the concept and structure of LPB, through both positive and negative examples, and the role of the UN in socialising states in crisis to international norms. We also consider what is necessary for liberal norms to be diffused and for liberal peace to take hold. Our goals therefore are to use a comparative case study of UN LPB to understand it as a general concept both in theory and practice, and to understand its usefulness as a model that could potentially be applied globally. The thesis contributes in three main ways: testing liberal theory in practice, empirically examining UN missions, and providing evidence for the value of LPB in contemporary cases. In hoping to understand if LPB can be applied in any environment, we chose two African missions for a number of reasons, as African states generally have a deficiency of liberal norms. Africa is also the home of the largest number of UN missions, regrettably. The two missions also have

the benefit of being quite recent and therefore the temporal closeness to our time can yield better conclusions.

Structure and Concept

The first section is devoted to a literature review, divided into a review of theory and a review of practice. The theoretical review is meant to give us a framework through which to analyse the missions and concepts we wish to understand, and to give us concepts which we can operationalise. This is followed by a review of the two missions and the empirical analysis, which follows the methodological and theoretical framework sections which structure and frame it. We provide a chronological narrative of the missions, followed by comparative analysis of the Processes and the Discourses, followed by the discussion of our results and the conclusion.

1 Literature Review

We conceive of these missions as being directed towards the transformation of the host societies, run by an organisation which is based on basic liberal principles according to its charter. Thereby we can see a liberal organisation trying to change the norms and identities by which the host societies function. Before we can apply these theories to our empirical data, we must define our basic prepositions in relation to them. As we are conducting our research into peacebuilding in general and liberal peacebuilding (LPB henceforth) in particular, it is important to understand some basic ideas and concepts related to this field, as well as the ongoing debates. As the UN evolves so does the concept of peacebuilding, and recently missions have moved away from LPB towards stabilisation and towards a greater respect for local peculiarities, where the latter could yield important improvements, while the former might in fact perpetuate the causes and treat only the symptoms of conflict.

1.1 Liberal Institutionalism as a Basis of LPB

LPB is based on Liberal theory, within which various researchers point out the expected effects that would result from its application. Among the most important concepts in it is what Franceschet calls the ethical tension in liberalism between state sovereignty and human rights, which can lead to interventionism. In his view Liberalism is a reform project that is aimed at alleviating the negative aspects of the anarchic international system, and part of this is giving rights and freedoms a paramount position in the system in which international institutions regulate the behaviour between states and even within them.[1] Peacebuilding in this environment would allow for a greater role of the UN, and for a clear normative stance within a problem solving model. Liberal Institutionalism considers domestic and international institutions to have a central role in facilitating international peace and cooperation, and order and peace are maintained by cooperation and shared norms, with liberalism embedded in institutions and spreading to member states.[2] LPB then is a tool by which the world is made more peaceful by being made more liberal, according to its theorists.

The Liberal international order is today being challenged by populist, nationalist and anti globalist movements, yet it is resilient and has been successful in supporting prosperity and

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[1] Franceschet, A. "The Ethical Foundations of Liberal Internationalism." *International Journal, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Summer, 1999). pp. 463-481*

[2] Johnson T and Heiss A, "Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization and Global Governance, 2nd ed,ed. By T.G. Weiss and R. Wilkinson Routledge 2019, chapter 8*

maintaining the "democratic peace" and a high level of multilateralism among its adherents. It has allowed for collective action at an unprecedented level and made multilateral cooperation the norm.[3] At the same time, the attempt to spread it by illiberal means has not succeeded nor was advisable, as the model could not be adapted fully to every region and coercion only produced the opposite result.[4] This multilateralism combined with coercion can be related to Hoffman's idea that Liberalism is in constant conflict with tyranny, which it can defeat through the introduction of democracy,[5] which provides a justification for LPB that has led it astray. This argument for a proselytising Liberalism is echoed by Doyle who considers illiberal states fundamentally illegitimate, claiming that they do not have the right to not be interfered with due to their illegitimacy, preferring the pacifying effects of liberal-democracy. In his view liberal states prioritise the freedom and welfare of the citizens to which they are accountable to, and are less likely to commit aggression.[6] The newer form of liberal theory expects interstate cooperation to take place when the states have common interests, and international institutions to form for the sake of reciprocity and coordination. In this view institutions can exert profound effects on state behaviour, and are essential for sustained cooperation between them,[7] providing a raison d'etre for the UN and for LPB missions.

Owen concurs that illiberal and undemocratic states are inherently unpredictable and therefore dangerous due to their lack of popular accountability or checks on government power and, providing a justification for opposition to them. He also argues that liberal ideas and institutions are the causal mechanisms which create democratic peace between liberal while their inexistence creates conflict in relation to illiberal states.[8] This would mean that importing liberal norms into illiberal contexts should make the recipient state and the region itself more peaceful. Liberals in his view have an interest in peace and conflict is seen as simply an instrument to bring it about in relation to illiberal states, seeing only in other liberal states the predictability and inherent pacifism. Thus liberal interventionism becomes a kind of preemptive peacemaking whereby the norms are the causal mechanisms of peace, and their imposition, even by violence, is justified thereby. Macmilan shares the view that liberal states

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[3] Lake D, Martin L and Risse T, "Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization", *International Organization , Volume 75 , Special Issue 2, Spring 2021 , pp. 225 - 257*

[4] Johnson and Heiss , "Liberal Institutionalism", 2019.

[5] Hoffmann, S. "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism." *Foreign Policy, No. 98 (Spring, 1995).(pp. 159-177)*

[6] Doyle M.W. "Liberalism and World Politics", *The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp 1151–1169*

[7] Keohane , R. O. and Martin, L. L., "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory*", International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer, 1995), pp. 39-51*

[8] Owen, J. M. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." *International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall, 1994). pp. 87-125*

are generally more peace prone both in relation to each other and to illiberal states, with their behaviour depending on the perceived legitimacy of other states in terms of liberal norms.[9] The argument of peacefulness is often disputed even by fellow Liberals such as Doyle who admits that there is a mistrust of liberal states towards illiberal ones which see other democratic as moral equals, but fear the illiberal states which have no democratic constraints on their behaviour nor authentically represent the rights of individuals. Democracy is meant to create a relationship of accountability between the governed and the government, signalling foreign policy intent through liberal principles,[10] and therefore international peace would depend upon the expansion of liberal democracy. Supporting this argumentation Ikenberry openly claims that the international community has an interest in what goes on within states due to their humanitarian responsibility to protect people, as it puts the liberal principle of respect for universal human rights high on the agenda.[11] This adds a moral universalist and internationalist dimension to the theory, but necessitating the spread of liberalism in order to maintain peace, justifying the democratisation of undemocratic states due to the interconnectedness of the world and universality of human rights, as it would be thereby creating a more safe and predictable world by transforming dangerous and isolated states into open and cooperative ones.

This is connected to the theory of democratic peace and the notion that as democratic states do not go to war with each other, which suggests that newly democratised states have greater peace both internally and externally by having the same democratic benefits applied to their societies. This would lead us to expect that newly democratised states have greater peace both internally and externally by having the same democratic benefits applied to their societies. Nonetheless there is a lack of studies that look beneath the surface to see if democratic and liberal principles were truly applied and accepted in recipient states in order to support the theory. Democratic peace is described by liberal theorists as resting on a commitment to human rights, republican representation, and transnational interdependence, whereby the shared norms and institutional constraints on strategic behaviour prevents these states from conflict with others like them,[12] and these norms can be operationalised in our study. Franceshet describes democracy as a tool to prevent state capture by elites, as that

[9] Macmillan, J. "Liberalism and the Democratic Peace." *Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr., 2004).pp. 179 - 200*

[10] Doyle M.W, "Three pillars of the liberal peace", *American political science review 99 (3) 2005 pp 463-466.*

[11] Ikenberry, G. J. "Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order." *Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 2009).(pp. 71-87)*

[12] Russett, B, Layne, C, Spiro, D , Doyle, M. "The Democratic Peace." *International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring, 1995).pp. 164-184*

leads to conflict as the elites aim to increase their power and consolidate their positions to the detriment of the population at large, preferring sovereignty to be derived from consent of the governed in order to be compatible with freedom and legitimacy.[13] The conceit of liberal peace therefore is that an international society of liberal states would indirectly lead to democratic peace, but this would necessitate the logical need for democracy to be rooted and understood as well as practised in a wide variety of local contexts.

Doyle argues that liberal institutions and principles have a pacifying effect on states, as they are inclusive and prioritise the freedom and welfare of their citizens which would be harmed by conflict, naming human rights, republican representation and transnational interdependence as their three pillars. In LPB the adoption of liberal norms is meant to facilitate long term peace and stability, as well as socio-economic progress.[14] Ikenberry develops this by considering liberal institutionalism to promote the idea of an open rule-based system in which states cooperate for mutual benefit, where the best system is a democratic one that is open to trade and exchange. He characterises liberalism as being supportive of international institutions, human rights and open markets with free trade.[15] Hoffman develops the idea of socialising states into the global mainstream, whereupon isolated authoritarian states are to be integrated in the international economic system, and their integration through the opening of their markets is meant to constrain them by the newfound inter-dependence,[16] and these ideas can also be operationalized in our study. Therefore we can sum up the argument by saying that Liberalism expects the UN to form, to spread liberal-democratic ideas which would then be taken up by all states, leading to a general peace. As this did not happen, thus informed by theory we will attempt to find out why in our empirical analysis.

1.2. Liberal Peacebuilding and its Discontents

We can see that perhaps liberal peacebuilders often seem didactic and arrogant, and there is not enough self criticism that would transform the concept for the future. However even Paris, who is the leading exponent of this thinking today accepts that the peacebuilding process is difficult and doesn't always fulfil its goals, and that it must take into account the

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[13]Franceschet, A. "The Ethical Foundations of Liberal Internationalism. 1999.
[14] Doyle M.W, "Three pillars of the liberal peace", 2005
[15] Ikenberry, G. J. "Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order."2009.
[16] Hoffmann, S. "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism.", 1995

nature of the local conflict.[17] Paris considers that modern LPB missions do not simply try to manage violence but to prevent its occurrence, and attempts to transform failed states according to the principles of liberal democracy which they promote, liberal democratic states being the most stable and prosperous in the world.[18] There is an inherent self-satisfaction with these norms that work so well for the developed north, and a belief that they could be applied anywhere and by their application would transform developing and troubled areas. We can observe easily that such a process has not worked as predicted in many cases, and we see here a gap and a need to see exactly why, and this is where empirical analysis of cases can help us.

The strong opposition to this liberal paradigm comes from critical scholars such as MacGinty who criticise the Liberal attitudes which we have mentioned before, arguing against the deemphasizing of the sovereignty of illiberal states and the universal applicability of liberalism.[19] He and Richmond are the main exponents of the local turn of the debate, challenging liberal principles and suggesting that local reconciliation efforts should be primary and supported by LPB in a secondary role thereby giving local actors ownership over the process. The local turn came after LPB lost confidence which challenges the precepts upon which liberalism is built,[20] and its scholars take a more pessimistic view that liberal principles cannot be universally applied nor can improve the countries in the global south by being applied to them. They take exception to the universalist ideas of liberalism that deemphasize the sovereignty of illiberal states, while not questioning the nature or origin of that sovereignty. They even take exception to state building itself, questioning the need for a state, while not providing alternatives, however they raise important points about the nature of the state and the power dynamics within it.[21] Richmond's view is that LPB neglects local agency and the particular needs of local societal and economic needs, but frames it as an a priori part of western hegemony, which is a bold statement, but does add an emancipatory angle to peace building.[22] Paris criticised this view and argued against the romanticization of

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[17] Paris R, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism", *International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall, 1997) 54–89*

[18] Paris R, "International peacebuilding and the mission civilisatrice", *Review of International Studies 28(04): 2002. pp/ 637 - 656*

[19] MacGinty R, "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace", *Security dialogue, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2010 pp. 391-412*

[20] Mac Ginty R & Richmond O "The Local Turn in Peace Building: a critical agenda for peace," *Third World Quarterly, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(5), 2013. Pp 763-783*

[21] Mac Ginty R, "International peacebuilding and local resistance", *Palgrave Macmilan ,2011*

[22] Richmond O, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace'", *Conflict, Security & Development 6:3 October 2006, pp 291-314*

local practices as they often serve to reinforce the authority of existing power and impose social conformity, and could therefore be only a part of the solution, while LPB could incorporate several models of democracy as well as social justice.[23] Paris argued that these critical views ignore the benefits of the liberal attempts at peace, stating that there is no alternative to some form of LPB, which is a statement worth testing, and his argument that there is nothing neocolonial about peacebuilding,[24] can be supported by the fact that the UN is an universal organisation and that regional countries gave full support and were fully involved with the missions we are studying here.

Peacebuilding itself is generally considered to be an essentially liberal project built upon the western consensus, however Selby argues cynically that peace agreements are subject to strategic considerations and power politics, making LPB doctrines unevenly applied and the model normatively and practically inconsistent.[25] This type of critique makes it all the more important to contribute to theory by presenting more empirical observations such as the ones we make in this thesis. As for the local turn being the paradigm that peacebuilding can move towards, Paffenholz critiques the turn by arguing that it is limited by its binary understanding of the local and the international as the only relevant locations of power and resistance, creating an unrealistic view of local context and overstating local resistance.[26] While we can see the local turn advocating a major shift in focus onto local people instead of international peace builders, it romanticises hybrid peace governance structures. Thus we require a greater sensitivity for power relations for which more empirical work is needed.

Importantly for our thesis, Paris argues that the international normative environment of global culture affects and shapes the design of peacekeeping operations, situating missions within the global cultural paradigm and making them conform to the established norms even when the strategy might necessitate an alternative approach.[27] Richmond rightly stresses that LPB tends to attempt to impose a model that works in the north but cannot necessarily be applied to developing states, and diverts our attention to the importance of the local context.[28] This

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[23] Paris R. "Saving liberal peacebuilding" *Review of International Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 337 - 365*

[24] Paris, R, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding", 2010

[25] Selby J : "The myth of liberal peace-building", *Conflict, Security & Development 13 (1), pp. 57-86, 2013*

[26] Paffenholz T, Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda for future research, Third World Quarterly, 36:5, 2015 pp. 857-874

[27] Paris R, "Peacebuilding and the constraints of global culture", *european journal of international relations 9 (3) 2003 pp 441-473*

[28] Richmond O. "Failed statebuilding versus peace formation", *Cooperation and Conflict 48(3), 2013, pp 378–400*

interplay requires more analysis as the correct relationship between the local and the international is an open question. While the liberal peace is considered to include democracy, human rights, free markets and the rule of law as a solution for war torn countries, it has been criticised for its western bias, however it is the top down interventionist approach that is mostly criticised, and a more heterogeneous nature of peace based on local characteristics with international influence could be attempted.[29] Paris calls for an improvement of the model, accepting the valid criticisms that call for a stressing of local agency and local ownership, and the interplay between the local and the international is worth pursuing in more depth through real-world cases. The stress on local sovereignty and the inapplicability of UN charter norms everywhere ignores the often very negative or regressive characteristics of local structures, which are only exacerbated by a full application of the stabilisation or local turn, and possibly have much to gain from the application of at least a part of LPB, as we have seen many benefits over the years of liberal norms being introduced. These norms may not be a sine qua non for peace, but their benefits cannot be ignored, and in our study we wish to find exactly those benefits which can be applied in relation to local preconditions.

What do we see in the field? We characterise peacebuilding as an attempt to address the sources of hostility after a peace has been negotiated or imposed in order to build local capacities for conflict resolution and stronger state institutions that lessen social strife.[30] It serves to contain violence, to prevent escalation, and to create space for peace through a ceasefire. The line between peacekeeping and enforcement has been blurred as of late, yet more than ever third parties and outside mediators are essential in contributing to conflict transformation and reducing tensions.[31] Most Peacebuilding agencies nowadays follow the paradigm of liberal internationalism,[32] yet the perception that it is in decline has somewhat reduced the willingness of the major powers and organisations to engage in statebuilding on its foundation. Hameiri argues that the paradigm can outlast the apparent decline and that statebuilding as a tool and process is itself not in crisis, even though stabilisation and a focus on security are replacing LPB, stressing the various benefits that international aid and support provide.[33] De Coning argues that international peacebuilding is experiencing a pragmatic turn

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[29] Van Leeuwen M, Verkoren W, and Boedeltje F, "Thinking beyond the liberal peace: From utopia to heterotopias", *Acta Politica Vol. 47, 3, pp 292–316 (2012)*

[30] Doyle M and Sambanis N, "International peacebuilding: a theoretical and quantitative analysis", *The american political science review 2000, vol 94 no 4 pp. 779-801*

[31] Ramsbotham O, "Contemporary conflict resolution", *Polity 2005*

[32] Paris R, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of liberal internationalism", 1997

[33] Hameiri, S. . "The crisis of liberal peacebuilding and the future of statebuilding" , *International Politics, 51(3), (2014) pp.316-333.*

occurring together with a shift towards multipolarity, where peace is being interpreted on a context-specific basis, suggesting an adaptive peacebuilding of support rather than state building through the UN. In this concept the UN would only support a state rather than recreate it, improving local institutions and social relations as one model cannot fit all cases.[34] However, while the turn towards pragmatism in peacebuilding f is aimed at creating peace from below, and as such it might undermine the intentions of peacebuilders to create socially transformative projects in the global south as is done in LPB.[35] The question at the heart of that is if the primary goal of peacebuilding is the ending of a conflict, or the prevention of future conflict.

While a strong state is a barrier to inter-group violence, it can be used by one group to conduct violence as well, and to create exclusion of certain groups, but that peace could be additionally secured by territorial autonomy. Likewise, states with more democratic governments were more likely to reach settlement in civil war, and reaching peace arrangements was more successful when there was international support and third party enforcement, as well as belief in the legitimacy of the government. Durable peace was found to be possible even without explicitly solving all of the issues that solved the conflict as long as the population was reassured that the political process was legitimate and that conflict wont reemerge.[36] In this we see that in practice democracy indeed has an effect, and it should be followed up with greater inquiry. Walter reached a similar conclusion that for peace to succeed the conflicting parties must be certain that the other will demobilise, which is best achieved with external guarantees and enforcement, as mediation increases trust and political will towards compliance with the peace process.[37] Karlsrud agrees that the stabilisation turn away from LPB is occurring and considers it counterproductive as it leads to more oppressive governments and more disillusionment, while undermining the UN in general and its peace missions in particular.[38] This finding supports LPB concepts, but then we must ask why it failed to provide peace in several major cases, and if it was a failure of mediation or enforcement.

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[34] De Coning C, "Adaptive Peacebuilding", *International Affairs 94 (2), 2018 pp 301–317;*

[35] Finkenbusch, P, "'Post-Liberal' Peacebuilding and the Crisis of International Authority", *Peacebuilding, vol. 4, no. 3 2016, pp 247-261.*

[36] Hartzell C, Hoddie M, and Rothchild D, "Stabilising the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables", *International Organization , Winter, 2001, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Winter, 2001),pp. 183-208*

[37] Walter B, "Designing transitions from civil war: demobilisation, democratisation and commitments to peace", *International security summer 1999 vol 24 no 1 pp. 127-155*

[38] Karlsrud J, "From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism, Counterterrorism", *International Peacekeeping, 26:1, 2019 pp 1-21*

Downs and Monten found that foreign imposed regime change by democracies did not generally lead to significant democratic benefit, nor that it is effective in producing stable democracy, especially when undertaken in a state where democratic prospects are poor. Their findings show that democratisation depends both on the intervention strategy and on domestic conditions being favourable to it.[39] There is a tension between the foreign peacebuilders who have a vested interest in promoting democracy, and the local elites on the other hand who try to preserve their privilege that can be disrupted by it, leading to economic aid being leveraged in return for democratisation.[40] Howard and Stark posit that due to the international liberal environment civil wars were more likely to end in negotiated settlements after the end of the cold war, as both states and peacebuilding agencies are under the influence of the international environment. However as of late stabilisation has been favoured over democratisation, weakening the paramountcy of liberal norms.[41] Based on these findings we should accept that no model can be simply copied and applied universally, and that the local context must be thoroughly understood if positive influence is to be achieved. Our question is then if LPB or some of its elements at least can provide these post-conflict benefits better than other attempts.

While there is evidence that international peacebuilding improves the prospects that a civil war will be resolved, the strategy must be designed to fit the conflict and local capacities for conflict resolution must be constructed. Democratic peacebuilding was found to be more successful after the UN provided economic and political assistance that substituted for a lack of local capacities.[42] This aligns to the moderate critique of LPB but not to the more radical form, which should provide conceptual support to a defence of a reformed LPB. The failure to regularly achieve results has sadly led to a pragmatic turn towards stabilisation over LPB, which as Hunt and Curran found, puts too much focus on strong host governments and fails to address the root causes of conflict or to include the population.[43] Peacebuilding operations it appears are more likely to reproduce the status quo rather than move post-conflict states towards a liberal democracy, but the creation of liberal democratic institutions is not a short

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[39] Downes A.B, Monten J, "Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratisation", *International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013), pp. 90-131*
[40] Barnett M, Fang S, Zurcher C, "Compromised peacebuilding", *International studies quarterly, september 2014, vol 58 no 3 pp. 608–20*
[41] Howard L. and Stark A, "How civil wars end: the international system, norms and the role of external actors", *International security vol 42 no 3 winter 2017/18, pp 127-171*
[42] Doyle and Sambanis, "International peacebuilding: a theoretical and quantitative analysis" , 2000
[43] Hunt, C. T. & Curran, D. "Stabilization at the expense of Peacebuilding in UN peacekeeping operations: More than just a phase? " *Global Governance, vol. 26, no. 1, 2020. pp. 46-68*

or simple process nor can it be carried out without the consent of the local population and elites. The goals of the local government should align with those of the peacebuilders and secondary elites in order to build democracy, with nominal institutions strengthening overtime. The building of democracy and new institutions is a long process which has to be led locally but with international support and understanding.[44] Related to this is the idea that peace is a developing process that is constantly renegotiated socially and politically, whereas peacebuilding requires more creativity and reactivity than it generally receives. [45] This means that any success should be valued and our expectations should not be extreme at the outset, while the best approach is a patient and cautious one, whereas the UN supports rather than imposes.

Autessere points out that peace cannot be made without the agreement of local parties to resolve their differences, and without taking into account their interests. Therefore for peace to take hold there must be a combination of top down and bottom up efforts, and it must be a positive peace and not only a negative one (lack of violence).[46] Smidt focuses on how UN missions can work with local populations in order to build peace and the state, utilising the legitimacy of the community leaders as a peacebuilding mechanism. Intergroup dialogue and understanding leads to a decrease in violence and a creation of peaceful relations from a bottom up angle. The UNOCI mission showed the effectiveness of such initiatives, aligning with the concepts of everyday peace.[47] In fact in recent UN missions its forces have been increasingly deployed in partnership with regional organisations and coalitions of states, however the UN is still irreplaceable and is the best tool for keeping and making peace. Empirical data has shown that mixed missions reduce violence and reinforce each other, and that mutli-dimensional approaches increase peace building efforts.[48] Peacebuilding fails after foreign intervention when preconditions for democracy are poor, such as a lack of economic development, heterogeneous populations, and a lack of democratic experience and civil society.[49] Thus we can consider that the UN has not yet abandoned LPB fully, nor has faith

[44] Barnett M, Fang S, Zurcher C, "Compromised peacebuilding", 2014

[45] Paffenholz, T, "Perpetual peacebuilding: a new paradigm to move beyond the linearity of liberal peacebuilding", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 15:3,2021 pp 1-19*

[46] Autesserre S, "International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness", *International Studies Review 2017, 19 (1) pp 114–132,*

[47] Smidt H. "United Nations Peacekeeping Locally: Enabling Conflict Resolution, Reducing Communal Violence ", *Journal of Conflict Resolution 2020, Vol. 64(2-3) pp 344-372*

[48] Schumann M. P. and Bara C, "A New Era: Power in Partnership Peacekeeping", *International Studies Quarterly (2023) Volume 67, Issue 3*

[49] Downes and Monten, "Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratisation",2013

been lost in its ability to produce peace in some form, provided that local contexts are respected, but we should understand that conditions for LPB are often lacking and cannot be forced.

Karlsrud considers the weakening of LPB to be connected to the reduction of ambition and optimism, and to have been caused by the difficulty of achieving peace in light of the increasing authoritarianism in host states and in the international order.[50] Greener sees liberalism as salvageable as a basic narrative, but the needs of peace need to be put as a priority, proposing that a greater tolerance and flexibility towards hybrid models is necessary through a critically informed liberalism.[51] Linden identifies attempts to revise LPB by either taking a more coercive liberal approach, a social peacebuilding emphasising local agency and socioeconomic rights, or multicultural peacebuilding with a focus on indigenous norms and institutions. He advocates for social peacebuilding as one which would combine cosmopolitan human rights advocacy which is consistent with a respect for local cultural diversity and political autonomy.[52] We can conclude that local ownership and LPB are not in enmity and can in fact be conjunctive in their interaction, and liberal norms can be adjusted to the local normative environment to the extent which does not undermine their fundamental aspects.

Here we should keep in mind the view that peacekeeping is not only a technique for managing conflict but also a product of global culture which is changing away from Liberalism. When preconditions for democracy is poor, when the democratic experience is limited, the population is heterogeneous and there is a limited civil society, LPB has low chances.[53] The process of LPB is difficult and doesn't always fulfil its goals, for it is slow and often faces difficult circumstances. To succeed it must take into account the nature of the local conflict while maintaining its basis which is that that individual freedom is protected and that power is legitimate only if it's based on consent and respects basic freedoms.[54] By now liberal peacebuilders understand the need for an emphasis on the socio-cultural preconditions of democratic institutions, but the call remains for a thorough transformation of

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[50] Karlsrud , "From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism, Counterterrorism", 2019
[51] Greener B. K. "Revisiting the politics of post-conflict peacebuilding: reconciling the liberal agenda? ", *Global Change, Peace & Security, (2011) 23:3, 357-368,*
[52] Liden, K, "Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping, vol 16, no 5, 2009 pp 616-634*
[53] Paris, "Peacebuilding and the constraints of global culture", 2003
[54] Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism", 1997

conflict-creating local institutions,[55] and as such there is room for an evolution of LPB that would keep it from irrelevance. We therefore find the need to conduct a case study over a longer period of time, observing the situation before, during and after a process of LPB, to see in practice what exactly can go wrong. Quantitative analyses should be buttressed by in-depth qualitative studies of peacebuilding missions, and this is what our own study tries to provide. As we see that the two new turns away from LPB have not produced stable peace either, we seek to understand if the turn was too abrupt and if LPB has an advantage in addressing the root causes of conflict.

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[55] Finkenbusch, "'Post-Liberal' Peacebuilding and the Crisis of International Authority", 2016

2 Theoretical framework

As we noted, liberal theory observes that liberal and democratic states are generally more stable and prosperous, as well as more peaceful, and we find liberal values in the UN charter and basic documents. As such we would expect that the adoption of such values would have a positive effect wherever applied, and attempt to add to theory and general knowledge by analysing the model in practice. We apply liberal theoretical concepts in contrast to the local turn and the stabilisation turn, to consider possible advantages by examining situations empirically. In doing so we hope to see the positive effects of LPB as well as its limitations.

The theoretical framework we have chosen is Liberal Institutionalism (LI), which we found most fitting for our research, as The UN is an international institution based on liberal concepts, and multilateral cooperation for the common good is a liberal concept. As LPB rests on the theoretical concepts of liberalism, it is worthwhile to examine this concept through the lens of its own intellectual foundation. Moderate interpretivism is used in order to stress the importance of ideas and norms and their acceptance. We apply liberal institutionalist theory to our framework in order to analyse how UN missions incorporate these concepts and diffuse liberal norms in the host states. Our framework therefore focuses both on the structures, policies and strategies of the missions on the one hand, and on the norms, narratives and ideas on the other.

As mentioned, among the basic ideas of LI is that International organisations such as the UN can help states cooperate and overcome their security dilemma by providing a continual platform for dialogue within common norms and rules, helping structure international relations. This makes states interdependent and it makes the unsocial behaviour of states more punishable, while rewarding prosocial behaviour, as the interdependence of these states itself encourages them to work together. Likewise this is an internationalist theory which highlights the importance of established international laws and norms and supports their enforcement. Another major idea we mentioned is that peace, both international and intranational can best be achieved through democracy and liberalisation. Unlike realism which focuses on power and the quest for power in order to explain state behaviour, LI focuses on international institutions as it expects that states are most likely to seek security and progress through cooperation rather than in the accumulation of power and direct competition, emphasising the potential for cooperation between states.

UN missions themselves require collaboration between multiple states for a goal seen as being in the interests of the international community as a whole, aligning well with the theory, as UN peacebuilding socialises states towards being a constructive and peaceful member of the international community. This theory is supportive of the construction of democratic institutions as beneficial to overall peace, and as we are observing two missions that both carried out a democratisation process, it the most relevant theory for the analysis. Likewise the theory expects that international institutions can and should assist in building up institutions in post conflict states in order to strengthen them against potential conflict, and this is precisely what LPB is supposed to do. The theory expects that international cooperation is beneficial and rational for any state, and that international influence can change the behaviour of a state to better conform to its environment. As we observe the effects that the international community has through the UN as its highest form of cooperation on recipient states, we find that using the theoretical postulates of LI we can highlight how such an international institution helps to establish and maintain peace.

Being concerned with the effects, mechanisms of action, and behaviour of an international organisation, we seek to examine it through the lens of the theory from which it developed as the most natural fit. LI is well suited to the analysis of the role of the UN missions in creating peace, or failing to do so, in the case studies selected, as it is oriented towards the examination of international institutions and international organisation in general. Postulating that cooperation with international institutions and following their norms (in this case liberal institutions and norms) has a positive effect on the creation of peace in individual states, we chose this theoretical framework as its predictions align with such a postulate, and we seek to test it in practice. The theory also predicts that adherence to liberal norms increases peace and reconciliation, and this is exactly what we wish to test. LPB is a practical framework which relies on promoting liberal norms and the rule of law, and the building of peace through the internalisation of these norms by recipient states. As the chosen theory is specialised towards the examination of such processes and the cooperation between the local and the international, we find it to be the most suited for the case studies.

According to the theory, institutions reduce uncertainty and build trust, which is exactly what peacebuilding itself is oriented towards, and here we are thus able to observe how an instrument of international peacebuilding can be used to construct peace within a state according to the same rules. Every state exists in an international environment, and its

policies and interests are dependent on how it fits that environment and acts with it, and acting in a way that doesn't harm or even aids other states makes it more safe. As the UN is the sum of all states in the global environment, how a state interacts with it shapes how it is viewed by its neighbours and the international community as a whole. As such we find LPB to be directly connected to LI and find the theory best suited to an analysis of it.

We take a primarily interpretivist Epistemology and Ontology as we wish to understand how liberal norms were understood and interpreted by recipient societies, and as democracy and peace cannot be calculated or quantified as would be prescribed by a fully positivist approach. This view is well suited to understanding gradual change in the identities, policies and characteristics of states and societies. Our choice leads us to the preference for a qualitative methodology. Based on the preconditions for the acceptance of liberal and democratic values, the recipient states have various levels of acceptance or rejection of LPB missions. Resting upon our theoretical observations before, we expect LPB to me most successful when adjusted to the local situation, and applied consistently while respecting the local context, while nonetheless having positive effects when when not succeeding. We also start from the position that the activity and pressure that the mission applies increases the chance that its norms and policies will be adapted, and that the more the local government accepts its recommendations the more success and legitimacy it will have. We ask then what is the proper amount of pressure the mission needs to apply, and what the recipient governments have to accept and implement in order to bring about peace, expecting that the introduction of liberal norms will lead them to it.

3 Methodology

We aim to take a critical view of the critical view both of LPB and of its critics, and to understand if its basic concepts can be used in a reformed way.. As such our concept is to provide empirical data that would examine LPB and liberal institutionalist theory. We observe two recent UN missions in Africa, highlighting the adoption liberal principles or the lack thereof, taking in account the later stabilisation turn as well as the local turn in peacebuilding that challenge the paradigm. We hope to identify the positive aspects of such peacebuilding, its uses, as well as its limitations, and to test the claims of competing paradigms in order to find a synthesis by which LPB could be recovered and expanded, and defended. We can then extrapolate the results of this analysis and apply it back to our theoretical precepts defined at the beginning of the thesis, and attempt to generalise the findings in order to find implications for policy and theory.

The research is problem-driven and will compare two UN missions.. Two African states are used in order to keep some measure of similarity in the comparison of the missions, and because these were some of the most robust peacekeeping missions conducted. These are among the most paradigmatic missions, some of the most recent, and the most extensive UN missions in recent history. These neighbouring states share political, cultural and economic similarities, but also certain differences that will make comparison more interesting. By comparing them we can see why these two recent UN missions which were largely contemporaneous and carried out under similar norms and principles had different results, Noticeably the Mali mission was primarily a stabilisation mission, while the Ivory Coast mission was more of a traditional LPB mission, and we suggest that this is among the main reasons why one mission failed and the other succeeded. We consider peacebuilding missions to be an excellent tool to see the norms and theoretical underpinnings of the UN at work, and an excellent opportunity to observe changes in identities and interests through direct interaction of a state with an international organisation. The chronological frame corresponds to the length of the two UN missions, as well as the time immediately preceding and following their existence. For Ivory Coast we start in 2003 and continue until 2019, and for Mali we start in 2012 and continue up to 2023, making the two case studies largely contemporaneous.

Our design is Qualitative, as we aim to primarily use the method of **Process Tracing,** supported by also examining the discourse of the states recipient of the mission. The key

processes we follow are: Democratisation, Protection of Human Rights, Socio-Economic improvement, Political stability, Intercommunal security, Consolidation of political rights and freedoms, Cooperation with international institutions, Consolidation of the rule of law, Inclusion and tolerance. Process tracing is used to understand the political changes that the two states underwent during the long UN missions and under UN pressure. We trace the processes of political changes and reforms, focusing on liberal policies. We use UN sources as the most objective ones, which we chose based on document analysis, and attempt to uncover and explain the causal mechanisms by which the missions attempted to build peace. We operationalise Democratisation through the fairness and regularity of elections, Political stability through the constancy of governments, the increase of rights and freedoms through the adoption of reforms, and cooperation with international institutions through the implementation of UN advice and acceptance of the missions. The main causal mechanisms by which we consider the missions to affect the recipient states: Mediation and Conflict Resolution; Diffusion of liberal norms; Institutional Influence and Pressure;Economic Aid and Sanctions

4. Empirical Analysis of the UN missions

In the following section we use UN documents, mostly reports and the proceedings of various meetings of the SC, in order to construct a narrative of the two missions, and to analyse the processes taking place therein. First we frame the missions by giving a short overview of the situations in the two countries which suffered from crises, using secondary sources. Following that we analyse the two missions and follow the various processes which they set in motion, by using primary sources. Finally we give an analytical overview of the processes outside of the analytical narrative of the missions, to highlight their progress and results

In order to analyse the UN missions and their effects in depth, we first overview the general situations in the two states and their respective crises from beginning to end, and to contextualise the missions in an African framework. We do this in order to situate the missions in the overall context, and to do so we shall give a broad review of what happened over the period of the missions, mentioning the reasons that led to the need for the missions, and connecting Peacebuilding with African UN peacebuilding.

4.1 Framing Peacebuilding in the Ivory Coast Crisis

The key event in the recent history of Ivory Coast is the election crisis and short civil war in 2010, which led it from an autocracy to an emerging democracy. The first civil war occurred in the early 2000s, during which old grievances with ethnic roots resurfaced,[56] adding a xenophobic and ethnic angle to the crisis. The conflict ended up dividing the country in half between the rebels in the north and the government in the south, with failed reconciliation fallowing.[57] The UN mission (UNOCI) was created following a failed coup in 2002 when an uprising attempted to topple president Gbagbo, leading France to intervene after being invited to prevent the rebel takeover of government. This peacekeeping period was limited in success because of the lack of support for the mission's goals by the local government, it was filled with widespread violence and confrontation.[58] This constant insecurity prevented any

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[56] Erameh N. "Cote D'Ivoire: responsibility to protect, electoral violence and the 2010 crisis" , *Conflict Studies Quarterly Issue 35, April 2021, pp. 3-17*
[57] Cheema M. Z. and Sunawar L, "Ethnic Conflict and UN Peacekeeping Operations in Cote d'Ivoire", N*UST Journal of International Peace & Stability 2023, Vol. 6(1) pp. 68-80*
[58] Novosseloff, A. , "The many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire", *New York, International Peace institute, june 2018*

consolidation or progress, while the initial UN mission had very limited goals, causing it's norms and principles to be generally ignored, and necessitating a greater role.

While the African Union (AU) was supposed to take a greater role in the solving of African crises, such as those in Ivory Coast, it had generally failed to do so on its own due to internal divisions and its norms of non-intervention remaining active.[59] The AU and ECOWAS participated in the resolution of the first ivorian civil war, but without the support of the UN and France in particular the resolution would have been impossible. [60] This could justify the action of the UN and the wider international community, helping where local and regional solutions are ineffective. The conflict in Ivory coast was both ethnic and political, with regional and religious divisions, which were exacerbated by inaction, and the use of the "responsibility to protect" framework was eventually widely supported and justified due to the real fear of escalation and violence.[61] The failed peace agreements which were attempts at power sharing undermined the concept of power sharing itself and the value of mediation, [62] and The UN peacekeepers initially were sent to assist the implementation of these internationally brokered peace agreements. The UN was meant to assist the government of national reconciliation with reintegration and demobilisation primarily, while also focusing on the rule of law.[63]

In 2010 the country slipped into civil war after President Gbagbo refused to accept his electoral loss to Ouattara in the long awaited elections.[64] These elections led to widespread violence and conflict, while in the same period there was post-electoral violence in other African states, with weak institutions and mobilisation of irregular forces being a common theme.[65] The AU recognized Outtara as president elect and suspended the country's membership in the organisation until a transfer of power occurred in line with the democratic will of the population, and it unsuccessfully attempted to mediate several times but it was

[59] Apuuli K. P. "The African Union's notion of 'African solutions to African problems' and the crises in Côte d'Ivoire (2010–2011) and Libya (2011)", *ACCORD AJCR 2012/2*

[60] Abatan E and Spies Y, "African solutions to African problems? The AU, R2P and Côte d'Ivoire", *South African Journal of International Affairs, 23:1 ,2016 pp 21-38,*

[61] Cheema and Sunawar , "Ethnic Conflict and UN Peacekeeping Operations in Cote d'Ivoire", 2023

[62] Mitchell M, "Power-sharing and peace in Cote d'Ivoire: past examples and future prospects", *Conflict, Security & Development 12:2 May 2012*

[63] Bellamy A. and Williams P. "Local Politics and International Partnerships: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) ", *Journal of International Peacekeeping 16 (2012) pp 252–281*

[64] Bellamy and Williams, "Local Politics and International Partnerships: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) " 2012

[65] Bekoe D, "The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: How a Certified Election Still Turned Violent", *International Peacekeeping25(1):1-26 2017*

divided on the need to use force,[66] and ultimately failed to provide an African solution as it promised to do, relying on outside help to solve the crisis.[67] The intransigence led to violence as the only alternative, causing first ECOWAS and then the AU to intervene with limited success.[68] The UN mission was also at unable to facilitate free, fair and transparent elections, yet it had limited leverage as the president refused to cooperate.[69]

At the time of the intervention, liberal interventionism was an accepted concept, making a forceful intervention more likely, yet it was restrained by state sovereignty and the resistance of local elites. President Gbagbo in his attempt to undemocratically hold on to power had spoken against "global governance" ideologically, combining discourse of sovereignty and anti colonialism to justify his authoritarianism, like many others in Africa.[70] After all else failed the UN intervened and used violence to support the president elect, blurring the lines between human protection and regime change, and creating discord in the Council where India, China and Russia disagreed with the use of force and raised the question of ulterior motives. However the General secretary justified the use of force as being in line with the mandate and supportive of legitimate representatives, while the mission managed to solve the security situation and minimise civilian casualties.[71] It is worth noting that the intervention was used as a last resort after attempts at power sharing, reform, regional mediation, and international mediation and sanctions.

In this situation the UN acted in an intrastate dispute rather than an interstate one, prioritising the protection of civilians from state authority which lost legitimacy, using the R2P doctrine, and this crisis is a good example of when international action is necessary.[72] AU mediation demanded elections and the withdrawal of Gbagbo while providing support to the legitimate president who had limited forces of his own.[73] The violence of the intervention in 2010 was used to stop the violence already occurring, however it started a conversation about legitimate uses of force and violence for the purpose of peace, the line between local and international

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[66] Apuuli, "The African Union's notion of 'African solutions to African problems' and the crises in Côte d'Ivoire (2010–2011) and Libya (2011)" 2012
[67] Abatan and Spies, "African solutions to African problems? The AU, R2P and Côte d'Ivoire", 2016
[68] Erameh, "Cote D'Ivoire: responsibility to protect, electoral violence and the 2010 crisis", 2021
[69] Bekoe, "The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: How a Certified Election Still Turned Violent", 2017
[70] Piccolino G, "David Against Goliath in Cote D'Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo's war against global governance", *African Affairs, 111/442, 2012 pp. 1–23*
[71] Bellamy A, and Williams P, "The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect", *International Affairs 87:4 (2011) pp 825–850*
[72] Erameh, "Cote D'Ivoire: responsibility to protect, electoral violence and the 2010 crisis", 2021
[73] Charbonneau B, "War and Peace in Co'te d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line", *International Peacekeeping, Vol.19, No.4, August 2012, pp.508–524*

agency, and the line between sovereignty and internationalism.[74] After the electoral crisis Ivory Coast increased its efforts to democratise, and it was moving forward towards political consolidation and legitimacy.[75] The second phase of UNOCI started after this crisis of contested elections, from the starting point whereas it supported a democratically elected government, lifting the country out of the crisis.[76] Ivory Coast thus emerged from a long crisis and a ten year low-level conflict not through peace negotiations but through the use of force, leading to the need to consolidate a peace by co-opting the former opponent and while maintaining the winning coalition. The UN supported the peacebuilding and statebuilding but the local government was an active and equal partner, creating a functional recovery. [77] In this way the mission at least on the outside seemed a true success story.

The initial strategy which helped Ivory coast consolidate peace and security was the establishment of the authority of the state and its institutions, protecting the rule of law and improving the economic situation while protecting minority groups,[78] highlighting the centrality of states and statebuilding in the peace building process. The elections of 2015 passed quietly and the president was reelected smoothly, providing a much needed success for the UN. However the transition was too abrupt,[79] for there was still unfinished business whereas due to the limited leverage of the mission the local government had inconsistent implementation of the reforms which were meant to safeguard peace and security.[80] While the new regime was not very stable and struggled to maintain unity, economic growth and improved security were apparent.[81] All these successes fit in well with the overall normative structure and mission goals of LPB, and while the process seems to have been rushed and the mission not fully adapted to local circumstances, the situation improved markedly. It should however be noted that exposure to rebel rule has long term consequences, due to the disrupted norms of compliance with the state,[82] meaning that earlier intervention could have

[74] Charbonneau, "War and Peace in Cote d'Ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line" 2012
[75] Sidibe D, "Peace processes in Côte d'Ivoire: Democracy and challenges of consolidating peace after the post-electoral crisis", *The African Centre for the constructive resolution of disputes, Issue 1 2013*
[76] Novosseloff, "The many Lives of a Peacekeeping Mission: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire", 2018
[77] Piccolino G, "Peacebuilding and statebuilding in post-2011 Cote D'Ivoire: a victor's peace?" *African Affairs, 2018 117/468, pp 485–508*
[78] Sidibe,"Peace processes in Côte d'Ivoire: Democracy and challenges of consolidating peace after the post-electoral crisis", 2013
[79] Novosseloff A. "Lessons Learned from the UN's Transition in Côte d'Ivoire," *International Peace Institute, December 2018.*
[80] Caplan R. "Political leverage and UN peacekeeping: the case ofUNOCI's withdrawal from Côte d'Ivoire", *Conflict, Security & Development, 24:2, (2024) pp. 111-125,*
[81] Piccolino, "Peacebuilding and statebuilding in post-2011 Cote D'Ivoire: a victor's peace?" , 2018
[82] Philim M, Piccolino G. and Speight J, "The Political Legacies of Rebel Rule: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Côte D'ivoire". *Comparative Political Studies, volume 55, issue 9, august 2022, pp 1439-1470*

improved the situation. The creation of civic identities and trust in state institutions is a long one, and trust has to be earned by institutions.

Consolidation could only work if the population truly desires peace and dialogue.[83] This was made easier by the period after the mission ushering in sustained economic growth, enhanced security and an improved political climate[84] In fact the mission succeeded in helping create a peaceful situation in which human rights were promoted, and the use of force by the mission was limited and reactive, and was used only to support the legitimately elected president.[85] Even though the AU has limited institutional capacities to resolve crises like the ones in Mali and Ivory Coast, it managed to contribute to the peace processes through mediation.[86] The problems that confronted the UN in Ivory Coast were similar to those it faced in other African crises, and the mission is a good example of the experience of multidimensional and robust peacekeeping. The experience highlighted the centrality of local politics to peacekeeping and the need for local cooperation with the mission and its parameters, and the need to include a broad range of local and regional actors in the peace process.[87] Overall the success of the mission proved, at least when looking at the situation from afar, to be a success.

4.2. Empirical Analysis and Narrative of the UN mission in Ivory Coast

In this section we analyse primary sources to provide a structural narrative of the UN mission in Ivory coast, beginning with the causes for the crisis which necessitated the creation of the mission, and ending with the immediate aftermath of the mission after it was completed. We divide the period in two in order to highlight the two main periods of the mission, which were carried out in different circumstances

4.2.1. The first period of the mission 2003 - 2010:

The initial reason for the mission becoming necessary was the failure to implement the first peace agreement in Ivory Coast between the government and the rebels (Linas-Marcoussis).

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[83] Mitchell , Power-sharing and peace in Cote d'Ivoire: past examples and future prospects" 2012
[84] Caplan, "Political leverage and UN peacekeeping: the case of UNOCI's withdrawal from Côte d'Ivoire" 2024
[85] Novosseloff, "Lessons Learned from the UN's Transition in Côte d'Ivoire," 2018
[86] Aning K and Edu-Afful F. "African Agency in R2P: Interventions by African Union and ECOWAS in Mali, Cote D'ivoire, and Libya", *International Studies Review (2016) , pp 1–14*
[87] Bellamy and Williams, "Local Politics and International Partnerships: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) " 2012

In 2003 the SC unanimously adopted resolution 1464 calling for its implementation, and authorised French and ECOWAS troops that were meant to act as peacekeepers while a government of national reconciliation was formed.[88] The situation in Ivory Coast was far from ideal, with large amounts of polarisation, ethnic tension, and legitimacy issues regarding the government, whereas the opposition leader mr. Ouattara was disparaged based on his nationality. The attempts at reconciliation resulted in failure, followed by violence and an open rebellion in 2002, which necessitated AU and ECOWAS mediation attempts and eventual deployment of peacekeepers while negotiations between the government and rebels were held. Thanks to the international response a ceasefire came into effect, and the agreement made thereafter called for elections to be organised after a government of national reconciliation is formed, which would improve inclusivity and tolerance in political life. The agreement was not followed and there were obstacles to the creation of the government, as well as strong disagreements between the two sides, whereas president Gbagbo was refusing to give up any power or to compromise.[89]

In the following months the UN determined that the situation was a threat to international peace and security and decided to establish a UN mission (MINUCI) through resolution 1479, that would ensure peace while the agreement's provisions are carried out. At the same time there was an attempt to constitute a reconciliation government with the help of regional mediation.[90] While this initial success was creating hope, tasks such as as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and reconciliation lay ahead. The new PM officially supported the terms of the agreement and its implementation, promising the holding of elections and actions in accordance with SC resolutions.[91] The situation remained calm and the overall security situation was improving, with the two main rivals opening a mechanism for dialogue during the ceasefire. The northern rebels declared an end to the war and pledged loyalty to the central government as their representatives joined the government, but they still held large territories under their control in the north of the country. Human rights and protection of civilians remained a serious challenge, but the government was at least nominally taking serious measures to address them, although the media were still not free. The UN mission and ints influence was fundamental in maintaining the ceasefire and as a

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[88] UN Archive (UNA henceforth) 4700th meeting Tuesday, 4 February 2003, S/PV.4700 ; S/RES/1464 (2003)
[89] UNA S/2003/374 Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire 26 March 2003
[90] UNA 4754th meeting 13 May 2003, S/PV.4754 ; S/RES/1479(2003)
[91] UNA 25 July 2003 S/PRST/2003/11 ; 4793rd meeting Friday, 25 July 2003, S/PV.4793

method of pressure to make the two sides cooperate.[92]   The two sides remained at odds, armed and unwilling to move forward democratically. As such the UN continued to prolong the mission and increased pressure for the implementation of the agreement. The differences between the two sides were too large and eventually the rebels withdrew from the government because the president was not sharing power, ruining the idea of compromise.[93] The breakdown caused ECOWAS to ask the SC to create a UN dedicated peacekeeping force to prevent violence, so a full UN mission was seen as necessary, [94] being created by SC resolution 1528 which established UNOCI under chapter 7. It was made the authority for peacekeeping in Ivory Coast directly, in order to stabilise both the country and the region, and to make sure that the peace agreement is implemented, and to attempt to influence a reconciliation that would lead to demobilisation and reintegration, while assisting in the field of human right protection. The initiative had a direct impact as the two warring sides started talking to each other again.[95]

With the government not accepting certain important reforms such as the nationality law, the rebel forces refused to fully lay down their arms, leading to violence. The SC demanded a respect of the peace agreement and of human rights, and for elections to take place in the following year, showing a concern for the liberal values of democracy and human rights.[96] The president dismissed opposition ministers in response to this escalation, and the UN SC demanded that he continue with the implementation of the agreement as the only possible basis for peace, condemning the human rights violations and demanding transparent elections and tolerance instead of hate. Mediation only managed to allay the crisis for a short while,[97] and soon the SC sanctioned the country (resolution 1572), while the protracted stalling of the peace process led to an increase of instability and a deterioration of the security situation as the two sides started losing faith in political solutions, while media outlets were used to spread hatred and intolerance based on ethnic differences.[98]

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[92] UNA S/PV.4804 ; S/RES/1498 (2003) ; S/2003/801 report
[93] UNA S/PV.4857 13 November 2003 ; S/PRST/2003/20; S/2003/1069 Report 4 November 2003
[94] UNA S/PV.4873 24 November 2003 ; S/PV.4874, S/PRST/2003/25 ; S/2004/3,report 13 November 2003
[95] UNA S/RES/1527 (2004) ; S/PV.4909 4 February 2004 ; S/PV.4918 27 February 2004, 1 ; S/RES/1528 (2004)
[96] UNA S/2004/443 2 June 2004 report ; S/PV.4959, 30 April 2004; S/PRST/2004/1
[97] UNA S/PRST/2004/17; S/PV.4977, 25 May 2004 ; S/PV.5018, 5 August 2004; S/PRST/2004/29 ; Report S/2004/697
[98] UNA 6 November 2004, S/PV.5072; S/PRST/2004/4; S/PV.5078 S/RES/1572 (2004); S/PV.5103 16 December 2004; S/PRST/2004/48; S/2004/962 Treport

The representatives of Ivory coast at this time spoke in support of an increased UN presence but primarily as a way to stabilise a situation and support governments, and expressed doubt that democracy, human rights and free markets can build inter and intra national peace, painting themselves as victims of an unreasonable rebellion. They spoke of resources as something to be divided through power sharing, showing a fundamental misunderstanding of democracy, offering reconciliation only on their own terms.[99] The UN was highly concerned not only with stability in Ivory Coast, but also with its internal situation, supporting a peace agreement which included liberal norms and ideas, such as tolerance and inclusion, democracy, and protection of human rights, among others. The local government was not interested in following such norms and this exacerbated an already tense situation into open conflict, as it prioritised self-preservation.

The crisis continued and the sanctions were continued as well, the Ivorian rhetoric at the UN was continually harsh and rigid, with little progress made and with mutual distrust and territorial consolidation between the two sides. The mission began to actively promote a culture of peace but the demobilisation and reconciliation processes were failing, and election preparations stalled due to political tensions and problems. The opposition complained of government obstruction, while the economy was suffering a serious decline and this led to social problems in the country alongside political ones.[100] The UN firmly considered that the holding of free and fair elections was vital to restoring peace and democracy in Côte d'Ivoire, a vital liberal norm, but the overall situation deteriorated because of the political impasse. By the end of summer the opposition claimed that elections would be impossible without significant reform which would render them free, for which there needed to be a transition government without the president.[101] Ivorian leaders still had deep mutual mistrust and suspicion alongside many challenges which were in the way of sustainable peace and security. The two sides did not follow through on their commitments, and the representatives of the government continued to show intransigence and disregard for human rights as they placed the blame on the situation solely on the rebels. The SC then agreed on a postponement but stressed the need for free, fair, open, transparent and credible elections,[102] but the two sides were still deadlocked and unresponsive to mediation, causing the national reconciliation

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[99] UNA S/PV.4899 23. January 2004; S/PV.4903 24. January; S/pv.4970, may 17 2004 ; S/PV.5005 16. July 2004

[100] UNA S/PV.5118 Tuesday, 1 February 2005; S/PV.515228 March 2005; S/2005/135; S/PV.5159 4 April 2005; S/2005/186 18 March 2005 , report, S/PV.5169, 26 April 2005,

[101] UNA S/2005/398 17 June 2005 , report ; S/2005/604 report

[102] UNA S/PV.5278 13 October 2005, ; S/2005/604 26 September 2005 report ; S/PV.5281 14 October 2005,

process to stall.[103] The rhetoric of the government demanded protection for itself without the democratic legitimacy which is necessary for such a request. They expressed scepticism towards peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, while at the same time claiming to be managing the peace process adequately, even though evidence pointed to the contrary.[104]

After the President's term ended he continued to hold on to power, and even the parliament's term ended without an election, causing a new political crisis which was flanked by hate speech in the media, intolerance and a disregard for human rights. The rule of law was an open question, and all temporary respites gave way to new violence, however the opposition figures showed greater concern with liberal norms than government ones.[105] The UN was trying to mainstream gender equality, freedom of speech and tolerance, but these were difficult tasks as the media was full of hatred and violence and the human rights situation was continually bad. This led to a strengthening of the mission and to stronger rhetoric from the UN, to which the local government responded with nominal promises to continue the peace process and with a focus on the need for stability before reform.[106]

This mediation managed to put the local leaders together at a table, but did not bring about actual progress, as reconciliation was not possible while the country was divided and while elections were not held. At the same time the liberal norms of tolerance and dialogue promoted by the UN saw little adoption.[107] All open problems continued unresolved, with narrow political interests dominating the process. With The UN used sanctions and pressure to influence reconciliation but the president refused compromise, acting in an intolerant way as another deadline for elections passed. The UN called for an end to xenophobia and hate speech, as well as for free speech, providing funds and support for the election process, trying to influence the two sides to cooperate.[108] It was concerned with rebuilding political trust between the sides and ensuring basic rights for all citizens, as well as ensuring the

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[103] UNA S/PV.5288 21 October 2005; S/PV.5314 30 November 2005; S/PV.5318 9 December 2005;S/PV.5327 15 December 2005
[104] UNA S/PV.5131 25th february 2005, S/PV.5169 26th April 2005; S/PV.5187 26th May 2005; S/PV.5509 9th August 2005
[105] UNA S/2006/2 report 3 January 2006; S/PV.5350 19 January 2006; S/PRST/2006/2; S/PV.5400 29 March 2006,
[106] UNA S/2006/222 11 April 2006, report; S/PV.5451 2 June 2006;S/PV.5426 27 April 2006,
[107] S/2006/532 Security Council 17 July 2006 report
[108] UNA S/PV.5491 19 July 2006; S/PV.5505 7 August 2006; S/2006/821 report 17 October 2006 ; S/PV.5561 1 November 2006; S/2006/939 report 4 December 2006; S/PV.5591 15 December 2006; S/PV.5606 21 December 2006,

redeployment of state administration in all parts of the country.[109] Even so it became apparent that without stronger will of the local partners with an acceptance of international liberal norms, peace was not achievable.

A temporary respite from the conflict was the Ouagadougou agreement, drafted by the Ivorian leaders as a peace treaty to resolve the crisis after a new attempt at a direct dialogue and a local solution through international mediation, creating local ownership. The focus of this agreement was the demobilisation and reintegration followed by voter registration and electoral preparation, and a return to state authority with a new transitional government. However it did not touch on human rights, crimes were given amnesty, and the method of reconciliation was not specified.[110] This calmed the situation but without significant progress in reconciliation, with the security and human rights situation remaining difficult, and the socio-economic situation not improving. Constant delays to the electoral process and in the implementation of the agreement continued, showing weak political will, and the government unsuccessfully demanded a removal of sanctions based on the appearance of improvement.[111] The government refused to take responsibility for a lack of democracy and tolerance, and maintained that the rebels simply had to give up. In their speeches they did not mention liberal norms or their inclusion in the resolution of the crisis,[112] praising African initiatives over UN ones, wanting a greater localisation and regionalisation of conflict resolution. His representatives complained that UN reports criticised them and that there were unfair sanctions against their country, but they did little to disprove the UN.[113]

The UN supported the electoral process but its organisation was in local hands, which promised to eventually conduct them, however the country was woefully unprepared for elections. Ethnically mixed communities had high levels of violence and police and militia brutality and a low concern for the rule of law, a large number of voters still had to be registered, and the elections were again delayed.[114] Progress was very slow and the two sides were deadlocked, preventing deep issues from being addressed, although the security

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[109] UNA S/PV.5617 10th january 2007;

[110] UNA S/2007/133 Report 8. March 2007. ;S/PV.5651 28th March 2007 ; S/PV.5676 18th May 2007; S/2007/275 report 14 may 2007

[111] UNA S/2007/593 1. October 2007; S/PV.5765 22. October 2007; S/PV.5772 29. October 2007.

[112] UNA S/PV.5717 16. July 2007

[113] S/PV.5868 16th April, S/PV.5765 October 2007.

[114] UNA S/2008/1 report 2nd January 2008; S/PV.5820 15th january 2008; S/2008/250 report 15 april 2008; S/PV.5880 29th april 2008; S/2008/451 10th july report, S/2008/645 13. 0ctober 2008. Report; S/PV.6014 7. November 2008.

situation stabilised. The UN was assessing the success of the peace process by the holding of open, free, fair and transparent elections and therefore conditioned the end of the mission by it, being disappointed in another failed deadline.[115] Even with certain progress, none of the main issues in the country could be solved without a functioning political system manifesting through free elections, which was made harder by the government disagreements with the independent electoral commission and attempts to control that body, as well as government interference in voter registration. Political tensions continued to increase during the year and the government used the security situation as a pretext to indefinitely delay elections,[116] unravelling the fragile peace and showing that liberal norms were not yet accepted no matter the amount of pressure and advocacy the UN put up.

The main point of disagreement became the desire of the government to achieve reunification and disarm the rebels before elections, while the opposition refused this and demanded elections before standing down, creating a stalemate. In spire of all this elections were held in autumn, and surprisingly passed peacefully,[117] However after the opposition leader Ouattara won, the government tried to usurp his win and challenged the independent electoral commission, attempting to provide fraudulent results. The UN which had a certification mandate for the elections which was accepted by the local politicians, was determined to put a stop to the attempts to steal the elections and condemned the president's actions, increasing the size and mandate of the mission and demanding a peaceful transition and restoration of the free media. Following the election violence escalated and the security situation markedly deteriorated, as the president refused to step down and used violence, leading to a grave human rights situation which included violence inspired by ethnicity, politics and religion. The UN imposed sanctions against Gbagbo and his associates and urged him to step aside, while the SC gave UNOCI full support to implement its mandate and protect the legitimate election result.[118]

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[115] UNA S/2009/21 8 January 2009 report ; S/2009/196 Report 13. April 2009; S/PV.6113 28th April 2009;S/PV.6168 23. July 2009.; S/2009/344 report 7. July 2009; S/2009/495 report September 29. 2009; S/PV.6234 December 8th 2009.
[116] UNA S/2010/15 report 7th january 2010; S/PV.6263 21st january 2010; S/PV.6284 17th march 2010; S/2010/245 report 20th of may 2010;
[117] UNA S/PV.6329 3. June 2010; S/PV.6350 30th June 2010; S/2010/537 report 18. October 2010; S/PV.6415 3 November 2010 ; S/PV.6431 24 November 2010; S/2010/600 report 23. November 2010
[118] UNA S/PV.6437 7. December 2010; S/PV.6458 20. December 2010; S/PV.6469 19.january 2011; S/PV.6506 25. March 2011; S/RES/1975 (2011); S/PV.6508 30th march 2011; S/2011/211 report 30th march 2011

The situation continued to deteriorate and was quite difficult until the former president Gbagbo was removed and apprehended on April 11th after he refused all efforts for a peaceful solution to the violent crisis. The northern forces supporting the new president Ouattara (renamed the Republican forces) together with the UNOCI forces and the French forces present in Ivory Coast (with a UN mandate) which were mandated to protect civilians from the former government's indiscriminate violence, took over the capital Abidjan in early April. This led to the legitimate president being installed, and immediately in May he established a commission for Dialogue, truth and reconciliation, and offered former officials the hand of peace. The UN was closely following the previously stopped processes of demobilisation, reintegration, and the reestablishment of the rule of law and of security. The previous government failed to depoliticize administration and to strengthen state institutions, and it failed to integrate the entire population without prejudice. The next steps for the legitimization of the political situation were the legislative elections, the return of displaced persons, a stabilisation of security, and the protection of civilians who were in a fragile situation. The World bank and the African development bank and the IMF provided financial support and loans to help the transition.[119] After years of crisis and failed reform, finally the country was ready to make full use of international support and to bring about peace with UN support and with an openness towards liberal norms.

4.2.2. The second period of the mission and its aftermath 2011-2018

Public order was swiftly restored and a sense of unity was created in the central government, but there were years of conflict that had to be overcome. The UN stressed that the new government must not only establish security, but supply reconciliation, build strong institutions, create inclusive governance, cooperate regionally, protect human rights, address the root causes of conflict and maintain economic development, which was all connected to liberal norms and LPB. The new diplomatic representatives brought with them a new discourse, prioritising human rights, the rule of law, a transparent and inclusive democracy, and being fully supportive of the international mission and international cooperation, promising a democratic turn and a liberalisation of the situation in their country with full cooperation with UNOCI.[120]

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[119] UNA S/2011/387 24 June 2011 Report
[120] S/PV.6513 , 13 April 2011; S/PV.6535 13. May 2011

The government started by restoring law and order and bringing security to the now unified country, but at the same time did not neglect justice and reconciliation. These processes benefited from an increased culture of tolerance and compromise, and the local government was emphasising the desire to take ownership of the reconciliation process, which the UN supported fully. A new government was formed with all political parties except for the former president's party which refused to participate, and the goals of the new government were: Reconciliation, human rights, legislative elections, economic recovery, security reform and a disarmament and reintegration of militias. As militias were disbanding and being integrated into the security services, displaced persons were returning home in large numbers, and the new national army was being instructed to respect republican morality and the principles of human rights and international human law. The new representatives promised a change from the previous policies and abuses of the defeated government, in line with international norms and civil rights, while fostering a culture of forgiveness and tolerance. They promised a fight for transparency, inclusion, approachability and the rule of law, and a focus on economic betterment especially for groups in positions of vulnerability.[121]

The new government was true to its word of being committed to continued democratisation and inclusion, with media freedom and tolerance and campaigning taking place in a calm atmosphere. The elections likewise passed peacefully and without major incidents, and the president promoted national reconciliation as a way to achieve lasting peace and stability, as well as regional cooperation. The UN assisted with the reopening of courts and the creation of a national justice strategy, and an added success was the transfer of the former president to the International court of Justice for a trial. It also actively supported freedom of the press and economic reconstruction and reforms .The situation remained stable and the peace consolidation process was on track.[122]

The new government was cooperating with the UN to achieve international norms and standards, being concerned with questions of gender, employment, healthcare and education, providing all citizens with support, and conducting a reconciliation process. The political situation was improving through the active measures of the government which now represented all citizens and their interests but consolidating peace and democracy was the work of all citizens and a long term process, however the freedoms of assembly and

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[121] UNA S/PV.6584 18 july 2011; S/PV.6591 , 27 July 2011
[122] UNA S/2011/807 30 december 2011; S/2012/186 report 29 march 2012

expression were better protected, and these are key democratic and liberal rights. The new opposition parties were being engaged in dialogue and were not oppressed, and this was reflected by the Ivorian officials which promoted an active and constructive role for the country regionally. Economic recovery was started and there was an enhanced partnership with the private sector, and access to services was improved as well.[123] Even with limited preconditions to democratisation and liberalisation the country was moving forward and had a stable environment to do so in, with UN support and guidance.

The UN initiated dialogue between opponents to make the political process more inclusive, and honest attempts at inclusion and dialogue were being made. The media landscape became more positive and local elections were being prepared with UN assistance, with a special interest in the culture of respect and tolerance. President Ouattara played an active regional role as the chair of ECOWAS, responding to the nearby crises in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, and they actively called for more UN influence and activity in the country.[124] War always has negative long term effects on security and in this case there was no difference, but the security situation was stabilising, and The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process received a national policy and a plan to reintegrate former combatants with the help of UNOCI, while the economy was recovering with billions of dollars pledged by donors.[125]

Regarding Mali, the Ivorian representatives promoted a message of inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, as well as democracy through fair and free elections, also urging cooperation with international organisations. They also called for the protection of human rights and support for sustainable development, and increased UN involvement, and a regional security policy.[126] Ivorians supported the UN and French assistance to the Mali government in response to extremist violence, but urged for reforms and dialogue on the basis of the respect for human rights as a solution.[127] The UN considered that remarkable progress was made after the democratic transition, where political divides and tensions were mediated through dialogue and reconciliation, and contained mostly within political life. There was now a united central authority tackling violence and human rights abuses and the country was

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[123] UNA S/PV.6708 26 January 2012; S/2012/186 report 29 march 2012; S/PV.6761 26 April 2012,
[124] UNA S/2012/506 29 June 2012 ; S/PV.6808 18 July 2012; S/PV.6817 26 July 2012
[125] UNA S/2012/964 31 December 2012
[126] UNA S/PV.6836 7 September 2012; S/PV.6717 21 February 2012; S/PV.6882 10 December 2012; S/PV.6846 12 October 2012; S/PV.6879 , 5 December 2012
[127] UNA S/PV.6903 21 January 2013; S/PV.6965 13 May 2013; S/PV.6898 20 December 2012; S/PV.7090 18 December 2013

unified under one government and legal structure. A major success was the economic growth rate of over eight percent of GDP, helping consolidate the overall situation in spite of the difficulties of social cohesion. Ivorian officials highlighted the enthusiasm for local elections and the belief in their legitimacy as proof that democratic culture was becoming rooted in society.[128]

The government was tending to land reform and identity issues that continued to fuel tensions, however the president was given constitutionally allowed authorization to rule by decree by the national assembly until the end of 2013 in a case of slight democratic backsliding. The local elections went by without trouble even though elements of the opposition criticised them, although many independent candidates won in dozens of municipalities. The humanitarian situation improved considerably, and while there were problems with respect for human rights and the rule of law, they were being addressed. The presence of UNOCI was considered essential both by the UN and the local government. The new nationality law was more inclusive and led to easier naturalisation, as the country joined international conventions on the status of stateless persons.[129]

The resumed political dialogue was a step towards reconciliation, but the release of the former regime's functionaries signalled that the divide between the executive and the judiciary was not strong, however a strong executive was necessary and had political legitimacy through democracy. The president continued to make conciliatory gestures to try and create an inclusive society, which was well received by the population who had increased trust in institutions. The UN recognized these developments in sustainable peace and confidence in reconciliation, and continued the reintegration of the country in international systems.[130] The president focused on the importance of reconciliation, national cohesion, and to that end the continuation of dialogue with political opponents and of conciliatory gestures towards the former regime's supporters, opening the door for political exiles to return and extending the mandate of the dialogue, truth and reconciliation commission. Even with the extended hand, those guilty of gross violations of human rights from a leadership position

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[128] UNA S/PV.6902 17 January 2013; S/PV.6947 16 April 2013
[129] UNA S/2013/377 26 June 2013 report ; S/PV.7004 18 july 2013; S/2013/761 report 24 December 2013
[130] UNA S/PV.7102 27 January 2014; S/PV.7163 29 April 2014

were transferred to the ICJ in the Hague, and the rule of law was improving along with state authority expanding to the whole territory.[131]

The government continued to develop the political process and strengthened the independent electoral commission, building confidence and promoting peaceful coexistence between communities. They supported women's rights and their political participation, as well as religious and ethnic tolerance, and by 2015 the majority of former combatants had been reintegrated into society. Civil society was continually expanding, political stability was consolidated, and the Ivorian representatives considered that a culture of democracy was developing and creating an increasingly equitable society were prioritised alongside an impartial judiciary. They placed an emphasis on the transparency, fairness and inclusivity of the upcoming election in respect for international norms, which was recognized by UNOCI.[132] In relation to the Mali crisis the ivorians continued to support transparent democracy, reconciliation, inclusion and human rights, including inclusion of women and religious tolerance.[133] The UN helped build an environment conducive to an inclusive and peaceful election, which was fully accepted and supported by the local government. The three year commission on dialogue, truth and reconciliation published a final report with many recommendations which were accepted by the president, compensating victims and publishing testimonies, as part of the national social cohesion strategy.[134] The local population showed a commitment to the democratic process and understood the importance of a peaceful election, and in light of these improvements the UN was actively considering a phase-out of the mission.[135]

The presidential election led to the re-election of president Ouattara with eighty four percent of the vote, in a peaceful but politically charged environment, and without incident. The other candidates congratulated the president in a sign of democratic maturity, the majority of the electorate turned up at the polls, and after the victory the president kept the same cabinet and announced legislative elections. The UN gave full technical and advisory support and oversight for the elections but the process was carried out by the locals, and the national human rights commission which was founded in 2012 received greater support and a strategic

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[131] UNA S/2014/342 report 15 may 2014; S/PV.7197 16 June 2014; S/PV.7207 25 June 2014; S/PV.7292 29 october 2014
[132] UNA S/2014/892 12 december 2014; S/PV.7358 , 13 January 2015;
[133] UNA S/PV.7095 16 january 2014
[134] UNA S/2015/320 7 May 2015 report
[135] UNA S/RES/2226 (2015); S/PV.7459 9 june 2015; S/PV.7471 25 june 2015

plan, while yearly economic growth reached nine percent.[136] The UN kept advocating for reconciliation and a consolidation of peace and democracy so that the government would not get complacent, but considered the situation to have improved markedly. The government's rhetoric focused on the progress and change in the country away from a difficult past, and was accepting of new norms, while the president in his victory address guaranteed constitutional equality and national cohesion, and promised increased international cooperation.[137]

After winning the new elections in 2015, the president initiated consultations with various stakeholders to further national reconciliation and social cohesion, and to consolidate democratic gains. The UN continued to provide support for institutional reforms and to promote liberal norms, but was starting to wind down its activities and transfer them to the local government. A shared sense of citizenship and nationhood was being formed, with democratic improvements and a consolidation of the legitimate rule of law.[138] Because of this success the UN terminated all sanctions against the country in 2017, with confidence that the remaining challenges would be met by the government. The officials stressed that reconciliation was the foundation of a unified nation, highlighting the importance of reaching out to political opponents, being focused on solidarity and peacebuilding.[139] They also advocated a respect and understanding for the local context when conducting peacekeeping operations, based on their experience, but stressed the importance of cooperation with international institutions, and were on the whole satisfied with the influence and effect that UNOCI had on their country.[140]

The new democracy was tested as the president introduced a new constitution that was to be put to a referendum, which would address the root causes of the civil war including questions of nationality and identity, and this led to strong political competition. The referendum passed without major incident, the UN put efforts into raising awareness of the importance of voting and participation and for the importance of free speech. The legislative elections followed with clear victory for the government showing the robustness of the democracy. The economy continued to grow at a stable rate and the government assisted the private sector by

[136] UNA S/2015/940 8 december 2015
[137] UNA S/PV.7601 13 january 2016
[138] UNA S/2016/297 31 March 2016
[139] UNA S/PV.7669 12 april 2016; S/PV.7681 28 april 2016; S/PV.7711 10 june 2016;
[140] S/PV.7750 28 july 2016; S/PV.7802 7 november 2016;

promoting business opportunities, liberalising the market somewhat, while state authority was extended and institutions were strengthened. The UN considered the elections to be peaceful, transparent and credible, showing a maturity of the democratic process and the limitation of political differences with the institutional framework.[141]

A shared sense of nationhood and identity was being made that weakened ethnic and religious barriers, and the new constitution underscored the diversity of the country, as well as the importance of tolerance and dialogue, being itself a tool of reconciliation. The constitution also supported women's empowerment and gender equality and Ivorian officials stressed national cohesion, solidarity and solid democratic institutions as their successes, sharing a sense of optimism. The government was so satisfied with the UN assistance that they pledged greater cooperation with other missions in order to share their experience and help others in a spirit of international solidarity. The Ivorian government announced that they would apply for non-permanent membership of the SC next year (and they did in fact become members of it for the term 2018-2019), while the UN in its closing down of UNOCI marked the various successes that the country achieved.[142] The successes were in line with liberal norms, which were expected to promote peace and stability in the context established by the mission. The UN mission was mandated to: Provide political facilitation and support to the Ivorian authorities to address the root causes of the conflict and consolidate peace; to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights; to contribute to the overall effort to promote sustainable peace. These goals were largely achieved.[143]

In the following two years at the security council, Ivorians showcased their acceptance of liberal norms. They stressed the importance of political inclusion, the implementation of the peace agreement, and for the conducting of free elections. They supported decentralisation and an international mediation, as well as an increased role of the UN mission, and called for measures to achieve sustainable economic development and the reducing of inequalities. They highlighted that there could be no military solution, only compromise,[144] pressuring Mali for a more inclusive approach and for more government accountability, and for more cooperation with the international community.[145] They also urged the creation of an inclusive

[141] UNA S/2017/89 report 31 January 2017
[142] UNA S/PV.7879 8 February 2017; S/PV.7992 30 June 2017
[143] UNA Part X Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions pp 488, 2017
[144] UNA S/PV.8163 23 january 2018
[145] UNA S/PV.8229 11 April 2018; S/PV.8435 20 december 2018; S/PV.8407 20 november 2018

and transparent democracy, measures for economic development, and for a constant political dialogue.[146] This would allow a peaceful coexistence among the diverse population, which would participate fully in the reform process putting national interests above narrow ones.[147] This rhetoric is in line with their internalisation of the liberal norms that the mission provided and demanded.

4.3 Framing Peacebuilding in the Mali Crisis

The crisis in Mali had both interesting similarities and certain important differences from the one in Ivory Coast, however the UN mission applied had fewer liberal principles and was primarily oriented towards stabilisation than reform. In this might lie the key to its failure, and the country was not so lucky in the end. In the case of Mali, the international community did not have consensus on how to approach the problem.

The conditions Mali was in and therefore the preconditions for liberalism or democracy, were rather slim. The northern desert region of Mali is poor, and it was never well integrated in the state. The local population refused to cooperate with the central government, raising several rebellions over the decades and leading to their marginalisation by the state after numerous failed peace agreements, creating great animosity between them and the central government.[148] Mali as a whole is part of a historically underdeveloped and crisis prone region with aggressive neighbours, and the international assistance provided to it focused primarily on security threats instead of economic development and social grievances.[149] Regional crises contributed to Mali being destabilised as well, [150] while at the same time the government had limited control outside of metropolitan areas. [151] Over the decades there were numerous rebellions, coups and failed peace agreements , the democratic consolidation was weak, the institutions failing and the state was fragile. [152] Mali had weak institutions and governance and fragile social cohesion, with no national unity and integration, with the

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[146] S/PV.8445 16 january 2019; S/PV.8376 19 october 2018
[147] S/PV.8497 29 march 2019 S/PV.8636 8 October 2019;
[148] Chauzal G, Van Damme T, "Roots of Mali's conflict, moving beyond the 2012 crisis", *CRU report, Clingendael Netherlands institute of International relations, 2015*
[149] Okon E.N. "Ecowas responses to the conflict in Mali 2012 -2021" , *Conflict Studies quarterly, 37, 2021 ; Chauzal and Van Damme,* "Roots of Mali's conflict, moving beyond the 2012 crisis", *2015,*
[150] Ritter N. "Mali: a new challenge for peacekeeping" , *AARMS 13. 2014*
[151] Okyere F, "Statebuilding ,local governance and organized crime in Mali", *International peace institute, 2015*
[152] Vermeig L, Minusma: "challenges on the ground", *Norwegian institute for international affairs 2015*

government not representing all citizens.[153] It was in fact a hybrid transnational war zone where an ethno-religious insurgency broke out in the north in early 2012, proclaiming an independent "Azawad". This Tuareg uprising led to an islamist takeover of all the northern cities and to a military coup in Bamako which ended what was considered a state developing democracy, although it was in a state of degradation and backsliding. [154] The northern rebellion was defeated after Bamako asked Paris for help, by a mix of an AU mission and a UN mission spearheaded by France, leading to the establishment of the UN mission (MINUSMA) in April 2013 to stabilise the country.[155] It was meant as a multi-dimensional stabilisation mission that would prop up state authority while fostering dialogue and reconciliation that could lead to the rule of law and reintegration of minorities.[156] It is important to note that primarily this mission was meant to stabilise the country, not transform it, and the democratisation of it was secondary to the priorities.

The international community was rather slow to react initially, with the AU and ECOWAS failing to stabilise the situation without the UN, [157] with the north remaining in crisis with heavy intercommunal violence.[158] This again justifies faster UN reaction with a wide mandate, but UN peacekeeping was undergoing a stabilisation turn, making support for Human rights and political reforms secondary to security concerns. It was later expanded to include reconciliation and dialogue, but in a limited way.[159] Even with questionable unity the UN could still mandate complex peace operations in Africa, necessitating cooperation between the UN, the AU and ECOWAS, and even with post-colonial concerns French help was welcomed locally and internationally.[160] Even with stabilisation being prioritised, President Hollande gave support for freedom and democracy when approving the mission,[161] and although it was still unclear if the mission would be carried out in the framework of LPB, invoking such principles was meant to justify it. Multilateral interventions generally have greater success than unilateral ones, and without the help of France and the UN the situation

[153] Ritter N. "Mali: a new challenge for peacekeeping", 2014
[154] Chauzal and Van-Damme , "Roots of Mali's conflict, moving beyond the 2012 crisis", 2015
[155] Ramsbotham, "Contemporary conflict resolution", 2005
[156] Ritter "Mali: a new challenge for peacekeeping" 2014
[157] Francis D. "The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali", *Norwegian peacebuilding resource centre, 2013*
[158] Guichaoua Y, "A northern knot: untangling local peacebuilding politics in Mali", *Peace Insights University of Kent, 2016,*
[159] Daniel J, "Building sovereignty? The UN peacekeeping and strengthening the authority of the state in Lebanon and Mali", *Global change, peace and security 29:3 2017, ppp 229-247*
[160] Avezov X, Smit T, "The consensus on Mali and international conflict management in a multi-polar world", *SIPRI 2014,*
[161] Charbonneau B and Sears J, "Fighting for Liberal Peace in Mali? The Limits of International Military Intervention", *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding Volume 8, 2014 - Issue 2-3, pp 192-213.*

was critical.[162] ECOWAS didn't have the capacity for massive action,[163] but the UN mission itself was insufficient, as it failed to create security and force negotiation, leading to a lack of north-south dialogue.[164] With the underlying problems remaining unresolved, and with only the symptoms being treated and not the disease, even UN missions are unsustainable.

The situation in Mali did not improve, the islamist insurgency continued, and the population remained divided and the government lacked credibility and legitimacy [165] Likewise, due to inter-ethnic conflict and discontent emanating from state weakness there was a proliferation of militias.[166] Even the preconditions for democratisation were limited, as Mali had a very shallow and fragile democracy before 2012, which didn't follow through with peace plans or decentralisation, having very low commitment and accountability and disinterested corrupt elites.[167] The UN mission focused more on ensuring security instead of identity issues, harming the UN credibility as a liberal-peacebuilder as the underlying problems weren't solved in favour of supporting a strong government that could physically restrain insurgents. With limited local support and unclear goals and means, the UN failed to adjust to the local situation and the population had unrealistic expectations from it. [168] Although the mission was meant to rebuild a failed state and end regional instability through stabilisation and reconciliation, the peace attempts led to nothing, and central Mali collapsed in 2016 with the security situation deteriorating.[169]

The mission was meant to create free and inclusive elections while restoring stability and providing humanitarian aid, but there was in fact a culture of irresponsibility masquerading as stability. [170] Violence continued and spilled into the central regions by 2015 due to low state capacity and legitimacy, with an increase of inter-ethnic and religious conflict and poorly coordinated responses from the international mission,[171] achieving minimal progress over

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[162] Oluwadare A, "African union and the conflict in Mali: extra-regional influence and the limitations of a regional actor", *African journal of governance and development vol 3 no 1 , 2014*
[163] Okon, "Ecowas responses to the conflict in Mali 2012 -2021" 2021
[164] Vermeig "Minusma: "challenges on the ground", 2015
[165] Boas M, Torheim L, "The Trouble in Mali—corruption, collusion, resistance", *Third World Quarterly ,Volume 34, 2013 - Issue 7, pp 1279-1292*
[166] Hickendorff A, "Civil Society White Book on Peace and Security in Mali (2019)", *Sipri 2019*
[167] Wing S, "Mali's precarious democracy and the causes of conflict", *The United States institute of peace 2013*
[168] Bere M: "Armed rebellions, violent extremism, and the challenges of international intervention in Mali", *African conflict and peacebuilding review, vol 7 no 2 2017, pp. 60-84*
[169] Charbonneau B, "The climate of counterinsurgency and the future of security in the Sahel", *Environmental Science & Policy, Volume 138, December 2022, pp 97-104*
[170] Cold-Ravnkilde S.M, "War and peace in Mali ", *Danish institute for international studies, 2013:33*
[171] Tobie A, "Central Mali: violence, local perspectives and diverging narratives", *SIPRI 2017*

years, with the state remaining fragile and undemocratic.[172] Mali remained unstable and poor, with its governance and security degrading, remaining remained the darling of international donors which supported a democratic process which was only nominal.[173] Karlsrud explains that the mandates of peace enforcement aimed at neutralising groups violates the UN idea of peacekeeping, which should use minimal force and be impartial.[174] In this case the UN used a large amount of force for the sake of stabilisation, rather than for the sake of democratisation or liberalisation, and all that force amounted to naught.

The building of democracy in post-conflict societies depends on the reconstruction of trust and reconciliation, which failed in Mali,[175] and Raineri notes that the peacebuilding process in Mali was more accountable to external than local aspirations, being focused on a short term fix that would support the corrupt local government that was eventually overthrown. The elections were untransparent and led to a compromised government without a truly democratic process, malleable to foreign influence.[176] Another problem in this regard is that within the UN missions there is friction between the contributing countries due to national interests, leading to incoherence of the mission.[177] Therefore neither the preconditions nor the conditions were conducive to a democratisation, nor was the mission suited for the task.

The distinction between war and peace in Mali was blurred, and state violence was justified by the struggle for peace and counter-terrorism. The population was divided into those with whom peace is possible and those which have to be defeated by force.[178] In regards to this there is a criticism of UN stabilisation operations as mixing liberal and illiberal goals and strategies, as they focus on state authority and using violence while excluding non state actors. In Mali the government excluded numerous groups from participation and repressed them,[179] and while the presence of peacekeepers makes local people more optimistic about other groups reciprocating cooperation, for this they must be in direct contact with the

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[172] Strydom H, "Mali and the sahel: making peace in another rough neighbourhood", *Netherlands international law review, 66 2019*

[173] Tronc E, Grace R, Nahikian A, "Local perspectives on peacebuilding, development and humanitarian action in Mali", *Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2019*

[174] Karlsrud , "From Liberal Peacebuilding to Stabilization and Counterterrorism, Counterterrorism", 2019

[175] Bratton M, "Violence, displacement and democracy in post-conflict societies: evidence from Mali", *journal of contemporary African studies 4(4): 2016, pp 1-22*

[176] Raineri L, Mali, "The short-sightedness of donor driven peace building", *Journal of peacebuilding and development Vol. 11, No. 1 (April 2016), pp. 88-92*

[177] Albrecht, P , Cold-Ravnkilde S, "National interests as frictions: peace keeping in somalia and Mali", *Journal of Intervention and state building, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 14(2): 2020, pp 1-17*

[178] Charbonneau B, Ricard M, Moe L, "Counterinsurgency and peacebuilding in Somalia and Mali", *Routledge handbook of African Peacebuilding, 2022*

[179] Duarte G, Souza M, "Illiberal peacebuilding in UN stabilization: peace operations and peace agreements in the CAR, the DRC and Mali", *International Peacekeeping, Vol. 31, no 2, 2014 pp. 157-185,*

locals.[180] The French intervention and the reliance of violence ultimately set the conditions for state capture in two coups after 2020, collapsing the mission and the effort, as a focus on security without political reforms led to a strong military and a weak government with low legitimacy.[181] This shows the limitations that are inherent in prioritising stabilisation over solving structural issues and changing the mindset of the local stakeholders.

4.4. Empirical Analysis and Narrative of the Mali Mission

In this section we repeat the same process as in the previous section, providing an analysis based on primary sources for the mission and its processes in Mali, likewise dividing it into two sections in order to highlight the different contexts in which the mission found itself. We begin before the mission starts and end after it finishes, to provide a wider context.

4.4.1. The Establishment and First period of the Mission, 2012-2018

The acute crisis in Mali started in 2012, with a Tuareg rebellion in the north which proclaimed an independent state of Azawad and entered conflict with the central authorities in Bamako, followed by islamist militant groups taking control of northern areas of the country, causing a deterioration of the humanitarian situation and violating human rights. The Sahel region was generally unstable and was made more so by the civil war in nearby Libya. This led to a coup that removed the president from power and installed a military junta, which did not want ECOWAS to get involved politically. The UN considered Mali to be consolidating democracy until the coup, but in a short span of time it completely unravelled, leading the UN, AU and ECOWAS to try to mediate the crisis and achieve a transition back to democratic practice.[182] Mali was in the midst of a profound political, humanitarian, socioeconomic, security and human rights crisis, suffering due to weak institutions, ineffective governance, fragile social cohesion, high corruption and abuse of power, with northern communities feeling neglected and marginalised by the central government.[183]

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[180] Nomikos W, " Peacekeeping and the Enforcement of Intergroup Cooperation: Evidence from Mali", *The Journal of Politics, Volume 84, Number 1, 2021, pp 194-208*
[181] Gazeley J, "The strong weak state: French state building and military rule in Mali", *Journal of intervention and statebuilding 16:3 2022, pp 269-286*
[182] UNA S/PV.6709 January 26 2012; S/PV.6741 26 March 2012;S/PV.67454 April 2012;
[183] UNA S/2012/894 28 November 2012

The junta was pressured by the international community towards the restoration of constitutional rule, as they demanded an inclusive national dialogue with all political forces and elections within a year. An interim president was chosen under international pressure, mr. Traore, and he formed a national unity government in summer which was willing to cooperate with the UN, but it was not functioning adequately. Meanwhile the rebels and islamist extremists continued to consolidate their control in the north.[184] The initial goals of the UN were to support the local authorities in creating a dialogue and a return to constitutional order, with a negotiated settlement with non terrorist rebel groups It was pressuring the government to continue preparing, but it stressed local ownership of the crisis. It's threats of intervention made some rebel groups more open to dialogue, but there were massive internal divisions without a common vision for the country. The government was primarily interested in assistance in returning the north under its control, avoiding the mentioning of liberal norms apart from elections, as it was fully focused on the security crisis. They accepted that the grievances of the Tuareg people need to be addressed and that dialogue had to be established in order to bring them in amity, but they rejected the reality of their marginalisation.[185]

The Mali crisis to be a part of a sustained and systemic crisis across the entire region, including weak institutions and fragile economies that made the populations especially vulnerable. The UN suggested a need for decentralisation that would be carried out with local ownership and governmental responsibility while the organisation supports it. The UN mandated an African-led support mission to help protect the population and restore national unity and constitutional order. The armed forces were interfering with the work of the transitional authorities making them unstable and nonfunctional, and the political process stalled.[186] The security situation in the north collapsed due to the rebel takeover, the economy was decreasing and living standards sharply fell, and as the coup prevented presidential elections from being held a political crisis occurred. The UN focused on helping the local authorities create the conditions for credible elections while mediating between various groups inside Mali, stressing negotiation with moderate rebel sand an inclusive political dialogue as a way to achieve reconciliation[187] , which can all be considered based on liberal norms.

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[184] UNA S/PV.6798 5 July 2012; S/PV.6804 11 july 2012 ; S/PV.6836; S/PV.6846 12 October 2012
[185] UNA S/PV.6879 , 5 December 2012;
[186] UNA S/PV.6882 , 10 December 2012; S/PV.6898 20 December 2012
[187] UNA S/2012/894 28 November 2012

The first international help came from France and the AU, whose forces helped the government in the North, but the UN was preparing for a mission of its own that would ensure sustainable peace, stability and reconciliation. The Malian representatives in their public discourse focused on security needs rather than on peacebuilding and liberal norms, while the UN stressed the need for a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping that would facilitate peacebuilding and prevent a relapse into conflict.[188] The political tensions between the transition government and the military and the leaders and the coup remained very strained, and the government was open to dialogue only with those rebel groups which respected the country's territorial integrity and secular nature. They announced the establishment of a commission for dialogue and reconciliation, but the media were subject to censorship and attack, limiting freedom of speech and information, and socioeconomic indicators were decreasing. The crisis of governance created a weak state and broken political system, making the UN focus on strengthening state capacity and building the legitimacy of the state and the political system through long term reforms and free elections within constitutional order. There was a high level of political and social polarisation between communities, not just north-south but within them, necessitating dialogue and reconciliation. The population had low confidence in the electoral process, lack of political reforms, high corruption, and overall the lack of inclusion undermined democracy.[189]

The influence of the UN and its support for the security of Mali led the interim government to promise the holding of presidential elections under international assistance, and to respect inclusiveness and plurality.[190] Regional conflicts were the result of poor governance, poor distribution of resources, and human rights abuses, so the UN demanded the inclusion and participation of marginalised groups in the socio-political life in their respective countries, and in this period focused on the support of such liberal processes and goals.[191] The SC established the peacekeeping Mission for Mali through resolution 2100 under chapter seven of the charter (MINUSMA) , which was meant to facilitate not only security and stability but democracy, as well as freedom of speech and the media. The Mission was meant to support national political dialogue, inclusion, transparent elections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, reconciliation, and the protection of human rights, and the government

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[188] UNA S/PV.6903 21 January 2013; S/PV.6905 22 january 2013
[189] UNA S/2013/189 26 march 2013, report
[190] UNA S/PV.6944 3 april 2013
[191] UNA S/PV.6946 15 april 2013

promised cooperation.[192]   Mali continued to face major political challenges that undermined social cohesion, such as social polarisation, political antagonism and intercommunal tensions. The newly appointed dialogue and reconciliation commission was considered untransparent and not sufficiently inclusive, although the government with the help of the UN was engaging in dialogue with northern groups. The UN was giving technical assistance for the holding of elections, but the country was far from united or prepared.[193]

The government began negotiations with northern rebels for the sake of the restoration of constitutional order and territorial integrity, hoping to organise the elections in the entire country after the international security assistance improved the situation. The UN mission was meant to put the government under added pressure after regional mediation failed, while the government's discourse was nominally accepting of transparent elections, hoping that integrity would be restored.[194] After months of strife, Mali had succeeded in conducting a nationwide peaceful presidential election, whereby Mr Keita was sworn in, and soon a government was formed as well, including a ministry for reconciliation and development of the northern regions. This was carried out with UN support and oversight and after months of diplomatic negotiations and pressures, however the elections did not immediately lead to reconciliation activities and the former coup leaders continued to have political influence.[195] The government was confident that the country was pulled from the brink of collapse and claimed to be focusing on inter-community dialogue and reconciliation. The government spoke of a unified and pluralist Mali, the restoration of confidence in the government, inclusion and limited decentralisation, and they promised reforms and democratisation.[196] The new government thus promised an adherence to liberal norms expected from the UN charter's principles, yet now that the security crisis was resolved it was still an open question if words would be turned into deeds.

The implementation of the promises was slow and inclusive and credible negotiations were still not implemented after several months, even with the remaining rebels offering to disarm upon a signature of a comprehensive peace accord. The new president claimed that Mali would be in charge of the reconciliation process since it now had legitimate institutions, and

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[192] UNA S/PV.6952 25 april 2013
[193] UNA S/2013/338 10 june 2013 report
[194] UNA S/PV.6985 25 june 2013
[195] UNA S/2013/582 1 october 2013
[196] UNA S/PV.7043 16 october 2013

that any new agreement would be signed in Mali and not through mediation, demanding that the disarming of rebels should precede the negotiation. The UN demanded implementation without preconditions and pointed to the danger of delay in the peace process, as the growing lack of trust between the sides created the risk of radicalisation. State authority was still not fully established in the North, and not all communities felt represented in the limited dialogue, leading to an increase of violent intercommunal outbursts in the north. The legislative elections passed and brought a semblance of constitutional order, and the new government started consultation on decentralisation in order to build confidence, however they still needed to address the root causes of the crisis in order to build genuine peace.[197]

The political situation continued to improve slowly with a restoration of order and well organised legislative elections and ouvertures towards national consultation, but the north still lacked sufficient state authority and even basic services. UN mediation and pressure brought the northern rebels back to the negotiating table and the government held a national conference in the north in order to promote reform and good governance and to reinforce unity. Mali was still facing widespread poverty and humanitarian issues, especially in the north where the security was also deteriorating and the disarmament process stalling, and the UN recognised the connection between development and security and pressured the government to provide measures to solve the urgent issues, and it created an emergency programme for the development in the north.[198] Mali was still highly volatile and all progress was likely to be undone without governmental focus and international support. It's government was still optimistic about the state of their democracy and their attempts at decentralisation and reconciliation, but the discourse still considered all of Mali to be one nation rather than the country being multicultural or multinational, ignoring the causes for northern rebelliousness. [199] The state capacity for governance was still lacking, and the economy was still unstable although it achieved growth of five percent, however Mali had strong regional and international support and cooperation. The UN continued to push for liberal norms to be followed, such as full social inclusion, the rule of law, impartial governance and a stable democracy, which were seen as crucial to peace.[200]

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[197] UNA S/2014/173 11 March 2014, Report of the Security Council mission to Mali, 1-3 February 2014 ;
S/PV.7120 26 february 2014; S/2014/1 2 january 2014 report
[198] UNA S/2014/1 2 january 2014 report
[199] UNA S/PV.7095 16 january 2014; S/PV.7099 23 january 2014
[200] UNA S/2014/229 report 28 march 2014

The government put the blame entirely on rebels, focusing on the need for unity and integrity and exaggerating its progress, worrying the SC, but signalling the intent to continue inclusive reconciliation efforts with international support.[201] The rebels were dismayed with the lack of progress and continued a low level insurgency,[202] leading to serious breaches of the ceasefire. The prime minister resigned, claiming that the government was failing to address core challenges and provide reforms, and no significant progress was achieved on the inclusive dialogue. The UN was pressuring the government to solve the crisis with political dialogue, not security measures.[203] The UN managed to mediate an urgent ceasefire, but the government's focus was still on security and stabilisation rather than addressing the causes of the conflict, and asking for increased international help in the fight against rebels. Intermittent violence continued as the crisis was not resolved for long, only alleviated through mediation.[204] The north was still not under government control which refused to compromise on the unitarian structure of the state, demanding that the rebels submit. Even so, agreements were signed in Algiers between the government and the Azawad rebels with international mediation , which formalised the peace process, but the ceasefire was still being violated.[205] The negotiation process led to agreement on certain liberal principles, such as the secular, unitary nature of the state, decentralisation, facilitation of cultural diversity, and reconciliation. However the institutional framework was not agreed upon as rebels wanted federalism while the government offered limited regionalism. At the same time the proposed agreements were ambiguous, and the rebels wanted political and institutional autonomy, while southern populations were against appeasement of the north.[206]

Security continued to deteriorate and the ceasefire was not respected, while the government stressed that they would respect diversity and decentralisation but not regional autonomy, which undermined the peace process and agreements over its implementation.[207] The government refused quotas that would ensure representation of all communities in state institutions, and refused to accept the existence of Azawad as a specific territory in any form. It continued to be unstable with frequent collapses, suffering from corruption, and contending high distrust and communal polarisation.[208] Months passed without agreement, with the two

[201] UNA S/PV.7158 23 april 2014
[202] UNA S/PV.7179 20 may 2014
[203] UNA S/2014/403 report 9 June 2014
[204] UNA S/PV.7202 18 june 2014; S/PV.7210 25 june 2014; S/PV.7227 28 july 2014
[205] UNA S/2014/692 22 September 2014 report; S/PV.7274 8 october
[206] UNA S/2014/943 report 23 December 2014
[207] UNA S/PV.7355 6 january 2015; S/PV.7378 6 february 2015
[208] UNA S/2015/219 report 27 March 2015

sides consolidating their positions, however part of the northern rebels coalesced into two political groups that signed an agreement on peace and reconciliation with the government. This was a limited success and the peace process was still highly unstable, but the UN was mediating as much as possible and now there was at least a formal process with a signed agreement.[209]

The UN wanted to focus more on peacebuilding and statebuilding, but the security conditions were not conducive to it, whereas the government wanted these processes to be done under their terms while disregarding the legitimate concerns of their opponents and demonising them.[210] The government attempted to include more northern rebel groups in the peace framework while antagonising other groups, and to de-escalate tensions with the help of UN mediation, while revised electoral laws were yet to be implemented. Not even a lasting and full ceasefire was achieved, nor were the rule of law and respect for human rights widespread, with the government creating various committees on reconciliation but without progress, conceding that the optimism created by the signing of the agreement waned.[211] There were more government reshuffles, and a postponement of the regional and local elections due to a lack of conditions, while socio-economic development stalled.[212] The government continued to ignore the deep causes of the conflict while stubbornly implementing its mild decentralisation policy and focusing mostly on security issues. Key provisions of the agreement saw continued delays, and consultations did not bring results due to large disagreements between the government and rebels about implementation.[213]

The more implementation was delayed, the worse the security situation became as trust was eroded, with the government expecting the UN mission to solve the security problems for them, leveraging reforms in relation to this, while the UN saw the solution not in military but in political measures which had to happen first. The lack of trust continued as rebels refused to disarm without political reform, and the government was still conditioning and promising reform upon surrender.[214] The rebel groups openly showed discontent with the government's progress on political reforms and the dialogue with the government fas failing, while the

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[209] UNA S/PV.7425 9 april 2015; S/2015/426 report 11 June 2015
[210] UNA S/PV.7468 23 june 2015; S/PV.7474 29 june 2015
[211] UNA S/2015/732 22 september 2015 report; S/PV.7528, 6 October 2015; S/PV.7566 25 november 2015
[212] UNA S/2015/1030 24 december 2015 report
[213] UNA S/PV.7600 11 january 2016; S/2016/281 report 28 March 2016
[214] UNA S/PV.7665 5 april 2016; S/PV.7719 16 june 2016

government still did not have political or military control of large parts of the north.[215] The continuance of ceasefire violations, the slow progress of reforms and the lack of measurable reconciliation were making the agreement obsolete.[216] Security problems and disagreements between signatory parties overshadowed other issues and the committees for reconciliation made little progress,the local elections were not carried out in the entire territory and some rebel groups rejected their legitimacy. The government was preparing a revision of the constitution, but its commitment to the peace process and political inclusion was low. Women were still minimally represented in governance and committees, and there was both ethnic and religious intolerance and limited media freedom, with challenges to the rule of law and the consolidation of democracy.[217]

The government did not do enough to create trust and to address human rights violations, and it was conscious that its partners were losing patience regarding the implementation of the peace, but it was active given the circumstances and it carried out elections with some success, being determined to achieve peace but only under its own terms and while refusing to accept the rebel's demands as legitimate.[218] The intense international engagement did not manage to decrease tensions between the signatory parties, with the rebels decrying a lack of inclusiveness in the decision making process regarding implementation, as well as exclusion from governance and a lack of reform.[219] The limited success achieved by the government was the organisation of a conference of national understanding to a muted response, and it's appointments of transitional authority officials to the north, most of which operated from the south.[220]

Continuing the attempts to implement the peace and reconciliation agreement with the support of the international mediation team, the government held a conference for national harmony, bringing together opposition parties and signatory armed groups, resulting in a set of recommendations for unity and reconciliation. These suggestions included addressing governance issues, cultural diversity, political inclusiveness and socioeconomic issues. Women were included in the conference but only a few members of the commission were women, and their inclusion was supported by the UN mission which also contributed to the

[215] UNA S/2016/498 report 31 May 2016
[216] UNA S/PV.7727 29 june 2016; S/PV.7784 6 october 2016; S/PV.7801 3 november 2016
[217] UNA S/2016/1137 report 30 December 2016
[218] UNA S/PV.7864 18 January 2017
[219] UNA S/2017/271 report 30 March 2017
[220] UNA S/PV.7917 6 april 2017

organisation of the conference and provided public information tools to inform all citizens of the proceedings. Disarmament and reintegration were still proceeding slowly, and while officials were appointed to the north to establish interim authorities they were not based there due to insecurity. The governments continued to be unstable and to be reshuffled, failing to include women up to the thirty percent quota, while the new constitution draft gave the president too much power, including over the judiciary, and did not mention the integration of traditional authorities or women. There was widespread discontent among civil servants, the recommendations of the national conference had little impact on politics, and the regions were not receiving the necessary political attention, nor was there a clear vision for implementation of the peace agreement. The UN mission was facing capability problems as it was given too much of a burden to carry, with the local government unable to provide for security nor to carry out necessary reforms.The government continued to officially support liberal norms in their own interpretation, but it was becoming apparent that their commitments to implementing inclusive peace were not entirely genuine as peace was always somewhere in the future.[221]

The interim and transitional period was again extended and the implementation continued to be delayed, with much fruitless dialogue that failed to stop hostilities or create reconciliation. The operationalisation of interim authorities was hindered by internal rivalries and limited state capacities, and civil administration was not extended to the north due to insecurity and disagreements with the rebels. The UN continued to promote a multidimensional approach in accordance with the liberal norms promoted, but it had very limited influence on the local stakeholders, who continued to be highly distrustful of one another.[222] Mali was marked by social unrest, protests against the constitutional reform and violent clashes between the signatory armed groups, with a delay of the implementation of key political provisions of the peace agreement. The elections were delayed to 2018 as it was nearly impossible to hold them in such conditions, with a failure to provide the rule of law under one judicial system, and the failure to achieve security and political inclusion. This undermined the legitimacy of the government and of the peace process, and the large economic aid which was given to Mali failed to solve economic problems, with large inequalities of wealth remaining and the macro-economic structure being unstable and unbalanced. Years after the elections,

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[221] UNA S/2017/478 report 6 June 2017; S/PV.7975 16 June 2017; S/PV.7991 29 June 2017; S/PV.8040 5 September 2017
[222] UNA S/2017/811 report 28 September 2017; S/PV.8062 5. October 2017

democracy was not consolidated and the peace dialogue was not successful,[223] leading the two sides to lose patience and to become less open to reconciliation and less malleable to foreign pressure.

4.4.2. The second period of the mission and Aftermath 2018-2023

In 2018 the president was Re-elected, however conditions deteriorated to such an extent that other elections and constitutional reform were delayed, and the peace process remained minimally active. Mali was facing growing insecurity and a notable decrease in the socio-economic and humanitarian situations, while the government continued to stress national unity and reject the multicultural character of the country, and were still making roadmaps and plans and strategies almost three years into the process, with a lack of progress. The UN was very concerned over the lack of progress and instability, as well as over a lack of reforms in line with liberal norms, and the inability of the government to establish authority and include minorities and decentralise.[224]

The government was failing to follow the electoral timetable and there was doubt in the UN mission over whether the elections would be peaceful and credible, while the implementation of the agreement became a political struggle. The fifth government during president Keita's term was established and it tried to approach the northern regions to limited effect, with a lack of reforms and implementation, as they still considered the opponents to their position to be enemies without legitimate political demands.[225] The level of mistrust between the government and the opposition increased as the regional and local elections were delayed, leading to demonstrations and a breakdown of dialogue. State authority and the rule of law were also decreasing, and the UN considered the Malian people to not have significant ownership over the peace process, and that there was a lack of political will to achieve peace or follow the UN norms. At the same time the mission was overstretched, understaffed, it lacked resources and had high casualties, as they bore the brunt of the attempts to stabilise the country as Mali's forces were in disarray and unreformed.[226]

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[223] UNA S/2017/1105 report 26 December 2017
[224] UNA S/PV.8163 23 january 2018; S/2018/273 Report 29 March 2018
[225] UNA S/PV.8229 11 April 2018; S/PV.8266 23 may 2018
[226] UNA S/2018/541 report 6 June 2018

The UN decided to put a larger focus on the peace process and the elections which were considered crucial in the democratic consultation and reconciliation, demanding an inclusive political dialogue and political settlement of disputes. This dialogue was missing and the state institutions were losing legitimacy and presence.[227] The UN also focused on the inclusion of women and youth, and on tolerance and inter-communal reconciliation, pressuring the government to continue reforms to little effect. The elections were marked by political tensions and incidents, with concerns over transparency and access to public media, with the opposition claiming that the elections were not credible and most candidates accused the president of electoral fraud. In the runoff the challenger rejected the results, and the turnout was under 35 percent, however the UN considered the credibility satisfactory and attempted to pressure the government towards reform.[228] The UN also made the government sign a "pact for peace" with the organisation as a form of international pressure, to supplement the commitment to the peace process, the rule of law, decentralisation, inclusive political reform, national reconciliation measures, and security and economic reform. [229]

The new government had a specific ministry created for the implementation of the peace agreement, which was a hollow institution as the processes of reform and reconciliation were not developing, and the signatory movements did not feel included nor represented and threatened to boycott the process of territorial and administrative restructuring, while the discussions on a planned national accord act were postponed. [230] The government renewed consultations on the project of national reconciliation under the pressure of the UN mission, preparing new elections and a constitutional referendum, but moving very slowly. The opposition boycotted the process as they found the meetings held to be non inclusive, and large parts of the country were developing parallel political processes while entrenching ethno-religious differences. The country was divided and fragile and the UN urged a political solution rather than confrontation,[231]as intercommunal relations deteriorated and governments collapsing under demonstrations and strife during a period of instability. The UN mission was concerned that the constitutional review won't be inclusive and frustrated that the root causes of the crisis were not being addressed.[232]

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[227] UNA S/PV.8288 14 June 2018; S/PV.8298 28 june 2018; S/PV.8336 30 August 2018
[228] UNA S/2018/866 report 25 September 2018
[229] UNA S/RES/2423 (2018) 28th june 2018 ; S/PV.8376 19 october 2018
[230] S/2018/1174 Report 28 December 2018; S/PV.8445 16 january 2019
[231] UNA S/2019/262 report 26 March 2019
[232] UNA S/PV.8497 29 march 2019; S/2019/454 report 31 may 2019; S/PV.8547 12 june 2019

The government signed an agreement with certain opposition parties and launched a new national dialogue, but it continued to fail to achieve dialogue with main opposition parties who lost trust in it and left consultations en masse, accusing the government of not being inclusive or open to compromise. At the same time the transitional justice process was hindered by government arbitrariness, witn ain creased lack of confidence of the population in the state.[233] The agreement monitoring committee couldn't even meet in the north, and the dialogue was completely failing as rebel demands were not respected, creating further uncertainty.[234] The situation continued to unravel in 2020, as the implementation had been slow and uneven, with important decisions postponed due to disagreements between the signatories and elections delayed due to the crisis. The national dialogue was boycotted by opposition parties and some rebel groups, while elections and constitutional reform were delayed, and rebels continually refused to disarm, and the government ignoring the lack of inclusion of wide swathes of the country.[235]

The government at least provided the semblance of an inclusive dialogue with rebels, but no major decisions or reforms had been applied or enforced.[236] The eventual elections were not held peacefully and there was interference by armed groups, and the leader of the opposition was abducted by extremists. At the same time the signatory parties made no progress on reconciliation due to constant disagreements, while the UN pressured the government to continue the promised constitutional reforms and maintain dialogue, as mandate still was heavily tilted towards security problems and stabilisation.[237] The fragile and unconsolidated democracy eventually collapsed in a coup in August, it being the culmination after widespread protests and dissatisfaction with the president, the government and the elections, caused by anger at the government interference in the election results where they overturned a large number of seats in their favour. After being accused of monopolising power and failing to implement long overdue reforms, the president and the prime minister were imprisoned, forced to resign and to dissolve the assembly. Colonel Goita installed himself as the head of a junta that promised to end bad governance and bring security to the whole of the country, while honouring previous commitments of the government he deposed. The event was universally condemned and ECOWAS suspended and blocked Mali, putting it under

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[233] UNA S/2019/782 Report 1 October 2019
[234] UNA S/PV.8636 8 October 2019; S/2019/983 Report 30 December 2019
[235] UNA S/PV.8703 15 january 2020
[236] UNA S/2020/223 Report 20 March 2020
[237] UNA S/2020/476 Report 2 June 2020; S/2020/625 2 july 2020

sanctions. The junta promised elections after a period of transition, providing transitional authorities, as well as a small appointed legislative body made up of various national stakeholders, whereas the leader of the junta designated himself as vice-president.[238]

The main reasons behind the collapse were popular grievances with corruption, insecurity, lack of political participation, unfulfilled promises for socio-economic improvement and institutional reforms, loss of faith in institutions, weakening of government power, and the rise of religious leaders. The junta promised elections, and included members of the signatory movements which were for the first time officially entered the government of Mali, appearing initially inclusive and reconciliatory. The UN tolerated the change under the conditions that elections be conducted within the period of one and a half years which the junta promised, and that the peace agreement's implementation continues.[239] The transitional government and parliament were appointed rather than elected, mostly from the military and contrary to the consultations held with political actors, and its rule by decree was rejected by both the previous government and the opposition. The coup led to a collapse of the political and administrative situation, setting back reforms and the peace implementation, and harming the limited rule of law.[240] The leader of the junta colonel Goita eventually seized power in the summer, removing the transitional president and prime minister which he previously appointed, and making himself the president. The seizure of power was justified by a perceived lack of inclusivity and transparency in the transition process, which continued in the same manner after the second coup. ECOWAS and the AU again suspended Mali, and failed to mediate, while at the same time increased violence in the north effectively dismantled the peace implementation process.[241]

The UN proclaimed that only an inclusive, civilian led government chosen at credible elections can create social cohesion and restore the faith of the population in state institutions, but it became obvious that no compromise for the sake of national interests will be reached and that a coherent vision or strategy of reconciliation was lacking. The junta prioritised security issues and delayed the elections while making no headway in the peace process, continuing to rule by decree to general consternation inside and outside of the country.[242]

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[238] UNA S/2020/859 31 august 2020; S/2020/867 1 september 2020; S/2020/952 Report 29 September 2020
[239] UNA S/PV.8765 8 october 2020; S/PRST/2020/10 15 october 2002;
[240] UNA S/2020/1281 Report 28 December 2020
[241] UNA S/2021/519 Report 1 June 2021
[242] UNA S/PV.8794 14 june 2021

Intercommunal violence increase with an more of incidents and a proliferation of extremist groups, supplemented with repression of political opponents.[243] The junta was not adequately cooperating with the UN, blaming it for failing to restore security in the country and avoiding their own responsibility, exhibiting no acceptance of liberal norms, as the UN was doing what it could to continue pressure.[244]

The junta's call for national dialogue on reform fell on deaf ears, and there was widespread political division and open opposition on various aspects of the transition. Due to political polarisation and rule by decree the national dialogue was postponed indefinitely. The state was weak and had very limited influence or control outside of the capital, and had increasingly strained relations with the international community which demanded that elections be held. The junta finally expelled the special representative of ECOWAS from the country and declared that elections will not take place as planned, leading to sanctions being imposed on them, after which they closed their borders. [245] The UN mission continued to operate and to pressure the government towards reform and elections, but it was apparent to them that the entire project was failing. The Junta paid little heed to pressures and continued their policies, focusing on a military solution against the rebels, and accepting Russian military support to that end. Their discourse was unrealistic, as they considered themselves unfairly maligned by the international community, while ignoring liberal norms. [246] There was a tense atmosphere between the junta, the political opposition and the northern signatories as the deadline for the transition passed in failure, and the UN's calls for a political solution were ignored.[247] As international mediation failed, reform and peace implementation followed, and Mali was governed by decree with elections essentially postponed indefinitely. Trust declined markedly and both the government and the signatories of the agreement were arming themselves and recruiting new forces.[248]

The junta declared that the transitionary period will continued for at least another two years, and as such the future of the reforms, elections and peace implementation became unknown, leading to a further decrease of trust.[249] The UN mission tried to continue as before, but they

[243] UNA S/2021/844 Report 1 October 2021
[244] UNA S/PV.8893 29 october 2021; SC/14687 4 November 2021
[245] UNA S/2021/1117 Report 4 January 2022
[246] UNA S/PV.8945 11 January 2022
[247] UNA S/PV.9012 7 april 2022
[248] UNA S/2022/446 Report 2 June 2022
[249] UNA S/PV.9061 13 june 2022

had no partner in the junta, which blamed the problems in the country on foreign interference and subversion, even accusing the UN of subverting the country, negating their own responsibility and and ignoring the problems they faced and the root causes of conflict.[250] The junta was preparing its own constitution which would give large powers to the president and jeopardise the separation of power, with no democratic legitimacy or legality, while negating the heterogeneous nature of the country. Their focus was on stabilising the country by force and through central authority, by conducting untransparent consolidation of power which further deteriorated the political and military situation.[251] The junta's relations with France deteriorated, and they began to restrict MINUSMA and obstruct it's work while complaining that its pressure was politicised. This combined with increased marginalisation of minorities led to further conflict in two thirds of the country and a humanitarian disaster, as well as to a strained relationship with the UN whose pressures and norms were no longer welcome.[252]

The junta postponed the constitutional referendum, and were adjusting election laws without a parliament and without plans for an election. Elections were being considered by it as disruptive and confrontational, and their constant delay was justified with their potential to worsen the situation, showing the preference of the junta for stability through dictatorship. [253] Without legitimate authorities, local cooperation or an active peace process there was little the UN could do, as the junta began to demand the removal of the mission,[254] which soon followed. The presence on the mission had contributed to the ceasefire in the north between the government and the signatory parties, and its removal signified the end of the implementation of the peace agreement, with both sides threatening new military action. Likewise the SC itself became divided as Russia began to veto proposals to continue sanctions against the military junta of Mali, acting as its protector after signing security contracts with it, and with that both the mission and the consensus of the mission in the SC ended.[255]

[250] UNA S/2022/731 Report 3 October 2022; S/PV.9154 19 october
[251] S/2023/21 Report 6 January 2023; S/PV.9251 27 January 2023
[252] UNA S/2023/36 Report 16 January 2023
[253] UNA S/2023/236 report 30 March 2023; S/PV.9302 12 april 2023
[254] UNA S/2023/402 Report 1 June 2023; S/PV.9350 16 june 2023
[255] UNA S/2023/480 30 june 2023; S/PV.9407 28 august 2023; S/PV.9408 30 august 2023

5 Comparative Process Tracing of the Two Missions

In this section we have separated the main processes from the overall narrative of the Missions, in order to examine them more closely and provide an overview of how these separate elements of the whole progressed through the length of the missions. We do this while comparing individual processes in the two missions to each other.

5.1 The Democratisation Process

Initially Ivory Coast was divided, as the president was stubbornly refusing to allow for free elections and inclusion, and the government was doubtful of democracy and liberalism, having a misunderstanding of the form and function of democracy. The government and the rebels became more confrontational as elections were continually delayed, while the UN mission was focusing on them as the most important aspect of progress. Trust was eroded and a political crisis emerged, preventing other processes such as reconciliation, until electoral fraud led to a popular overthrow of the former president with UN assistance. The new government immediately planned elections and reforms, which were transparent and free according to liberal norms. Political rights and freedoms were restored, along with dialogue with opposition parties. Due to free elections the new government was seen as legitimate, leading to greater tolerance and dialogue and stabilising the situation. This allowed the government to overcome religious and ethnic divisions and to create a more inclusive and democratic society with the help in the UN, protecting the rights and freedoms of the citizens with an enthusiasm for elections and democracy .

Mali was from the start a state with weak democratic institutions and weak preconditions. During the civil war its political system fell apart, and UN pressure led to a temporary restoration of constitutional rule, but the military and the coup organisers had strong political influence. Every following election was less free until elections were discontinued. while social and intercomunal polarisation remained unsolved in the political sphere. A misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of democracy undermined its entrenchment in Mali, as the political elite saw elections as a tool to gain power. Finally the elections were seen as illegitimate by the population, coupled with low turnout, incidents and tensions, making interest in democracy minimal. The government's focus was directed towards security, and liberal norms were only tolerated and leveraged against the receiving of aid.

Unlike in Ivory Coast where the civil war ended with an establishment of democracy, creating stable conditions for democratic consolidation, the civil war in Mali continued and as such democracy was not only limited in its consolidation but in its territorial reach. The failure to compromise with rebels led to a continuation of the war which undermined democracy and led to authoritarian measures as an alternative. In Ivory Coast democracy became the forum for disagreements, while in Mali conflict continued to be the norm. Lack of political reform, dialogue and inclusion, separated the population from the democratic process and undermined trust, and the focus on security problems made it a secondary concern. Likewise even under UN pressure Mali did not accept any of the liberal norms connected with democracy and kept conditioning democracy on security assistance.

5.2 Security Stabilisation, Socio-Economic Development and Intercommunal peace

The lack of compromise between the two halves of Ivory coast exacerbated socio-economic problems and made intercommunal relations confrontational. Ethnic intolerance in the media contributed to instability and causing outbursts of insecurity. This led to repression which increased interethnic violence and decreased development and security. After the UN-assisted democratic change, a culture of tolerance, compromise and forgiveness was fostered, leading to inclusion and economic betterment, which decreased inter-communal tensions. The acceptance of liberal norms led to greater security and to disagreements being solved politically. A greater concern with welfare and women's rights and minority rights made all communities feel respected and included, removing the root causes of destabilisation, and ethno-religious divisions were overcome through democratic reforms, leading to peaceful coexistence between communities.

In Mali the northern half of the country was throughout the period neglected and marginalised, and the UN pressure for negotiation was only partially accepted and led to incomplete dialogue. The governmental intransigence towards the rebels prevented dialogue that would address the root problems of the conflict. As UN influence waned and as minorities were repressed rather than included, intercommunal violence and separatism increased, preventing any consolidation or economic development. Social polarisation, antagonism and tensions were not addressed through politics, and the division of the country became entrenched and was mediated only through violence. The lack of implementation of

the peace, and a lack of dialogue and mediation with refusal to compromise compromised trust, and unravelled the security situation.

Security was dependent on resolving the root causes of conflict, and development was dependent on security. As Ivory coast accepted the UN role and its norms the population was appeased and society was stable and developing, while in Mali the lack of liberal norm acceptance led to a complete breakdown of inter-communal relations, making security impossible as violence was the only recourse of the marginalised.

5.3 Political stability, Political Rights and Freedoms

Before the democratic transition Ivory Coast was highly divided and politically unstable, while the population had very limited rights and freedoms. There was an atmosphere of repression and illegitimacy. The UN put the president under sanctions an demanded liberal norms to be applied to politics, while the president held on to power and delayed elections, causing a political crisis. When he was democratically deposed, the main obstacle to reforms was removed and the new government worked with the UN to establish political freedoms, extending political rights to all citizens and normalising the political sphere, which then allowed for democratic reforms to be carried out. A legitimate democratic system stabilised the political environment, consolidated the new rights and increased the cohesion of society. The government promoted the values of inclusion and tolerance, and established the rule of law, including political inclusion and transparency.

In Mali even before the coup the government was weak and ineffective, suffering from hugh corruption and an abuse of power, being democratic in name only. It experienced a constant crisis of governance and legitimacy, exacerbated by the ongoing rebelion. Political freedoms and rights were minimal throughout the period, even when there was a democratic improvement, and the military continued to interfere with politics. Much of the population was not included in political processes and its freedoms were repressed, leading to low confidence and trust in institutions and to strong polarisation. Constant instability and collapses of government, along with the ignoring of the political will of the citizens and a repression of the opposition and marginalisation of the rebels, prevented other processes of reform and peace, and led to several coups and rule by decree. The Malian government

wanted a unified and unitary country with limited decentralisation, and were unconcerned with the marginalisation or exclusion of minorities.

There is a direct correlation in these cases between liberal and democratic norms and political stability and democratisation. With minimal political rights and dialogue in Mali there was a constant breakdown in the political sphere, until any attempts at democracy were abandoned, and the constant air of oppression and the stifling of free expression made democracy untenable. All the while in Ivory coast an acceptance of these norms led to a peaceful political process and a widening of political rights and freedoms, consolidating both democracy and peace.

5.4 Local Ownership and Cooperation with the International Community

In both cases there was a lack of trust, dialogue and tolerance between the communities, and unsuccessful local attempts to resolve the crises led to a deterioration of relations within the countries. After the Ivorian democratic transition the UN was pressuring the new government to accept liberal norms in order to rebuild trust and create inclusion, but it did so with a receptive local government as a partner. The local turn was based on international support, and the government applied the norms while being conscious of the local context. The role of the UN in supporting a democratic transition made these norms more acceptable, and the following improvement in political and socio-economic spheres made the government and the UN popular. and the UN had a beneficial influence on the government, which was in control of the process under the tacit agreement that they would follow these norms. Compliance with the norms and cooperation with the UN led to a success of the peace process, as the democratic government aimed to fulfil all those requirements which the UN asked for, and was continually open to the international role in mediation.

In Mali the UN was more focused on stability and it gave plenty of leeway to the local government, which was minimally responsive to international cooperation and liberal norms, accepting them only to the extent that the UN assisted their war against the rebels. The government had very little interest in compromise, or in UN advice, eventually attempting to resolve the conflict through violence and supporting the mission only as long as it provided military support and tolerated their democratic backsliding. Cooperation with the

international community was pragmatic and dishonest, and liberal norms were refused, returning the country in the the same destructive conflict it had before the UN mission. Eventually Mali's government became openly belligerent towards the international community, blaming it for its problems, and as they were put under sanctions and suspended from international organisations due to coups, they became isolated and aggressive.

The benefits of cooperating with the international community and accepting widely used international norms and law are obvious in this case, but so is the need to tailor the local-international relationship to local context, and to find a receptive and legitimate local partner.

5.5 Respect for Minorities and their Inclusion

The original crisis in Ivory coast occurred because minorities were not included in the political process or structures, and tolerance was minimal. Hatred and intolerance contributed to polarisation, and UN mediation and promotion of liberal norms was ignored, until the democratic transition led to a reversal and the inclusion of ethno-religious minorities and women in politics. The increased tolerance and inclusion resolved the root causes of conflict as all elements of society were included in the democratic and political process. The new government was legitimate and it used its position to create a wide dialogue with minorites in line with liberal norms and with UN support and guidance, leading to peaceful elections and wide participation in political processes. The culture of tolerance and compromise contributed to a local interpretation of liberal norms and their entrenchment, bringing about a socio-economic betterment and transparency. They promoted the equality and inclusion of all citizens no matter their ethno-religious affiliations, and they were fully supporting of the inclusion of women and their increased role in politics.

Mali had very fragile social cohesion, not only between north and south but in the south as well, with wide segments of society neglected and marginalised. The UN did not pressure the government enough to undertake meaningful dialogue, and what dialogue there was failed to bridge divides. Women were consistently marginalised, and the different communities were all similarly repressed by the government, which did not include them or accept their demands. The government wanted peace on its own terms and disregarded legitimate concerns of minorities which completely lost trust and faith in central institutions, continuing

the rebellion. They claimed that the lack of human rights and freedoms is natural in a time of war, not accepting responsibility that the war was caused by such a lack of rights and freedoms.

The benefits of accepting the liberal norms of tolerance and inclusion are seen in the successful overcoming of internal divisions and healing of the divides in Ivory Coast, whereas in Mali the government rejected any compromise or inclusion of minorities, treating them as enemies of the state. As such the situation in Mali descended into a new war in which the government and the repressed minorities resorted to violence. The government in Mali tried to heal the symptoms but did not address the disease, treating various communities differently depending on their submission to the government.

5.6 The rule of law, Human rights and the Stability of Institutions

The division of Ivory Coast prevented the stability of institutions and the rule of law, undermining respect for human rights and equal justice. The population was not integrated under one legal system, and the central institutions were week and considered illegitimate. With the return of democratic governance, the rule of law extended throughout the country under one legal system. Trust in institutions increased, aiding the rule of law and the application of transitional justice. The government created various commissions which carried out work on the respect of human rights and there was a significant improvement of the situation. A new constitution which emphasised human rights was democratically created, and the state regained its authority while maintaining transparency and social cohesion. They attempted to construct an impartial and democratic rule which treated citizens equally and was respectful of differences

The institutions in Mali were fragile and corrupt, the rule of law extended only across half of the country continuously, and human rights as such were not fully respected. A lack of state authority and legitimacy contributed to the rule of law being limited, with justice being selectively carried out, and human rights not being respected. The government did very little to build the legitimacy and strength of institutions and focused on the consolidation of power, which collapsed in coups, making very little progress towards human rights and justice.

Democracy and legitimacy of the government are essential to the trust in institutions, which is decisive in establishing the rule of law and the respect of human rights. Acceptance of liberal norms allowed Ivory Coast to regain control over the territory and establish the rule of law, while a rejection of tolerance and compromise in Mali prevented the conclusion of civil war and prolonged human rights abuses, undermining the legal system.

5.7 Reconciliation and the Peace Process

While Ivory Coast was divided and undemocratic no reconciliation was taking place. The government was sceptical towards peacebuilding, seeing the defeat of the rebels as its main goal rather than dialogue. The first attempts at local ownership led to no improvement, and only when it was coupled with international support and norms after the democratic transition did reconciliation begin. The new government extended the hand of peace to former opponents, creating a wide and inclusive dialogue. The UN fully supported and oversaw the process which led to compromise, forgiveness and tolerance. Divisions were overcome through dialogue and political inclusion, leading to reforms which allowed for peaceful coexistence between communities. Political reforms were carried out in a transparent and conciliatory way, the diversity of the country was recognised as its strength, and the values of tolerance and dialogue were promoted, preventing a return to conflict and strife.

The peace and reconciliation process in Mali was flawed from the beginning, and its biggest problem was the lack of political will towards compromise, with the government refusing to accept changes. Various attempts at negotiation failed to include all rebel groups, and they failed to bring about changes and reforms, with the various agreements never being implemented by the government. The UN urged compromised with moderate rebels, but the government was a priori against appeasement and was not pressured enough to change neither by the UN or by the rebels. The local ownership did not bring about peace because the central government only accepted peace if all its terms were met, considering all rebel demands as illegitimate. The rebels became disillusioned with the process and abandoned it, while the semblance of political and peace dialogue did not convince either political opponents or rebels towards peace. There is very little discourse speaking of the tolerant inclusion and rights of northern communities, and most political and security problems were blamed on the rebels who were composed of minorities.

There is a direct correlation between the application of liberal norms in one case and their lack of application on the other, in relation to the successful process of peace and reconciliation. Ivory Coast used its opportunity of establishing democracy to build a transparent and inclusive reconciliation process based on tolerance and on the accepting of the interests of all communities. Mali however had a more direct ethno-religious division that was mirrored geographically, and its stubborn government with limited legitimacy was not able to use the opportunity to build reconciliation and peace because it refused to take into account the interests of their opponents. A lack of the liberal norms of tolerance and inclusion and of democratic governance undermined any attempts to reconcile the two sides.

6 Discussion

Overviewing the missions we clearly see that only the state which accepted it and internalised its norms through reforms, managed to establish peace and reconciliation. It is worth noting that Ivory Coast had an advantage in the preconditions necessary for the adoption of these norms, such as a more stable security environment, less pronounced identity issues, better economic potential, and more established institutions. Democratisation and liberalisation were carried out by local actors with support of the UN, and the processes were not forced on the locals but chosen. From this process we surmise that LPB is most beneficial when it has a partnership with the local government, when it is not imposed from outside, and when the conditions are not opposed to it. The crisis in Mali was much deeper, the identity conflict and the lack of economic potential and institutional resilience prevented an acceptance of liberal norms. Carrying out democratisation in Mali was a Herculean task and it is not surprising that it failed to come to fruition, as there was neither local will and understanding of the process, nor was there enough pressure from the UN.

We found that constant UN mediation at a local level fostered dialogue and assisted reconciliation, under the norms of inclusion and tolerance, and as expected having a neutral third party is beneficial in conflict resolution. In the case of Mali, UN pressure on the government to conform to liberal norms did not succeed as security was prioritised, and so the government was propped up even when not in compliance. The values of tolerance and inclusion failed to take root in Mali, and it lacked the stability necessary for democratic and civic values to spread. The failure to put Mali back together and have unified control over the territory likewise prevented the creation of a stable system where certain values could be promoted, yet even in the part of the country which the government had under control was there much interest in liberal norms. Economic aid managed to motivate the already compliant government of Ivory Coast to continue reforms, yet neither aid nor sanctions changed the fundamentally undemocratic and intolerant governments in Mali to change.

We found that while the mission in Ivory Coast was throughout its duration constant in its goals of liberalisation, the mission in Mali was going back and forth between stabilisation and liberalisation, and this had a definite effect on the success of the missions. Firm and responses from the mission had immediate effect, as while the non democratic Ivorian government which refused to cooperate with the UN lost its legitimacy and was sanctioned,

leading to democratisation. Oppositely the Mali government's undemocratic measures were tolerated due to the mission's need to have a more or less stable government for the sake of security, and this lack of pressure undermined the mission's ability to pressure it, until its legitimacy was no longer important due to emerging dictatorship.

In these two case studies at least, acceptance of aforementioned liberal norms had a clear effect on the success and failure of the missions respectively, moderated of course by the varying ways of implementing the missions and the different preconditions. As such we find certain advantages in LPB as it attempts to address the root causes of conflict by a radical change of the normative environment, which we must add does not always work due to local non compliance. We found a correlation between the processes based on liberal norms (democratisation, liberalisation, increased tolerance and inclusion) and successful peace building. However we are cautions to point out that not all societies are ready to accept liberal norms, nor is the acceptance thereof always the optimal course of action, yet we find preference for it over mere stabilisation. LPB must be adjusted to the local context and applied consistently and while respecting the local situation, in order for it to be successful.

Prioritising urgent peace and reconciliation through a focus on liberal norms, and supporting an increase of trust and intercommunal tolerance through inclusion, freedoms, and political rights, was a successful strategy in Ivory Coast. In Mali the strategy to create stability and to allow liberal norms to develop slowly did not succeed, as stability without deep change and reform could not be maintained, and without reforms following dialogue in good faith the causes for conflict remained unsolved. Overall we find the influence of the international community through the UN to have a positive effect on states in crisis, especially if their influence follows the liberal norms which are to be found in the foundation of the UN itself. However without local cooperation and acceptance little can be done, as states have to be persuaded to follow suit through beneficial consequences. In Mali the benefits could not be felt because the conflict continued, and it continued because the mission's recommendation were not accepted, creating a negative feedback loop. The first step towards reconciliation has to be made by the local government, otherwise we saw that even a removal of an intransigent government is beneficial, however such a removal has to be locally owned and led and not enforced, for as we discussed earlier the enforcement of liberal peace rarely succeeds.

Conclusion

In our attempt to further develop the understanding of Liberal peacebuilding, we analysed the interaction between two recipient states and the UN missions present in them, in their attempt to both derive benefits from the UN and to take part in its work. Examining the expected benefits of the missions in line with liberal institutionalist theory, which expects international organisation to be beneficial both for the foreign relations of states and their internal stability, it was shown how international cooperation provides assistance for their problems. As LPB was framed within liberal theory, we defined the concept of LPB, and tested out two paradigmatic examples of it through an empirical analysis, following the missions in their entirety in both political process and discourse. Examining the role of the UN in the two peace and reconciliation processes, and noting the causal mechanisms by which they operated, it was possible to analyse the results of the missions. This was done in consideration of both political processes taking place in the recipient states, and the deeper understanding and acceptance of new norms and identities by observing the public international discourse in them. The method of analysis was an deep process tracing of the Missions, starting in the periods slightly before the missions and finishing after their end respectively, to follow the missions from the beginning of their formulation to their immediate aftermath. Likewise a focus on the discourse of the mission recipients in the UN SC was observed in order to supplement the main line of process tracing. This forum was chosen as it is the highest form of international organisation in which the discourse is directed towards the entire international community, and not for internal politics, and in which words have to be carefully selected due to their implications. Our findings tentatively and carefully support the need to maintain a liberal basis for peacebuilding, but not through a simple model which can be applied everywhere regardless of the local context, but as a foundation upon which to build a local-international partnership. In our discussion and analysis we noted the various processes taking place and how they were influenced by the UN missions, as well as the changes in the discourse over time. As such we concluded that while LPB was often misapplied in the past and is not a perfect model, its essential and paradigmatic aspects are conducive to peacebuilding in general and should therefore not be disregarded in future peacebuilding, as LPB can be combined with the local turn to provide the best results.

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